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 Abstract 
 
 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to tell the story of the 2011 Egyptian revo-
lution through re-visiting and re-telling modern Egyptian history. Starting 
from the events of the revolution itself, the aim has been to go back into 
Egyptian history in order to understand why the revolution happened when 
it did: why did it happen in 2011, and not 2020 or 1990? What led to such a 
momentous political crisis, and who were the social forces involved?  
 
I argue that conventional historical and contemporary accounts cannot 
explain the timing of the 2011 events. This is because there is a glaring lack 
of analysis that looks at production, the ruling class, hegemony, labour, and 
time. These elements are central to the revolution, as well as to the decades 
and even centuries preceding the revolution. Little work focuses on questions 
of capitalism and imperialism, and even fewer conceptualize elites as a ruling 
class, let alone as part of a historic bloc. The work that does look at capitalism 
focuses on crony capitalism, corruption or businessmen being involved in 
politics. This analysis looks at structures of domination through historic blocs 
and hegemony. This work also does not separate the ruling class from the 
subaltern classes—it is not a story about either elites or workers; it is a story 
about how they are brought together at specific times through specific his-
toric blocs and their particular forms of hegemony. 
 
Using the Gramscian concepts of hegemony, historic bloc and passive 
revolution and the neo-Gramscian reading of these concepts as well as their 
concept of fractions of capital, I have argued that the ruling class creates a 
historic bloc consisting of itself and segments of the subaltern classes, who 
are bound to the bloc through production and labour. The creation of this 
historic bloc occurs through hegemony—and each historic bloc has its own 
form of hegemony. Time is a means through which different historic blocs, 
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and by extension different hegemonies, can be analysed. The rise and fall of 
historic blocs in Egypt, as well as the ruling and subaltern classes that com-
prised these blocs, allows for a hegemony-driven analysis. The central ques-
tion is therefore one of production: how is production organized during each 
historic bloc? And how did the rise and fall of these different historic blocs, 
with their distinctive modes of production, create the conditions for the po-
litical crisis of 2011? 
 
Historic blocs are formed when a particular group goes beyond its narrow 
interests to sell its project to other groups through intellectual reforms. These 
groups are within the ruling class itself, but also within the subaltern classes. 
The historic bloc is therefore not simply a synonym for ‘ruling class,’ but a 
configuration that includes both the ruling class and the subaltern classes, 
primarily labour. An analysis of a historic bloc would look at how a particular 
group said specific things at specific times—in other words, the ideology they 
used—and how they packaged their own narrow interests within a wider pro-
ject that was made appealing to other segments of the ruling class as well as 
to segments of the subaltern classes. Each historic bloc creates—or attempts 
to create—a new hegemony—an analysis looks at who makes up this historic 
bloc, their ideology, and how they create this hegemony. As mentioned pre-
viously, this project is a hegemony-driven analysis. At some point in time, 
each historic bloc breaks down. The breaking down of a bloc and its hegem-
ony is a point at which a political crisis may occur. 2011 is one such example, 
although it was not until mid-2013 that we see a new historic bloc being 
formed. It is precisely this rise and fall of historic blocs and hegemony that 
are central. In this dissertation I argue that the different degrees of hegemony 
in modern Egyptian history explain why the 2011 revolution happened when 
it did. 
 
My main argument is that the 2011 revolution happened when it did because 
there was no historic bloc in place to either prevent the conditions that led to 
the revolution or to prevent it from toppling the regime. Starting with the 
Nasserist historic bloc, which was the strongest bloc in modern Egypt, 
through to the Infitah bloc, which was relatively smaller and weaker, until the 
final ruling class that failed to create a bloc, we see that the historic blocs have 
been getting smaller and weaker until by 2011, there was no bloc to speak of. 
It is this state of affairs that can answer the temporal question this dissertation 
poses. 
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Het oude gaat dood en het nieuwe is nog niet geboren. De 
Egyptische revolutie van 2011: Arbeid, kapitaal, tijd 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Dit proefschrift vertelt het verhaal van de Egyptische revolutie van 2011 door 
de moderne Egyptische geschiedenis opnieuw en vanuit een nieuw 
perspectief te verkennen. Met de gebeurtenissen rond de revolutie zelf als 
uitgangspunt is beoogd terug te gaan in de Egyptische geschiedenis om te 
begrijpen waarom de revolutie juist op dat moment uitbrak. Waarom was dit 
in 2011, en niet in 2020 of 1990? Wat heeft geleid tot zo’n ernstige politieke 
crisis, en welke sociale krachten speelden daarbij een rol?  
 
In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat conventionele historische en 
hedendaagse bronnen de timing van de gebeurtenissen in 2011 niet kunnen 
verklaren. Dit komt door een opvallend gebrek aan onderzoek naar productie, 
de heersende klasse, hegemonie, arbeid en tijd. Deze elementen staan centraal 
in de revolutie en in de decennia en zelfs eeuwen voorafgaand aan de 
revolutie. Slechts weinig studies gaan over vragen rond kapitalisme en 
imperialisme, en er zijn er nog minder waarin elites als heersende klasse 
worden opgevat, laat staan als deel van een historisch blok. Studies waarin 
wel wordt gekeken naar kapitalisme zijn gericht op vriendjeskapitalisme, 
corruptie of zakenmensen die betrokken zijn bij de politiek. In dit onderzoek 
wordt gekeken naar structuren van overheersing door middel van historische 
blokken en hegemonie. In dit proefschrift wordt de heersende klasse ook niet 
apart van de lagere klassen onderzocht—het is geen verhaal over ofwel de elite 
ofwel de werkende klasse; het is een verhaal over hoe deze worden 
samengebracht op specifieke momenten door middel van specifieke 
historische blokken en de bijbehorende specifieke vormen van hegemonie. 
 
Met behulp van de Gramsciaanse begrippen hegemonie, historisch blok en 
passieve revolutie, de neo-Gramsciaanse opvatting van deze begrippen 
xvi THESIS TITLE 
 
alsmede het begrip fracties van het kapitaal, wordt betoogd dat de heersende 
klasse een historisch blok creëert dat bestaat uit de eigen klasse en segmenten 
van de lagere klassen, die met het blok verbonden zijn door productie en 
arbeid. Dit historisch blok ontstaat door hegemonie; en ieder historisch blok 
heeft zijn eigen vorm van hegemonie. Tijd is een middel met behulp waarvan 
verschillende historische blokken en daarmee ook verschillende hegemonieën 
geanalyseerd kunnen worden. De opkomst en ondergang van historische 
blokken in Egypte, en van de heersende en lagere klassen waaruit deze 
blokken bestonden, maakt een door hegemonie gestuurde analyse mogelijk. 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag gaat daarom over productie: hoe is de productie 
georganiseerd tijdens elk historisch blok? En hoe werden door de opkomst 
en ondergang van deze verschillende historische blokken, met hun 
kenmerkende productiemethoden, de voorwaarden geschapen voor de 
politieke crisis van 2011? 
 
Historische blokken worden gevormd wanneer een bepaalde groep verder 
kijkt dan de eigen belangen met als doel zijn project aan andere groepen te 
verkopen door middel van intellectuele hervormingen. Deze groepen maken 
deel uit van de heersende klasse zelf, maar ook van de lagere klassen. Het 
historisch blok is daarom niet simpelweg een synoniem voor ‘heersende 
klasse’, maar een configuratie waarvan zowel de heersende klasse als de lagere 
klassen, met name de arbeiders, deel uitmaken. In onderzoek naar een 
historisch blok wordt gekeken naar specifieke uitingen van een bepaalde 
groep op bepaalde momenten—met andere woorden, naar hun ideologie—
en naar hoe ze hun eigen smalle belangen verpakten in een breder project dat 
aantrekkelijk werd gemaakt voor zowel andere segmenten van de heersende 
klasse als segmenten van de lagere klassen. Elk historisch blok schept een 
nieuwe hegemonie, of probeert dit te doen. Een onderzoeker kijkt naar wie 
deel uitmaken van dit historisch blok, naar hun ideologie, en naar hoe ze deze 
hegemonie scheppen. Zoals eerder vermeld is dit een door hegemonie 
gestuurd onderzoek. Ieder historisch blok stort op een gegeven moment in. 
Op het moment dat een blok instort en zijn hegemonie verliest, kan een 
politieke crisis ontstaan. Dit gebeurde bijvoorbeeld in 2011, hoewel er pas 
midden 2013 een nieuw historisch blok werd gevormd. Deze opkomst en 
ondergang van historische blokken en hun hegemonie is precies waar het om 
gaat. In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat de verschillende mate waarin 
sprake was van hegemonie in de moderne Egyptische geschiedenis verklaart 
waarom de revolutie van 2011 nu juist op dat moment ontstond. 
 
 Preface xvii 
Het belangrijkste argument in dit proefschrift is dat de revolutie van 2011 
juist toen ontstond omdat er geen historisch blok aanwezig was om ofwel het 
ontstaan van de voorwaarden voor de revolutie te voorkomen, of te 
voorkomen dat het regime omvergeworpen werd. Vanaf het Nasseristische 
historisch blok, wat het sterkste blok in het moderne Egypte was, via het 
Infitah-blok, wat relatief kleiner en zwakker was, tot de uiteindelijke heersende 
klasse die er niet in slaagde om een blok te vormen, is zichtbaar dat de 
historische blokken steeds kleiner en zwakker worden tot er in 2011 in feite 
geen blok meer over was. Deze toestand vormt het antwoord op de 
timingsvraag die in dit proefschrift wordt gesteld. 
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1 Chapter One: A Note on Theory 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
When millions of Egyptians took to the streets on January 25 2011, the 
events that followed were both entirely unexpected and yet scarcely shock-
ing at the same time. The myriad of problems facing the country were 
endless, from socioeconomic standards to political disintegration, and 
thus it should have come as no surprise that eventually Egyptians would 
have had enough. But it did come as a surprise, and that is for a simple 
reason: no one had predicted that the revolution would happen when it 
did. In other words, a central question that remains unanswered is one that 
at first glance appears to be simple: why now? 
 The decades leading up to 2011 witnessed multiple structural crises. 
Economically, policies of structural adjustment and increasing neoliberal-
ism had led to widespread poverty, unemployment, increasing class ten-
sion and severe government debt. Politically, several trends became dom-
inant, including authoritarianism, centralization of power, and an 
increasing reliance on the coercive apparatus to maintain stability. Socially, 
numerous problems have resulted from political and economic misman-
agement; these have manifested themselves and resulted in severe social 
tension among citizens as well as between citizens and the state. These 
trends are global in nature, a response to the spread of the neoliberal pro-
ject internationally. 
 Given the fact that multiple structural problems existed and that 
multiple crises have resulted from these problems indicates that this was 
not the first time that the Egyptian ruling class and state experienced se-
vere, multiple-level crises. Poverty, unemployment, and the increasing un-
reliability of social services are just some of the structural problems that 
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were facing both the state and Egyptians. These problems have led to nu-
merous crises, most notably the 1977 “bread riots.” Because there have 
been crises in the past and because these problems have existed for dec-
ades, if not longer, the question of temporality arises. The question of why 
the revolution happened when it did thus becomes pertinent.  
 Addressing the ‘why now?’ question is a broad task. The revolution 
has been approached from multiple angles, and yet there is not much work 
on the question of the ruling class. This project therefore looks at the rul-
ing class, shifts within it, and their changing attempts at creating hegemony 
over time; as well as the subaltern classes and their relations to the ruling 
class. As Edward Said notes, “No society known to human history has not 
been governed by power and authority, and, as Gramsci says succinctly, 
every society can be divided into interlocking classes of rulers and ruled. 
There is nothing static about these basic conceptions since if we consider 
society to be a dynamic distribution of power we will also be able to regard 
the categories of ruled and rulers as highly complex and changeable,” 
(1983, 168). This central assumption underlies the research project and its 
focus on the ruling and subaltern classes. 
 This chapter is divided into several sections. The first section pro-
vides a brief overview of the research project. The second section outlines 
the main research question (with the sub-questions to be outlined in the 
following chapter). The third section aims to situate this project within 
several disciplines that have addressed the 2011 Egyptian revolution in 
order to demonstrate the ways in which this project departs from other 
approaches. The final section provides a justification for using Gramsci 
and neo-Gramscians, and is thus centered on theory.  
  The overarching goal of this research project is to explore the con-
figuration of Egyptian elites over time and space, in order to answer the 
main research question: why did the revolution happen in 2011? Looking 
at these elite configurations provides a lens through which broader politi-
cal and economic processes can be understood. The starting point of this 
analysis is production and its relationship to elites. In the following chapter 
that focuses on method and methodology, the concepts of production and 
time will be presented in detail. This chapter focuses on the question of 
elites—conceptualized as a ruling class—and the Gramscian approach. 
 Equally interesting and relevant is the way attempts at creating he-
gemony are experienced and resisted by the subaltern classes. This re-
search project differs from liberal or positivist elite analysis in the sense 
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that the subaltern classes are viewed as key to the political process. As 
Randolph Persaud argues throughout his book entitled Counter-Hegemony 
and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginal and Global Forces in Jamaica, the 
subaltern classes are always constitutive of hegemony (2001). This disser-
tation uses the concepts of fractions of labour and fractions of capital in 
order to address the relations between the subaltern and the ruling class. 
While the focus of the project is on configurations of elites, this cannot be 
analysed separately from fractions of labour. Numerous subaltern groups 
fall under fractions of labour and understanding them as such aids in an 
analysis that looks at the complex ways in which hegemony is produced 
and reproduced. Moreover, including the subaltern makes it possible to 
look at the question of resistance and thus avoids the determinism of top-
down elite approaches. Here Marx’s dialectical method is key: fractions of 
capital and fractions of labour can and should be understood dialectically. 
Indeed this is why the concept of a historic bloc is unique: it moves us 
away from looking at either elites or the subaltern; it encompasses both 
but also goes beyond them to form a unity.  
 When making claims about the 2011 revolution, it is crucial to place 
it within its historical context. The roots of the political crisis that emerged 
following the protests can be traced as far back as the reign of Muhammad 
Ali (1769-1849), Ottoman Khedive of Egypt, and the incorporation of 
Egypt into the global capitalist system.1 Certain structures that came into 
existence and that have survived over time—albeit in modified form—
continued to condition Egypt’s political economy in ways that need to be 
understood in relation to the revolution. Moreover, each historical era 
since Ali has likewise produced its own structures as well as reproduced 
structures from previous eras. At very specific points the production of 
new relations of production dominated, notably following the 1952 revo-
lution, during the Infitah period, and during the late Mubarak era. These 
                                                 
1 It is arguable that they can be traced back even further than this, but considering 
the scope and focus of this project, I have used Muhammad Ali as the cut-off 
point as it was this point that marked the beginning of Egypt’s integration into 
the capitalist economy. 
Muhammad Ali, commonly referred to as Mehmet Ali Pasha, became the Khe-
dive of Egypt, which was under Ottoman rule from 1517 to 1952. The dynasty 
founded by Muhammad Ali was founded in 1769 and remained in place until the 
1952 revolution.  
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specific points are particularly interesting because they represent moments 
of dynamism during which Egypt’s political economy underwent tremen-
dous changes. 
 The 2011 revolution was the result of a crisis that had its roots both 
within the ruling class and various segments of the subaltern class. Shifting 
configurations within the ruling class, particularly in the 2000s, meant that 
the balance between various fractions of capital was altered. These config-
urations resulted from the failure of one particular fraction of capital to 
create a historic bloc and expand its hegemony. Simultaneously, these 
shifts and the changes in the organization of production were having dras-
tic effects on labour, including the 2008 Mahalla strike.2 It comes as no 
surprise that when these reconfigurations were happening, there was a 
massive spike in the number of strikes and protests by labour. Moreover, 
even during the revolution itself, it was only when labour joined that there 
was enough momentum to finally topple Mubarak. It is therefore clear 
that these two analytical levels need to be highlighted. 
 This dissertation uses Gramscian concepts as articulated by key neo-
Gramscians, including Robert Cox on the one hand and the Amsterdam 
and Nottingham Schools on the other. The neo-Gramscian approach in-
forms this project and allows for an analysis of the Egyptian configuration 
of elites over time and space. Situated within historical materialism, neo-
Gramscian theory focuses on historicism (time) as well as both the na-
tional and international (space). Moreover, concepts such as hegemony, 
the ruling class, passive revolution and others that are Gramscian in nature 
are clearly applicable to the Egyptian instance. The materiality of the ap-
proach is key as the starting point of the analysis is production; in addition, 
what separates Gramsci from many orthodox Marxists is his focus on the 
ideational—on how systems of meaning are produced.  
 This analysis begins by identifying the ruling and subaltern classes 
during each era, including: the Muhammad Ali dynasty, British colonial 
rule, the Nasser era, the Sadat era, and the Mubarak era. The Nasser era, 
for example, had specific fractions of capital within the ruling class and 
                                                 
2 This was one of the many strikes that took place at the Misr Fine Spinning and 
Weaving Company in the town of Mahalla al-Kubra, close to Alexandria. This 
strike in particular, with over 20,000 workers participating, is infamous for the 
sheer amount of violence exercised by the state to end the strike. 
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specific fractions of labour within the subaltern class. How did these frac-
tions of capital organize production, and how did they relate to capital in 
its expansive form? How did these realities impact fractions of labour? 
The next step is to look at how these specific configurations—present in 
the Nasser era—persist after Sadat came to power? This means not only 
investigating which fractions of capital and labour continued to exert in-
fluence, but also at which institutions and norms continued to be hege-
monic. 
 After exploring this for each era, it is necessary to now take 2011 as 
the starting point and look back historically and identify which configura-
tions persisted all the way up until 2011. In other words, isolate the con-
figurations that are directly connected to the revolution itself. The analysis 
of the era preceding the revolution is of particular importance, notably 
understanding what the organization of capital was when the revolution 
occurred. This means moving away from a linear model of time—that fo-
cuses on successive regimes—and introducing a non-linear model that in-
stead focuses on production. This will be explained further on. Such a 
method allows the analysis to be centered on changes in production and 
elites in order to understand the shifting configuration of elites through 
time and space. This in turn sheds light on the 2011 revolution and the 
question of why it took place when it did. 
 This research project aims to look at several interrelated questions. 
The overarching question is why the 2011 revolution happened when it 
did, and this will be answered by focusing on time and production through 
the concepts of hegemony and the historic bloc. The first question looks 
at the constitution and nature of the ruling class through different historic 
blocs, and in particular the structural divisions within each ruling class. 
Identifying each historic bloc will be done through the concepts of time 
and production, with special attention to the ways in which each bloc at-
tempted to create a hegemonic system. There are different levels in iden-
tifying the constitution of a historic bloc, ranging from the individual level 
to the level of social forces and the state. A second research question re-
volves around hegemony; analysing hegemony means understanding the 
social relations of production (mode of production), the forms of state 
(the various historical constructions of different forms of state) and the 
world order (international geopolitics over time). Here an analysis of the 
structure of accumulation is key, as well as the dialectic between the ruling 
class and the subaltern classes. The hegemonic project of each historic 
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bloc will be looked at in detail. The third research question focuses on the 
breakdown of hegemony and the disintegration of historic blocs. A his-
toric bloc breaks down when the hegemonic project is no longer strong 
enough to maintain the class alliance formed under it. This question fo-
cuses on what factors lead to the rise and fall of historic blocs and the 
changing intensity of hegemony under each bloc. The final question re-
volves around the 2011 revolution and tries to bring together the different 
questions in order to answer why the revolution happened when it did.   
 
1.2 Overview of the Research Project  
 
History has always been a tool through which power can be exercised. 
More specifically, the telling of history is a process through which power 
is extended or withdrawn, and through which ‘common sense’ narratives 
are produced and spread. Because of this, we have what can be called ‘con-
ventional history’—accounts of historical events that are told from a par-
ticular perspective—normally the perspective that is in line with dominant 
powers in society. But this is not the only understanding of history, nor is 
it necessarily what really happened. This project is an attempt to tell the 
story of the 2011 Egyptian revolution through re-visiting and re-telling 
modern Egyptian history. I want the reader to cast aside what conven-
tional historical accounts of Egypt have told us Egyptian history is, and 
forget what the supposed pivotal moments were. Starting from the events 
of the 2011 revolution itself, I interrogate Egyptian history in order to 
understand why the revolution happened when it did: why did it happen 
in 2011, and not 2020 or 1990? What led to such a momentous political 
crisis, and who were the social forces involved?  
 I argue that conventional historical accounts cannot explain the tim-
ing of the 2011 events. This is because there is a glaring lack of analysis 
that looks at production, the ruling class, hegemony, labour, and time. 
These elements are central to the revolution, as well as to the decades pre-
ceding the revolution. The concept of a historic bloc is key to this disser-
tation, as well as to Gramsci’s work. The ruling class creates a historic bloc 
consisting of itself and segments of the subaltern classes, who are bound 
to the bloc through production and labour. The creation of this historic 
bloc occurs through hegemony—and each historic bloc has its own form 
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of hegemony. Time is a means through which different historic blocs, and 
by extension different hegemonies, can be analysed. The rise and fall of 
historic blocs in Egypt, as well as the ruling and subaltern classes that com-
prised these blocs, allows for a hegemony-driven analysis. The rise of a 
new bloc becomes clear when a dominant fraction of capital transcends 
its own narrow interests to create this hegemony. The central question is 
therefore one of production: how is production organized during each 
historic bloc? And how did the rise and fall of these different historic 
blocs, with their distinctive modes of production, crate the conditions for 
the political crisis of 2011? 
 Historic blocs are formed when a particular group goes beyond its 
narrow interests to sell its project to other groups. These groups are within 
the ruling class itself, but also within the subaltern classes. The historic 
bloc is therefore not simply a synonym for ‘ruling class,’ but a configura-
tion that includes both the ruling class and the subaltern classes, primarily 
labour. An analysis of a historic bloc would look at how a particular group 
said specific things at specific times—in other words, the ideology they 
used—and how they packaged their own narrow interests within a wider 
project that was made appealing to other segments of the ruling class as 
well as segments of the subaltern classes. Each historic bloc creates a new 
hegemony—an analysis would look at who makes up this historic bloc, 
their ideology, and how they create this hegemony. As mentioned previ-
ously, this project is a hegemony-driven analysis. At some point in time, 
each historic bloc breaks down. The breaking down of a bloc and its he-
gemony is a point at which a political crisis may occur. 2011 is one such 
example, although it was not until mid-2013 that we see an attempt at a 
new historic bloc being formed. It is precisely this rise and fall of historic 
blocs and hegemony that is central. 
 The concepts I have already used, including hegemony and historic 
bloc, come from a scholar firmly situated within the Marxist tradition: An-
tonio Gramsci. I have read these concepts through the work of particular 
neo-Gramscians, whom I elaborate on in section 1.5. The notion of a rul-
ing class is a classic Marxist concept, but its articulation through a historic 
bloc and hegemony is a Gramscian contribution. A deep historicism as 
well as a dialectical approach to the material and the ideational are addi-
tional features of the Gramscian approach that distinguish it from other 
Marxist approaches. Finally, neo-Gramscians in particular have extended 
Gramsci’s work to look at the global capitalist system and the question of 
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the international. This will be of particular use when it comes to an analysis 
of the rise and fall of historic blocs in Egypt, as it provides a means of 
contextualizing these historic blocs within international relations of pro-
duction, and thus avoiding the tendency in much of the literature on Egypt 
to localize events in Egypt. 
 Such an analysis would depart from much of the work being done 
on Egypt in the contemporary period. Not a lot of work focuses on ques-
tions of capitalism and imperialism, and few scholars conceptualize elites 
as a ruling class, let alone as part of a historic bloc, as I demonstrate in the 
literature review. The work that does look at capitalism focuses on crony 
capitalism, corruption or businessmen being involved in politics. This 
analysis looks at structures of domination through historic blocs and he-
gemony. This work also does not treat the ruling class as independent 
from the subaltern classes—it is not a story about either elites or workers; 
it is a story about how they are brought together at specific times through 
specific historic blocs and their particular forms of hegemony.  
 It is useful here to note that there are competing understandings of 
what exactly Gramsci meant by hegemony.3 Some have interpreted it to 
mean a combination of coercion and consent that the ruling class exercises 
over society, with consent—ideally—dominating. This is in distinction to 
domination, whereby a ruling class (or historic bloc) rules society mainly 
through coercion. Others have interpreted it to mean a state of hegemony 
within the historic bloc, rather than between the historic bloc and the rest 
of society. Thus there cannot be a historic bloc without hegemony: a his-
toric bloc arises precisely when there is hegemony among certain factions 
of the ruling class along with certain factions of labour. In this project, I 
use this latter interpretation. Thus when I speak of hegemony, I use it to 
mean hegemony within a historic bloc, whereby one fraction of capital (or 
more) disguise their own narrow interests and universalize them in order 
to form alliances with other fractions of capital and fractions of labour in 
order to achieve their hegemonic project. Further in the paper I discuss 
whether Gramsci’s concept of a historic bloc can be applied to colonial 
contexts such as Egypt, in order to shed light on the debate about using 
Marxist concepts developed in Europe in the postcolonial world. These 
concepts will be looked at in more detail in the rest of this chapter. The 
following section clarifies the particular research question that frames the 
                                                 
3 For a recent article addressing this debate, see: Anderson 2016. 
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research, before I move on to a deeper and more detailed presentation of 
Gramscian and neo-Gramscian theory. 
 
1.3 The Research Focus 
 
The 2011 Egyptian revolution4 represented a monumental series of 
events that had ramifications across the Arab world. Taking this revolu-
tion as its subject, the research question this dissertation sets out to answer 
is a deceivingly simply one: why now? In other words, why did the revo-
lution happen in 2011? The question appears simple because the concept 
of time is often part of the analyses that have sprung up since the revolu-
tion. Many scholars have looked at the ways in which certain events led 
up to the revolution, or at the accumulation of grievances over time. How-
ever, taking time into account is not the same as answering a temporally 
driven question. Looking at events before and after 2011 as part of the 
revolution does not answer the question of why the revolution happened 
when it did. This is the aim of this dissertation. 
 The first step in answering this question is to situate this particular 
revolution within previous uprisings and revolutions in Egypt. At certain 
points in modern Egyptian history, there have been similar outbreaks of 
protest demanding systemic change. Some can be characterized as revolu-
tions, such as the events of 1952, whereas others appear more like upris-
ings, such as the 1977 “bread riots.” What is a defining feature of all of 
these events that allows us to analyse them as connected to one another 
and as part and parcel of a certain trajectory? 
 I argue that one way to do this is to analyse these events through 
the concept of a historic bloc, and to look at the rise and fall of various 
historic blocs over modern Egyptian history. This allows for a conceptu-
alization that takes into consideration both elites and subaltern classes and 
the ways in which they are tied together. The concept of a historic bloc 
comes from Antonio Gramsci’s work. He argued that a historic bloc is a 
union of social forces that exert moral and intellectual leadership in order 
                                                 
4 I use the term revolution to refer to the process put in place by the events of 
January 25 2011 and that continues until today. When I refer to the specific pe-
riod of January 25 to February 8 I use the term event. 
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to establish hegemony. This is not done through coercing other social 
forces and the subaltern classes, but rather by making alliances and com-
promises with as many of these forces as possible in order to create as 
strong a historic bloc as possible. This political and economic alliance must 
not have internal contradictions, but it can be internally diverse, made up 
of fractions that rely on different bases of production. The idea of differ-
ent fractions of capital can be traced to Marx’s identification of the three 
circuits of capital—commodity, productive, and money—and, as Over-
beek has noted, ‘fractions of capital’ is an abstract concept that refers to 
the “movement of capital in the accumulation process, thus influencing 
the preferences and behaviour of concrete firms, interest groups and po-
litical actors,” (2013, 175).  
 Through class alliances, a historic bloc is created in order to achieve 
the narrow goals of a particular fraction of capital. Here again, following 
Gramsci, it is crucial to note the ways in which this operates at both the 
ideational and material levels. As Gramsci wrote: 
 
“Another proposition of Marx is that a popular conviction 
often has the same energy as a material force or something of 
the kind, which is extremely significant. The analysis of these 
propositions tends, I think, to reinforce the conception of his-
torical bloc in which precisely material forces are the content 
and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between 
form and content has purely didactic value, since the material 
forces would be inconceivable historically without form and 
the ideologies would be individual fancies without material 
forces,” (1971, 377).   
 
Walter Adamson has elaborated on this in a succinct paragraph: 
 
“The central thrust of the concept [historic bloc] is the sug-
gestion that a class, as it develops itself historically, becomes 
more or less politically powerful not only because of its posi-
tion within the economic structure but also because it is the 
carrier of certain values which become detached as images or 
projections of its political outlook. Depending on the attrac-
tiveness of such images, the class will be able to attach itself 
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to other political groups as joint power-seekers, potential 
power-shapers, and the social forces behind new cultural ex-
pressions. There is nothing inevitable about the growth of 
such an historical bloc and this growth may be arrested at any 
point,” (1983, 178). 
 
What characterizes each historic bloc as well as separates them from one 
another is a particular organization of production, or mode of production. 
This has concrete effects on the constitution of the ruling class and the 
ways in which the dominant forces within each historic bloc defined the 
hegemonic project. The moment of crisis that brought an end to each his-
toric bloc shifted the balance of forces within the ruling class, a balance 
that had been meticulously created through the formation of the historic 
bloc. 
 The historic bloc—made up of fractions of capital and labour—must 
not simply hold power in terms of the material production of society, but 
also in terms of the ideational, which is grounded in the material. Elabo-
rating on the concept, Stephen Gill writes, 
 
“A[n] historical bloc refers to an historical congruence be-
tween material forces, institutions and ideologies, or broadly, 
an alliance of different class forces politically organized 
around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction 
and coherence to its constituent elements. Moreover, for a 
new historical bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in con-
scious planned struggle. Any new historical bloc must have 
not only power within the civil society and economy, it also 
needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives that build 
on, catalyze and develop its political networks and organiza-
tion – not political parties such,” (2002, 58). 
 
Identifying the rise of historic blocs means looking for new (or old) social 
forces in society that are attempting to displace one configuration of he-
gemony with another. In turn, identifying the breakdown of historic blocs 
is an important method of tracing shifts within society and understanding 
the causes of uprisings and revolutions. I argue that in the case of Egypt, 
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the major revolutions and uprisings have always been connected to either 
the rise or the fall of a given historic bloc, including 2011. 
 I argue that the 2011 revolution happened when it did precisely be-
cause of the failure of the new ruling class that emerged in the 1990s to 
establish a historic bloc. This led to a political crisis within the ruling class 
as well as within the subaltern classes. In order to demonstrate this, I will 
trace the creation and dissolution of various historic blocs over time in 
order to situate the last ruling class as well as to answer the question of 
why the 2011 revolution in particular was such an eventful one. I begin 
with the 16th century, and the historic bloc led by Muhammad Ali, because 
that was when the capitalist mode of production was introduced into 
Egypt. This mode is to be central to the story of the rise and fall of historic 
blocs in Egypt. 
 
1.4 Surveying the Theoretical Field(s) 
 
 This section looks at some of the key debates in the field of modern 
Egyptian history in order to identify key gaps and situate my own inter-
vention. 
 
 1.4.1 Modern Egypt: Key Debates 
 
“Arab countries and their people have always posed a chal-
lenge to commentators and analysts of the region as they have 
systematically failed to act in ways expected of them,” (Ab-
delrahman 2014, 1). 
 
The following section presents an overview of the literature on modern 
Egyptian history. However, due to its expansive nature and the vast 
amounts of literature on this subject, I focus here on particular areas or 
themes that I have identified that constitute the main focus areas when it 
comes to Egyptian politics and economics. The first area focuses on the 
literature dealing with the Muhammad Ali dynasty and British colonial 
rule. This literature has covered the almost two-century rule of Muham-
mad Ali and his successors, culminating in the occupation of Egypt and, 
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eventually, the 1952 revolution that brought independence. The second 
area focuses on the Nasser era and the extensive work that has looked at 
Nasser, his rivals and co-conspirators, and the various ideological and ma-
terial changes his regime brought about. The third area looks at the litera-
ture that focuses on the Sadat era – Infitah in particular – and the fourth 
looks at the Mubarak era, ending with the events of 2011. The key themes 
in this area include authoritarianism, democratization, the rentier state, 
electoral politics and reform, Islamism, the youth, sectarianism, and labour 
movements. The fifth area I look at is the literature that deals directly with 
the Arab Spring. Within this literature we have the continuation of the 
transition and authoritarianism paradigm, as well as anthropological ap-
proaches, approaches that focus on new media, and approaches that focus 
on neoliberalism, class and labour. The final part of this section looks at 
authors across the entire time spectrum whose work I have aimed to build 
off of, extend, and productively engage. The Marxists of the 1950s and 
1960s, as well as critical political economists and neo-Gramscians today 
form the bulk of this section. This literature review engages with literature 
in the fields of political economy, international relations, and Middle East 
Studies. Because of the vast nature of these fields, I have found it pertinent 
to focus on themes. Doubtless this means that some key literature has 
been left out; however by focusing on themes I hope to have covered the 
main debates and questions in the field, historically as well as contempo-
rarily.  
 
1.4.1.1 Muhammad Ali and British Colonial Rule 
 
Perhaps the most well-known academic work on the Muhammad Al dyn-
asty is Khaled Fahmy’s All the Pasha’s Men (1997). In this book Fahmy 
provides an overview of the epic reign of Muhammad Ali, arguing that 
many of the problems facing modern Egypt can be traced back to Ali’s 
creation of the modern Egyptian state. While this book is certainly im-
portant for its immense historical detail, the key assumption that Ali’s 
reign was what triggered many of the economic and political crises Egypt 
faces until today ignores the role of foreign capital and the spread of im-
perialism, both processes that began simultaneous to Ali’s rule. In Chapter 
Three I provide an alternative reading of the Muhammad Ali period that 
argues that his aim had been to protect Egypt from the encroaching power 
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of European capital by preventing the rise of a native bourgeoisie. Ali did 
establish a strong centralized and bureaucratic state, a legacy that contin-
ues to condition Egypt’s economy today, but this cannot be held solely 
responsible for Egypt’s multiple economic and political crises since then, 
including 2011. Other important work that provides necessary back-
ground to the Ottoman period in Egypt include Albert Hourani’s The Ot-
toman Background of the Modern Middle East (1981) and Galal el-Nahal’s The 
judicial administration of Ottoman Egypt in the seventeenth century (1979). 
  Other scholars have focused on the role of European expansion, 
including Zachary Lockman (2004), Roger Owen (1972), PJ Vatikiotis 
(1986), and Juan Cole (2007). These accounts are important as my own 
work builds off the assumption that European expansion is key to laying 
the foundations of the modern Egyptian state. I expand on this by focus-
ing in particular on the capitalist mode of production, which I argue is 
central to understanding the rise and fall of historic blocs. Work such as 
P.J. Cain’s Character and Imperialism: The British Financial Administration of 
Egypt, 1878-1914 (2006) provide important insight to the ways in which 
imperialism and capitalism worked to condition Egypt’s economy. The 
political economy approach of this piece is similar to my own, and it is 
such work I build off of. Samir Amin in particular is key (2012). He has 
argued that the British violently put down Egypt’s attempt to emerge. He 
has also noted that free trade under the British was central to weakening 
Egypt (1981). In particular, I focus on the institution of wage labour and 
the ways in which debt was used as a mechanism to draw Egypt into the 
global capitalist system on a subservient basis. Sven Beckert’s attempt to 
show how the creation of a rural proletariat in Egypt relied on what he 
calls war capitalism in order to expand cotton production is also key to my 
own arguments (2014). In Chapter Three I show that labour was part of 
all these changes, an aspect missing in much of the literature above with 
the exception of Beckert. Using work from Deeb (1979), Alexander and 
Bassiouny (2014) and Lockman (1988) I show the ways in which labour as 
a politicized nationalist force was central to undermining colonial rule.  
  Another body of work has looked at the ways in which expanding 
colonial capital and rule attempted to produce new forms of subjectivity 
in Egypt as a means of furthering capitalism. Timothy Mitchell’s important 
books (1991, 2002) provide the foundation of this approach, by demon-
strating that Egyptians had to be confined to particular plots of land in 
order to produce for landlords tied to British and French capital. New 
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norms of private land ownership and confinement to the land were the 
result of the introduction of the system of wage labour. Mitchell’s work 
has been ground-breaking in delineating these changes in subjectivities 
and how they were linked to changes in political economy. My own work 
engages with his in Chapter Three, and while I share many of his assump-
tions, what is different is the focus on historic blocs and how they shape 
and are shaped by production. Indeed more recent work that has followed 
in Mitchell’s footsteps has not been as conscious of connecting changes 
in subjectivities to the introduction of colonial capital in what is a clear 
power dynamic. On Barak’s recent book on time and British colonialism 
in Egypt is one example (2013). 
  The literature above discusses some of the key debates that sur-
rounded the Muhammad Ali dynasty as well as the British occupation of 
Egypt. The role of Ali in the creation of the modern Egyptian state and 
public bureaucracy; the role of his successor Ismail in creating the agrarian 
fraction of capital, and the ways in which British capital moulded the 
Egyptian economy were some of these debates. I address them in depth 
in Chapter Three.  
 
1.4.1.2 Gamal Abdel Nasser and the 1952 Revolution 
 
 The literature on the Nasser years is seemingly endless. I have drawn 
on numerous scholars to present a general historical overview, including 
Abdel-Malek (1968), Botman (1986), Beattie (1994), Dekmejian (1971), 
Faksh (1976) and Gerhart and Tignor (1998). In this dissertation I have 
focused extensively on four aspects of the Nasser era. The first is the de-
bate surrounding whether this era can be considered a case of Arab social-
ism; the second is the role of ideologies in the constitution of the new 
regime; the third is the material economic changes made by the new re-
gime; and the fourth the role of labour under this regime. Each area has 
its own set of literature, which I will now briefly describe. An important 
note is that because much of the literature mentioned above focused on 
the challenges facing the Nasser regime, there has been little work on the 
internal divisions within the Free Officers. I have focused on this in Chap-
ter Three in an attempt to highlight the importance of internal structural 
divisions within any ruling class. 
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  One of the major debates to dominate the literature on the Nasser 
era is about what type of economic system the new regime tried to imple-
ment. I discuss this extensively in Chapter Three, drawing on the work of 
Ayubi (1992), Aoude (1994), Hussein (1973), Hosseinzadeh (1988), Vari-
okiotis (1986), and Vitalis (1995). Scholars such as Ayubi and Hussein cri-
tiqued the idea that the Nasser regime aimed to implement Arab socialism. 
My conclusion—where I extend the work on which I mention above—is 
that while the Nasser era cannot be considered a socialist one, it did rep-
resent a new and unique articulation of capitalist development, where cap-
ital was accumulated in favour of state-led development. My contribution 
here lies in showing the ways in which each new historic bloc has a differ-
ent articulation of capitalist development, and that the reason the Nasserist 
bloc was the strongest is because of its particular articulation.  
  The second area of literature I engage with is on the role of ideolo-
gies in the Nasserist historic bloc. Pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, and Arab 
socialism are three of the more prominent examples of these ideologies. 
While much work has looked at these ideologies and how the Nasserist 
regime used them (Beattie 1994, Keddie 1988, Cook 2011, Gordon 1992, 
Jankowski 2001, Crabbs 1975), my contribution lies in using the particular 
blend of the material and ideational put forward by Gramsci. Indeed 
throughout Chapter Three I show that the power of these ideologies came 
from the material changes that were also being put in place by the new 
ruling class. This builds off the suggestion Reem Abou el Fadl makes in 
her article Early pan‐Arabism in Egypt's July revolution: the Free Officers' political 
formation and policy‐making, 1946–54 (2015), in which she argues that we 
need to pay attention to the changes Nasser actually implemented and how 
these solidified his ideological claims.  
  The third body of literature looks at the changes implemented by 
the new ruling class. Work by Malcolm Kerr (1962), M. Abdel-Fadil 
(1980), Donald Reid (2002) and Joel Gordon (1992) have explored in de-
tail the types of economic and political changes taken on by Nasser and 
the Free Officers. Aoude (1994) has looked at the various fractions in 
place, and Vatiokiotis (1986) has analysed the new class of Egyptian capi-
talists. Some scholars, such as Vitalis, have argued that Egyptian capitalists 
acted independently and were not tied to foreign capital in any important 
way (1995). I have juxtaposed this with scholars such as Davis (1983) as 
well as Ayubi (1996) who point to the fact that foreign capital creates im-
portant contradictions. Indeed by ignoring the colonial condition, Vitalis 
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misses an important aspect in the transition to the Nasserist historic bloc, 
one that my work aims to highlight.  
  The fourth body of literature looks at the role of labour under this 
new regime. Charles Issawi (1954) has argued convincingly that the Nasser 
regime used workers in an attempt to solidify their rule. Building off of 
this assumption, I argue that this bloc was hegemonic precisely because it 
managed to transcend its narrow interests and include fractions of labour 
within the bloc. Another debate I engage with in the chapter is surround-
ing the political consciousness of workers. While scholars such as Hussein 
(1973) argue that workers were not able to challenge capitalism because 
they were not proletarianized enough, as well as Beinin and Lockman 
(1998) who argue that workers were not politically conscious, my aim is to 
show that workers both pre and post the Nasserist bloc were politically 
conscious. I critique the delinking of the political and economic, and argue 
that while the changes implemented by the new bloc had major material 
ramifications on workers that are important to take into account and that 
incorporated workers into the bloc, the fact remains that under the British, 
labour remained a highly politicized force, as well as during the decline of 
the Nasserist bloc. To do this I engage critically with work by Botman 
(1988) and Bianchi (1986), and build off of Pacynska (2010) who argues 
that labour is not only an important force, but is also not a passive one. 
What is novel in my approach is understanding labour and the ruling class 
as tied together, rather than separate.  
 
1.4.1.3 Sadat and Infitah 
 
 Although not as extensive as the literature for the Nasser period, quite 
a body of work exists detailing the Sadat era. Much of my historical data 
comes from pioneering books such as Aulas (1982), Cooper (1979), 
Aoude (1994), Ayubi (1996), Dessouki (1981), Kandil (2012), Mitchell 
(1991), Springborg (1996), Hinnebusch (1980), Waterbury (2014) and So-
liman (1998). Arafat (2009) was particularly useful as he focused on the 
formation and downfall of the agrarian fraction of capital, and then its re-
emergence under Sadat. Work by Ayubi (1980) and Kandil (2012) was use-
ful in demonstrating how this new bloc used the public sector to argue its 
pro-liberalization views and to construct its own form of hegemony. My 
unique contribution here was to identify the rise of the new ruling class 
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during the Nasser era (s opposed to conventionally locating it at the time 
when Sadat became president), as well as to show that an entire ruling class 
was at play. Accounts such as Kandil (2012) and Hinnebusch (1980) argue 
that Sadat was an individual calling all of the shots. My approach instead 
looks at fractions within a ruling class, and extends that to looking at the 
historic bloc as a whole.  
  Another debate within the literature focused on liberalization. 
Springborg in particular (1990) has argued that Arab countries have been 
slow to liberalize, but I critique this as it relies on liberal assumptions of 
what ‘freedom’ entails. Roll (2010) similarly relies on such problematic as-
sumptions such as the securing of property rights. Instead, I focus on how 
this new bloc was tied to transnational capital, and how this led to the 
closing down of political space. Using Mitchell (1991) in particular, I show 
that the new ruling class was very much tied to new forms of global capi-
talist domination. The dialectic of the local and transnational is thus a cen-
tral focus of Chapter Four. 
  My approach in this chapter is also unique because of its focus on 
the ideational, and this distinguishes it from both the literature cited above 
as well as literature that focuses on literature as somewhat detached from 
global structures of capital or as not particularly tied to the formation of 
historic blocs (Mehrez 2011). Another distinguishing feature of the ap-
proach I take is to locate Islamist businessmen as a fraction of capital 
within the ruling class of this bloc. This departs radically from the litera-
ture, particularly in the Mubarak era, which tends to see the Islamists as 
either an electoral political force or a force that has widespread societal 
support (Kienle 1998, Hamzawy and Brown 2010). Finally, my focus on 
labour in this chapter, as well as other ones, avoids missing the important 
contestation and resistance from certain fractions of labour. 
 
1.4.1.4 Hosni and Gamal Mubarak: democratizing Egypt? 
 
 There are several key themes characterizing the literature that domi-
nates the Mubarak era, from the late 1980s to 2011. These are: authoritar-
ianism, democratization, the rentier state, electoral politics and reform, Is-
lamism, the youth, sectarianism, and labour movements. 
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  The literature on authoritarianism and democratization can be said 
to be part of the transition literature/paradigm. This literature comes 
mainly from political scientists and focuses on two broad themes: the 
mechanisms of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy; and the 
notion of a so-called “democracy deficit” in the Arab world. Key concepts 
within this approach include: democratization, authoritarianism, transi-
tion, stakeholders, elites, and liberalization. As Maha Abdelrahman has 
written: 
 
“Arab countries were at the ‘bottom of the class’ after the 
third wave of democratization had come and gone. The ina-
bility of the region to join other countries in ridding them-
selves of dictatorial regimes gave rise to a robust industry de-
voted to deciphering the enigma of this anomaly, looking for 
signs everywhere but mostly in the dark recesses of the re-
gime’s cultural and religious systems or, occasionally, in a re-
ductionist version of the ‘rentier’ thesis,” (Ibid). 
 
In approaching the Middle East, the transition literature has often implic-
itly assumed a certain linear set of developments that must be followed for 
“democracy” to have been achieved. As Jamie Allinson has noted, citing 
Andrea Teti, there is an implicit assumption underlying work on transition: 
that of the “democratization framework’s taxonomical end point – liberal 
democracy (2015, 2). This assumption structures research so that scholars 
are either trying to understand why authoritarianism in the Arab world is 
so “resilient” or they are trying to pinpoint signs of a transition to liberal 
democracy (see: Bellin 2012 as a case in point). Much of the work that uses 
this approach carries assumptions about Arab countries as being especially 
averse to current and previous waves of democratization around the 
world, based on static concepts about Arab elites, crony capitalism, cor-
ruption and so on.5 Moreover, this approach also tends to neglect the 
global level of analysis, locating the problems Egypt is facing within the 
country itself. Indeed electoral institutions are a central part of the transi-
tion paradigm. Within transitology, the emergence of electoral institutions 
                                                 
5 See for more: Schwarz 2008, Brynen et al. 1995, Hudson 1991, Diamond 2010, 
Cook 2005. 
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is seen as the first step towards democratization (Koehler 2008, 974). Ni-
cola Pratt has noted that the literature overwhelmingly assumes that once 
a transition is underway certain institutions must be put in place, such as 
free and fair elections; a political culture that values democracy; and elites 
who are willing to not be corrupt, or at least a civil society that can “man-
age” them (Pratt in Abou El Fadl 2015, 3). 
 At the same time, there has also been a strong focus on neopatri-
monialism and the power of informal institutions6, which has often ne-
glected the study of formal institutions as well as the fact that informal 
institutions have power in almost all political regimes globally. Oliver 
Schlumberger has argued that Western economic systems emphasize for-
mal rules and leave no space for corruption, whereas Eastern systems tend 
to be ruled informally (2008, 624-5). Emphasizing neopatrimonialism can 
sometimes fall into the “Arab despot” thesis whereby a single ruler is seen 
to control an entire country through corruption. Schlumberger writes: 
“Relations between the ruler and the elite are strictly hierarchical, i.e. they 
represent asymmetric relations of loyalty, dependence, subordination and 
dominance, and thus power,” (Schlumberger 2008, 624-5). This view is 
problematic for several reasons, key among them the essentializing of cer-
tain cultural traits in the “East” as well as the fact that such an approach 
simplifies rather than accounts for the complexity of political and eco-
nomic systems in countries like Egypt. The focus on electoralism in Egypt 
in the 1990s and 2000s is an example of this approach (Brownlee 2002, 
Albrecht 2005, Lust-Okar and Zerhouni 2008, Lust-Okar in Schlumberger 
2007, Blaydes 2010).  
 One of the key propositions is the centrality of culture to the out-
come of political and economic events. Another is that increased liberali-
zation are crucial to democratization in Egypt and the region in general. 
Yet another is that specific indicators, such as women’s rights, minority 
rights, and freedom of speech to name a few, are important in assessing 
the state of democratization. All of these propositions serve to reproduce 
a modern and Eurocentric teleology whereby it is assumed that in order 
to democratize, Egypt must follow the path set by “developed” nations. 
What is usually left out of many of the analyses within the field is the 
question of capitalism and the question of imperialism. 
                                                 
6 See: Brownlee 2002, Herb 1999. 
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  Another problem with the transition literature is its emphasis on 
elites from an individualist perspective. Allinson writes: “Treating the 
Arab revolutions as discreet events after which a “transition” to this vari-
ety of democracy can successfully be negotiated amongst elites, renders 
the institutional set-up and timing of this process the most important fac-
tor: ruling out then, the political economy analysis of the respective social 
bases of the actors, an analysis present in the previous work of democra-
tization theorists,” (Ibid). Whereas a Gramscian approach would clearly 
locate elites both within the mode of production and social relations of 
production as well as within the ruling class, the transition literature often 
tends to see elites individually. This is where my approach is novel.  
 In attempting to understand what political scientists often refer to 
as the region’s resilience to democratization,7 the majority of approaches 
tend to be Eurocentric, state-centric, or culturalist, whereby Arabs are 
viewed as especially authoritarian or especially obedient to authority. Even 
more nuanced approaches that focus on elite alliances or resources such 
as oil reproduce the centrality of the state and civil society as diametrically 
opposed to one another. As Adam Hanieh writes: 
 
“The state/civil society dichotomy serves to conceptualize 
away the problem of capitalism, by disaggregating society into 
fragments, with no overarching power structure, no totalizing 
unity, no systematic coercions—in other words, no capitalist 
system, with its expansionary drive and its capacity to pene-
trate every aspect of social life. Academic approaches that pre-
sent the ideal of liberal democracy as the desired policy goal—
supposedly guaranteeing the same rights and responsibilities 
for all “civil society actors” regardless of wealth, social status 
or accident of birth—act to obfuscate this reality of class 
power. The economic realm is separated from the political 
                                                 
7 Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger argue that the question of why Mid-
dle Eastern countries have not followed the “Third Wave” of democratization is 
a highly problematic one. On the one hand, it is based on specific normative 
assumptions and teleological premises; and on the other hand, it diverted atten-
tion away from the study of what was happening in the Middle East (2004, 371). 
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sphere. Capitalism itself is rendered invisible through a jurid-
ical scrim of ‘equal rights’ that posits equality where none ex-
ists,” (2014, 11).  
 
 A focus on class from a Marxist or Gramscian perspective means 
that the state will be conceptualized differently. As noted previously, the 
state then becomes a space that mediates the hegemony of the ruling class 
and is thus linked to the ruling class itself, not separate from it. As neo-
Gramscians argue, the state is to be seen as a social relation whose bound-
aries are fluid. Class structures actually generate the character of the state 
(Hanieh 2014, 11). “By treating the state as a disconnected, all-dominating 
“thing” rather than as a social relation formed alongside the development 
of class, these perspectives treat the institutional forms of society as deter-
minant rather than determined,” (Hanieh 2014, 12).  
 Related to this problematic view of the state is the view that the 
apparent cause of authoritarianism in the Middle East: the weakness of cap-
italism. It is not only political and civil rights that are missing, but the free 
market is also prevented from functioning because of the authoritarian 
state. “The agency of freedom is located in the realm of the market, while 
tyranny lurks every-present in the state. The history of the region is thus 
characteristically recounted as a long-standing struggle between the “au-
thoritarian state” and “economic and political liberalization,” (Hanieh 
2014, 5). In this way, capitalism is posited as necessary for democratiza-
tion. This is reflected both in academia as well as through policy, with 
copious amounts of funding allocated to spreading democracy through 
neoliberalism in countries such as Egypt. As Hanieh writes, “All interna-
tional financial institutions were to employ the same basic argument link-
ing “free markers” and a “vibrant civil society” with the weakening of the 
authoritarian state,” (2014, 5). This framing hides the fact that the 2011 
Egyptian revolution was in fact both a result of and against neoliberalism, 
not in favour of it. In other words, ‘freedom’ was not conceptualized as 
political and civil rights nor as a free market and weaker states; it was in-
stead conceptualized as centered around social justice—through a strong 
state with social service programs and thus a weakening of neoliberalism. 
This, however, has often been written out of the narrative.  
  Much of the work on Egypt in the 1990s and 2000s has been based 
on the assumptions outlined above. Kassem (2004), Abdulbaki (2008), 
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Langohr (2005), Brownlee (2002, 2007) have focused extensively on au-
thoritarianism; Albrecht (2005), Koehler (2008) and Blaydes (2010) on 
electoralism and patrimonialism; Cook (2007), Stacher (2012) and Schlum-
berger (2007) have put forward theses relying on assumptions about liberal 
democracy and neoliberalism; and Bellin (2012) in particular has been a 
strong advocate of the thesis that Arab states are uniquely unable to de-
mocratize. I engage critically with all of this literature in Chapter Five, and 
build off of several key authors who critique these assumptions, as I will 
detail in the final section of my literature review.  
 
1.4.1.5 The ‘Arab Spring’ literature 
 
 Egypt’s centrality within the Middle East has meant that there has been 
an enormous response to the 2011 revolution from scholars and policy 
makers across multiple disciplines. From the first days of the revolution 
there were already articles being published and book manuscripts being 
re-written. While much of the literature on the Egyptian revolution has 
looked at the notion of time through the build-up or accumulation of 
events and/or grievances, there has yet to be an answer to the question 
posed in this paper: why did the revolution happen in January of 2011? 
Theoretically, it could have occurred months or years before 2011, or 
months or years after. Assuming that we accept that it was an accumula-
tion of grievances that led to the final breaking point in 2011, we are still 
left without an answer as to why the breaking point came when it did.  
 The literature within the transition paradigm highlighted above was 
been quick to address the 2011 revolution. Scholars such as Eva Bellin 
have asked whether the transition paradigm should be questioned given 
that Arab states are unlikely to democratize any time soon (2012). She 
writes: “For Middle East specialists, the events of the Arab Spring proved 
especially jarring, even if welcomed, because of their extensive investment 
in analysing the underpinnings of authoritarian persistence, long the re-
gion’s political hallmark,” (2012, 127). Nevertheless, authors within this 
paradigm continued to list the same problems as preventing democratiza-
tion: the weakness of civil society, the failure of electoral reforms, crony-
ism and the failure of economic liberalization, and the continued perse-
verance of corruption (Bellin 2012, 127). Examples of this include, most 
prominently, Stacher (2012) Osman (2011), and Masoud (2015). In what 
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is perhaps the most blatant reiteration of the transition paradigm in rela-
tion to the Arab Spring, Stepan and Linz have argued that Islam and the 
persistence of “sultanism” are crucial to understanding the Arab Spring 
(2013). Most of this paper focuses on whether Islam and democracy can 
co-exist, and then goes on to reproduce the Arab despot thesis in the form 
of sultanism. Coming from two of the major thinkers in the field of polit-
ical science, this is no small oversight.  
  Even though the demands articulated by protesters that were visible 
throughout the revolution focused specifically on the question of social 
justice, the literature continues to reproduce the centrality of liberal de-
mocracy and political representation as the main demands of protesters. 
Additionally, the global context of capitalism and imperialism are again 
left out, as are the millions of workers who held strikes throughout the 
2000s. What this narrative serves to construct is a story where the neolib-
eralization of Egypt is not a cause of the uprising, and is sometimes even 
seen as a cure for the problems faced by society. Indeed even scholars such 
as Paul Amar who do present a critical perspective on the revolutions by 
focusing on securitization (2011) have looked less at neoliberalism and 
transnational capital and more at questions of security, as though the two 
can be neatly separated. It is this strand of literature I engage with in Chap-
ter Five when I argue that neoliberalism and the global capitalist system 
continue to be central to events in Egypt. Some have pointed to the con-
nections between Egypt and the US (see: Marshall and Stacher 2012) but 
have done so by referencing US military aid rather than the broader system 
of neoliberalism. This, too, I critique.  
  Another discernible approach comes from the literature that deals 
with class. The majority of this literature is not Marxist in any sense, and 
tends to understand class in a more simplistic manner rather than as the 
material and social relations that emerge from a particular mode of pro-
duction. Nevertheless, this approach has been one of the few that recog-
nizes the centrality of neoliberalization and the labour movement vis-à-vis 
the revolution itself. Multiple scholars have looked at the labour move-
ment and its increasing prominence during the 1990s and 2000s and have 
argued that this was what ultimately tipped the scales and led to the revo-
lution (El Mahdi 2011, Anderson 2011, Bush and Ayeb 2012, Korany and 
El Mahdi 2012, Joya 2011). Others have looked at the ways in which so-
ciety has been transformed by neoliberalization and have focused on crony 
capitalism and global processes of neoliberalization as key to this. My work 
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will build off some of the work in this strand, focusing specifically on the 
labour movement and its resistance to neoliberalization. However, I focus 
more extensively on the question of how the ruling and subaltern classes 
are related to one another, and how looking at the labour movement alone 
is not enough to explain the timing of the revolution. My approach looks 
at both the ruling and subaltern classes in order to show that these two 
levels of analysis are not separable and should be analysed as a totality. I 
use Marxist assumptions about the centrality of the mode of production, 
in particular the capitalist mode of production, as well as the Gramscian 
assumption that the material and the ideational are both crucial to under-
standing change.  
  Another major theme that has characterized literature on the Arab 
Spring has been a focus on social media and, occasionally, satellite televi-
sion. This focus has been extremely noticeable because of the sheer vol-
ume of output (Lim 2012, Tufekci and Wilson 2012, Shirky 2011, Herrera 
2014, Eltantawy and Wienst 2011, Hamdy and Gomaa 2012, Howard and 
Parks 2012, Khondker 2011). The focus here has been on the ways in 
which new media and communication technologies have allowed for pro-
testers to congregate in new ways outside of the purview of the state and 
police forces. While this has certainly allowed Egyptians of certain social 
classes to communicate more directly, I posit that it cannot act as a strong 
explanatory factor when analysing the causes of the revolution. Satellite 
television is probably a stronger mechanism to look at with regards of 
spreading new information—as millions of Egyptians have access to it—
but media alone cannot account for a revolutionary uprising. Instead my 
approach aims to look at how different historic blocs use different forms 
of media—through what Gramsci calls civil society—to propagate certain 
hegemonic projects. In Chapter Four, for example, I spend quite some 
time looking at how films and novels can tell us quite a bit about historic 
blocs and political change. I posit that this same type of analysis can be 
applied to tweets and online posts today—although beyond the scope of 
this project. 
   A final theme that has emerged in the Arab Spring literature—and 
this at the regional level—has been a focus on the youth and the lost op-
portunities they have had to endure. Anderson (2011), LaGraffe (2012), 
Malik and Awadallah (2013), Al-Momani (2011) and Lynch (2011) have all 
put forward variations of the “youth bulge” argument, namely that the 
populations of most Arab states are predominantly under 30 years of age, 
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and this has created an entire section of the population that needs educa-
tion, employment and other economic opportunities. Demographics are 
therefore key. While my approach certainly takes this into account, I aim 
to conceptualize the economic challenges facing Egyptians more broadly, 
by looking at how the ruling class reproduces a system that in effect priv-
ileges a very few.  
 
1.4.1 .6 Precedents 
 
 This section gives a brief overview of the approaches and scholars on 
whom I have built off my own arguments in this dissertation.  
  The work of the Egyptian Marxists of the 1950s and 1960s has been 
key to my own arguments, and in a sense I have extended their work to 
the contemporary period. This includes Ayubi (1996), Abdel-Malek (1968) 
and Amin (1981, 2012). Neo-Gramscian work has also greatly informed 
my project, and I engage with this in depth in the following section on 
theory. Little neo-Gramscian work to date has focused on the Middle East, 
and this makes my application quite novel. Critical political economists, 
and in particular Adam Hanieh (2012, 2014), have also been invaluable to 
my own argumentation. I build off his work but also extend it by focusing 
more specifically on how changes in Egypt’s economy and its regional re-
lations affect the constitution and reproduction of its ruling class. My fo-
cus on fractions of capital and labour provides another angle from which 
to analyse capitalism in Egypt. Roberto Roccu (2012) and Brecht de Smet 
(2014) have also worked on Egypt using a Gramscian approach; their work 
has been extremely useful and while I share their assumptions, it is once 
again my focus and research question that is different.  
  The anthropological literature on Egypt that has addressed ques-
tions of political and economic life in Egypt, including the many ethnog-
raphies that have made important interventions in the ways in which we 
understand Egypt’s economy, has been key to providing new ways of 
looking at class and capitalism in the Middle East. Julia Elyachar (2005), 
Salwa Ismail (2006), and Farha Ghannam (2002, 2013) have done extraor-
dinary work in uncovering the ways in which norms and values are tied to 
neoliberalism. My work engages with this, but shifts focus by looking at 
historic blocs and how these norms and values are connected to hege-
monic projects.  
44  
 
 
  Work on Egyptian workers and labour history in general has also 
provided an important resource. Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman’s nu-
merous texts on workers in Egypt, as well as work by Ray Bush, Dina 
Makram-Ebeid, and Agnieszka Paczyńska were important to my own anal-
ysis, but my assumptions often differed, as will become clear throughout 
the dissertation. 
  This literature review has aimed to both highlight the major debates 
in modern Egyptian historiography, as well as to position my own work 
vis-à-vis these debates. While it is by no means exhaustive, it does touch 
on some of the major themes that scholarly work on modern Egypt has 
been preoccupied with. The bulk of these themes and debates will be en-
gaged with throughout the following chapters. 
 
1.5 Theory 
 
This research project is set within the theoretical parameters of the 
Marxist tradition, drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s work in particular. I use 
a particular interpretation of Gramsci’s work put forward by neo-Gram-
scians, who focus on using Gramsci’s concepts at the global level. The 
neo-Gramscian understanding of realism is similar to that put forward by 
critical realists—in other words, they have the same ontological roots. 
Robert Cox’s work (1983, 1986, 1987, 1989, 2002) as well as the work of 
critical realism (in particular Bhaskar 2010, 2013) both critique positivism, 
arguing that the Western philosophical tradition anthropocentrically re-
duced the question of what is to the question of what we can know (Archer 
1998, xi). Critical realism in particular argues that the world exists with or 
without man interpreting it—that there is a material world out there that 
is independent of our observation. Roy Bhaskar writes: 
 
“Any philosophy of science must find a way of dealing with 
the paradox of science: that men in their social activity pro-
duce knowledge which is a social product much like any other. 
This is one side of ‘knowledge.’ The other is that knowledge 
is ‘of’ things which are not produced by men at all: the specific 
gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the mechanism 
of light propagation,” (Bhaskar in Archer 1998, 17). 
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In other words, ‘objects of knowledge’—intransitive objects—do not de-
pend on human activity for their existence; they exist with or without it. 
There is a material world out there that is independent of human 
knowledge and interpretation. “If men ceased to exist sound would con-
tinue to travel and heavy bodies fall to the earth in exactly the same way,” 
(Ibid). Reality would be uninterpreted, but it would still exist. Importantly, 
the causal laws discovered by science would also still exist. This shows that 
the material world is not dependent on our knowledge of it to exist.8 
Causal forces exist as real ontological forces outside of our observation 
(Ibid, 365). Here we see the clear similarities between Gramscian theory 
and critical realism. Joseph Femia has pointed to the confluence between 
the two, writing: “Gramsci is denying not the existence of a nature prior 
to the human spirit, only to the relevance or intelligibility of such a natural 
order,” (1981, 106). While ideas, discourses and knowledge production are 
essential elements of knowing, there is a material world out that there exists 
with or without knowledge production.  
  The rest of the chapter introduces Gramsci and the neo-Gramsci-
ans. I first begin by positioning Gramsci vis-à-vis Marx, before looking at 
Gramsci himself and his key ideas, and finally the neo-Gramscians. 
 
1.5.1 Gramsci and Marx 
 
     The Marxist tradition as a whole emphasizes the centrality of class, 
production, and the ways in which human beings reproduce themselves 
in order to survive, and thus the material always takes ontological prior-
ity. Production creates the material basis for all forms of social exist-
ence. Following this, the mode of production is central to any analysis. 
                                                 
8 Critical realism has directly challenged the causation approach within IR, which 
has been favoured by positivists. The last 300 years have seen an empiricist un-
derstanding of causation dominate the field of IR, where causality is studied 
through observed patterns of facts. These strong patterns can also be used to 
predict. This means that causal analysis has essentially meant a methodological 
focus on observing patterns of facts.8 The fourth debate in IR, between positiv-
ists and post-positivists challenged the dominance of this understanding of cau-
sality, and reflectivists began to reject causality altogether. 
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Production and capital—understood broadly—refer to the production 
and reproduction of knowledge and social relations, morals and institu-
tions that are prerequisites to the production of goods. Referred to as 
the mode of social relations of production, this makes it possible to dis-
cern how certain changing production relations give rise to particular 
social forces that become the basis of power within and across states 
and within a specific world order. 
           Both Marx and Gramsci should be contextualized within the the-
oretical field of historical materialism. Marx first articulated the concept 
of a materialist approach to history, and this turned into the methodol-
ogy/approach of historical materialism. The central point is that it is the 
material conditions of society that can explain the evolution of social 
relations. For humans to survive, they must produce and reproduce 
both the material and non-material requirements that allow human life 
to sustain itself. The ways in which a given society reproduces its mate-
rial existence can explain the way in which the society is organized. Marx 
outlined his conception of materialist history in the following excerpt: 
 
“In the social production of their existence, men inevitably 
enter into definite relations, which are independent of their 
will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given 
stage in the development of their material forces of produc-
tion. The totality of these relations of production consti-
tutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to 
which correspond definite forms of consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but 
their social existence that determines their consciousness. 
At a certain stage of development, the material productive 
forces of society come into conflict with the existing rela-
tions of production or — this merely expresses the same 
thing in legal terms — with the property relations within 
the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From 
forms of development of the productive forces these rela-
tions turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social 
revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead 
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sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense 
superstructure. In studying such transformations it is al-
ways necessary to distinguish between the material trans-
formation of the economic conditions of production, 
which can be determined with the precision of natural sci-
ence, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philo-
sophic — in short, ideological forms in which men become 
conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does 
not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so 
one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its 
consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness 
must be explained from the contradictions of material life, 
from the conflict existing between the social forces of pro-
duction and the relations of production,” (Marx 1859, 11). 
 
Changes in human society are thus connected to changes in the mode 
of production. The division between those who own the means of pro-
duction and those whose labour is exploited to create profit is central 
to a historical materialist approach; in other words, class divisions. The 
economic base creates institutions, norms, values, and dispositions, 
which are referred to as the superstructure. This bring us to Antonio 
Gramsci’s work.  
 
1.5.2 Gramsci’s Thought  
 
Gramsci’s work, collected in The Prison Notebooks, is a mine of infor-
mation spread across hundreds of individual notes that demonstrate 
everything from his major intellectual theorizations to small reminders 
to himself about future research. What is perhaps most impressive 
about Gramsci is his critical approach to politics, an approach that is 
based not only on his own theoretical leanings but also on his personal 
involvement in Italy’s workers’ movement. His most famous contribu-
tion is his concept of hegemony—a system of rule that combines a bal-
ance between consent and coercion and that functions through the in-
ternalization of specific norms and ideals directly tied to a specific mode 
of production. 
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     Gramsci’s deep historicism and his emphasis on the dialectic be-
tween structure and agency situate him within Marxist theory. Gramsci, 
however, was one of the first Marxists to emphasize the role of the ide-
ational. He was also one of the first to work with the concept of the 
historic bloc as a means of unifying an analysis on the ruling and subal-
tern classes.9 As noted by Hobson, there has been a recent trend indi-
cating that Gramscian analysis has been utilized by a growing number 
of scholars within both IR and IPE (2012, 31). The approach aims to 
understand how world orders are created and influenced by specific so-
cial forces, at both the level of ideas and materiality. Its main point of 
critique towards IR is the neorealist bias in much of the analysis in the 
field, including the centrality of the state. In the previously-mentioned 
quote about the formation of historical blocs, Gramsci makes explicit 
his assumption that ideas are powerful precisely because they constitute 
a material force in and of themselves; throughout the Prison Notebooks 
he expresses his interest in material forces and production as the basis 
of social relations (1971, 377). Therefore for Gramscians, “production 
creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the way 
in which human efforts are combined in the productive processes af-
fects all other aspects of social life, including the polity,” (Cox 19871, 
1). This approach thus assumes that the labour process and the repro-
duction of our survival are central to existence. “The labour process is 
that process of concrete, living man in creating his existence in daily 
practice where he eats and breathes and loves and suffers,” (Struik 1964, 
41). Or as Sara Ahmed writes, “Human needs require interaction with 
the environment and others, and this is existence,” (2010, 176). There-
fore the centrality of the mode of production is clear—it is what pro-
duces social relations. 
         As mentioned previously, while beyond doubt part of the Marxist 
tradition Gramsci should still be distinguished for the emphasis he put 
on certain aspects of his analysis. He was attuned to the question of 
                                                 
9 Gramsci’s materialism has sometimes comes into question because of this focus 
on the ideational, to the extent that he is sometimes used as a cultural theorist 
divorced from any positioning with Marxism. Yet it is clear from his work that 
he saw the material and ideational as co-constitutive, with the material decisive 
in the final analysis. 
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consciousness, culture, ideology and—by extension—the role of intel-
lectuals and constitutes one of his most unique interventions. In a par-
ticularly vivid set of excerpts, Gramsci writes: 
 
“The intellectual’s error consists in believing that one can 
know without understanding and even more without 
feeling and being impassioned (not only for knowledge 
in itself but also for the object of knowledge): in other 
words that the intellectual can be an intellectual if distinct 
and separate from the people-nation, that is, without feel-
ing the elementary passions of the people, understanding 
them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the 
particular historical situation and connecting them dialec-
tically to the laws of history and to a superior conception 
of the world, scientifically and coherently elaborated—
i.e. knowledge. One cannot make politics-history without 
this passion, without this sentimental connection be-
tween intellectuals and people-nation,” (1971, 418). 
 
“To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary 
they have a validity which is “psychological”; they “or-
ganize” human masses, and create the terrain on which 
men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they 
only create individual “movements,” polemics and so 
on,” (1971, 377). 
 
These two quotes demonstrate the central importance Gramsci placed 
on the ideational. Indeed he often emphasized the superstructure, while 
constantly maintaining the dialectical relationship between base and su-
perstructure. 
         Central to analysing this dialectic was Gramsci’s notion of rela-
tions of force, which outlines a means of approaching the analysis of 
historical situations. Gramsci wrote the following: 
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“The study of how ‘situations’ should be analysed, in other 
words, how to establish the various levels of the relations of 
force, offers an opportunity for an elementary exposition of 
the science and art of politics. (…) These levels [levels of the 
relations of force] range from the relations between interna-
tional forces to the objective relations within society—in 
other words, the degree of development of the productive 
forces; to relations of political force and those between par-
ties; and to immediate political relations,” (1971, 175-6).  
 
This brings us back to the relation between structure and superstructure, 
as this can only be understood if the relations between different forces 
during a particular period can be analysed. “It is the problem of the 
relations between structure and superstructure which must be accurately 
posed and resolved if the forces which are active in the history of a 
particular period are to be correctly analysed, and the relation between 
them determined,” (Gramsci 1971, 177). As the opening quote shows, 
there are different levels in the relations of force. The first is the level 
of the development of material forces of production, which is what lays 
the basis for the emergence of social classes. Each class has a specific 
relation to the forces of production, a relation that is structural and ob-
jective and which can be studied. This level is closely linked to the struc-
ture and it is objective: “The level of development of the material forces 
of production provides a basis for the emergence of the various social 
classes, each one of which represents a function and has a specific po-
sition within production itself,” (Gramsci 1971, 180-1). The second 
level is the relation of political forces, in which one ascertains the ho-
mogeneity, self-awareness and organization of the different social clas-
ses. This can be analysed at the different moments of consciousness (as 
discussed previously, the economic-corporate level, the solidarity within 
the social class level, and the transcendence of these specific interests). 
This brings us to the third level in the relations of force: a social class 
transcending its own specific interests and expanding them so that they 
become the interests of other groups too. The fourth and final level is 
the relation of military forces, which can be in turn analysed at two lev-
els: the military in the strict technical military sense and the military as a 
political-military structure. These levels of the relations of force allow 
for a complex analysis of a society and its disposition towards creating 
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a new hegemony. The relations of force at the political level in particular 
are crucial to the ideological struggle between classes.  
          Gramsci goes on to elaborate on these levels and the develop-
ment of a crisis: 
 
“A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This ex-
ceptional duration means that incurable structural contra-
dictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and 
that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling 
to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are 
making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and 
to overcome them,” (1971, 178). 
 
It is through a focus on the relations of force that these dynamics can 
be analysed, thus leading me to characterize it as a framework for anal-
ysis and a key concept.  
      Gramsci is also known for his elaboration on the concept of he-
gemony, a concept with a long political history. Gramsci’s theorizing on 
hegemony can be traced back to Machiavelli, as Benedetto Fontana has 
convincingly argued (1993), as well as debates in the Third International 
about the Bolshevik revolution (Cox 1983, 163). Cox argues that Gram-
sci’s contribution was in applying the concept to the bourgeoisie as op-
posed to seeing it from the perspective of the working class (Ibid).  
      Hegemony, put simply, is the process whereby one class exerts 
influence over society so that other classes follow its political and eco-
nomic project. Political society and civil society10 are part of this hegem-
ony in that they maintain the façade of spreading the narrow interests 
of one class to other classes through moral reforms. The power of the 
                                                 
10 Civil society is an important part of the state/society complex. Gramsci defines 
it as the realm in which the existing social order is grounded. It is comprised of 
non-state institutions that provide the ruling bloc with additional support and 
legitimation. In other words, the state is comprised of political society and civil 
society. Moreover, it can also be the realm in which a new social order is founded 
following a counter-hegemonic revolution. Civil society is especially important 
because the political power of the ruling class does not rest exclusively on the 
control over the means of coercion. 
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ruling class is therefore not just concentrated in the state, but through-
out society.  
          In the Prison Notebooks Gramsci writes: 
 
        “What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major super-
structural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society,’ 
that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private,’ 
and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state.’ These two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ 
which the dominant group exercises throughout society and 
on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or com-
mand exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ govern-
ment,” (1971, 12).  
 
Hegemony is not just exercised through the state11, but within a wider 
social and political constellation of forces (Gill and Law 1989, 477). This 
means that any counter-hegemonic movement must exercise power in 
the realm of ideas and society, as capturing the state will not be enough 
to create a new hegemony. A hegemonic project is one that attempts to 
capture power and is exercised through a historic bloc. In sum, a hege-
monic project expresses the ideological structure of specific historical 
configurations of class and capital. 
     Hegemony is constituted through three spheres of activity. The 
first is the social relations of production, with production referring to the 
production and reproduction of knowledge and to the institutions and 
social relations that are required to produce physical goods.12 In other 
words, as mentioned previously, production is to be understood very 
broadly. This allows for an understanding of how the relations of pro-
duction lead to specific types of social relations, which then become the 
basis of power relations and social forces. The second sphere of activity 
is forms of state. The state is not a given and thus the historical construc-
tion of different forms of state need to be understood. The concept of 
                                                 
11 In place of a state that refers to the legal and bureaucratic order, Gramsci 
speaks of an integral state. The integral state is a combination of political soci-
ety—the government—and civil society—all non-state institutions and actors. 
12 This expansive definition of production is from Cox (in Gill 1994, 39).  
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a historic bloc is utilized in order to show how different forms of state 
are related in society as well as the relationship between economic, cul-
tural and political aspects of reality. This will be expanded on below. 
The final sphere consists of world orders. Hegemony is first consolidated 
within the national sphere, before beginning to move outwards. 
Changes in international power relations can be traced to fundamental 
changes in social relations.13 Global hegemony begins with the outward 
expansion of a nation’s internal hegemony established by a dominant 
social class, thus demonstrating the link between internal social relations 
and international power dynamics. 
 Hegemony depends heavily on the consent produced through 
civil society. Recall Gramsci as quoted earlier: 
 
“…two super-structural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society,’ 
that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private,’ and that 
of ‘political society’ or ‘the State.’ These two levels correspond on the 
one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group ex-
ercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct dom-
ination’ or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ govern-
ment,” (1971, 12).  
 
Further on, Gramsci notes: 
 
                                                 
13 Linked to international power relations is the process of nation-state for-
mation. “The nation is a particular historical form of community wrapped around 
an axis of exploitation. It builds on natural and naturalized identities and at the 
same time goes beyond them, as a secular form of social organization idealized 
in the 18th century notion of a social contract,” (van der Pijl 2001, 494). Alongside 
this there was a process of socialization, by which traditional communities were 
transformed into new units, with an ever-increasing parcelization of social func-
tions that convinces people they are more and more independent, while in fact 
making people more dependent on one another than ever before (van der Pijl 
1989: 16). As noted by Habermas, socialization does not just occur at the level 
of labour relations, but also at the level of one’s internal nature: people’s mental 
outlook and worldview had to be completely changed. “This proceeds through 
normative structures through which needs are interpreted and actions are legiti-
mized and made binding,” (Ibid). 
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        “Thus it is asserted that economic activity belongs to civil 
society, and that the State must not intervene to regulate it. 
But since in actual reality civil society and the State are one 
and the same, it must be made clear that laissez-faire too is a 
form of State ‘regulation,’ introduced and maintained by leg-
islative and coercive means,” (1971, 160). 
 
What these quotes suggest is that civil society is a broad and expansive 
concept, enveloping everything from the State to education and reli-
gious institutions. Civil society is thus crucial to hegemony. This is be-
cause civil society allows for consent to dominate, thus freeing the ruling 
class from having to use coercion to maintain order. Consent is manu-
factured in very complex ways, and its mechanisms are often hidden. As 
long as the ruling classes control the means of creating consent, a revo-
lutionary movement is unlikely to be successful even if it takes over the state. 
Revolutionary consciousness is central, and this is created in civil soci-
ety: 
 
“Revolutionary activity has little or nothing to do with in-
citing people to rebel; instead it consists of a painstaking 
process of disseminating and instilling an alternative order 
by means of cultural preparation on a mass scale, critical 
and theoretical elaboration, and thoroughgoing organiza-
tion. These kinds of activities can only be carried out in civil 
society—they require the creation of and help to extend 
new spaces in civil society beyond the reach of the govern-
mental, administrative and juridical apparatuses of the state. 
Whereas reformists collaborate with the state, the goal in-
stead should be establishing a different concept of the 
state,” (Gramsci 1994, 65-68). 
 
As while be shown below, neo-Gramscians extended much of Gram-
sci’s work to the international sphere. Cox in particular emphasized that 
the state should not be the main unit of analysis when analysing trans-
national forms of hegemony. Instead, the state-society complex should 
become the main unit of analysis, as this allows us to analyse social 
forces within and outside of the state. 
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       Connected to this is the concept of the historic bloc. Social 
forces are the main collective actors produced by the social relations of 
production and which operate across all spheres of activity—and it is 
these forces that make up historic blocs. When different social forces 
emerge due to changes in production, similar transformations happen 
both in forms of state and the world order. State power rests on these 
configurations of social forces. Through drawing on the concept of the 
historical bloc (discussed below), it becomes possible to analyse the var-
ious social forces and class interests that form a hegemonic project. The 
state itself is also conceptualized as a social relation. As Gramsci has 
written: 
 
“The state presents itself in a different way beyond the po-
litical society of public figures and top leaders so that ‘the 
state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activ-
ities with which the ruling class not only justifies and main-
tains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent 
of those over whom it rules. The state is a social relation 
and not a distinct institutional category,” (1971, 178). 
 
Indeed the concept of the integral state—civil and political society—
poses a challenge to the liberal tendency to separate powers between the 
state, the economy, and other spheres. 
 What is the historic bloc? Gramsci argued that state and society 
put together constituted a structure in and of itself, and that a revolution 
therefore had to develop a separate structure strong enough to displace 
the first. This structure, whether in place or emergent, is called a historic 
bloc and depends on an organic cohesion between the rulers and the 
ruled: 
 
          “If the relationship between intellectuals and people-na-
tion, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the 
ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion in which feeling-
passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge 
(not mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only 
then is the relationship one of representation. Only then 
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can there take place an exchange of individual elements be-
tween the rulers and the ruled, leaders and led, and can the 
shared life be realised which alone is a social force—with 
the creation of the ‘historical bloc’,” (Gramsci 1971, 418). 
 
In another passage, Gramsci writes: 
 
        “In what sense can one identify politics with history, and 
hence all of life with politics? How then could the whole 
system of superstructures be understood as distinctions 
within politics, and the introduction of the concept of dis-
tinction into a philosophy of praxis hence be justified? But 
can one really speak of a dialectic of distincts, and how is the 
concept of a circle joining the levels of the superstructure to 
be understood? Concept of ‘historical bloc,’ i.e. unity be-
tween nature and spirit (structure and superstructure), unity 
of opposites and of distincts,” (1971, 137).14 
 
Thus we see that the interacting elements of a historic bloc are labelled 
structure and superstructure, and these form a historic bloc, which can 
be understood as the culmination of structure and superstructure that 
represents the social relations of production. The relationship between 
structure and superstructure is a dialectical one. A historic bloc cannot 
exist without a hegemonic social class. A new historic bloc is formed 
when a subordinate or subaltern class establishes its own hegemony 
over other subordinate groups. In order to form a new historic bloc, 
there are three levels of consciousness: the economic-corporative, in 
which people are aware of the specific interests of a particular group; 
the solidarity or class consciousness, where the entire social class is 
aware but only at the economic level; and the hegemonic consciousness, 
where the interests of the leading class come in sync with the subordi-
nate classes (Gramsci 1971, 176).  
                                                 
14 For a few selected examples in the Prison Notebooks where Gramsci discusses 
formations of blocs, see pp. 74, 146, 221, 462 (1971). 
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         Finally we come to the idea of a passive revolution. In the Prison 
Notebooks Gramsci refers to a ‘revolution’ without a revolution—a ‘pas-
sive revolution’ (1971, 59). He expands: 
 
       “The concept of ‘passive revolution’ must be rigorously de-
rived from the two fundamental principles of political sci-
ence: 1. That no social formation disappears as long as the 
productive forces which have developed within it still find 
room for further forward-movement; 2. That a society does 
not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary condi-
tions have not already been incubated, etc,” (1971, 106).  
 
Gramsci distinguished between two types of societies: one that had 
gone through a social revolution and thus developed new modes of pro-
duction and social relations; and one that had elements of a new order 
but without the old order having been displaced. These societies tended 
to go through a process of revolution-restoration, a condition in which 
neither the new or old forces could gain the upper hand, leading to a 
situation in which the new forces failed to achieve hegemony. Passive 
revolution was the term Gramsci gave to the resulting stalemate (Cox 
1983, 166). Put simply: passive revolution is a condition of stalemate 
between social forces. Although a social force may be dominant, it is 
not hegemonic. A small elite moulds state power and institutions in or-
der to preserve capitalist property relations—it is revolution from 
above. The key is to find out whether it is revolution or restoration that 
dominates. While the case of Egypt in 2011 represents a revolution from 
below with mass participation, it is clear that the ruling class was able to 
contain it by agreeing to some of the demands while maintaining their 
rule. For Gramsci, a social revolution entails society developing new 
modes of production and social relations. Where restoration rather than 
revolution dominates, the ruling class can re-exert its hegemony.  
 
1.5.3 Robert Cox and the Neo-Gramscians 
 
     Neo-Gramscians build off a wave of critical theories that emerged 
in the 1970s, mainly in the fields of feminism, historical sociology and 
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post-structuralism, that rejected positivism and its key assumption that 
the aim of social science is to engage with the world critically. This the-
oretical debate is known as the positivist-post-positivist debate. The 
new emerging approaches argued that it was not possible to separate the 
object from the subject or to differentiate between normative enquiry 
and empirical scientific research. Robert Cox’s work can be said to the 
umbrella underneath which most of the neo-Gramscian approaches sit. 
These approaches differ from one another but all take Cox as their point 
of departure. The Amsterdam School focuses on what Overbeek calls 
“transnational historical materialism” by looking at fractions of capital 
and concepts of control, with a strong focus on Poulantzas; the Not-
tingham School focuses on fractions of capital and labour by integrating 
a more ideational lens; and scholars such as Stephen Gill have used a 
more Foucauldian basis through which to approach Cox’s work. In this 
dissertation I draw on different approaches, by primarily relying on Cox 
and his work on hegemony and passive revolution, the Amsterdam 
School’s concept of fractions/concepts of control and, importantly, the 
Nottingham School’s work on the interaction between fractions of cap-
ital and fractions of labour. In effect my aim is to look at the cumulative 
shifts from one bloc to another by building off both the Amsterdam 
and Nottingham approaches.  
          Before delving into the work of neo-Gramscians, it is useful to 
situate them vis-à-vis both the Dependency School as well as World 
Systems Theory (WST). Immanuel Wallerstein’s intervention with WST 
was to make the global capitalist system central to social scientific anal-
ysis and thus provide a new way of understanding social reality. Core 
capitalist countries needed to continually draw surplus from semi-pe-
ripheral and peripheral countries and this created an unequal world sys-
tem. The endless drive to accumulate capital is what defines the system 
and gives it its internal logic. Wallerstein traces WST back to the debates 
about the inequality of Free Trade among Latin American scholars 
(2004, 10). Dependency theorists built off this idea of unequal exchange, 
with Andre Gunder Frank and others looking at questions of underde-
velopment as a conscious process put in place by core countries. Wal-
lerstein goes on to discuss Braudel’s intervention that argued for analy-
sis of the longue durée, before finally coming to the 1970s when 
discussions about a “world system” were taking place. Wallerstein writes 
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retrospectively: “World-systems analysis was an attempt to combine co-
herently concern with the unit of analysis, concern with social tempo-
ralities, and concern with the barriers that had been erected between 
different social science disciplines,” (Ibid, 16). Questions of the devel-
opment of the social sciences and how we aim to “know” reality are also 
part of this intervention, although it has often been lauded for its ap-
proach to economic systems. Indeed WST represented an intervention 
ontologically and epistemologically that has had a dramatic effect on the 
academy in general.  
          While Wallerstein conceptualized capitalism as a transnational 
system, the focus was still on states as the main actors within it. More-
over, as Henk Overbeek has pointed out, it is crucial to distinguish be-
tween the mode of production and the social formation: on the one 
hand we have a capitalist social formation and on the other the capitalist 
mode of production, with the latter being dominant within the former 
(2004, 121). This conceptualization allows for a more nuanced analysis 
of the articulation of modes of production. This is discussed further in 
Chapter Two, where I go into detail about the different modes of pro-
duction in Egypt. Marxist scholars have argued that what defines the 
world system is the tension between capital and labour and the extrac-
tion of surplus value. While this does pose a critique to WST, the ap-
proaches remain very similar in their core assumptions.  
          Additionally, Wallerstein’s conception of hegemony differs from 
that of Cox and other neo-Gramscians because of its focus on states as 
the main actors in the capitalist system, as well as an understanding that 
is primarily rooted in the dynamics of capital defined somewhat econo-
mistically. Neo-Gramscians tend to focus more on the structure-agency 
dialectic by favoring both, rather than favoring the former. Importantly, 
neo-Gramscians move away from centering the state, and indeed con-
ceptualize the state in a very different way, following Gramsci. The state 
is defined much more broadly, and the concept of civil society becomes 
key. Neo-Gramscians have a much more complex view of the global 
system and the hegemony it produces, and the Amsterdam School is 
notable here. The scholars in this school looked at hegemonic and non-
hegemonic states (Lockean vs. Hobbesian states)15 and contextualized 
                                                 
15 See Van der Pijl (2013) for an interesting analysis of the Middle East using 
these categories.  
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all relations within and between these states as embedded within wider 
transnational relations: “Hegemony in the global system is therefore 
seen as a form of class rule,” (Overbeek 2004, 127). All of these ideas 
will be discussed in detail below. Moreover, the focus on consent in 
hegemony distinguishes the Gramscian approach from WST to an ex-
tent. 
 The body of scholarship that has been labelled neo-Gramscian 
emerged in the 1980s and was spearheaded by Robert Cox’s two seminal 
articles: Social forces, states and world orders: neorealism and its critics (1986) and 
Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method (1983).16 Cox’s 
critique of problem-solving theories is a useful way to understand how 
neo-Gramscians distinguish themselves from other approaches within 
political economy. Cox argued that problem-solving theories take the 
world as it is without looking at power relations. Critical theories, on the 
other hand, question how an order came about rather than taking it for 
granted. The origin and historical construction of these relations and 
structures are the starting point of analysis. This type of exploration is 
done by looking at three interlocking levels of analysis: ideas, institu-
tions, and materiality, where all three make up the context in which ac-
tors are determined by creating expectations, habits, pressures, con-
straints, and so on.  
     In his article Gramsci, hegemony and international relations, Cox begins 
by critiquing problem-solving theories, which tend to take the world as 
it is without questioning power relations or the way power is embedded 
in and reproduced through institutions. In other words, the world sys-
tem is seen as a constant. This view does not question power relations, 
as the features reproducing these relations are not problematized in and 
of themselves. This particularity, however, leads to a fragmentation 
within the theory and makes it difficult to understand connections be-
tween various particularities as well as the historical construction of the 
system as a whole. 
     Critical theory, on the other hand, consists of questioning how an 
order came about, rather than simply taking for granted the institutions 
and power relations that make up the order. The origin and historical 
construction of these relations and structures becomes the starting point 
                                                 
16 It is useful to note that before this, the Amsterdam School had already begun 
theorizing with Gramscian concepts (Overbeek 2004).  
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of the analysis. “Critical theory is a theory of history in the sense of 
being concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of 
historical change,” (Ibid, 129). Cox argues that while realist theory in IR 
has a similar focus at its inception—understanding particular configura-
tions of forces by placing them within their historical context—the the-
ory underwent changes during the Cold War and became a problem-
solving theory, characterized by an ahistorical view.17 Returning to my 
research question—why the revolution happened in 2011—I want to 
note that in asking ‘why,’ a Gramscian approach also asks ‘how,’ pre-
cisely because it is both historical and materialist. By answering the ‘why’ 
question in my dissertation I must also answer the ‘how’ question. 
     Critical theory assumes that action always takes place within a 
framework, and that this framework is what constitutes the problema-
tique. It is assumed that theory (and action) is shaped by this problem-
atique, demonstrating that critical theory is aware of its relativity but that 
it is precisely this awareness that allows it to transcend its relatively, to 
an extent.18 Change is an expected element of the framework and thus 
critical theory is prepared to deal with social and political changes. Im-
portantly, the framework in question is made up of ideas, institutions, 
and material conditions; these do not determine people’s actions in a 
material sense but rather make up the context (expectations, habits, 
pressures, and constraints) in which actions are determined. Finally, the 
framework should be looked at in terms of the conflicts within it, and 
how these conflicts open up space for social change (Cox 1986, 135). 
This brief overview of Cox’s argument is useful in situating the neo-
Gramscian approach within broader debates. 
 
                                                 
17 This new brand of realism—termed US realism or neo-realism—was charac-
terized by three assumptions. First, the nature of man was represented as being 
restless in his desire for power. Second, the nature of states was represented as 
being dominated by specific concepts of national interest as guiding their actions. 
Third, the nature of the state system was represented as one in which constraints 
were placed on rival national interests because of a mechanism ensuring the bal-
ance of power (Cox 1986, 132). 
18 It is acknowledged that no theory or approach can completely transcend its 
particularity. However, awareness of this particularity can aid in overcoming bias. 
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1.5.4 The Neo-Gramscians 
 
     Neo-Gramscians provide two important extensions of Gramsci's 
work that are relevant to this project. First, while Gramsci did not say 
much about the international sphere or the global capitalist system, neo-
Gramscians have focused extensively on the international division of la-
bour and transnational capital—they have worked to internationalize 
Gramsci’s concepts. Thus we have the Amsterdam School that argues 
that neo-Gramscian analysis should be understood as a form of histor-
ical materialism called transnational historical materialism: “Transna-
tional historical materialism brings back to life themes that were central 
to the debates on imperialism in the early years of the twentieth century. 
The global dimensions of the processes of capital accumulation and of 
class formation, and the changing roles that national states play in these 
processes, were central in Marx’s own understanding of capitalism,” 
(Overbeek 2013, 162). Similarly, scholars within the Nottingham 
School, such as Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, have looked at the 
ways in which fractions of capital and labour evolve internationally 
(2004, 2003). Second, numerous neo-Gramscians have worked with the 
concepts of fractions of capital and fractions of labour as a specific tool 
with which to analyze the ruling class and the subaltern classes. This has 
provided a useful concrete means of analyzing the historic bloc, one that 
I use in this project. Above all, one of the key contributions of neo-
Gramscians, and in particular Cox, has been to bring Gramscian ideas 
in conversation with IR and IPE. 
     Building on Gramsci’s concept of the relations of force, neo-Gram-
scians have focused on its transnational application, arguing that this 
framework allows us to look at forces at the transnational level. As 
Gramsci noted, “It is also necessary to take into account the fact that 
international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-
states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations,” 
(1971, 182). Henk Overbeek, a founding member of the Amsterdam 
School, has written about the ways in which neo-Gramscian analysis—
which he terms transnational historical materialism—can be defined as 
“the application of the historical materialist method to the study of 
transnational social relations,” (2013, 162). Using Gramsci as a basis, the 
  63 
aim is to bring questions of imperialism to the center through analysing 
global processes of capitalist accumulation (Ibid). Overbeek writes: 
 
“Gramsci was concerned to rethink political strategy in 
light of the very different experiences of the Russian and 
the West European revolutions of 1917-1919. It is really in 
the context of this project that all the concepts that have 
come to serve as keys to recognize ‘neo-Gramscian work’ 
were developed (civil society, hegemony, historic bloc, or-
ganic intellectuals, passive revolution, trasformismo, war of 
manoeuvre and war of position),” (Ibid, 167).  
 
World hegemony begins when one state establishes internal national he-
gemony and then expands it outwards on a global scale. This world or-
der must be universal in conception and include universal norms and 
institutions that provide the rules on how states and societies should 
act. Hegemony at the global level is not simply a hierarchy between 
states. As Cox writes,: 
 
“It is an order within a world economy with a dominant 
mode of production which penetrates into all countries and 
links into other subordinate modes of production. It is also 
a complex of international social relationships which con-
nect the social classes of the different countries. World he-
gemony is desirable as a social, economic and political 
structure and must be all three,” (Cox 1983, 172). 
 
Focusing on world hegemony using relations of force allows for an anal-
ysis of imperialism. Neo-Gramscians analyse the imperial system as a 
world structure that depends on a particular configuration of social 
forces. Imperialism is a system and thus cannot be located in individuals, 
states, or corporations (Cox 1981, 144). The reality of passive revolution 
in the peripheral countries as well as the global neoliberal project allows 
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for an insight into why countries such as Egypt were unable to success-
fully topple the ruling class.19 
       Related to this is the concept of hegemony and its interpretation 
by neo-Gramscians. Cox has defined hegemony as: 
 
“…a structure of values and understandings about the na-
ture of order that permeates a whole system of state and 
non-state entities. In a hegemonic order these values and 
understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. They 
appear to most actors as the natural order. Such a structure 
of meaning is underpinned by a structure of power in which 
most probably one state is dominant but that state’s domi-
nance is not sufficient to create hegemony. Hegemony de-
rives from the dominant social strata of the dominant states 
in so far as these ways of doing and thinking have acquired 
the acquiescence of the dominant social strata of other 
states,” (Cox in Gill 1993, 43). 
 
Hegemony constitutes a particular configuration of social forces that is 
maintained through a balance of consent and coercion. The distinction 
between coercion and consent is crucial to Gramscian thought, and is 
based on Machiavelli’s rule of ‘force’ and rule through ‘consensus.’ 
Power “recedes into the background of consciousness,” (Ibid, 137). The 
presence of high levels of consent is important: in hegemony, domi-
nance is hidden as people consent to a system they see as common sense 
and natural. It is important not to see the dialectical relationship be-
tween coercion and consent as static. Indeed each situation needs to be 
looked at historically in order to determine what the precise relationship 
between coercion and consent is, and how they materialize.  
        Key to this is the state. The state can never be a neutral broker 
among competing interests—it has a “necessary structural selectivity” 
                                                 
19 Here Van der Pijl’s work on passive revolution in the Soviet Union provides 
an important view on how peripheral countries have different experiences of 
revolution because of the central role of the state as opposed to civil society (in 
Gill 1993). 
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that favours some social forces over others (Bieler 2006, 522). A Gram-
scian analysis would take as its point of departure the assumption that 
world politics is historically embedded in capitalist social relations. Thus 
capitalism represents the context within which sovereign states exist 
(Rupert in Gill 1993, 84). Moreover, the constellation of forces that have 
shaped the historical production of states and the relations among them 
cannot be ignored. “All social relations—including the system of states 
and the world economy—are historically produced and politically con-
testable. Such contests are fought out among various historically specific 
social forces and actors,” (Ibid, 87). Importantly, there is no one ‘state’ 
but rather multiple forms of state, all expressions of different configu-
rations of state/society complexes (Cox 1986, 127). The aim is to un-
derstand how social power becomes merged with political power. This 
can partly be done through a historic bloc. 
 
“A historic bloc implies the constitution of a radical and 
novel reconstruction of the relational nature and identity of 
different interests within a social formation and indicates an 
organic link between a diverse grouping of interests that 
merge forms of class and cultural identity,” (Morton 2010, 
161). 
 
Active and conscious struggle has to be engaged in, and it is not enough 
to capture the state: civil society and the forces of production are crucial, 
as is ideology (Gill and Law 1989, 477). In order for a historic bloc to 
be successful, it had to coalesce around a set of hegemonic ideas. Any 
new hegemonic class will be shaped by ideology at both the national and 
international level (Ibid, 489). The different fractions within the emerg-
ing historic bloc must disseminate their ideology through society in or-
der to establish hegemony. Understanding which social forces were in-
volved in establishing a historic bloc is essential. 
 As a fraction of capital becomes powerful, it draws on its power 
not only from its economic standing but also from the values it pro-
motes even as these values become “detached as images or projections 
of its political outlook,” (Ibid). These values must be powerful enough for 
the fraction to form alliances with other members of the evolving his-
toric bloc, thus demonstrating the central role of the ideational within 
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hegemonic expansion. The historic bloc points to the dialectic between 
the material and ideational and cannot be understood without taking 
this dialectic into account. A historic bloc is a state of being that each 
ruling class aims to achieve, one that allows it to organize society in its 
own image. 
         This understanding of the historic bloc as a condition to be 
achieved rather than simply as a social alliance provides us with a more 
abstract and theoretical understanding of the concept. A historic bloc is 
a new configuration of social forces and this is not something to be 
taken lightly. These social forces, coming together in this way, thus pro-
duce a new form of politics. Different norms, different values, and dif-
ferent ideologies emerge, as well as different material conditions of pro-
duction. In short, society changes. Nevertheless this change is not 
abrupt nor does it represent a clear break with the previous configura-
tion; thus we see that new forms of politics or new norms and disposi-
tions may only become dominant halfway into a new historic bloc. 
Moreover, these new changes within society usually do not displace old 
ones completely, but rather mix with them.  
    It is because the historic bloc is so crucial and expansive that only 
an organic crisis can attempt to dislodge it. Such a crisis would most 
likely play on the contradictions and weaknesses within the bloc. As 
Brecht de Smet, a Gramscian whose work focuses on Egypt, argues: 
 
“Any historical bloc expresses an equilibrium that contains 
internal class contradictions by material concessions and 
ideological justifications for the limits of its economic struc-
ture. When internal or external dynamics disturb the funda-
ments of the equilibrium, centrifugal forces become 
stronger than the centripetal power and a crisis ensues,” 
(2016, 19). 
 
An organic crisis in particular results from the contradictions within the 
system—the historic bloc and its accumulation strategy. De Smet con-
tinues: “In order for capitalism to survive organic crises as a system, con-
crete historical blocs have to be reconfigured by modifications to their 
economic structure and superstructures,” (Ibid, 40). This is where the 
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concept of passive revolution comes in, and it is precisely the combina-
tion of an organic crisis, a restructured historic bloc, and passive revo-
lution that can help us understand the events of January 25 2011. 
         Cox has elaborated on Gramsci’s concept of the passive revolu-
tion by emphasizing the dialectic of revolution-restoration present in 
cases were a passive revolution was taking place (1983, 166). Caesarism 
and trasformismo are two accompaniments to passive revolution; the first 
referring to a strongman intervening to resolve the stalemate between 
social forces and the latter to a process of co-optation. Passive revolu-
tion can be understood as non-hegemony, and, similar to van der Pijl 
(in Gill 1993), Cox makes the assertion that this often characterizes in-
dustrialising Third World countries (1983, 167). Throughout this disser-
tation I argue that while this was the case pre-1952 and post 1990, there 
did exist hegemony and a historic bloc in Egypt from the 1950s through 
to the 1980s.  
      Connected to all of this is the concept of a fraction of capital, a 
concept directly tied to various neo-Gramscian schools, notably the 
Amsterdam and Nottingham schools. While it was Marx who distin-
guished the different circuits of capital—commodity, money and pro-
ductive—it has been specific neo-Gramscians who have extended this, 
namely Kees van der Pijl and Henk Overbeek. Fractions of capital and 
labour are important to understand because they represent a way of an-
alysing the complexity of the ruling class. As Kees van der Pijl notes, 
“Class struggle has to be understood as a complex process in which 
fractions of the bourgeoisie, increasingly located in more than one state, 
struggle with each other and with the workers and other classes over the 
definition of the common good that will serve as the guiding light,” 
(1989, 16). Similarly, Henk Overbeek notes that it is Marx’s division of 
the functional forms capital assumes that shapes class fractions (2013, 
167). The general interests shared by class fractions can be called “con-
cepts of control”: 
 
“Concepts of control are constituted around two proto-
types: the money capital concept and the productive capital 
concept. The latter reflects the particularities of the produc-
tive process and its social context. The latter reflects the par-
ticularities of the productive process and its social context. 
Usually those groups assert themselves most effectively 
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whose specific group interests at a given juncture most 
closely correspond with the prevailing objective state of cap-
ital accumulation and class struggle,” (2013, 167).  
 
In this understanding, class fractions are very much to be understood 
materially and ideationally, as well as in terms of structure and agency—
the way in which capital is accumulated is the structure, and the ways in 
which social forces negotiate and define this is the agency (Overbeek 
213, 168). Using fractions is useful because it focuses on the constantly 
shifting balance of class forces. It is not just an elite-focused approach 
but looks at social forces as a whole. “The congruent interests of the 
class fractions of both capital and labour and their fundamental antag-
onism justify the central Marxist emphasis on the dialectic of class strug-
gle,” (Nicholls 1988, 83). This dominance, however, can be understood 
in terms of a power bloc with shifting alliances within it, and this is the 
approach this paper takes. This dominance of one fraction is often 
masked at the political and ideological levels (Ibid). As noted by David 
Nicholls, the historical dominance of one fraction over the others can-
not be reduced to homogenous class categories.  
    Fractions of capital and labour are much more than merely inter-
ests. It is not enough to identify interest groups within society and label 
them as fractions. Marx emphasized that class cannot be explained on 
the basis of interests because interests are constituted by and thus de-
pendent on social classes. Fractions are therefore much more complex 
and have deeper roots in the social relations of production. A class is 
distinguished from an interest group because it is constituted on the basis 
of an economic interest. “A class is defined by its ownership of that particu-
lar factor of production that defines its particular interest,” (Clarke 1978, 
38). This is why a ruling class can be made up of competing fractions 
that all have different features. The underlying relation of exploitation 
is the same for the whole class and thus unites them to an extent. Take, 
for instance, the existence of industrialists and financiers under the ne-
oliberal bloc—while both may have the same hegemonic project of cap-
italist accumulation, they achieve it using different forms of accumula-
tion and different technologies. This, if not balanced carefully, could 
lead to a conflict that could culminate in an organic crisis.  
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 A useful starting point is noting the connectivity that character-
izes fractions of capital. Capital is divided into various forms depending 
on the function it performs within circuits of circulation.  
 
“The ‘start point’ and the ‘end point’ for the money capital-
ist, the productive capitalist and the commodity capitalist 
are entirely different—essentially they are engaged in the 
same overall circuit, however. Fractions of capital assume 
different circuits within the overall circuit of capital but they 
are nevertheless part of the same circuit: money capital can-
not exist independently of productive capital,” (Macartney 
2009, 461).  
 
The interests of each fraction are therefore dependent on their position 
within the realm of production. As Macartney points out, one would 
assume that the interests of finance capital are different from productive 
capital: whereas the circulation of finance and money capital must have 
an international dimension, productive capital must be based within na-
tional territory (Ibid). Interests of fractions cannot be assumed apriori, 
however, and must instead be understood historically. Moreover, it is 
necessary to underline the unity of the ruling class as a whole. As the 
quote above highlights, fractions are engaged in the same overall circuit.  
 All fractions of capital are part of the same whole, but they do not 
all have the same status. Because they are part of the same whole, they 
have a vested interest in maintaining and reproducing the rule of capital 
and in harnessing the state in this dissertation. In other words, all frac-
tions of capital are invested in the state expression the domination of 
capital over labour (Ibid, 61). What differs among fractions of capital is 
the emphasis they put on different modes of production. The debate 
surrounding productive capital is important in the case of Egypt, as will 
become clear further on. Finance capital being dependent on productive 
capital as well as banking capital being less determining than productive 
capital are both formulas that changed during the transition from the 
Nasserist bloc to the Infitah bloc. During this transition we see that pro-
ductive capital became less and less determining, while financial capital 
became hegemonic. This was to have dramatic consequences for the 
entire society. 
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 What is especially important to note about fractions is that alt-
hough they collectively form the bourgeoisie, they cannot act as one 
entity because of their divergent interests. The ways in which various 
fractions of capital confront labour represents one divergence: “Secur-
ing the preconditions of the exploitation of wage labour is the overrid-
ing interest of capital, but since capital necessarily confronts the workers 
in highly divergent labour processes, the capitalist class on this score 
will always be divided within its own ranks,” (Nicholls 1988, 13). An-
other divergence is their position vis-à-vis the circulation of capital; and 
a third is their relationship vis-à-vis the state.  
 To sum up, the ruling class can be divided into fractions of capital 
in order to analyse the divisions within it. Fractions are distinguished 
from one another by the particular way in which they relate to (the mode 
of) production. A group of individuals that accumulates its wealth 
through agriculture and the land would be brought together and labelled 
an agrarian fraction of capital, whereas a group that accumulates wealth 
through industry would be labelled an industrial fraction of capital. Each 
fraction has specific institutions that it may use to establish itself, such 
as ministries, banks, and so on. For example, the establishment of the 
agrarian fraction of capital in Egypt during the early 1990s required the 
formation of native Egyptian banks such as Bank Misr. The industrial 
fraction that formed during Nasser, however, relied heavily on the state 
apparatus. What is important to highlight is the way in which fractions 
must overcome their particularity in order to elevate to the level of gen-
eral interest. This differentiation complicates the traditional distinction 
between the rentier class, the bourgeoisie and the working class, show-
ing potential fault lines within the same class, as noted by Roberto 
Roccu (2012, 74). This contributes to the concept of a historic bloc, as 
it shows the ways in which different fractions form alliances in order to 
achieve their overarching goal of capitalist accumulation. The aim is to 
trace which fraction dominated during each period, in order to then an-
alyze how each historic bloc is formed. In order to achieve their own 
narrow interests, the fraction has to mask them as universal ones. 
         Here it is relevant to bring up some of the main critiques of neo-
Gramscians. The responses to the emergence of neo-Gramscian work 
have varied. Some have argued that it is not as rigorous in its treatment 
of orthodox Marxist presumptions as it should be (Burnham 1991) 
while others argue it is too economistic in its treatment of hegemony 
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(Mouffe and Laclau 2011). Additionally, Drainville (1995) and Panitch 
(1994) critique the neo-Gramscians for giving too much agency to elites 
and not allowing for the possibility of change among and from subaltern 
groups.  
          The critique I want to focus on is that of Germain and Kenny 
(1998), who argue, first, that the form Gramsci’s ideas have come to us 
makes it difficult to speak of a Gramscian ‘approach’ per se. While the 
format of the Prison Notebooks has certainly led to a wide range of inter-
pretations of Gramsci’s ideas, it is clear that Gramsci was firmly embed-
ded within the Marxist tradition and that many of the concepts scholars 
derive from his work can be clearly identified in the original text(s). 
Much of their critique focuses on the way in which Gramsci related the 
structure to the superstructure. This debate was covered in the previous 
section on meta theory, where I argued that Gramsci was unique among 
Marxists of his time for the way in which he conceptualized the role of 
the ideational. His break from orthodox Marxists should be empha-
sized, but this did not constitute a shift towards privileging the ideolog-
ical as he consistently grounds his analysis in the material. Indeed here 
work by Stuart Hall in particular has provided a creative means of inter-
preting Gramsci within cultural studies (1986). Moreover, I want to 
point out that non-Western Marxists have long pointed to the need to 
break with orthodox Marxist presumptions about economism and a cer-
tain set of linear developments that must occur (see: Amin 1981, Ayubi 
1996, Abdel-Malek 1968).  
          The second point made by Germain and Kenny is to question 
whether the Gramscian concepts used in IR to study the “interna-
tional”—hegemony, civil society, and historic bloc—are really useful in 
examining the dynamics of the world order (1998, 20). They advocate 
for a different type of historicism, which Bieler and Morton have de-
scribed as “austere,” (2004, 104). Responses to this have come from 
authors in different approaches. Overbeek, for example, has argued that 
the main aim of neo-Gramscian analysis is to re-center the question of 
imperialism by looking at capital accumulation at the global level (2013). 
To this end, these Gramscian concepts have proven effective in much 
of the work cited in this dissertation. As Mark Rupert writes in his re-
sponse to Germain and Kenny (1998), “I see Gramsci arguing for a di-
alectical understanding of world politics which cannot proceed in ab-
straction from the specific constellations of factors—global and local—
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which have shaped the historical production of particular states, the 
emergence of international and transnational relations, and historical 
possibilities for transformative politics (432-3).20 Bieler and Morton sim-
ilarly responded to Germaine and Kenny’s critique with the following: 
“Yet the demand to return Gramsci to his historical context need not 
prevent the possibility of appreciating ideas both in and beyond their 
context. Rather than the seemingly austere historicism of Germain and 
Kenny’s demands, which limit the relevance of past ideas in the present, 
it is possible to acknowledge the role played by both past forms of 
thought and previous historical conditions in shaping subsequent ideas 
and existing social relations. This method pushes one to consider what 
might be historically relevant as well as limited in a theoretical and prac-
tical translation of past ideas in relation to alternative conditions,” (2004, 
104). Adopting a historical method that is not austere allows scholars to 
engage with IR and IPE approaches by relying on Gramscian concepts 
that continue to be relevant today and combining them with the rich 
literature already available in the fields of IR and IPE.  
         Additionally, I have found these concepts particularly useful to 
apply to the concept of Egypt precisely because they build on WST and 
the Dependency School’s assumption of a core and periphery—thus 
making the twin processes of capitalist expansion and colonial domina-
tion central to analysis—but also expand on it in important ways. It was 
precisely Gramsci’s own positionality as a Southern Italian Marxist that 
allowed him to develop concepts critically aware of power dynamics that 
in turn are especially useful to those working on the Global South. In 
my attempt to look at the cumulative transitions from one bloc to an-
other, concepts such as hegemony, passive revolution and the historic 
bloc gave me the conceptual tools needed to analyse how these transi-
tions happen.  
   This overview of Gramsci and the neo-Gramscians leads me to 
clarify my own approach. Neo-Gramscians have been important be-
cause of their exploration of Gramsci’s concepts internationally. Thus 
we have the Amsterdam School, for example that has looked at imperi-
alism and neoliberalism, and the Nottingham School that has looked at 
EU integration. While this is a useful frame, and while imperialism is 
                                                 
20 For another engagement with Germain and Kenny, see Murphy (1998). I want 
to thank Henk Overbeek for pointing me to these articles. 
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key to my analysis as well, my focus has been on the interconnections 
between Egypt as a case study and the transnational interactions the 
neo-Gramscians look at.my major contribution is a cumulative under-
standing of Egyptian history, and looking at the trajectory of historic 
blocs in Egypt allows me to this.  
 
1.5.5 Meta Theory  
 
In terms of the themes Gramscian and neo-Gramscian work addresses, 
I have found two particularly important. The first is the connection be-
tween the material and the ideational, and the second is the connection 
between structure and agency. Both of these themes touch on key de-
bates, and in both instances Gramsci's work calls for a complex combi-
nation between the two traditional poles.  
      Beginning with the structure-agency relation, a neo-Gramscian 
approach articulates a conception of the world in which structure and 
agency are dialectical and where both play a role in the production and 
reproduction of social life. This is clear in Gramsci’s insistence that one 
outcome is never predetermined, and that other routes were always pos-
sible. In other words, structures do not determine outcomes—agency is 
also a factor, thus allowing for multiple pathways. Neo-Gramscians 
have used this dialectical approach to agency/structure to analyse com-
plex processes such as globalization and neoliberalism.21 
 
“What emerges within this historicist conception of philos-
ophy and history is a concern with the structural conditions 
of existence, the realm of necessity, initially inherited from 
the past forms of thought and action, as well as concern for 
the realisation of agency, the realm of freedom, that is both 
determined and determining,” (Bieler 2005, 517). 
 
                                                 
21 See: Overbeek 2002. Henk Overbeek writes about globalization as a dialectical 
phenomenon circumscribed by both agency and structure, which are mutually 
constitutive. 
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The importance of agency becomes clear when we look at political acts 
made through an error in calculation on the part of members of the 
ruling class. Agency can make a difference within the constraints pro-
vided by structures. “There is an impact on agency in the present from 
the social relations of production, forms of state and world order, re-
sulting from strategies in the past,” (Ibid). This provides a different view 
from structuralist and neo-realist approaches that tend to ignore or 
downplay agency. Neo-Gramscians see structures as socially con-
structed and argue that these become part of the objective world be-
cause of their existence within intersubjective understandings of social 
actors (Cox 1987, 409). Because actors are involved in producing these 
meanings and structures, it is possible that established meanings change, 
especially during times of transformation. This means that there is al-
ways a possibility for change. The course of action that results depends 
on which historical bloc is best able to articulate a strategy that most 
corresponds to socially dominant meanings and structures. Moreover, 
this necessitates a focus on time because analysis must look back to the 
past to understand how agency has been conditioned in the present. The 
focus on agency in particular is an important factor that distinguishes 
neo-Gramscian analyses from approaches such as sociological institu-
tionalism that focus predominantly on structures and often minimize 
the role of agency (Koelble 1995). “History is always in the making, in 
a complex and dialectical interplay between agency, structure, con-
sciousness and action,” (Gill 1993, 9). In other words, the historical 
structures that form an important part of Gramsci’s approach are con-
stituted partly by human activity and consciousness. 
     Moving to the material-ideational dialectic, recall the quote from 
earlier: 
 
       “The analysis of these propositions tends, I think, to rein-
force the conception of historical bloc in which precisely ma-
terial forces are the content and ideologies are the form, 
though this distinction between form and content has purely 
didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceiv-
able historically without form and the ideologies would be 
individual fancies without the material forces,” (1971, 377). 
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Approaches to IPE and IR based on Gramscian assumptions rely on a 
combination of ideational and materialist claims that can be summed up 
in the following paragraph: 
 
“Ideas and materialism are always bound together, mutually 
reinforcing one another, and not reducible to one another. 
Ideas have to be understood in relation to material circum-
stances, which include both the social relations and the 
physical means of production. Superstructures of ideology 
and political organization shape the development of both 
aspects of production and are shaped by them,” (Cox 1983, 
168). 
 
Walter Adamson has argued that Marx never gave ideas the full atten-
tion they deserved, claiming that classical Marxists neglected non-eco-
nomic factors such as ideology, and further claims that Marx saw ideol-
ogy as simply a belief system (Ibid, 176). 
         And yet in the same text Adamson goes on to cite the following 
excerpt from Marx: 
 
“The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness 
is directly interwoven with the material activity and the ma-
terial relationships of men; it is the language of actual life. 
Conceiving, thinking and the intellectual relationships of 
men appear here as the direct result of their material behav-
iour. The same applies to intellectual production as mani-
fested in a people’s language of politics, law, morality, reli-
gion and metaphysics. Men are the producers of their 
conceptions, ideas, etc., but these are real, active men, as 
they are conditioned by a definite development of their pro-
ductive forces and of the relationships corresponding to 
these up to their highest forms. Consciousness can never 
be anything else except conscious existence, and the exist-
ence of men is their actual life-process,” (Adamson 2014, 
110). 
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This quotation is much closer to the way Gramsci conceptualizes the 
connection between the material and the ideational. Indeed in the Prison 
Notebooks Gramsci himself pointed out that Marx himself proposed that 
a popular conviction “has the same energy as a material force,” (1971, 
377). As Edward Said notes, of all the Marxists of his time Gramsci was 
the one that focused on culture, specifically through his argument that 
the power of the state relies not only on coercion but the ways in which 
culture produces consent (1983, 171). It is therefore fair to say that 
Gramsci is perhaps rare among Marxists for the attention he paid to the 
role of the ideational.  
         Culture, civil society and organic intellectuals are all means 
through which hegemony is produced and resisted. Indeed it is precisely 
this that allows hegemony to exist through consent rather than coercion. 
Gramsci’s focus on organic intellectuals demonstrates this: 
 
          “Every social group, coming into existence on the original 
terrain of an essential function in the world of economic 
production, creates together with itself, organically, one or 
more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and 
an awareness of its own function not only in the economic 
but also in the social and political fields,” (1971, 5). 
 
          “Thus there are historically formed specialized categories 
for the exercise of the intellectual function. They are 
formed in connection with all social groups, but especially 
in connection with the more important, and they undergo 
more extensive and complex elaboration in connection 
with the dominant social group. One of the most im-
portant characteristics of any group that is developing to-
wards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to con-
quer “ideologically” the traditional intellectuals, but this 
assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more effi-
cacious the more the group in question succeeds in simul-
taneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals,” (197, 
10). 
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Gramsci notes that organic intellectuals occupy a particular position in 
society that is tied to countering the hegemony propagated by traditional 
intellectuals. Neo-Gramscians have built off this focus on intellectuals 
and idea, and understand ideas at two levels: as intersubjective mean-
ings/shared notions of the nature of social relations that are historically 
determined; and as collective images of the social order: multiple and 
contradictory. Identifying these ideas and modes of production brings 
us back to the deep historicism of the Gramscian approach. The mate-
rial world refers to productive and destructive potentials, whether they 
be technological capabilities or natural resources which can be trans-
formed and the wealth which results from this process. While neo-
Gramscians take ideas and discourse seriously, they also maintain that 
materiality forms the basis of knowledge production. It is more useful 
to look at how the discursive and material inform one another than to 
see the world as purely a series of constructions, since underlying these 
is always the material world. In other words, the focus is on social forces 
that result from the capitalist production process and how they relate to 
ideological struggles. This interplay between ideas and materiality rests 
on the assumption that ideas are underpinned by materiality. Under-
standing for what purpose and for whom a discourse has been con-
structed means understanding the social forces present in society 
through the mode of production. It is the social relations of production 
that determine this, even though many approaches ignore this because 
of their focus on power as located in the state (Overbeek 2013, Van der 
Pijl 1997). The focus should thus also be on social power, which is both 
material and normative.  
         The importance of the ‘material structure of ideology’ is one ex-
ample of how Gramsci prioritized the ways in which materiality was 
discursive. Another is his argument that hegemony functions through 
consent, and thus through processes of social diffusion, which include 
the propagation of ideas. Finally, the importance Gramsci accorded 
ideas can be noted in his emphasis on the role of organic intellectuals. 
Intellectuals exercise an ideological social function and organize the he-
gemony of specific social class forces. Organic intellectuals articulate 
strategies for the hegemonic project. “It is their social function to trans-
cend the particular interests of their own social group which brings ‘the 
interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate 
classes and incorporates those other interests into an ideology expressed 
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in universal terms,” (Van der Pijl 1997, 126). It is only when ideas are 
accepted as common sense that they disappear from sight. 
         A focus on production does not mean a reductionist approach to 
social life. I conceive of production very broadly: it includes the pro-
duction and reproduction of knowledge and social relations, morals and 
institutions, all of which are prerequisites to the production of physical 
goods. To analyse capital in any given era means not just looking at the 
material means of production (land, labour and the organization of the 
economy) but also at culture, norms, and dispositions.  
         Any analysis of the 2011 revolution should not only look at both 
the material and ideational levels and the interplay between them, but 
also how the two are co-constitutive. At the material level, there should 
be an analysis of the mode of production, the social relations of pro-
duction, and the social forces—all three of which make up Egypt’s po-
litical economy. As mentioned previously, this does not mean only look-
ing at these in terms of production, but also in terms of how these 
relations organize life culturally and how norms that sustain these rela-
tions are transmitted to society in an attempt to construct them as com-
mon sense. Take the example of the ideational and the revolution. It is 
not enough to identify specific notions that were central, such as social 
justice, dignity, rights, democracy or understandings of what it means to 
live a dignified life, to have hope, to have the ability to live well. Instead 
the analysis must go further and locate these concepts within the struc-
tures of the economy. Take the common demand of social justice, per-
haps the most common demand of 2011. It is possible to see this as 
being a social construction rooted at multiple levels: the national level 
where it is tied to Nasser and Egypt’s first independent regime that of-
ten used social justice as a rallying point; at the regional level where eco-
nomic and political crisis have become the norm rather than the excep-
tion; and also at the international level, where questions of economic 
crisis have taken center stage and where Egypt’s peripheral position vis-
à-vis global capital is not lost on most Egyptians. Using this as a loose 
framework it would then be possible to trace the emergence of the con-
cept of social justice before and after 2011 and to connect it to the main 
forces behind the revolution. 
        But is this convincing? It seems clear that the term social justice is 
used in many ways by many different actors and yet it points to a similar 
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underlying malaise: the current structure and functioning of Egypt’s po-
litical economy. And this is precisely why it becomes necessary to not 
just include materiality in an additive sense but to ground the analysis in 
materiality. Then the questions shift: what is meant by social and what is 
meant by justice? When did this term emerge and how is it linked to the 
regime and ruling class of that era? In other words, which historical for-
mation are Egyptians bringing attention to by making social justice the 
central demand of 2011? If the answer to this is the Nasserist historic 
bloc, then that needs to become part of the analysis: which social forces 
were present at that time, how did they relate to the means of produc-
tion, and how did they use this relation to spread specific conceptions—
such as social justice—through society? What is being recalled here? I 
would assume that it is not simply a call for “economic equality” or 
liberal democracy, as has been suggested in much of the literature. In-
stead it is a pointed collective recollection of an era during which the 
material and cultural organization of society was different and during 
which “the people” were better off. This would then bring in questions 
of imperialism, geopolitics, pan-Arabism, and neoliberalism; questions 
that may have been elided had the focus been only on the idea of con-
struction of the concept of social justice. A genealogy of the concept 
therefore cannot be a basic historical overview, but rather a historical 
materialist interrogation. Thus we can’t take the notion of social justice 
for granted—instead we must determine what it meant to specific pro-
testers and what would need to change vis-à-vis the relations of produc-
tion for it to be achieved. In other words, social justice and democracy 
are tied to a specific organizing of the political economy.  
          Above all, the reason the neo-Gramscian approach to the idea-
tional-material relation is useful is because it explains why certain ideas 
triumph over others. The neo-Gramscian approach answers both the 
how and the why: it can look at the material structure of ideas and over-
come the false separation between materiality and ideas, and it can also 
locate ideas within their material foundations. 
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2 Questions and Methodology  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the specific details 
of the research project from the perspective of how research material was 
gathered and how it will be used, and also touches on some key debates 
that frame the dissertation. The chapter is made up of six sections. The 
first section builds off of the main research question presented in the pre-
vious chapter in order to present the various questions that will be ad-
dressed in each chapter. The second and third sections look at methodol-
ogy and method respectively. The fourth section looks at the various 
modes of production in the Egyptian context. The fifth section elaborates 
on the theoretical section on fractions of capital and labour by applying it 
to the Egyptian context. The final section addresses the question of ap-
plying Gramsci to postcolonial contexts, and how to approach the concept 
of hegemony in a case like Egypt. 
 
2.2 Research Questions 
 
 The overarching question this dissertation tries to answer is why the 
2011 Egyptian revolution happened when it did. This question will be an-
swered through an analysis of time and production. By looking at time as 
continuous and tied to production—analysed through the historic bloc—
several questions will be answered. 
  The first area of research will be the ruling class. Neo-Gramscians 
argue that structural divisions characterize the ruling class, but that these 
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divisions are minimized in the face of resistance from other forces. In 
other words, the ruling class tends to find ways to preserve the class when 
faced by external threats, as happened in Egypt in 2011. Focusing on the 
ruling class constitutes one avenue of understanding a hegemonic project 
as well as analysing broader social forces. What is crucial to note about 
groups within the ruling class is that they do not simply defend class inter-
ests; they define these interests. Their aim is to create strategies that will 
shape future forms of governance. In other words, they do more than 
simply accumulate capital; they create a discourse that makes this accumu-
lation easier and more profitable, in a process that can be likened to cre-
ating a consensus.  
  The first research question is therefore: which historic blocs will be 
analysed? Identifying historic blocs will be done through an analysis of 
time and production, in order to locate the rise and fall of blocs according 
to changes in production. This departs from conventional accounts of Egyp-
tian history that locate changes in the ruling class through changes in the 
head of state. Focusing on production does not mean reducing everything 
to economistic terms; rather production should be conceptualized as 
broadly as possible, and includes everything from knowledge, morals, and 
institutions to the production of economic relations themselves. In other 
words, the social relations of production in Egypt need to be located. This 
allows for an analysis that shows how specific social forces emerged due 
to specific relations of production.22 
  The second area of research is identifying the individuals and groups 
who make up each bloc. The individuals and relations that make up the 
ruling class cannot be understood in isolation from other dominant social 
forces. The question of social forces is closely linked to an analysis of his-
torical structures that produce these social forces. The state is among the 
more complex social forces, and should be seen within a state/society 
complex rather than as an object set apart from society. This will be dis-
cussed further on. The second research question therefore looks more 
                                                 
22 These questions show the importance of focusing on ideological as well as 
material processes. One example of this is from the work of van Apeldoorn, who 
starts his analysis by focusing on splits within the transnational capitalist elite, 
which eventually broadens out through contextualization. His work ends up 
providing in-depth structural and societal information, particularly with regards 
to labour and the labour movement (Van Apeldoorn 2009). 
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concretely within historic blocs in order to identify who constitutes each 
ruling bloc. This will be analysed at two levels: the individual elite level, 
which identifies personalities dominant within the historic bloc; and the 
broader class level which looks at the various fractions of capital and frac-
tions of labour that make up a given historic bloc. Both of these levels will 
locate the historic bloc by looking at production. 
  The third area of research is focused on hegemony and hegemonic 
projects. Analysing hegemony means understanding the social relations of 
production (mode of production), the forms of state (the various historical 
constructions of different forms of state) and the world order (interna-
tional geopolitics over time). These three spheres of activity that constitute 
hegemony—the social relations of production, forms of state, and the 
world order—should be analysed through three additional categories: ma-
terial capabilities, ideas and institutions. This allows for an analysis that 
includes materiality, subjective notions of social relations, and power rela-
tions as reflected by institutions. Understanding the mode of production, 
the social forces that emanate from the mode, the state as a social relation, 
and the imperial system are central to understanding the formation of a 
hegemonic project. A hegemonic project can be defined as successful if it 
galvanizes support behind a national program of action23 that claims to 
represent the general interest of society while explicitly or implicitly ad-
vancing the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (Jessop 1990).  
  A key aspect of any hegemonic project is a successful accumulation 
strategy. One example is neoliberalism. “Neoliberalism is a project of re-
storing capitalist class power by liberating capital from its post-war con-
straints through a program of marketization and privatization,” (Gill and 
Law 1989, 478). As an accumulation strategy, it has been linked to both 
globalization and financialization. Neoliberalism is hegemonic both ideo-
logically and in terms of policy, and when these two fail to “protect the 
nature of global governance” then military force is used (Cox 1999, 9). 
The world today is characterized by the integration of production and fi-
nancial structures and along with that, the emergence of associated forms 
                                                 
23 An example of concepts within a hegemonic discourse is Stephen Gill’s at-
tempt to delineate the key concepts that constitute the “new constitutionalist 
discourse.” These include: market efficiency, discipline and confidence, policy 
credibility, and policy consistency (Gill 1992, 168). Which concepts formed 
Egypt’s hegemonic project? 
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of consciousness (Gill 1993).24 Neoliberalization—which is the term I use 
throughout this dissertation—refers to the process whereby a neoliberal re-
gime of capital accumulation is established. This focus on process is im-
portant because it points to the uneven nature of its application—a coun-
try like Egypt does not simply become neoliberal, but is rather engulfed in 
a process with the ultimate aim of establishing a neoliberal form of accu-
mulation. Thus I use the term neoliberalization throughout. Roberto 
Roccu, drawing on Harvey, has argued: “The overall result of neoliberali-
zation amounts to what Harvey calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’, that 
is: the persistence of forms of primitive accumulation, ranging from re-
source extraction to privatization of property rights to asset-stripping, 
within the capitalist mode of production,” (2012, 72-73). 
  Tracing a hegemonic project thus includes analysing relations of 
production and power at several intertwined levels. The ruling class are 
central to the analysis, but the subaltern classes are equally predominant 
within any hegemonic project. Gramsci’s focus on the interplay between 
the ruled and the rulers allows for an analysis of hegemony that focuses 
on both domination as well as resistance.25 One way of understanding this 
                                                 
24 Some have argued that there is a movement towards consolidating a new form 
of hegemony with a different social base, which explains the existence of G7 and 
the World Economic Forum, among others. Both Gill and van Apeldoorn have 
done work on hegemonic projects, and shown how they are clearly linked to 
specific accumulation strategies. 
25 Timothy Mitchell has shown in his work by many parts of Egyptian society 
were not and have not been brought under neoliberal hegemony, and in fact 
continue to subvert it by creating and reproducing different forms of knowl-
edges. “The operation of the neoliberal myth of progress in market civilisation is 
intended to implicitly engender a fatalism that denies the construction of alterna-
tives to the prevailing order and thus negates the idea that history is made by 
collective human action. Neoliberalism holds the reified prospect of a stark uto-
pia. A pure market system is a utopian abstraction and any attempt to construct 
it fully would require an immensely authoritarian application of political power 
through the state,” (1999, 278). Mitchell’s theorizing on capitalism and those ex-
cluded by it is a useful means to approach the question of how hegemonic pro-
jects are subverted (Ibid). Mitchell argues that forces external to the essence of 
capitalist modernity continually divert the modernity they help constitute (Mitch-
ell 2000, 12). For this reason, I use neoliberalization to show that the spread of 
neoliberalism is always a continuous process. 
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interplay is by identifying the formation of the subaltern classes through 
specific developments within the sphere of production. This would in-
volve an analysis of the ideologies and mentalities of the subaltern classes 
and their affiliation to dominant social forms, thus allowing for an analysis 
of the consciousness of the subaltern classes. It is important to remember 
Gramsci’s comment that the subaltern classes are always subject to the activity 
of ruling groups, even when they contest them or rebel against them (Ibid, 
174). 
  As Persaud notes in his seminal work, Counter-Hegemony and Foreign 
Policy: The Dialectics of Marginal and Global Forces in Jamaica, hegemony and 
counter-hegemony26 are not two distinct processes but rather dialectically 
linked: “Methodologically it is difficult to separate hegemony and counter 
hegemony since they are dialectically rather than sequentially configured. 
It is impossible to locate the practice of hegemony outside of resistance 
or counter hegemony. Hegemonic practices are forms of defence by the 
dominant classes against the transformative actions from the marginal-
ized,” (2001, 66). Thus it is precisely through an analysis of both fractions 
of capital and labour that this dialectical relationship can be probed.27 
                                                 
26 I would add a reservation on the use of the term counter-hegemony, as it 
somehow suggests that something can exist outside of hegemony, which is prob-
lematic from a Gramscian point of view. Rather I conceptualize counter-hegem-
ony as in a relational and dialectical relationship with hegemony. By focusing on 
the subaltern through fractions of labour, it thus becomes clear that these frac-
tions are constitutive of hegemony, not rebelling or reacting against it from out-
side of hegemony. 
27 Adam Morton’s work on passive revolution in Mexico is also useful. Through 
analysing the agrarian-based EZLN movement, he shows how fractions of the 
subaltern classes are very much active in posing a challenging to hegemonic 
forces. Uneven development within Mexico (which he links to the international 
and the national) and land reforms on the part of the neoliberal ruling class have 
led to a situation in which masses of peasants have challenged and contested the 
hegemonic project. “As peasants became further excluded from the processes of 
capitalist accumulation and detrimentally affected by rapidly changing social re-
lations of production they began to embrace new forms of political organiza-
tion,” (Morton 2007, 181). This led to consciousness-raising by different parts of 
the subaltern classes in order to demonstrate the exploitative nature underpin-
ning social relations that were related to forces of production. “New peasant net-
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The third research question therefore looks at the hegemonic project built 
by each historic bloc. This will also be analysed using time and production, 
by looking at the rise and fall of each bloc through its construction of a 
project built on both material and ideational foundations.  
  The fourth area of research looks at the breakdown of historic blocs, 
or the creation of political crises. A historic bloc breaks down when the 
hegemonic project is no longer strong enough to maintain the class alli-
ance formed under it. In Egypt, the increasing need for coercion meant 
that the hegemonic project was becoming less tenable. This can be ex-
plained by looking at changes within Egypt’s ruling class. Understanding 
the decline of a hegemonic project or a moment of crisis can thus partly 
be explained through an analysis of the ruling class, as well as the analysis 
of fractions of labour. Of particular interest is the challenge posed to the 
military’s position in the ruling class from a new “neoliberal” elite led by 
Hosni Mubarak’s son, Gamal—the “government of businessmen” men-
tioned earlier. This challenge led to strong realignments within the ruling 
class that had an effect on both the ability of the ruling class to implement 
its hegemonic project as well as on the military’s decision to intervene in 
the 2011 uprising. It becomes clear that the new “neoliberal” elite threat-
ened the hegemonic project and thus the entire ruling class. The military’s 
intervention in both 2011 and 2013 can be theorized as attempts to both 
save the ruling class and its hegemonic project, as well as re-center itself 
within the ruling class. Accordingly, scholars such as De Smet have char-
acterized 2011 as a passive revolution, in which a new configuration of 
social forces came to dominate Egypt (2016). In other words, 2011 her-
alded a new historic bloc. 
  The fourth research question builds off of this to look at which fac-
tors led to the breakdown of each historic bloc. Again by looking at time 
                                                 
works progressed with a less centralised structure and a more critical stance to-
ward the roe of conventional political parties,” (Ibid, 183). The EZLN rebellion 
of 1994 was a direct result of this and a response to the neoliberal restructuring 
of the Mexican state and NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement). 
Morton also shows how the ruling class’ hegemony was slowly weakened also as 
a result of the neoliberal restructuring: “There was a growing absence of hegemonic 
rule as the social and institutional bases of peasant control were altered,” (Ibid, 
187). 
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and production it becomes clear that specific political crises led to imbal-
ances within the configuration of each bloc that eventually caused it to 
decline and a new one to take its place. Identifying the factors that causes 
these crises is central to this question. 
  The final area of research focuses on the 2011 revolution itself. The 
research question that makes up the last chapter of the dissertation focuses 
specifically on the 2011 revolution and understanding what caused the po-
litical crisis that led to it. This entails an analysis of the ruling class that 
emerged in the 1990s, and its eventual downfall in 2011.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Encountering the Field 
 
 This next section will discuss the research areas in the dissertation and 
the type of material collected to answer the questions posed. This section 
is split into two sub-sections, each reflecting a different aspect of my re-
search project: the first is time and the second is production. The division 
reflects an artificial distinction based solely on the theories that inform 
each section and, by extension, the types of data collected. It is important 
to note that while I initially conceptualized my dissertation as an empirical 
project, the more research I did on Egypt and the revolution, the more 
clear it became that a theoretically-induced project was more relevant to 
the questions I wanted to ask. Because of the ways in which the 2011 rev-
olution has been analyzed and presented in the literature, it became clear 
that a theoretical intervention that would change the frame of analysis was 
a more useful contribution to make. There is more than enough infor-
mation and empirical data on Egypt. The major gap I have identified in 
the literature is that no one has used this empirical data to look at hegem-
ony, capitalism, labour or time. Using the empirical data that already exists, 
I have aimed at telling a different story; at presenting a new way of enaging 
the empirical data. This is why I refer to this dissertation as an theoreti-
cally-induced one.  
  For this reason, much of my methodology has focused on collecting 
material that will allow me to make this theoretical intervention. This ma-
terial has largely consisted of secondary sources, which I have approached 
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and read using new theoretical tools. While much research has been done 
on political and economic change in Egypt since the 1800s, this data has 
been analyzed through particular lenses, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Because of my broad aim to present a new view on what is an 
expansive time period, I chose not to conduct primary research myself and 
instead focus on the data already available. This is not to say that I do not 
see data or data collection as unaffected by the theoretical positioning of 
the scholar who collected it; in many cases I only used information that 
was verified in multiple scholarly works. For chapters three through five, 
memoirs were often used as a means of piecing together events. 
  The first area that my fieldwork focused on was the mode of pro-
duction. Indeed a major part of the dissertation focuses on tracing the 
historical origins of the current articulation/mode of production in Egypt 
by using historical material. The mode of production essentially shows the 
distinctive way in which people produce in order to subsist and survive. It 
is a combination of the productive forces at any given time (human labour 
power and the means of production) and the relations of production 
(property, laws, relations between classes, and so on). In other words, pro-
ductive forces refer to techniques and methods, and relations of produc-
tion refer to ways of organizing those techniques and methods. The pres-
ence of different modes existing together is termed an articulation. A 
capitalist society is one in which capitalism is the dominant mode. While 
this has increasingly become the case in Egypt, it is also necessary to look 
at other modes that persist and that combine with the capitalist mode. 
Relations of production include two important aspects: the way in which 
ownership of the means of production is laid out; and the distribution of 
surplus value. It is through these two aspects that class rule in any given 
society is made concrete. To locate these distributions is to locate power, 
where power is clearly connected to the forces of production or produc-
tive forces. This requires, however, looking at the social aspect: how soci-
ety distributes wealth. The material collected from the research focusing 
on the mode of production in Egypt demonstrates that different modes 
co-exist alongside one another and are articulated in specific ways. These 
different modes give rise to different relations of production and therefore 
different norms and values. Moreover—and this is crucial—these rela-
tions of production are tied to the ruling class in very particular ways. In 
order to understand the Egyptian ruling class and shifts within it over time 
thus necessitates outlining the mode of production and the relations of 
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production that stem from it. The material collected from this section 
therefore fulfills the double aim of providing historical context as well as 
theoretically clarifying the relation between the ruling class and production 
at various points in time.  
  The second area of research focuses on the ruling class. The aim is 
to locate them within various eras denoted through production rather than 
linear time. The question “why now” is clearly a temporal one. However, 
given that there are many ways to address time, it is necessary to specify 
my approach and to explain how this ties in with Gramscian theory. His-
torical materialism in general is a historical approach, and therefore it is 
taken for granted that an analysis of history is part and parcel of research. 
A useful second approach to history can be found in the work of Fernand 
Braudel, a French historian who wrote extensively on the notion of the 
longue durée. In the first part of this part of my research, I looked at the 
conception of time in the work of historical materialists as well as in the 
work of Braudel. In the second part, I looked at the question of production. 
Indeed the methodology of this project rests of an analysis of these two 
aspects: time and production. On the one hand, the event that occurred 
in 2011 is clearly the starting point of this project. However, to understand 
this event it needs to be historicized. This is where the specific analysis of 
time comes in, particularly the longue durée. On the other hand, it is as-
sumed that the underlying forces driving changes or continuities over time 
are material in nature. This is where production comes in. Indeed it is pre-
cisely this combination and time and production that reveals the historical 
material approach and that allows for an analysis of how social forces re-
lated to the social relations of production have specific relationships to the 
temporal. How are the questions of time and production linked to the 
ruling class? As demonstrated above, an understanding of time that is non-
linear and that focuses on continuities and ruptures allows me to lay out a 
very different picture of the changes that have occurred within the Egyp-
tian ruling class. This is because I have located these changes in relation 
to changes in production, which take priority in defining shifts that happen 
at all other levels. In other words, a change in the organization of produc-
tion is the explanatory variable that explains changes within the ruling 
class. This automatically breaks with traditional accounts of Egypt in po-
litical science that tend to analyze elites by era. In this dissertation I refer 
to the Nasserist historic bloc, which corresponds with the first half of 
Nasser’s rule—1952 until 1965; the Infitah historic bloc, which runs from 
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1965 until the start of the 1990s; and the neoliberal bloc, which runs from 
the early 1990s until 2011. Thus we see that the blocs do not correspond 
to the traditional classification of the Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak eras. 
 
2.3.2. Time 
 
 The concept of time is central to this dissertation because of the his-
torical materialist approach that is used. I conceptualize time as non-linear 
and as tied to production. The argument of this dissertation is that it is 
only by looking at Egyptian history through the lens of production and 
historic blocs that we can investigate why the 2011 revolution happened 
when it did. To conceptualize time as non-linear, I use Braudel’s work in 
particular.  
  Fernand Braudel’s work on the longue durée (1982, 2002) has been 
particularly useful for scholars working within the Marxist tradition. 
Braudel is known for the concept of the longue durée and specified that 
different conceptualizations of time should co-exist in any analysis. His 
work actively criticized historians and social scientists that looked at his-
tory as a series of dramatic discontinuities, and instead emphasized the 
continuous nature of history. This was opposed to views of history that 
focused on events or that focused on the short-term, as well as views that 
looked at history in a linear or schematic fashion. Even views of history 
that focused on crisis moments, such as revolutions, were criticized by 
Braudel, who insisted that history should not be analyzed through such 
events nor through the actions of individuals. History is beyond the aware-
ness of individual actors: they make history, but history bears them along 
(Harris 2004, 163). 
  The focus on continuity does not mean that Braudel ignored historic 
ruptures, events, or breaks. These are also important to temporal analysis, 
but should not be seen as the crucial driving force of history. He spoke of 
‘breaks’ or events ‘bursting forth’ as a way of highlighting these ruptures, 
but overall emphasizes that history is connectedness rather than discon-
nectedness. Moreover, when he does refer to breaks, he uses terminology 
that emphasizes the cyclical nature of these breaks, such as “turning 
points,” “swinging pendulum,” “turning wheel,” and “motors,” (Ibid). 
Braudel saw history as taking place through three temporal dimensions. 
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The first is events, which are short-lived and dramatic; the second is con-
jectures, which are longer cyclical processes; and the third is the longue 
durée, a long historical span that changes slowly and plays a role in struc-
turing the present.  
  Braudel has been positively received by many working within the 
Marxist tradition because of his materialism and his emphasis on history. 
Both agree that history cannot be explained through individual actions and 
decisions, but rather through structural conditions that produce these hu-
man actions. One critique that can be made towards Braudel by historical 
materialists is his tendency towards structuralism at the expense of any 
meaningful notion of agency. As Harris notes, Braudel sometimes tends 
to see people as merely instruments through which structures and histor-
ical processes act. Another difference is how the underlying structures that 
produce the conditions of human action are conceptualized. For example, 
what decides the ruptures and breaks for Braudel? Here a historical mate-
rialist approach can be more useful. Indeed, Gramsci’s work contains a 
very complex approach to time that focuses on both structure and agency. 
See for example: 
 
“It is precisely the study of these ‘intervals’ of varying fre-       
quency which enables one to reconstruct the relations on 
the one hand between structure and superstructure, and 
on the other between the development of organic move-
ment and conjunctural movement in the structure,” 
(1971, 180). 
 
Indeed the Amsterdam School has expressly focused on the recurrence of 
certain relations as a means of analyzing politics. As Overbeek has pointed 
out, this is what distinguishes the Amsterdam School’s approach to ne-
oliberalism: “The rise of neoliberalism as well as its specific characteristics 
has been explicitly situated in a longer-term historical perspective. (…) 
This recognition defined one of the principle tasks of the AP (Amsterdam 
Project), which is to understand and explain the continuities involved and 
the underlying structural dynamics responsible for the recurrence of the 
liberal phenomenon,” (2004, 129). This has been inspired largely by the 
work of Braudel, and the quote above shows that Gramsci too saw the 
study of recurrence as important.  
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     Braudel called for a more complex approach to history that looks at 
continuity, structures, and movement, and that does not focus excessively 
on individuals and events, although these too are important. As he wrote, 
“Every event, however brief, has to be sure a contribution to make, to 
light up some dark corner or even some wide vista of history,” (2002, 901). 
A historical materialist approach brings to this an analysis of structure and 
agency grounded in changes in production.  
 
2.3.3. Production 
 
 In much of the work on Egypt, there is a tendency to present history 
in a conventional manner that is linear and associated with its rulers (the 
Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak eras). Time is seen as linear, and history is often 
recounted either through events or through influential individuals. More-
over, what is understood as the “political” is given priority: political events 
such as changes in the head of state or governing bodies; changes in laws; 
and so on. Sometimes an “economic” explanation is used to explain these 
political changes, but overall there tends to be a distinction between the 
political and the economic, as well as the predominance of the political 
over the economic. A different approach to history and time is the histor-
ical materialist one, combined here with the above-mentioned approach 
used by Braudel. This view of history is non-linear and instead focuses on 
the cyclical nature of history. While Braudel seems to have preferred the 
notion of history as continuity, historical materialists have amended this 
view somewhat by speaking of disjunctures. Points of rupture are as sig-
nificant as continuity.  
  In order to demonstrate the differences between these two ap-
proaches to time and history (the conventional vs. the historical material-
ist, it is useful to present an overview of how they would look at contem-
porary Egyptian history. What are the points of rupture according to both 
approaches? Where were the continuities? Where did production continue 
and politics rupture, and vice versa? 
  Conventional accounts tend to highlight specific historical eras. 
Egypt during colonialism, and Egypt after independence is a common one, 
as well as the distinction between Egypt pre-1952 and Egypt post-1952. 
In such a history, specific ruptures are emphasized, usually corresponding 
92  
 
 
to political shifts in who is ruling the country. There is the reign of Mu-
hammad Ali, followed by the British occupation and parliamentary de-
mocracy. There is a significant rupture in 1952 with the Free Officers and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, followed by another significant rupture with Sadat 
and Infitah in the 1970s. The 2000s are then characterized as a relatively 
stable period, with a focus on either decreasing or increasing authoritari-
anism, depending on the author. 
  It is clear, however, that a historical materialist approach would 
identify different ruptures, as well as different explanatory variables for 
both these ruptures as well as the continuities. Muhammad Ali’s reign 
would certainly constitute an important rupture, but for reasons related to 
production. His introduction of industrialization, his emphasis on state-
centered control of the economy, and his introduction of the capitalist 
mode of production all brought about significant changes in Egypt’s mode 
of production and consequently both the social relations of production 
and the ruling class. The British occupation was important but did not per 
se constitute a rupture; many of the tendencies introduced by Ali and re-
inforced by Ismail continued under the British but in an accelerated fash-
ion. There was an intensification of the capitalist mode of production as 
well as an increase in the amount and influence of foreign capital. Moreo-
ver, the various dates suggested for Egyptian independence—1919, 1922, 
1936, 1952 and 1954 all seem to suggest a linear progression to full inde-
pendence when in fact closer analysis reveals that 1936 was a regression 
compared to 1919. This shows the importance of not imposing linear time 
analysis on events. 
  Nasser and the 1952 revolution constitutes another rupture, but not 
as extensive as assumed in the conventional approach to history. It is clear 
that many of the tendencies that emerged during this period are repetitions 
of what occurred under Muhammad Ali, most notably a focus on indus-
trialization and state control of the economy. The state thus became the 
central actor once again, impacting the ruling class and the direction of the 
economy. Despite this similarity between the two ruling classes and the 
strength of the state in both it remains crucial to point out the junctures 
in each that point to differences. For example, under both ruling classes 
we see a focus on industrialization, but the role of foreign capital differed. 
Similarly, both ruling classes had different relations to subaltern forces. 
This suggests that just because both brought the state to the center does 
not mean they were similar in other aspects. 
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  Nevertheless, despite claims to socialism, it is clear that this period 
was a capitalist one, directed by nationalism and the state. In the conven-
tional approach, the Sadat era is also identified as a major point of rupture. 
A historical materialist approach, however, would show that while there 
certainly was a point of rupture here—Infitah and the opening up of the 
Egyptian economy—many of the tendencies that emerged during this pe-
riod were a result of shifts under Nasser. Here it becomes important to 
analyze continuities as well as ruptures. In other words, had the Nasser 
regime opted for a different course, it is possible that Egypt would have 
taken a different direction under Sadat. Finally, a focus on production 
would allow for the recognition of a final rupture—often overlooked in 
the literature—that occurred in the mid-2000s. This refers to the emer-
gence of a new influential group within the ruling class, headed by Gamal 
Mubarak. It is here that some of the tendencies introduced during Sadat 
materialized, including the increased pace of neoliberalization. This rup-
ture would only be discernable through a focus on production. Moreover, 
it is arguably this rupture that is the culmination of the various tendencies 
dating back to Muhammad Ali, as well as the final trigger for the 2011 
revolution. 
  How are the questions of time and production linked to the ruling 
class? As demonstrated above, an understanding of time that is non-linear 
and that focuses on continuities and ruptures allows me to lay out a very 
different picture of the changes that have occurred within the Egyptian 
ruling class. This is because I have located these changes in relation to 
changes in production, which take priority in defining shifts that happen 
at all other levels. In other words, a change in the organization of produc-
tion is the explanatory variable that explains changes within the ruling 
class. This automatically breaks with traditional accounts of Egypt in po-
litical science that tend to analyze elites by era (the Nasser era, the Sadat 
era, and so on). 
 
2.3.4 Synthesis 
 
 How does this project bring together time and production in order to 
create a viable methodology that analyses Egypt’s political and economic 
transitions? Production and time form the centrepieces of this research 
94  
 
 
project—they are the concepts through which all of the analysis takes 
place. Concurrent to these two concepts are the theoretical notions of the 
historic bloc, narrow interests, moral reforms, and hegemony. In each 
chapter the aim is to locate the historic bloc, and trace the ways in which 
it defined its narrow interests. After these narrow interests are located, the 
aim is to look at how these interests were universalized through moral 
reforms. In other words, how did each bloc attempt to spread their narrow 
interests while simultaneously maintaining the façade that they were in the 
interest of society. Thus time and production are key at every stage of this 
process. Narrow interests are defined vis-à-vis production, by locating the 
different fractions of capital and labour within production. It is also by 
locating dissenting fractions within the relations of production that we can 
understand actors excluded by each historic bloc. Time is key in that it 
allows us to look at the shifts and transformations between historic blocs 
in order to analyse change and continuity, as well as to answer the question 
of why blocs rise and fall. Each historic bloc is thus established through 
time and production—these are the key methodological tools.  
 
2.4 Method 
2.4.1 Mode of Production 
 
 To trace the mode of production for the period in question I relied on 
historical literature as well as contemporary data, as well as both theoretical 
and empirical input. In order to analyze this literature I relied on historical 
analysis. The aim of such analysis is to develop a narrative about a partic-
ular event, context or series of events based on historical material. By re-
viewing and interpreting sources, a narrative is formed that is historically 
grounded and that provides explanations of large-scale important out-
comes (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 4). Following this, the histori-
cal material was analyzed in order to locate the various historical narra-
tives.  
  In order to understand the mode of production, the articulation of 
various modes, and the changes over time, I looked to the work of Marx 
in Capital, where definitions and examples of what the mode of production 
is and how it is the basis of understanding the economic system are clearly 
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explained and indeed form the basis of a Marxist understanding of pro-
duction. In the case of the Egyptian context in particular, I used the theo-
retical work of Samir Amin, Nazih Ayubi and Charles Issawi, who are the 
prominent political economists writing on Egypt from a Marxist perspec-
tive. In the following section I provide an overview of their work on the 
historical changes in the mode of production in the case of Egypt and the 
broader Middle East. Their work also provides useful empirical data. In-
deed for much of the historical research in my dissertation, I relied on 
previous work because the data is very difficult to come by. 
  In order to understand the contemporary mode of production in 
Egypt the work of Samir Amin and Adam Hanieh in particular was key to 
delineating the shift from productive to finance capital. In addition, data 
from several sources in Egypt were used including key ministries such as 
the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of 
the Economy and the Ministry of Investment; CAPMAS (Central Agency 
for Public Mobilization and Statistics) which is the main statistics database 
in Egypt for anything related to the economy; the Central Bank of Egypt 
(CBE) which issues extensive reports on the Egyptian economy; Eco-
nomic and Business History Research Center (EBHRC) at the American 
University in Cairo; the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) 
which issues reports and analysis on the Egyptian economy; and the Egyp-
tian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), an NGO headed 
by Khaled Ali (former presidential candidate) that both collects data and 
issues reports on the Egyptian economy, in particular in relation to labour.  
  The labour component was of particular interest to me. As I was 
not trained in economics, I decided to begin with an analysis of changing 
labour patterns in Egypt over a specific period (2000s) as this seemed a 
relatively uncomplicated way of approaching the question of capital, la-
bour and production. Theoretical work by Joel Beinin, Robert Bianchi, 
Marius Deeb, Adam Hanieh, Mahmoud Bassiouny, and Anne Alexander 
was helpful in understanding the relationship between capital and labour 
in Egypt as well as the multiple forms of resistance towards capital from 
labour over time, particular in the 2000s. Alongside this, data collected 
from the above-mentioned sources allowed me to analyze changing pat-
terns in labour.  
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2.4.2 The Ruling Class 
 
 As mentioned in the methodology section, an analysis of the ruling 
class will focus both on an understanding of time that is non-linear and an 
analysis of production. The analysis of time relies mainly on the work of 
Braudel, which I touched on briefly in the previous section. The analysis 
of production will build on the two previous parts of this section: the 
mode of production and the circulation of capital. Using the data collected 
in those sections, I will be able to reconstruct the specific relations be-
tween the ruling class and production over time, understood here as non-
linear. Thus the focus will be on continuities and disjunctures in produc-
tion and how these relate to the ruling class.  
  Theoretical work on the ruling class will come primarily from Gram-
sci as well as important neo-Gramscians such as Andreas Bieler, Adam 
Morton, Robert Cox, Kees van der Pijl, and Otto Holman. This work al-
lowed me to form a framework with which to understand the ruling class 
through production, understood here as both material and ideational. 
Work by Egyptian Marxists Samir Amin, Nazih Ayubi and Arab political 
economist Charles Issawi allowed me to analyze the ruling class in the 
context of Egypt, thus applying the general framework to the specific con-
text.  
  Empirically, there are several sources that have allowed me to collect 
information on the Egyptian ruling class, both historically and contempo-
rarily. Memoirs have been of particular importance, especially in under-
standing the historical period. Since 2011, moreover, several memoirs 
have come out that cover the contemporary period, and these have been 
extremely useful. Empirical data on the Egyptian economy from the 
sources mentioned previously has also been useful here, as it has pointed 
to key players in the world of investment that are part and parcel of the 
ruling class. Finally, previous literature, analysis, and reports have provided 
a final source of information. Work on labour in particular has been useful 
in highlighting the structure of the ruling class, the way it functions, and 
the shifts within it over time. This work includes ethnographic studies, 
data on Egyptian labour, and interviews with workers from other sources. 
  The decision to focus on the topic theoretically led me to concep-
tualize my field in a more abstract sense: as consisting of archives, histor-
ical records, memoirs, previous research by Egyptian (and some non-
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Egyptian) political economists, reports by economic institutions, Egyptian 
state reports and census data, and secondary source material about the 
ruling class in Egypt over the past one hundred years, including interview 
data from other scholars. My main argument is that what is unique to my 
project is not new data or information, but rather a new and innovative 
framework that can help in understanding not only the 2011 uprising, but 
also the major structural changes in Egypt’s political economy over the 
past century. Therefore my focus has been on refining the theoretical ap-
proach (neo-Gramscian and uneven and combined development) in order 
to create a framework that would adequately address some of the im-
portant questions facing Egypt post-2011, key among them the question 
of neoliberalism as well as the restoration of previously-dominant social 
forces. This has meant that the information I collected was more along 
the lines of historical and contemporary events, processes and relations 
that can help me trace shifts within the ruling class and that eventually 
allowed me to connect these to the changes in the mode of production. 
 
2.5 Fractions of Capital and Fractions of Labour in Egypt  
 
 Interestingly, the Egyptian case shows that the number of fractions of 
labour and capital in each historic bloc declined steadily over time, until 
the 2000s when there wasn’t even a historic bloc to speak of. Before Egyp-
tian independence, it is impossible to speak of a historic bloc given the 
colonial condition, but there was a ruling class made up of several frac-
tions: a British colonial fraction that extracted surplus through the impo-
sition of foreign capital, the domination of foreign banks, the introduction 
of private property, and the extraction of raw material; an agrarian fraction 
made up of Egyptian landlords who extracted surplus through exploiting 
peasants on the land that was now their private property; and Ismail Pasha 
and the state who still controlled aspects of Egypt’s production but were 
not as dominant as under Muhammad Ali. By the early 1900s, one more 
fraction was added. This fraction was made up of native Egyptian capital-
ists who had started to invest in industry (this fraction included some for-
eign Egyptian-born capitalists as well but these were a minority). 
 The 1952 revolution led to major changes in Egypt and to the es-
tablishment of a new historic bloc. This bloc was smaller than the previous 
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one. The dominant fraction within the bloc was made up of the Free Of-
ficers (the military) and the Egyptian state. A second fraction was made 
up of the agrarian fraction, which was weaker than it had been during the 
previous bloc because of the Free Officers’ successful attempts at destroy-
ing its material power base. A third fraction was an emerging fraction that 
focused on the private sector. It was this fraction that became powerful 
within the ruling class in the next historic bloc. The historic bloc within 
which the Free Officers were powerful declined because of the 1967 de-
feat to Israel, which brought to the fore the central contradictions of the 
bloc. Following this, the fraction of capital that accumulated through the 
private sector began to dominate, particularly through opening up the 
economy to foreign direct investment and speculation through real estate 
and finance. Within this new historic bloc, the fraction of capital headed 
by the military played a lesser role than in the previous bloc, as its political 
power was curbed. A third fraction of capital was represented by industri-
alists and those who accumulated through the public sector—these groups 
had been in a more powerful position under Nasser but remained a key 
fraction of capital because of the sheer strength of the public sector. Nev-
ertheless, it was without doubt the “Sadatist bourgeoisie” that dominated 
the ruling class during this historic bloc. The emergence of a new fraction 
of capital in the late 1990s contributed to the decline of the Infitah bloc, 
but this new fraction ultimately failed to create a new bloc or hegemony.  
 We already know that there was a decline in the number of fractions 
of labour in the historic bloc over time. It is more difficult to identify frac-
tions of labour than fractions of capital because fractions of capital are 
usually more organized and thus somewhat easier to delineate. In order to 
identify fractions of labour it is not always enough to simply distinguish 
workers based on their relation to the mode of production, e.g. industrial 
workers, peasants, and so on. At some points, workers within the same 
“industry” were represented by different organizations, and at other times 
workers from different “industries” were represented by one organization. 
Thus initially I will attempt to use specific labour actions to trace the var-
ious fractions of labour that were included and which were excluded in 
each historic bloc. 
 Under Muhammad Ali, Egypt was still largely an agricultural country 
and thus the majority of workers were peasants, although there was a petty 
bourgeoisie made up of artisans and merchants. Because the mode of pro-
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duction was largely tributary, with the state collecting a tribute from peas-
ants who worked on the land, and because there was not yet widespread 
private property, the antagonism between capital and labour took on a 
very different form than it would later when the capitalist mode was es-
tablished. We cannot really speak of fractions of labour that were in the 
historic bloc during this time, and this raises important questions about 
whether we can even use historic blocs as a unit of analysis for periods 
that were pre-capitalist. This will be discussed in Chapter Three. Never-
theless, there were numerous recorded peasant revolts during this period, 
which can be used to trace the specific dynamics between those who 
owned the means of production and those who did not.  
 The next historic bloc was a period during which there were a very 
high number of workers’ actions. This bloc was dominated by the colonial 
fraction of capital, and it was through this fraction that the capitalist mode 
of production was deepened. This led to a diversification in the fractions 
of labour within the country, as industrial workers grew in number. There 
was also a sizable fraction of foreign labour, made up of foreigners who 
had settled in Egypt such as the Greeks and Italians. Alongside these frac-
tions were the peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. The growing nationalist 
movement had a tremendous impact on workers during this historic bloc, 
and this made it near impossible for the ruling class to include any major 
fractions of labour in its bloc. The large number of workers’ actions were 
often heavily nationalist and anti-colonialist, and in a historic bloc domi-
nated by colonial fraction of capital, this made it difficult for a hegemonic 
project backed up by significant fractions of labour to succeed. In other 
words, because of the intersection between workers and nationalist anti-
imperialism, the historic bloc of this period did not include any fractions 
of labour. Most Egyptian workers were not only ideologically in support 
of independence, but also carried out actions in support of this. One of 
the biggest actions was the tramway workers’ strike, which in fact repre-
sents one of the most famous strikes in Egyptian labour history. The Brit-
ish occupation often responded to these strikes with violence, and was no 
doubt worried about the anti-colonial tendencies of many of the fractions 
of labour. During this historic bloc, there was a moment during which a 
native fraction of capital, represented politically by the Wafd, looked as 
though it was poised to integrate some significant fractions of labour into 
the historic bloc. This attempt failed, however, as workers soon rebelled 
against what they saw as a paternalistic attempt at co-optation.  
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 The following historic bloc, however, managed to integrate multiple 
fractions of labour within its hegemonic project. Nasser’s land reforms 
integrated peasants, while his drive for industrialization integrated indus-
trial workers. Moreover, the massive expansion of the public sector and 
the bureaucracy integrated the petty bourgeoisie workers, thus ensuring 
that the middle class were some of Nasser’s biggest supporters. We see 
during this historic bloc an ideological and material attempt to gain the 
support of fractions of labour, through economic reforms as well as the 
discourse of Arab socialism. Thus the historic bloc of this period saw little 
resistance from fractions of labour—showing how some could conflate 
their ideological norms – Arab Socialism – with preponderant mode of 
production of socialism. This must be linked to the ways in which the 
ruling class continued the ideological and material struggle for nationalism 
and independence, a struggle that had dominated workers’ interventions 
for at least forty years. Although it made sure to use coercion to deal with 
the Communist movement, overall it managed to create the strongest his-
toric bloc Egypt in modern Egyptian history precisely because there were 
multiple fractions of capital and labour within the bloc. Indeed this will be 
a key argument in the chapter focusing on this historic bloc: was this bloc 
the strongest because of its integration of multiple fractions of labour? 
While other blocs have had multiple fractions of capital within the bloc, it 
is arguably only this particular bloc that managed to integrate multiple 
fractions of labour. 
 The historic bloc that developed under Infitah saw a decline in the 
number of fractions of labour integrated within the bloc. Indeed this bloc 
arguably did not manage to integrate any fractions, with the exception of 
businessmen’s associations. This can be explained by the fact that very few 
workers stood to gain from the changes being implemented by the domi-
nant fractions of capital within this bloc. At the same time, because this 
bloc marked a dramatic turning point, it would take fractions of labour 
well over two decades before resistance to neoliberal restructuring 
emerged. In my analysis on this bloc, I want to focus on this notion of a 
turning point to show that the 1970s and 1980s were a time of flux, not 
only for fractions of capital but also fractions of labour. Even though it 
was during this time that we witnessed two major revolts—the bread riots 
and the Central Security Forces uprising—these were different from the 
more organized resistance to neoliberalism from fractions of labour that 
would come later. This raises an interesting question: despite the lack of 
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major fractions of labour within the historic bloc of this period, we still 
see that this bloc managed to ideologically and materially set the tone for 
the coming forty years, ultimately setting the stage for the 2011 revolution. 
How could a bloc that was, on paper, quite weak, manage to do this? I will 
argue that here it is necessary to bring in a transnational lens that shows 
the ways in which the global turn towards neoliberal capitalism during this 
period provided crucial support to specific fractions of capital within 
Egypt. 
 The final ruling class before the 2011 revolution also failed to inte-
grate any major fractions of labour within it, and indeed failed to establish 
a bloc altogether. Moreover, it is during this ruling class that we see the 
ideological failure to extend the hegemonic project built around neoliberal 
capitalism, even as neoliberal expansion was underway. This failure is cen-
tral to understanding the 2011 revolution. While the fractions of labour 
within historic blocs as we progress chronologically declined steadily and 
consistently, we see that the same was the case with fractions of capital 
with the exception of the shift from the Muhammad Ali historic bloc to 
the British colonial bloc, and the transition from the Nasser to the Infitah 
bloc, which both had three fractions of capital. Overall, however, there is 
a decline in the number of fractions of both capital and labour making up 
the historic blocs over time. By the time we get to 2011, there isn’t a his-
toric bloc to speak of. 
 
2.6 Reading Gramsci in the Postcolonial World 
 
The following two sections address the question of traveling theory by 
looking at how Gramsci’s concepts work when they travel to contexts out-
side of Southern Italy. Key here is how the concept of hegemony can be 
applied to countries that were under colonial rule, as this touches on a 
question I tackle in Chapter Five, namely: can the pre-1952 era be under-
stood through the concepts of hegemony and historic blocs? While this 
section aims to look at the rich theoretical debate surrounding Gramsci 
and the postcolonial world, the following section tries to ground this de-
bate by offering a way of conceptualizing production in countries like 
Egypt. By looking at the rich work done by Arab Marxists, I show that 
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when concepts such as the mode of production travel, they need to be 
modified before they can be applied. 
 
2.6.1 Marx and Gramsci in Egypt 
 
“Socialist action is no longer compelled to observe literally 
laws formulated in the 19th century. The progress in means 
of production, the development of nationalist and labour 
movements in the face of domination of imperialism and mo-
nopolies, the increasing chances of world peace, as a result of 
the influence of moral forces and, at the same time of the ef-
fect of the balance of atomic terror - all these factors com-
bined of necessity created, and should create, a new situation 
for socialist experiments, entirely different from what existed 
in the past,” (Nasser 1959, 15). 
 
“Social freedom, namely socialism, does not mean observing 
rigid theories which have not arisen out of the nature of na-
tional experience,” (Ibid, 38). 
 
These two quotes from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s book The Philosophy of the 
Revolution touch on an important question for any scholar doing research 
on the Arab world using Marxist concepts, namely: how do theories and 
concepts change when they travel to contexts outside of those in which 
they were created? This seems an especially pertinent question to ask about 
Gramscian concepts. Gramsci is a theorist who was deeply rooted in the 
movements and context about which he wrote, and he consistently made 
this clear. The South of Italy and the workers’ movement based in those 
cities were what inspired Gramsci to make the theoretical interventions 
that he did. This shows that context is key when it comes to Marxist anal-
ysis, and also shows that when we use Gramsci’s concepts elsewhere we 
need to think about the ways in which they were connected to Southern 
Italy and hence the ways in which they might be disconnected from Egypt. 
The two Nasser quotes above hint at this possible disconnection: on the 
one hand, there are theories and laws that Nasser contextualizes histori-
cally as emerging in the 19th century. Since then, times have changed, and 
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he focuses here specifically on imperialism, monopolies, and the rise of 
nationalist and labour movements, arguing that these changes mean that 
we can no longer look to laws and theories formulated in another time to 
outline socialist action for today. This is an important point that Marxists 
and socialists continue to debate today, and is what frames the questions 
asked in this section. 
 In this section I want to focus on the specific question of hegemony. 
On the one hand, there is disagreement over what Gramsci meant by he-
gemony: did it refer to creating and expanding hegemony over society as 
a whole, or did it refer to creating hegemony only within a historic bloc? 
Throughout this dissertation I use the second understanding. On the other 
hand, there has been a debate about whether the concept of hegemony 
can be used in non-Western contexts. This is the debate I focus on here.  
 Ranajit Guha, one of the more influential scholars within the Subal-
tern Studies School, has perhaps made the most important intervention in 
this debate. The Subaltern school emerged as a response to class analysis 
that tended to over-emphasize elites at the expense of the subaltern. The 
“politics of the people” was a central focus for subaltern scholars as a 
means of demonstrating that politics is not just made by elites—be they 
colonial or indigenous elites—but also exists among the subaltern seg-
ments of society. Guha’s main work on hegemony—Dominance Without 
Hegemony—is an important intervention because it focuses on the ways in 
which postcolonial societies differ from countries that were former colo-
nial powers. He argues that understanding the limitations faced by local 
bourgeois elites during colonial and neo-colonial times allows us to 
acknowledge that hegemony was always based more on dominance and 
coercion than persuasion and consent (1997). 
 Guha begins his argument by pointing out that while metropolitan 
nations—the colonizers—may have constructed hegemony in their own 
countries through persuasion and consent, in the colonial state hegemony 
did not exist because consent was outweighed by coercion (Ibid, xii). The 
ramifications of this are immense, particularly because the fact that India 
was non-hegemonic meant, by extension, that the state could not assimilate 
civil society to itself. Moreover, the Indian bourgeoisie was incapable of 
speaking for or representing the Indian nation, and thus their attempted 
hegemony was never able to incorporate all aspects of social, cultural, po-
litical and economic life. While Guha accepts that there is domination and 
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subordination, he argues that the “organic composition of power is de-
pendent on a host of factors and their combinations, circumstantial as well 
as structural” and thus that the organic composition is circumstantial (Ibid, 
22). Therefore Guha refers to a form of hegemony as a condition of dom-
inance where persuasion outweighs coercion: 
 
“It is clear that coercion comes before persuasion and all 
other elements. This precedence accrues to it by the logic of 
colonial state formation. For there can be no colonialism 
without coercion, no subjugation of an entire people in its 
own homeland by foreigners without the explicit use of force. 
Coercion prevails in domination as its crucial defining ele-
ment. For that power had established itself initially by an act 
of conquest,” (Ibid, 24). 
 
“What was acquired through conquest developed into a care-
fully regulated empire. Corresponding to that change, the ex-
clusive reliance on the sword gave way to an orderly control 
in which force (without losing its primacy in the duplex sys-
tem of domination) had to learn to live with institutions and 
ideologies designed to generate consent. Order is enforced by 
the coercive apparatus of the state,” (Ibid, 30). 
 
This analysis of a colonial state sheds light on the important point that 
colonial states could never be hegemonic in the sense that the power dy-
namic favours consent over coercion. Colonial states, by definition, are 
first established through coercion and violence, even if institutions are 
later constructed that serve to create consent among specific segments of 
the population. Moreover, the indigenous ruling class is always in a com-
plicit relationship with imperialism and thus—through a series of pro-
cesses—becomes isolated from vast segments of society. This is precisely 
why, as Guha notes, they are unable to create a fully hegemonic system.  
 It seems clear that Guha is working with the understanding of he-
gemony as a society-wide phenomenon, rather than with the definition I 
am working with in which hegemony is created within the historic bloc. 
However his argument can be transplanted because I believe his argument 
about coercion and the colonial condition is central. In my dissertation I 
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ask whether we can imagine the ruling class before 1952—i.e. before 
Egyptian independence—as constituting a historic bloc. My answer to 
this, drawing on Guha, is that we cannot, because the colonial condition 
creates very specific circumstances within which it seems pointless to 
speak of consent. As Guha notes, there cannot be colonialism without 
coercion. For an entire people to be subjugated by foreigners in their own 
land can only occur through force—whether this force is ideological or 
physical. As we will see in Chapter Five, the British intervention in Egypt 
was built on coercion that relied on both the ideational and material. For 
the production and export of cotton, for example, an entire ideological 
apparatus was needed that relied on notions of private property, individu-
alism, and modern development. Thus coercion does not rely singularly 
on force or physical violence. The presence of coercion in multiple forms 
signifies the impossibility of referring to the pre-1952 ruling classes as his-
toric blocs; the ruling class were dominated by the British not because the 
British managed to create hegemony within the ruling class, but because 
the British exerted a specific type of power through its position as a colo-
nial power. 
 
2.7 The Mode(s) of Production in Egypt 
 
 This section will provide an overview of the historical trajectory of the 
different modes of production in Egypt, followed by a discussion on ne-
oliberalization.  
  In countries such as Egypt, the extraction of surplus appeared in 
isolation from developments in Europe and also took on a different char-
acter. As the Asiatic mode of production theory posits, due to the geo-
graphical nature of Egypt and the need for irrigation the state emerged as 
the only structure able to organize and carry out the irrigation of land. 
Surplus was appropriated via tribute from peasants who lived on the land, 
which was largely owned by the state. This is different to Europe where 
the surplus was instead extracted by landlords under feudalism. Scholars 
such as Nazih Ayubi have argued that because of this distinction, the state 
in the Arab world needs to be conceptualized differently. It has held this 
central position for a longer period of time than other parts of the world, 
and this can aid in explaining current developments.  
106  
 
 
  Relations of production include two important aspects: the way in 
which ownership of the means of production is laid out; and the distribu-
tion of surplus value. It is through these two aspects that class rule in any 
given society is made concrete. To locate these distributions is to locate 
power, where power is clearly connected to the forces of production or 
productive forces. This requires, however, looking at the social aspect: 
how society distributes wealth. As Nazih Ayubi writes: “A mode of pro-
duction is therefore a combination of the ‘labour processes’ by which man 
extracts his means of existence from nature and the social patterns that 
determine access to and control over resources and means of production 
as well as determining the division and organization of labour tasks, and 
the forms of product distribution or ‘circulation’,”” (1996, 39). Specific so-
cial formations arise depending on the mode of production, or the articu-
lation of modes.  
  Ayubi argues that in the specific context of the Middle East, two 
modes of production should be added to those identified by Marx: the 
lineage mode of production, organized by kinship, and the bureaucratic 
mode of production, sometimes referred to as Asiatic; and further, that 
these stages should not be assumed to occur in a linear fashion (Ibid). The 
concept of articulation is especially important in places like Egypt where 
capitalism was imposed from the outside and did not develop organically 
through a native bourgeoisie. “Capitalism neither evolved mechanically 
from the modes of production that preceded it in the Arab World, nor did 
it completely dissolve these modes,” (Ibid, 41). Here colonialism played a 
central role in expanding capitalism, which became the first mode of pro-
duction that was universalized.  
  The lineage mode of production, based on kinship, is important to 
understand as the precursor to other modes in the context of the Middle 
East. Here the struggle between nomads and the increasing settled or ur-
banized population is central. The presence of nomads led to a mode of 
production where wealth is derived from the acquisition of goods, rather 
than through their production (Ayubi 1996, 50). Here the base and super-
structure are not connected because political power does not stem from 
the relations of production but from kinship. Military power becomes im-
portant as the means through which goods are acquired. “Most kinship-
ordered modes allocate people differentially to positions of power and es-
tablish a genealogical range of mobilisable allies,” (Ibid, 53). When kin-
ship-based societies or groups find themselves faced with those based on 
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the tributary or capitalist mode, they are able to seize and acquire surpluses 
that are greater than when they are faced with other kinship-based groups.  
  In the context of Arabia, the rise of Islam acted as a unifying force, 
for the first time creating a unified Arab state. Ayubi shows how this was 
linked to both economic and ideological incentives (Ibid, 55). As the ex-
pansion took place, the spoils of war were distributed based on a scale 
internal to the social stratification of Arabian society. Under the Caliph 
Omar, however, this was based on an ‘Islamic scale’ where one’s date of 
conversion determined seniority. Omar also introduced the deferment of 
distribution, after he accumulated the money. This marked a departure 
from the nomadic norm of distribution: “The leader is now no longer in 
charge of immediate distribution but of accumulation and storage. Politi-
cal leadership assumes a treasurer function but it cannot achieve this with-
out still gripping the reins of war. Political leadership is now the agent that 
shapes the community into a certain order of distinctions and also the 
treasurer of war (Ibid). Non-Muslim Arabs, through a special tax called 
jizya, were relegated to the zone of production, instead of distribution 
(Ibid, 55). This was the basis of the tributary mode, which became the 
characteristic of the whole Islamic territory.  
  The domination of nomadism (that gave rise to the lineage mode of 
production) began to decline following the spread of settlements (e.g. the 
Islamic state) as well as the increasing “pinning down” to agricultural land 
(Ibid, 58). Ayubi writes, “It is precisely these (two) processes that trans-
form the tribe into state, because they divide the population into a class of 
surplus producers and a class of surplus takers. Such a transformation re-
quires mechanisms of domination to ensure that surpluses are transferred 
on a predictable basis from one class to another. This cannot be secured 
without an apparatus of coercion to maintain the basic division into clas-
ses, namely the state,” (Ibid, 60-61).  
  The Asiatic mode of production refers mainly to Marx’s claim that 
in parts of the world, geographical factors created a specific set of relations 
between the land, people, and the state. In places that were primarily de-
serts, artificial irrigation was needed in order to advance agriculture. This 
common use of water needed a centralized power to organize and distrib-
ute it: the government. On the one hand, this led to the centralization of 
power, and on the other hand, it co-existed with village life that was on 
the whole self-sufficient. This led Marx to label the Arab state as the “real 
landlord” in the absence of private ownership of land: “The State is here 
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the supreme landlord. Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land 
concentrated on a national scale. Conversely, no private ownership of land 
exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of 
land,” (Marx in Lichtheim 1963, 95). This analysis may mark the beginning 
of the “Arab despotism” thesis that continues to be quite dominant in 
studies of the political economy of Arab states. The idea is that because of 
this centralization, Arab states are utterly despotic and involve no checks 
and balances that can curb the overwhelming power of the state. This, 
however, neglects two points: first, the self-sufficiency of villages despite 
this apparent inescapable despotism; and second, the implicit assumption 
that private landlords—in contradistinction to the state as landlord—are 
not despotic. Nevertheless, this does not take away from the fact that this 
centralization gave the Arab state extensive powers, and that these persist 
until today.  
  Thus we have a situation in which the state extracts a tribute from 
villagers in the form of surplus labour and by extension controls the dis-
tribution of the surplus product (Ayubi 1996, 45). The clearest instance of 
this in the Egyptian case is the reign of Muhammad Ali, where a strong 
centralized state was in control of extracting surplus value. Ayubi has sug-
gested that the Asiatic mode is also useful in analyzing Nasser’s Egypt, 
which is certainly a point worth exploring in further chapters (Ibid, 46). 
This centralization has not simply appeared during certain eras and disap-
peared during others; instead it has extended into the superstructure and 
thus conditioned political society extensively. This leads to a hierarchical 
society where the state plays the most important role. Some, like Abdel-
Malek, Mursi and Ayubi, have argued that this did not just affect the base, 
but also the superstructure in terms of conditioning the Egyptian charac-
ter. In other words, Egyptians came to relate to the state in a specific way 
because of the Asiatic mode of production. While this argument would 
immediately seem problematic in terms of the vast Orientalist scholarship 
that has focused extensively on the “Egyptian character” and seen it as 
unchanging, static, and especially obedient to authority, it is useful to note 
that these authors must by default make the connection between the base 
and superstructure, otherwise a key aspect of Marxist analysis would be 
missing. 
  In Egypt, the tributary mode became especially important during 
Ottoman rule. The distinction between the tributary mode and the lineage 
mode is that society is now divided into a class of surplus producers and 
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a class of surplus takers (Ibid, 82). Taxes and other tributes were collected 
for the Sultan from Egyptians, who were given control of a piece of land 
(Ibid, 68). The question of ownership of land is always essential to discus-
sions on the mode of production. For much of its history, the Arab world 
has favoured collective ownership of land. The Caliph Omar ibn Khattab 
instituted the practice of collecting taxes from people who owned land 
(rather than taking over the land and distributing it to soldiers). Increas-
ingly there was pressure from individuals within the military and bureau-
cratic sectors to be given land, demonstrating that private ownership of 
land did exist. This, however, was marginal. To return to the Ottomans, a 
new system of military feudalism was implemented, where a strata of of-
ficers took charge of collecting taxes and exploiting the land in return as a 
salary from the state (Ibid, 74). As Ayubi notes, this semi-feudalist rela-
tionship is not determined by the peasant-officer relation but rather the 
officer-state relation (Ibid). Samir Amin has argued that the tributary mode 
present in Egypt was essentially more effective than the one found in Eu-
rope, noting that the etatiste version was more integrated whereas the feu-
dalist version was more flexible (Ibid). Thus Egypt in effect has a stronger 
system than Europe and was thus more developed: it was here the center 
and Europe the periphery. Ayubi writes: 
 
“In Egypt the state historically was so dominant over the so-
ciety and in such a manner that the peasants were left without 
the margin of freedom that would have enabled them to im-
prove agricultural techniques or to resist economic exploita-
tion, as happened in Europe. In the Egyptian case the peasant 
had to confront the centralized state directly. The crucial im-
portance of the state made most foreign conquerors content 
themselves with dominating the state machine itself without 
having to penetrate the society socially and culturally in ways 
that might have prompted further change. The limited devel-
opment and transformation in Egypt’s case was therefore the 
price she paid historically for her advanced, rather than back-
ward, mode of production,” (Ibid, 81). 
 
Muhammad Ali’s reign saw major changes in the organization of Egyptian 
production. On the one hand, his protectionist policies and strong state 
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ensured that he reproduced the same pattern of state control that had ex-
isted previously. On the other hand, the introduction of private property 
on a larger scale and the integration of Egypt into the global capitalist 
economy signaled the start of the dominance of the capitalist mode of 
production. His policies revolved around state control of the land and 
production through a strong bureaucracy, thus preventing the develop-
ment of a national bourgeoisie. His strict control over both landowners 
and peasants meant that the government monopolized industry and agri-
culture. His policies revolutionized land tenure and abolished tax farming, 
thus improving the lives of peasants. Moreover, Ali focused extensively 
on industrialization. He did not want to create a national bourgeoisie, but 
because his successors did not complete his industrialization policies a 
strong landowning class emerged following his death.  
  Both private property and the capitalist mode of production ex-
panded under Ali. It was during this time that the first land register in 
Egypt was created, thus consolidating the notion of private property in 
Egypt (Abdel-Malek 1968, 6). The law of September 16, 1798 inaugurated 
land prices, recognized the right of peasants to inherit and introduced a 
framework to regulate the recording of landownership. Restrictions on the 
private ownership of land were removed and foreigners were allowed to 
buy land. It was also during this time that several changes heralded the 
integration of Egypt into the broader capitalist system. Cotton was a big 
part of this. Juan Cole notes, “The cotton boom of the 1860s in Egypt 
constituted one of the region’s first large-scale experiences with the boom-
and-bust cycles that typify primary commodity training in the periphery of 
the industrial world market,” (1999, 58). This is a pattern that is cyclical. 
During the late Ottoman period, Egyptian peasants, who had previously 
gained rights to property under Ismail, began to clash with Europeans, 
both because they began to owe them debt and because Europeans began 
to confiscate their land (Ibid, 65). This marked the increasing incorpora-
tion of Egypt into the global economy, alongside other significant changes 
such as the emphasis on private property and individual wages. Indeed, 
this process is intricately tied to several points—the peripheralization of 
Egypt in the global capitalist economy through constructing Egypt’s econ-
omy as one based on exporting cotton; the lack of industrial or agricultural 
development that resulted from this; and the subsequent class tensions.  
  Following Muhammad Ali’s death, a class of landowning elites 
emerged and consolidated the capitalist mode of production. The unequal 
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trade of raw materials and the introduction of a vast system of credit were 
the hallmarks of this period, which lasted until 1952. Agricultural produc-
tion was now based on capitalist relations because of the structural 
changes that had happened vis-à-vis land ownership during the past few 
decades. Primitive accumulation can be seen here in “the state’s role in 
depriving the peasantry of their land, paving the way for the formation of 
an ‘agrarian bourgeoisie’,” (Chaichian 1988, 29). This landowning class 
had close tied to the British, particularly the cotton markets. By 1913, large 
landowners (0.8% of the population) held 44.2% of the land, showing the 
widening gap between these large landowners and peasants/small land-
owners (Ibid, 30). The emergence of this class that made profit off of ag-
ricultural production, and the increasing number of Egyptians involved in 
wage labour, demonstrate the presence of primitive accumulation. From 
1919 onwards, Egypt was ruled by the agrarian fraction of capital within 
the ruling class, which emphasized foreign capital. Capitalism now became 
the dominant mode of production, but this happened on an uneven scale 
globally.  
  The Nasser-Sadat-Mubarak presidencies (1952-2011) saw the capi-
talist mode of production deepen. It soon became the dominant mode, 
reflecting global processes. Although Nasser attempted to alleviate 
Egypt’s peripheral status, his policies were clearly structured around capi-
talist extraction of surplus value, where this value is controlled by the state. 
This is why Nazih Ayubi argues that the Nasser period was similar to the 
Muhammad Ali period in the sense of a strong, centralized state that col-
lected surplus. Import substitution industrialization (ISI) emerged as a re-
sponse to a series of agricultural crises but was not enough to absorb the 
surplus agricultural labour force (Ibid, 33). Major changes in land owner-
ship were implemented, however, in an attempt to weaken the agricultural 
bourgeoisie. The Nasser regime wanted this bourgeoisie to invest capital 
in industrialization projects instead, but were unsuccessful on this count. 
Widespread nationalizations were another important hallmark of this pe-
riod, although, as Chaichian notes, without the abolishment of private 
property this nationalization was easily reversed by Sadat (Ibid, 36).  
  Sadat laid the groundwork for the neoliberalization of Egypt that 
was to happen in the 1990s and 2000s. I discuss this in detail in the fol-
lowing section, so suffice it to say that during this period there was a re-
surgence of the agricultural fraction of capital that had been weakened by 
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Nasser. Sadat relied on this fraction, among others, to push for the open-
ing up of Egypt’s economy—Infitah. De Smet and Versieren write, “Be-
tween 1975 and 1985 Egypt’s economy grew with an impressive average 
of eight per cent. However, this growth was not an expression of the de-
velopment of productive forces, but a reflection of an increasing share of 
rents in the national income: remittances of Egyptian migrants working in 
the Gulf countries; tariffs of the Suez Canal; tourism; oil; foreign loans 
and aid. Sadat’s Infitah did not revolutionize the extraction of relative sur-
plus-value,” (Ibid, 21). There was a de-industrialization of the economy 
during this time because of the lack of attention being paid to productive 
forces. Because the focus was on the import of luxury consumer goods 
and the collection of rents, the industrial fraction of capital continued to 
be weak. Moreover, under Sadat the shift towards neoliberalization did 
not mean that the state was no longer a central player; rather it meant that 
the state was now a clear facilitator for specific fractions of capital, a role 
it would continue to play until 2011, and after. 
  In the 1990s Mubarak signed a structural adjustment deal with the 
IMF—ERSAP—which was to ultimately work in the benefit of capital at 
the expense of labour (Ibid, 9). This played out in different sectors of the 
economy. The land reform law from Nasser’s time was abrogated, allow-
ing a higher rate of exploitation of agricultural laborers. “A majority of 
lands became fully owned by the landed elite and embedded in a modern 
capitalist system of cash paid tenancies, allowing the landlords to accumu-
late capital at an accelerated speed,” (Ibid, 9). On the industrial front, a 
“Ministry of Investment” was established in order to replace state-con-
trolled companies with private ones. De Smet and Versieren write, “The 
state made 1.5 billion dollars from these privatisations. Meanwhile, real 
wages in the public industrial sector dropped by eight per cent between 
1990 and 1996. By 2002 half of the public enterprises were privatized or 
liquidated. After 2004, the aggressive policies resulted in an economic 
growth of seven per cent, which reflected the self-cannibalisation of the 
state, and the increased exploitation of workers and farmers by private 
actors,” (Ibid, 11). He labels this process accumulation by dispossession.  
  Throughout this, it is important to note the continuing central role 
of the state in capitalist accumulation. As De Smet and Versieren correctly 
note, the state was not the ‘loser’ in these privatizations, because the lines 
between the state and private capital are blurry: “The introduction of ne-
oliberal policies in Egypt did not stimulate the free market as the primary 
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organizer of economic life, but it reinforced a tendency towards so-called 
‘crony capitalism’ the close ties between the regime and segments of Egyp-
tian big business were hardly weakened by privatization,” (Ibid, 13). This 
discussion brings to mind Kees van der Pijl’s chapter on passive revolution 
in the Soviet Union (in Gill 1993). Here he points out that the historical 
centrality of the state in the Soviet Union means that it continues to be the 
most important political and economic player, unlike in Western Euro-
pean countries where civil society is a more important force. This section 
has tried to highlight the centrality of the state in production throughout 
modern Egyptian history, thus pointing to the different trajectory a pro-
cess like neoliberalization takes in Egypt.  
  Moreover this is where Gramsci’s conceptualization of the state is 
clearly useful. The state should not be seen as a separate from or inde-
pendent of the ruling class, but rather as part and parcel of the ruling class’ 
project of hegemony. Instead of attempting to posit the conflict as be-
tween state and private capital, it is more useful to posit it as a conflict 
among different fractions of capital. “The state had lost its position and 
imaginary as a ‘universal capitalist’ securing the interests of the Egyptian 
capitalist class as a whole and instead explicitly became the particular tool 
of a select group of conflicting domestic oligarchs the old landed and com-
mercial bourgeoisie, state bourgeoisie, and nouveaux riches rent-seekers 
and speculators who enjoyed close ties with foreign financial capital,” 
(Ibid, 14). This select group was a new fraction of capital that emerged in 
the 2000s and that would not only bring about a shift in the ruling class 
but also in the productive forces and the relations of production. This 
fraction will be a central focus of this dissertation. 
 
 
2.7.1 Neoliberalization 
 
     Neoliberalization is a process that has been underway in Egypt for dec-
ades, starting with the 1967 defeat to Israel under Gamal Abdel Nasser 
after which there was a shift in the balance of social forces favouring those 
that wanted to open Egypt’s economy to global market forces. This sec-
tion addresses the question of how neoliberalism should be conceptual-
ized. In particular, I build off this section in Chapter Five in my discussion 
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of how the new fraction implemented an accelerated form of neoliberali-
zation, which not only distinguishes it from the Infitah bloc, but also ex-
plains why the conditions for the 2011 revolution were created so rapidly.  
 Neoliberalism remains one of the most contentious terms in politi-
cal economy today, and is defined in a multiplicity of ways. While defini-
tions that focus on the economic policies resulting from a specific set of 
actors and assumptions tend to dominate,28 I believe it is more useful to 
conceptualize neoliberalism as a transnational project tied to global frac-
tions of capital, much as the Amsterdam School have argued (Overbeek 
2004). The former view sees neoliberalism as emerging from theorists 
such as Milton Friedman and the “Chicago Boys,” organizations such as 
the IMF and World Bank, and agreements such as the Washington Con-
sensus. The latter sees neoliberalism more extensively: as a project that is 
based on material and ideational assumptions that work together to struc-
ture the global financial system in a certain way. 
 Theorizing neoliberalism as a global project requires us to under-
stand the particularities of its effects on countries such as Egypt that have 
been labelled peripheral/Global South/postcolonial. Here the work of 
Adam Hanieh has been invaluable; Hanieh writes that the neoliberal phase 
of capitalism has seen “the world market evolve as a hierarchically layered 
global system with each country inserted into this structure with its own 
specific role and linkages. The form that the world market took in this 
period deepened the internationalization tendencies of capitalist accumu-
lation as well as its uneven development across the globe,” (2009, 62). Ha-
nieh goes on to argue that the linkages constructed between the countries 
of the Global South and the rest of the global economy were constructed 
in such a way as to aid the accumulation of capital to the benefit of the 
core countries. This clearly builds of some key assumptions of Waller-
stein’s World Systems Theory. Hanieh traces the neoliberal phase to the 
1970s, and claims that it was a response by the global capitalist ruling class 
to the crisis that was driving down profits (Ibid). Neoliberalism has its 
roots in classical liberalism and Austrian monetarist economics, and by the 
1980s had become dominant globally (Ibid). “Its policy prescriptions are 
now familiar across the globe: privatization, cutbacks to social spending, 
reducing obstacles to capital flows worldwide, dropping trade barriers, and 
                                                 
28 See: Harvey 2005 
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imposing market imperatives throughout all spheres of human activity,” 
(Ibid, 63). 
 The literature review in the previous chapter pointed to the ways in 
which much work in Middle East Studies avoids the topic of capitalism. 
This plays out in numerous ways, including the tendency to look at the 
surface appearance of measures of inequality. This occurs at the expense 
of “engaging with the nature of capitalism as a systemic totality that pen-
etrates every aspect of social life. This unequal distribution of wealth is not 
an unfortunate consequence of wrong-headed economic policy or a ‘con-
spiracy’ of elites but rather a necessary presupposition of capitalist markets 
themselves,” (2013, 3). Similarly, Samir Amin, one of Egypt’s most prom-
inent scholars of political economy, situates neoliberalism within capital-
ism, and traces it back in time in order to show that the 2011 revolution 
was not an isolated event but rather part of a chain of events. He traces 
this back to 1919, and connects it to the British occupation of Egypt and 
Egypt’s conversion to a periphery in the global capitalist system whose 
institutions were structured to serve imperial accumulation (2012, 17). In 
1919, the Wafd emerged at the head of a nationalist movement that was 
opposed by a variety of social forces, including the British, the monarchy, 
the landlords and the rich peasants (Ibid, 18). However, the 1919 revolu-
tion led to political modernization through the adoption of a bourgeois 
form of constitutional democracy. It was only after the 1952 revolution 
led by Nasser and the Free Officers that a more nationalist ruling class 
emerged.  
 Nasser’s program focused on industrialization as a way out of 
Egypt’s confinement to the role of exporting cotton for the imperialist 
core (Ibid, 20). Nasser’s decision to impound European capital and na-
tionalize it in order to create a public sector failed not because it was ide-
ologically flawed but because the responsibility was given to individuals 
who wanted to accrue personal benefits, and because the Egyptian bu-
reaucracy was inefficient (Ibid, 105).29 Sadat and Mubarak later dismantled 
the system set up by Nasser. The liberalism of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s 
                                                 
29 In the on the Nasserist historic bloc I go into this debate in more detail. It is 
problematic to designate the Egyptian bureaucracy or public sector as inefficient 
as this does not necessarily hold up to interrogation. It has been the key argument 
used to promote privatization. 
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dismantled the previous system without constructing another in its place. Amin 
writes: 
 
“The economy of Egypt now constitutes a series of activities 
juxtaposed side by side. Their different logics of reproduction 
are conflictual while the state has been made to ‘disengage’ 
itself, to give way to a ‘market’ with the mythical function of 
ensuring the coherence of growth. Nasser had proposed rein-
forcing inter-industrial complementarities to establish the au-
tonomy of the national productive system vis-à-vis the world 
economy, in order to give it negotiating strength over the con-
ditions of insertion into that economy. But this was aban-
doned in favour of the immediate profitability of the compa-
nies considered separately from one another,” (Ibid, 157). 
 
Amin’s argument that no new system was constructed in place of the Nas-
serist one is an interesting one. On the one hand, it is clear that a new 
mode of production was being put in place, and that new fractions of cap-
ital had emerged. This in turn created new political and economic policies. 
On the other hand, what Amin seems to be suggesting is that other than 
the Nasserist bloc, no other ruling class was able to create a system of 
meaning as strong as Nasser managed to create. Under Nasser, the ideo-
logical support for the historic bloc’s process of capitalist accumulation 
was extremely strong. This was not less so under the Infitah bloc, and al-
most non-existent under the financial bloc. I would thus argue that the 
Nasserist bloc’s project was replaced by another one, and that the state did 
not disengage itself, as Amin argues. Nevertheless, Amin’s point that Nas-
ser had tried to establish the autonomy of the national productive system 
vis-à-vis the world system is an important one. 
 Central to the shift to accelerated neoliberalization is the process of 
privatization, which continues to be a fundamental mechanism through 
which neoliberalism has spread. Privatization is often accompanied by de-
regulation and calls to open up local economies to international trade. 
“Privatization is normally one of several parallel policies in the context of 
structural adjustment or systemic transition,” (Luciani in Handoussa 1997, 
107). The neoliberal rhetoric surrounding privatization is clear. The main 
argument used to argue for privatization is the lack of efficiency on the 
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part of public sector companies and services, due to a host of reasons 
including political interference and regulation (Ayubi in Handoussa 1997, 
125). This is linked to the argument that free markets require minimal in-
terference from the state, a key ideological tenet of neoliberalism. 
 Privatization requires specific conditions in order to bring about a 
revitalization of the economy. One is the presence of a large domestic 
market that can consume, a condition that is not present in most develop-
ing countries. This means that these countries must ensure that there is 
foreign participation in the privatization process, which means opening 
itself up to competition from countries producing high-quality products 
or ensuring that labour is cheap and government interference lax (Luciania 
in Handoussa 1997, 109). Another condition that should be emphasized 
is that privatization is not automatically a positive means of improving 
efficiency unless competition is ensured—privatization within a monopo-
listic environment does not increase efficiency, as Egypt’s experience dur-
ing the 1990s and 2000s shows. Nazih Ayubi has noted the particular tra-
jectory taken by Arab regimes vis-à-vis privatization: 
 
“Privatization programs in the Middle East have not followed 
from empirical evaluations of the performance of the public 
sector, nor have they resulted from pressures exerted by na-
tive entrepreneurs. Rather, they represent mainly a public pol-
icy, carried out in response to the fiscal crisis of the state and 
under pressure/temptation from globalized capitalism 
through its international institutions,” (Ayubi in Handoussa 
1997, 125). 
 
This point is crucial to emphasize. Whereas privatization in European 
countries, for example, may have resulted from a set of pressures related 
to increasing efficiency or the new balance of class forces linked to trans-
national capital, privatization in countries like Egypt was a result of inter-
national institutions implementing neoliberal policies.   Privatization rep-
resents an example of this type of non-organic development. The drive 
towards privatization in the Middle East was a result of the fiscal crisis 
facing many states. This, however, should not be delinked from a specific 
teleology that views privatization as the best, or only, solution. In other 
words, the delineating of problems and the construction of “common 
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sense” solutions is an ideological exercise. Theorists who work with Une-
ven and Combined Development (U&CD) have articulated the ways in 
which capitalist development and expansion always occurs in an uneven 
manner because different nation states are at different levels of develop-
ment. This is premised on the assumption that development in postcolo-
nial countries tends to occur in non-organic ways, pushed by social forces 
that have strong connections to transnational capital, because the condi-
tions for capitalist expansion were not present. The uneven nature of the 
global system is both the cause of this as well as the result of it (Hobson 
2011). 
  The empirical data I collected affirmed the increasing importance of 
privatization as a mechanism through which neoliberalization accelerated 
under the new fraction of capital. The Central Bank of Egypt reports 
demonstrate the increasing focus on the private sector at the expense of 
the pubic one, and American Chamber of Commerce reports consistently 
note the increasing importance of privatization (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000). 
The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights has documented the 
increasing pressures on workers resulting from the accelerated privatiza-
tion, including calls by workers’ groups to return ownership of companies 
to the public sector, the latest happening in 2014 (“Workers Demand Re-
turn of their Five Companies to Public Sector, to be Operated and Com-
pensated, 2014).30 
 Egypt went from having a leading public sector under Nasser in the 
1950s and 1960s to a rapidly expanding private sector under Sadat. Egypt’s 
privatization process began by allowing public sector firms to act more 
autonomously and focus on increasing their profits; later these public sec-
tor firms became more commercial and market-oriented, with a focus on 
profitability and efficiency (Ibid, 130). Following Infitah, joint-venture 
firms in particular became more numerous: 
 
                                                 
30 The ECESR reports and press releases are all available on their website: 
http://ecesr.org/en/ ECESR recently released a detailed report on multination-
als in Egypt, arguing that Bilateral Investment Treaties work to Egypt’s detriment 
(Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights 2015). 
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“Privatization in Egypt has followed a quiet, discreet ap-
proach rather than a “big bang” strategy. Furthermore, alt-
hough domestic capital has welcomed the new policies, and 
while international capital has encouraged it, privatization in 
Egypt is still basically a public policy pursued by the state for 
its own purposes. Therefore the changes that have happened 
do not amount to a retreat by the state,” (Ibid). 
 
This point about the state demonstrates that the state did not disappear 
after the fall of the Nasserist bloc. Instead the policies pursued by the state 
should always be contextualized within the general hegemonic project of 
the historic bloc in power. Under the Nasserist bloc, the state strengthened 
the public sector; under the financial bloc we see that the state did the 
opposite. This suggests that the state does not have an essential position 
or set of priorities and should always be seen as part and parcel of a historic 
bloc. 
 Following the structural adjustment program (ERSAP) in 1991, 
Egypt’s privatization program intensified, as will be discussed below. Ha-
nieh outlines two phases of the ERSAP. The first spans the 1980s and 
includes an institutional and legislative framework that called for the sell-
ing of state assets. In Egypt the total amount resulting from privatization 
reached over $4 billion (Ibid, 66). The second began in the 2000s and was 
characterized by an increase in the intensity of privatization (Ibid). Egypt 
again emerged as one of the major privatizers. Law 203 in 1991 ensured 
that 314 public enterprises were privatized. Nevertheless, as will be shown 
in the rest of this chapter, this privatization process was not as fast-paced 
as had been expected by international institutions.  
 Privatization in Egypt also had the effect of bringing local industries 
into competition with foreign goods and services with which it was not in 
a position to compete. Moreover, capital for investment was now being 
diverted into privatization and the private sector and thus away from 
strengthening these industries so they could compete with foreign ones 
(Ayubi 1996, 339). At the same time, unlike Muhammad Ali and Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, the Infitah and financial blocs did not impose protections 
for local industries. 
 In 1998, the IMF rated Egypt’s privatization program as the fourth 
most successful in the world (Ikram 2007, 82). Nevertheless, as Ikram 
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notes, “While privatization was undoubtedly a crucial signal of the gov-
ernment’s intent for the future direction of the economy, it could not by 
itself guarantee a more efficient use of resources; there was always the 
danger that it could end up simply replacing public monopolies with pri-
vate monopolies,” (Ibid, 84). The replacement of the powerful public sec-
tor with private monopolies has been the outcome of the privatization 
process, and the defining feature of the new ruling class. Here it is useful 
to note the compelling argument, to be addressed further on, that neolib-
eralism works hand in hand with crony capitalism (Abdelrahman 2014, 
14). The extent of corruption during the Infitah bloc as well as the new 
rising bloc cannot be overstated. The public sector’s decline due to the 
diversion of capital away from it towards the private sector has created an 
atmosphere where bribery is normalized. The institutionalization of cor-
ruption served as a “safety valve” for the public sector (Ayubi 1996, 344). 
This suggests that corruption should be understood as a side effect of 
open-market systems, not a sign that the market needs to be opened fur-
ther (Ibid). 
 As can be seen, the internationalization of capital is important as a 
mechanism through which neoliberalization occurs. Capitalism naturally 
looks for markets to expand into; this is a constant process. Indeed Rosa 
Luxemburg has shown the ways in which capitalists need new markets that 
can be dominated through violence and coercion in order to expand, in a 
never-ending process of primitive accumulation (1972). Today, foreign di-
rect investment, joint ventures, and intellectual property are all features of 
the process of the internationalization of capital. Hanieh brings together 
this internationalization with the concept of imperialism: 
 
“The notion of imperialism captures the tendency of domi-
nant capital to increasingly draw the world market in on itself, 
forcibly extracting profits from all corners of the globe and 
thereby actively accentuating the unevenness of the system as 
a whole, while simultaneously deepening the interdependency 
of states as a necessary prerequisite for this extraction to take 
place,” (Hanieh 2013, 18). 
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Imperialism is thus conceptualized as a question of economic domination 
and exploitation, not simply one of political and military superiority. “Cap-
italist class formation in the Middle East has become increasingly tied to 
the ebbs and flows of accumulation at the global scale,” (Ibid). It is im-
portant to note here the role imperialism plays in the formation of a na-
tionalist capitalist ruling class. Imperialism is visible in the Middle East in 
numerous ways. Debt and aid are two of these that continue to influence 
the structure of the economy in many Middle Eastern countries post-2011. 
Food aid has been part of US policy towards the Middle East since the 
1960s. This provided an outlet for agricultural surplus in the US and made 
Arab states dependent on imports of food (Ibid, 40). Moreover, it ensured 
that Arab states had to have increased amounts of foreign currency to 
purchase this food. Food aid was political and indeed the US ambassador 
to Egypt clearly said that its aim was to establish a link between Egyptian 
politics and the US through food assistance (Ibid). Imperialism is also vis-
ible in the relationship between Middle Eastern countries and Israel, usu-
ally facilitated by the US. In Egypt, for example, the case of the Qualified 
Industrial Zones (QIZ) demonstrates the ways in which the Egyptian 
economy is implicated in that of Israel. Anything produced in QIZs can 
enter US markets duty-free only if a certain percentage (11.7 in Egypt) of 
inputs were Israeli (Ibid, 47). By 2008, one third of Egypt’s exports to the 
US were coming from QIZs. Between 2005 and 2008, exports from the 
QIZ grew by 57% per year, and by 2010 40% of Egyptian exports came 
from the QIZ (Hanieh 2011, 20). The concept of the QIZ was invented 
by Jordanian businessman Omar Salah after he travelled to Israel in 1993 
in search of business relations. Because many local Jordanian companies 
boycotted him for dealing with Israel, Salah began to work with interna-
tional companies. The QIZ protocol spread to Egypt and was set up in 
2005 in three zones: Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal Zone. Here the 
particular role of Egypt is to supply cheap labour. 
 On the Egyptian QIZ website the following quote sums up the pro-
ject: “The signing of the Qualified Industrial Zones is significant for 
Egypt. It is consistent with our government efforts to open up the econ-
omy, increase growth rates, enhance job creation, and promote exports.”31 
Work conditions in the QIZ are notoriously bad, in both Jordan and 
Egypt. Although some cite the high numbers of women employed as a 
                                                 
31 http://www.qizegypt.gov.eg/ 
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positive selling point, these women usually work in terrible conditions and 
face routine harassment.32 Some have pointed out that the QIZ in Jordan 
have diverted trade away from Palestinians.33 Above all there is the theo-
retical assumption that free trade is what will lead to economic develop-
ment for countries such as Jordan and Egypt.  
 The EU also moved to consolidate its position in the Middle East. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was signed in 1995 between 
the EU and ministers from numerous Mediterranean countries, including 
Egypt. The aim of this was: “The promotion and development of the pri-
vate sector…and establishment of an appropriate institutional and regula-
tory framework for a market economy,” (Ibid, 53). In other words, the 
aim was to open up markets. This was to be done through reducing public 
services, removing trade barriers, and increasing the level of foreign direct 
investment in the region. New laws were to be passed that made EU in-
vestment easier through the privatization of firms (Ibid). As Hanieh 
writes, “The integration of Mediterranean productive sectors with Euro-
pean capitalism has acted to deepen social differentiation both within in-
dividual nation states as well as between the region as a whole and Europe. 
The relationship with the EU helped to shape the trajectory of class for-
mulation by simultaneously enriching (and drawing closer to the European 
project) a tiny layer of the region’s elites,” (Ibid, 60). 
 States have adapted to the new internationalized mechanisms of 
capital accumulation, whereby their tasks such as disciplining labour, pro-
tecting private property rights and maintaining laws for investment, have 
all been internationalized. Hanieh underlines the fact that this does not 
signify a decrease in the importance of the state—an assertion increasingly 
being made. In fact, the state is often strengthened, as corporations need 
states to minimize the many risks of global accumulation (2014, 15). Marx-
ist scholars such as Nicos Poulantzas (1974), who argued that the process 
of internationalization was having the effect of embedding foreign capital 
within national state formations; and Ellen Meiksins Wood (2005), who 
pointed out that the nation state continues to be essential to capitalism, 
both show the problems with arguing that the nation state is of declining 
importance. Hanieh continues: “This did not mean that nation states had 
                                                 
32 See: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1813/report-on-foreign-work-
ers-in-one-of-jordans-export 
33 See: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta 
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lost their significance, or that there existed a single, transnational capitalist 
class, but rather that capital needed to be regarded as increasingly existing 
beyond any locally specific identities,” (Ibid). This conceptualization is es-
pecially important in light of the influence of Gulf capital in Egypt. The 
US and Gulf capital have converged in recent decades as a new form of 
economic dominance in the Middle East. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
has played a role in internationalizing Gulf capital and embedding it within 
corporations and firms in the Middle East, ensuring that Gulf capital be-
comes intertwined with local ruling classes (Ibid, 62). While Hanieh and I 
share the same assumptions, as I have shown, my work departs from his 
in my focus on fractions of capital and labour and how these coalesce into 
a historic bloc. This lens, I believe, allows us to see more clearly how trans-
national capital plays out in local contexts.  
 In the academic literature on Egypt and the Middle East, neoliber-
alism is often treated as part of a natural linear progression. Indeed in dis-
cussions on democracy, it is often conceptualized as necessary for democ-
ratization to take place, rather than being seen as a possible deterrent. This 
also ignores the role that specific assumptions play in how democracy is 
defined. For example, in an article on the decline of pluralism in Mubarak’s 
Egypt, Jason Brownlee writes the following: “The country’s immediate 
level of economic development, its extensive array of nongovernmental 
organizations and its multiparty system all seem to favour a democratic 
future,” (2002, 6). Thus what is implicitly made essential to democratiza-
tion includes a specific form of economic development, the presence of 
NGOs, and a multiparty system. Indeed Brownlee’s entire argument rests 
on the assumption that pluralism is the key indicator of how autocratic or 
democratic Egypt’s system is, an argument that essentially promotes elec-
toral politics above all other understandings of democracy, including those 
that privilege social justice. Brownlee goes on to argue that international 
actors are even more important than local actors in pushing for more plu-
ralism in Egypt (Ibid, 7). Brownlee’s views are not uncommon. Pluralism, 
a strong civil society, and a free market system have been naturalized as 
prerequisites for a transition to democracy. Here we see how defining de-
mocracy is always an ideological act. 
 Discussions about capitalism in the Middle East have to take into 
account the reality of global structures of capitalist accumulation and the 
positionalities they produce. In this sense, the Middle East should be seen 
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as a periphery34 of the global system and as a penetrated system “subject 
to an exceptional level of external intervention and control,” (Hinnebusch 
2002, 3). Once the Middle Eastern region was incorporated into the global 
capitalist system, it became dependent on it and its role transformed into 
an exporter of primary raw materials. One way this has occurred has been 
through the creation of “client elites” which has not only created shared 
economic interests between the core capitalist countries and these Middle 
Eastern states, but has also ensured that Middle Eastern states do not in-
vest in local development (Ibid, 4). 
 It is useful to add some nuance to this view, as it relies on older 
variants of dependency theory. The case of Egypt is a clear example of 
how economic dependency does not automatically mean that external 
forces or a transnational ruling class representing globalized capital should 
be theorized in a deterministic or totalizing manner. Following Egypt’s 
agreement with the IMF, for example, there were domestic fractions that 
prevented the implementation of all the reforms demanded by the IMF 
and World Bank. We should not take away all agency from the domestic 
ruling class in any analysis of postcolonial contexts. Instead, this domestic 
ruling class should be understand as made up of different fractions, some 
of which have ties to international capital and some of which do not. It is 
the tension created by this that often drives forward economic develop-
ment and policies. Here again I emphasize the usefulness of the neo-
Gramscian fractional approach that looks at structure and agency, rather 
than over-determining structures. “Economic dependency means a major 
function of foreign policy must be to secure and maximize resource flows 
from external sources,” (Ibid, 3). In other words, while it is true that local 
elites must pay more attention to global capital rather than domestic opin-
ion, it is never a case of either/or but always historically contingent. On 
the one hand, fractions of capital must accumulate and thus pay attention 
to global capital fractions. Indeed, global capital often acts as a disciplinary 
force, using sanctions, withdrawal of aid, and military force in cases where 
local fractions act against their interests (Ibid, 4). On the other hand, cap-
ital accumulation requires political stability, which means attempting to 
                                                 
34 It is important to add here, however, the nuanced point that parts of the Middle 
East are less peripheral than others and in fact act as mediators between global 
capital and Middle Eastern states. For more, see Hanieh 2011. 
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create consent. Indeed what we saw in 2011 was the complete neglect of 
this last aspect. 
 While some scholars35 have called for attention to be paid to the 
dynamics of neoliberalism in Egypt as an explanatory variable of the 2011 
revolution, these voices have been few and far between. Joya, for example, 
centers neoliberalism in her article on the background of the revolution: 
 
“The revolution was a response to many years of neoliberal 
policies that radically transformed Egyptian society by trans-
ferring social power to the hands of an elite while disempow-
ering workers and dispossessing the peasantry. Neoliberal 
policies followed a period of deep economic crisis in the 
1980s characterized by declining oil revenues, reduced earn-
ings from the Suez Canal and a shrinking level of remittances 
sent back by Egyptian migrant workers. All of these factors 
led to an expansion of foreign and public debt and an increas-
ing fiscal strain on the state,” (2011, 370). 
 
One could add alongside these the structural adjustment program imposed 
by the IMF and World Bank that reduced the state budget significantly. 
Since the IMF and World Bank conceptualize the role of the state as en-
suring the smooth operation of a free market, the liberalization of the 
economy of this. As Joya notes, it was precisely this process of intense 
privatization that “transferred public resources into the hands of a new 
elite,” (Ibid). Indeed a Ministry of Investment was created for the purpose 
of speeding up the privatization process, which accelerated after Ahmed 
Nazif became Prime Minister in 2004 (Ibid). This was not a new phenom-
enon, but what changed was the intensity with which it was promoted—
thus the term accelerated neoliberalization. 
 Indeed Egypt’s experience with the IMF and World Bank goes back 
in 1976, when Sadat was pressured by both the IMF and the US and vari-
ous European countries to introduce severe economic reforms, primarily 
through cutting subsidies and encouraging more foreign direct invest-
ment. This led to the infamous 1977 “bread riots” and the eventual adop-
                                                 
35 See: Hanieh 2014; Amin 2012; Joya 2011. 
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tion of a policy whereby subsidies were to be cut gradually. Under Mu-
barak, a structural adjustment program was signed, and major economic 
reforms were put in place, most notably widespread privatization, major 
cuts in the public sector, and the floating of the Egyptian pound. Beinin 
rightly notes: 
 
“In Arab countries defined as “success stories” by the IMF—
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan—the upper-middle 
classes expanded while crony capitalists reaped outsized prof-
its due to neoliberal growth. But their conspicuous consump-
tion was an outrage to the majority of the population. The 
capacity of non-oil-producing states to deliver basic social ser-
vices and decent livelihoods to their people was undermined 
by state budget cuts and privatization programs demanded by 
the international financial institutions. In Egypt, real wages 
were lower in 2006 than in 1988,” (2012, 325). 
 
The response from Egyptian workers was fiery. From 1998 to 2010, over 
two million workers participated in between three and four thousand 
strikes and other collective actions (Ibid, 326). This will be elaborated fur-
ther on, but suffice it to say that these numbers are unprecedented. 
 Following the structural adjustment deal in 1991, a joint public-pri-
vate sector committee was established called Partners in Development. 
The committee split public enterprises into five separate categories: joint 
ventures with domestic and foreign capital; partly nationalized companies; 
companies owned solely by the state; companies with commercial activi-
ties; and organizations providing public services linked to private busi-
nesses and commercial activities (Ayubi in Handoussa 1997, 131). The pri-
vatization was funded using $US300 million worth of American aid, and 
an American consultancy group designed the program (Ibid). Law 2013 in 
1991 aimed at restructuring the public sector, which detailed the separa-
tion of ownership from management. “The new holding companies are 
no longer governmental bodies subject to public law, but rather “moral 
personalities” subjects to private law and responsible to their own share-
holders,” (Ibid). 
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 To conclude, it is useful to emphasize the place of neoliberalization 
within the broader structure of capitalism. The history of capitalist devel-
opment in Egypt can be traced back as far back as Muhammad Ali. Suffice 
it to quote Beinin and Lockman here who have noted that the central 
problematic of modern Egyptian history is the integration of Egypt into 
the world capitalist system on a subordinate and dependent basis, and the 
consequent growth of a capitalist mode of production and class differen-
tiation (1998, 8). The production of Egyptian cotton relied on its export 
as a raw material to Europe, and this is what formed the basis of this inte-
gration. 
 
“The rapid expansion of cotton cultivation provided much of 
the impetus for the transformation of agricultural land into 
private property, a transformation that resulted in the restruc-
turing of agrarian social relations. The great majority of the 
peasantry was by the end of the nineteenth century either 
landless or land-poor, while a new class of large landowners—
an agrarian bourgeoisie—had emerged and would remain the 
dominant class until the land reform of 1952,” (Ibid). 
 
Foreign capital investment in Egypt was powerful enough to control the 
import-export trade and European banking in particular was influential. 
Few Egyptians owned medium or large enterprises, although a new class 
emerged from among the urban educated: the effendiyya. These men were 
Western-educated and worked in the sectors that had been created by the 
penetration of European capital. 
 Egypt’s integration into the world capitalist system thus led to une-
ven capitalist development. “It was characterized by a monoculture econ-
omy oriented towards and dependent on the world market, the absence of 
a significant industrial base or the impetus for industrial investment, an 
extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of the indigenous agrarian 
bourgeoisie and foreign capital coupled with extreme deprivation of the 
masses, and an apparently limited capacity for self-sustaining economic 
growth,” (Ibid, 10). It is important to note, however, that the form of un-
even development that occurred in Egypt did not prevent attempts at in-
dustrialization, as noted by Beinin and Lockman. Bank Misr, founded in 
1920, funded numerous industrial enterprises until it was nationalized in 
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1960. However, this attempt was not strong enough to create an industrial 
fraction within the ruling class alongside the agrarian fraction. Although 
there were industrialists, they could not be said to represent a fraction of 
their own, particularly since many agrarian landowners invested in indus-
try. 
  Thus by the 1970s, when Sadat laid the groundwork for a free-mar-
ket economy, the economy had shifted from one based on the export of 
raw materials under the control of foreign capital, to one in which there 
was a sizable indigenous bourgeoisie and a large public sector. It was the 
acceleration of neoliberalization, however, that created many of the con-
ditions for the 2011 revolution. Ahmed Nazif was one of those responsi-
ble for this acceleration. The public sector continued to be downsized and 
privatization was rampant. In spite of the neoliberal discourse calling for 
a bigger role for the private sector, in Egypt the privatization process in 
fact led to a situation whereby local rural elites became even more depend-
ent on the state for access to the means of capitalist accumulation (Joya 
2011, 371). It was under Nazif—who was part of the new financial frac-
tion of capital—that excessive neoliberal reforms accelerated neoliberali-
zation. Moreover, this fraction’s monopolist form of capital accumulation 
threatened others within the ruling class—notably the military—and thus 
not only created the conditions for the 2011 revolution but also an organic 
crisis within the ruling class. The new fraction was unable to expand its 
narrow interests through moral reforms, and thus failed to create a historic 
bloc. This was ultimately why the 2011 revolution happened when it did. 
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3 
Egypt’s Most Hegemonic Historic Bloc:  
Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free 
Officers 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
“Therefore the great politician has to be “very learned,” that 
is, he should have maximum “knowledge” of the components 
of contemporary life; he should know them not “bookishly,” 
as “erudition,” but in a “living” way, as the concrete substance 
of political “intuition”.”  
      – Antonio Gramsci (1992, 32). 
 
I have chosen the quote above to start this chapter because it encapsu-
lates my thinking around why the Nasserist historic bloc was the strongest 
bloc in Egyptian history. Gramsci argues that a great politician must not 
only have great theoretical and “bookish” knowledge, but that he/she 
must also know contemporary life and the concrete substance of everyday 
happenings—and that this is what constitutes political intuition. I argue 
that Gamal Abdel Nasser was a great politician in the sense Gramsci out-
lines. He was not just intelligent in terms of theoretical knowledge, but 
was—literally—“one of the people.” This fact gave him great knowledge 
about the workings of everyday life, and the common sense of Egyptian 
society. This was the case with many of the Free Officers, and I argue that 
it was this very fact that made this particular ruling class stand out.  
 The aim of this chapter is to chart the history of the Nasserist his-
toric bloc. To do this, I focus on the Muhammad Ali and British colonial 
ruling classes, as well as the Nasserist bloc itself. Because the state and 
state-led development were so central to this bloc, it is necessary to look 
at the reign of Muhammad Ali as well, as this was when the capitalist mode 
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of production was introduced; by 1952 it had become dominant. In be-
tween these two periods we have the British colonial occupation. One of 
the central questions this chapter addresses is whether the concept of the 
historic bloc is applicable to Egypt during this period, that is, before cap-
italism became the dominant mode of production. I argue that the first 
time in Egyptian history that a historic bloc was formed was after 1952, 
and that prior eras should be conceptualized as ruling classes; these ruling 
classes laid the groundwork for what was to be Egypt’s first and strongest 
historic bloc. Demonstrating this requires a set of other questions. How 
did the capitalist mode of production emerge in Egypt, and what pre-cap-
italist modes did it find in place? What were the specific relations of pro-
duction between capital and labour, both in precapitalist modes in place 
under Muhammad Ali as well as after the shift towards a capitalist mode? 
Understanding this provides one way of then tracing the changes in social 
relations that occurred during the transition to capitalism. Using historical 
data, I argue that the specific relations between capital and labour during 
this particular period are vastly different from the coming periods during 
which the capitalist mode was deepened. For this reason, the historic bloc 
is not useful conceptually, and only becomes useful in explaining capitalist 
social relations by way of a ruling class, fractions of labour, and the he-
gemony that binds them. 
 The first historical period I look at is that of Muhammad Ali. Com-
pared to the other eras there is relatively little information about the pre-
cise economic and political system in place under Muhammad Ali. It 
seems clear that Ali himself ruled over a powerful state and bureaucracy, 
which in turn exercised control over the rest of society through collecting 
tributes. For this reason, this period was dominated by the tributary mode 
of production. Private property did not yet exist in any institutional sense, 
thus the relation between landlords and peasants was mediated by the 
state. Ali’s persistent attempts to prevent the formation of a native bour-
geoisie are important to note, and contributed to the articulation between 
the tributary, feudal and capitalist modes during this period, rather than 
the all-out domination of the capitalist mode. An area in which research is 
lacking for this particular period is in the realm of ideology and its material 
basis. What precisely was the ideology of the ruling class/rulers during this 
period, and how did this tie in to the economic structure of society? Sig-
nificantly, what changes happened ideologically with the introduction of 
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capitalist relations? This requires that attention be paid to the specific con-
crete relations between Ali, the state, and bureaucrats and the various 
groups that can loosely be said to make up “fractions of labour”—the 
peasants, and the merchants/artisans. Importantly, this ties into the debate 
about historic blocs—a historic bloc is based on the interplay between 
material and ideology because in order to exist it must form alliances with 
fractions of capital and labour; thus the ideational is necessary. Under for-
eign occupation or colonial rule, the aim is not forming alliances (except 
in certain circumstances) but rather domination. Thus consent—though 
still key—is not as important as it becomes under the formation of a his-
toric bloc. 
 The second era that will be covered as part of the pre-1952 Egypt is 
that of British colonial rule. The British occupation saw the formation of 
a ruling class that was dominated by the British/colonial fraction of capi-
tal. Alongside this fraction, an Egyptian agrarian fraction and the monar-
chy made up the ruling class. The physical structures of the British occu-
pation allowed for the imposition of the hegemonic project that was 
accepted within the ruling class onto society. A key question to look at in 
this section is the ways in which the specific colonial condition alters the 
coercion-consent formula outlined by Gramsci in his theory of hegemony. 
While it is clear that hegemony refers to the process of creating hegemony 
within a historic bloc—not in society—there remains the question of how 
in colonized societies coercion is necessary to promote the hegemonic 
project of particular historic blocs. Here we see how the British occupa-
tion’s legal and military structures in particular were central in creating and 
maintaining this through coercion. The Capitulations and the violent 
quelling of Egyptian rebellions are two examples of this at work. Thus one 
could argue that British capital dominated the ruling class because of this 
coercive ability as well as international backing. 
 A second question this section explores at is what this particular 
hegemonic project entailed. On the one hand, we can understand this pro-
ject through the lens of Britain’s larger colonial project at the global level, 
while paying attention to the specific form it took in the case of Egypt. 
On the other hand, we must also note the specificities created through the 
interactions within the ruling class—while British capital was the domi-
nant fraction, it still had to expand its hegemony through appealing to 
other fractions such as Egyptian agrarian capital and the monarchy. It is 
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precisely through tracing these negotiations that we can tease out the spec-
ificities of the British colonial hegemonic project that was central to this 
historic bloc. 
 While answering these two central questions there remains the need 
to analyse what was happening at the level of labour. During this period 
there was a lot of movement on the labour front, with much of it being 
anti-colonialist and nationalist. This did not happen in isolation from the 
ruling class and the British colonial project, but rather was impacted by it 
and in turn shaped it. Exploring this will also be a major part of this sec-
tion. 
 What ties together these three eras—Muhammad Ali, British colo-
nial rule and the Free Officers—is the central question of this chapter: 
why was the hegemony created by the Nasserist historic bloc so strong? 
The historic bloc that was formed following the 1952 revolution was ar-
guably the strongest historic bloc in Egyptian history, as it was able to 
exercise hegemony over almost all major fractions of capital and labour. 
On the one hand, it is clear that the hegemony within the ruling class itself 
was particularly strong. This can only be understood by looking at the bal-
ance of social forces preceding 1952, and the weak position of British cap-
ital, as well as the magnetism of nationalism as an ideological and material 
force. On the other hand, it is also clear that this bloc was the only one 
that managed to incorporate all major fractions of labour. Understanding 
the power of this historic bloc necessitates that we clearly make use of 
Gramsci’s intervention against classical Marxism and look at both the ide-
ational and the material as central to rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the 
Free Officers, as well as the bloc that they created. Nationalism, pan-Ar-
abism and Arab socialism all contributed to a new system of meaning un-
der this bloc. Materially, the Free Officers’ control of the Egyptian state, 
its move to weaken the agrarian fraction of capital, and its move to indus-
trialize Egypt are all tied to its ability to establish hegemony. Ultimately, 
however, this bloc was undone by the 1967 defeat to Israel. This event 
managed to tilt the balance of social forces away from those who sup-
ported state-led capitalist development towards those who were in favour 
of a free market system. It was this event and its aftermath that led to the 
decline of the historic bloc, and the rise of a new one dominated by social 
forces that favoured free market capitalism. 
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3.2 Continuity and Rupture  
 
The Nasser era is one of the most documented eras in modern Egyp-
tian history. Representing Egypt’s formal break with colonial rule as well 
as an attempted transition to an industry-driven economy, the Nasser years 
were a momentous time. Indeed as Sven Beckert has noted, “Without its 
Eurocentric distortions, decolonization would be at the very center of the 
narrative we tell about the twentieth century—and this retelling would al-
low us to see that global capitalism today is most fundamentally shaped by 
the struggles for independence,” (2014, 359). One of the biggest debates 
on this era has revolved around the subject of this chapter: capitalism. On 
the one hand, the rhetoric of the new regime was socialist, and indeed 
many of the changes put in place by the regime were decidedly anti-capi-
talist. On the other hand, some scholars point to the Nasser era as repre-
senting an extension of capitalism in Egypt, albeit with a shift to a state-
led form of capitalist development. This chapter uses this debate to ex-
plore the capitalist mode of production in Egypt, its consolidation 
throughout the 1950s, and the ways in which this was connected to the 
historic bloc that was created. I want to note that I do not refer to the 
Nasser years but instead to the Nasserist historic bloc, which corresponds 
to a different time period. The Nasser years/era commonly refers to 1952 
until 1970. The Nasserist bloc corresponds to 1952 until the mid-1960s, 
as this was when the new Infitah bloc emerged.  
 Positing the question of how far changes in the 1950s can be said to 
represent a transition to Arab socialism or a reversion to state-led capital-
ism is one way of attempting to understand the changes in production that 
occurred during this period, and how they were built on certain continui-
ties from previous eras as well as how they broke away from the past. In 
the literature the Nasser era is predominantly represented as a complete 
break from the British occupation. It is seen as a new phase that heralded 
completely new structures and social relations. In this chapter I argue that 
while this was not the case, the reason the Nasserist project failed is due 
primarily to structural barriers tied to the global economy, rather than be-
cause of intrinsic contradictions within the project itself. Moreover, I ar-
gue that while there is little doubt that the Nasser era does not represent 
a clear continuity with the past, it is also true that it does not represent a 
clean break either, as often been assumed in the literature. There were 
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significant changes in the fractions of capital that came to dominate the 
ruling class, but these fractions did not constitute a complete shift in the 
mode of production, although they did significantly alter the trajectory 
Egypt was already on. In other words, the new historic bloc stayed within 
the parameters of the capitalist mode of production, but produced a sig-
nificantly different articulation than British colonial rule had implemented. 
 The reason I have emphasized that the Nasser era did not com-
pletely break with the previous one is because tracing the continuities and 
disjunctures are crucial to determining changes in the social relations of 
production. This is why the concept of non-linear time as well as the con-
cept of production are crucial to any nuanced analysis of economic history: 
they allow for the destabilization of assumptions taken for granted in the 
literature, and for new ways of conceptualizing what occurred by using 
historical research as a tool. Drawing on Braudel’s notion of time as non-
linear (1992) and as based instead on continuities and ruptures, I trace the 
emergence of the capitalist mode of production by focusing on history in 
a certain way. To recall Braudel, his work focused on the longue durée and 
saw history as not focused on events or individuals but rather as made up 
of different time periods that should always co-exist in any analysis. His-
tory is continuous and connected, and is to be analysed through three tem-
poral dimensions: events, conjectures, and the longue durée. Braudel does 
not ignore the existence of rupture, events, or breaks, but does not believe 
that they are the driving forces of history. An important historical materi-
alist critique of Braudel’s view is useful here, and centers on the question 
of agency: if history is structured in such a seemingly deterministic man-
ner, then what is the role of agency? This is where a Gramscian lens be-
comes important. History happens within the limits of the possible, and 
these limits are always being set through the dialectic of structure and 
agency. Moreover, historical materialism adds the dimension of produc-
tion to that of time. As noted previously, time and production are to be 
analysed simultaneously. The lens through which I analyse production is 
that of elite configurations and shifts within the ruling class as a whole.  
 The capitalist mode of production is complex in that it represents 
both a continuity and a rupture. It continued its pattern of consolidation 
throughout the new historic bloc, but its articulation was significantly al-
tered. The capitalist mode did not evolve organically in the Egyptian con-
text, but was imposed through imperialism, as I have detailed in Chapter 
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Two. In other words, it did not arise from social forces organically em-
bedded in the country. The beginnings of this imposition began during 
Muhammad Ali, and were deepened during British colonial rule. However 
this was not a straightforward linear process of continued expansion.  
 I begin this chapter by setting the scene of one the most important 
events in modern Egyptian history: the 1952 revolution. I then lay out the 
debate on Arab socialism versus state-led capitalism, before arguing one 
of the key points of this dissertation: that what ultimately prevented the 
Nasserist historical bloc’s project were structural limitations that can only 
be explained historically. These structural limitations can also explain the 
rise of the social forces that established the Infitah bloc described in the 
previous chapter. Through an analysis of configurations of elites during 
the 1950s, I show that the capitalist mode of production that was intro-
duced during the reign of Muhammad Ali did not become dominant until 
the specific configuration of state and capital that Nasser’s regime brought 
about was in place. Thus understanding the configurations of elites is cen-
tral. Moreover, here the non-linear understanding of time is important: I 
argue that the main factors that can explain the 2011 revolution must be 
located at specific junctures throughout modern Egyptian history, and that 
they do not build off of each other in a causal or mechanistic way. Conti-
nuities and ruptures, and—crucially—reversals are all present. This chapter 
begins with 1952, but throughout there are references to previous eras. 
This chapter ends by pointing to the fact that the Infitah historic bloc has 
its roots in the late 1960s—under Nasser—when social forces favouring 
liberalization began to dominate. This is a departure from most historiog-
raphy on Egypt, which locates liberalization at the beginning of the Sadat 
era. 
 
3.3 Nasser, the Free Officers, and the 1952 Revolution 
 
“The military experiment in Egypt is a specific one; i.e. the 
path followed by Egypt to win back its independence, break 
the chains of archaism and move forward to modernity since 
1952 is fundamentally, historically Egyptian,” (Abdel-Malek 
1968, xxxiv). 
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During a coup d'etat led by General Muhammed Naguib, an Egyptian army tank and 
field guns are drawn up in front of the royal Abdin Palace, in Cairo, on July 26, 1952.36 
 
 
General Mohamed Naguib broadcasts to the people of Egypt, in  
Cairo July 24, 1952 (Ibid). 
 
                                                 
36 Source: http://blogs.denverpost.com/captured/2013/07/09/egypt-1952-rev-
olution-free-officers-movement-military-rule/6183/ 
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Meeting of the Egyptian Free Officers in Cairo in 1952. 
 
 
 
Lt. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, 36-year-old leader of the Revolutionary Com-
mand Council of Egypt on August 1, 1954 (Ibid). 
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A large crowd storms into the Ministry Council Headquarters 28 March 1954 in Cairo, 
during a demonstration supporting the revolutionary regime. 
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Egyptians crowd the tops of telegraph poles in Cairo, Egypt on Oct. 1, 1970, for a 
grandstand view of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s funeral procession. 
 
The 1950s saw tremendous changes sweep across Egypt, most signifi-
cantly the 1952 revolution that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free 
Officers to power. 1952 is often heralded as one of the most significant 
dates in modern Egyptian history, and indeed it is impossible to argue 
against the fact that major changes followed. The new historic bloc was 
dominated by the military, headed by Nasser and the Free Officers. 
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that historic blocs do not correspond 
with conventional interpretations of time that look at changes of leader-
ship in Egypt. However, the historic bloc formed after 1952 does corre-
spond to the change in leadership, and this can be explained by contextu-
alizing it within Egypt’s transition out of colonial rule and the creation of 
the first historic bloc. I have called this bloc the Nasserist historic bloc 
precisely because the configuration of fractions of capital and of labour 
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are clearly connected to the nationalist project put in place by Gamal Ab-
del Nasser and the Free Officers. At the same time, the historic bloc came 
to an end in the mid-1960s, not at the end of Nasser’s reign following a 
fatal heart attack.  
 The new ruling class within this bloc implemented policies that led 
to major shifts in many aspects of governance, from education and devel-
opment to Egypt’s geopolitical standing. This new ruling class and the 
fractions of capital that make it up are the central aspect of this section. 
This era is particularly known for its changes to Egypt’s class structure. As 
mentioned previously, class forces are not reduced simply to classes; rather 
they represent broader relational constellations within society. Shifting al-
liances as well as the domination of one fraction are part of these constel-
lations. It is these constellations that directly impact the configurations of 
capital.  
 The coup that took place on July 23, 1952, was the final event in 
Egypt’s process of formal decolonization. The coup signalled the end of 
the foreign monarchy in Egypt, as well as a new era in which foreign cap-
ital—specifically British capital—was to play a much-reduced role. A new 
ruling class came to power with its own set of class configurations that 
depended on different class fractions, thus giving rise to new economic 
relations and a new direction towards development. Ideological changes 
during this bloc are an important aspect of this shift, particularly the use 
of nationalism as a prominent mobilizing force, and its connections to 
Egyptian independence, both in terms of formal legal independence as 
well as economic independence.  
 In this section, I trace various fractions of capital in order to argue 
that while the Nasserist bloc did continue to accumulate capital through 
capitalism as a mode of production, it put in place a very different articu-
lation of capitalist development, one that may have eventually set the scene 
for a transition to socialism. This challenges both the conception of 1952 
as a complete break from previous eras, as well as the conception of 1952 
as a clear continuation of the same economic system put in place by British 
colonial rule. Throughout this section and the following ones, I move back 
and forth in time in order to properly contextualize and historicize the 
events in question. While these specific events are tied to the 1950s and 
1960s, their precedents and legacies are scattered both before and after. 
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 The Free Officers came to power with the clear intention of trans-
forming Egyptian society. From land reform to cultural and social prac-
tices, Egypt was to enter an entirely new phase post-1952. The Free Of-
ficers were initially a nationalist movement in the sense that they were not 
primarily defined as military men, but represented a political movement 
within the military that covered numerous trends, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Wafdists, and the Communists (Botman 1986, 350). No-
tably, many of the officers shared a similar class background—that of the 
petit bourgeoisie—and thus had reason to feel antipathy towards the sta-
tus quo in Egypt as well as the traditional political parties that tended to 
cater to certain classes. In terms of class composition, the Free Officers 
were not from the agrarian fraction, and came from predominantly mid-
dle-class families, with the exception of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar 
el Sadat, who came from lower middle-class families (Beattie 1994, 37). 
 The most obvious change within the new ruling class was the new 
centrality of the military. Some have spoken of Egypt during this period 
as a “military society,” (Abdel-Malek 1968). Indeed by the 1960s the mili-
tary had indeed amassed control over vast segments of the state apparatus, 
bureaucracy, and economy. Moreover, the military exercised immense ide-
ological power, not simply through the media, education systems and so 
on, but also through their use of nationalism, development and anti-impe-
rialism as cornerstones of the new Egypt. Seen as the ultimate nationalist 
institution, the military was highly regarded in the public imagination, and 
this continues until today. However before presenting a brief history of 
the military it is useful to discuss the context within which they emerged. 
The 1930s and 1940s saw the continued British occupation of Egypt, al-
beit with the Wafd in control of Egypt’s government. The Wafd were a 
political party dominated by Egypt’s elite, characterized as being strongly 
nationalist. It was headed by Saad Zaghloul, who had participated in the 
earlier ‘Urabi Revolt of the 1880s, also a nationalist affair. The Wafd in-
troduced Egypt’s first constitution and parliament. The term wafd means 
delegation, and this was precisely Zaghloul’s aim: to gather a delegation 
that would present the British with the request that the British grant Egypt 
independence. They were denied the right to travel to London to do so, 
and Zaghloul and other members were exiled to Malta. This culminated in 
the heavily nationalist revolution of 1919, during which Egyptians over-
whelmingly demanded independence. Although by 1919 the British had 
somewhat reduced their presence in Egypt, they were able to intervene in 
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four key areas that maintained the occupation: foreign interests, the de-
fence of Egypt against foreign aggression, the Suez Canal, and Sudan 
(Gordon 1992, 16). 
 By 1920 Egypt was no longer a protectorate, and instead of the Brit-
ish, the Wafd were now heading the country. Nevertheless, the ruling class 
at this point was still dominated by the monarchy and British interests—
the Wafd did not displace either of these. By 1936, following King Fa-
rouk’s signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty—seen as highly damaging to 
hopes of full Egyptian independence—popular disillusionment with the 
Wafd grew as they had failed to boycott the King for his signing of the 
treaty. Although the Wafd had risen to power through their strong re-
sistance to British rule and the British occupation, by the 1940s it was clear 
that this resistance was not as robust as it needed to be in the face of 
growing discontent. Internal rivalries within the Wafd were also responsi-
ble for the decline of the party as well as the party’s structure which left 
little space for contrasting views (Ibid, 23). The Abdeen Palace incident of 
1942 demonstrates the switch in allegiance clearly. Miles Lampson, Brit-
ain’s ambassador in Egypt, presented King Farouk with a decree demand-
ing the abdication of Hussein Sirri’s government and its replacement by a 
Wafd government head by Mustafa el Nahhas. Finding his palace sur-
rounded by military forces, Farouk had little choice but to assent. The 
Wafd therefore came back to power in 1942 at the hands of the British. 
This event was crucial to the revolution that was to come just ten years 
later.37  
 At the same time, King Farouk had been amassing additional pow-
ers that increasingly brought the Egyptian military under his control. He 
forced the army to enter the 1948 Palestine War, during which Egypt suf-
fered heavy losses, and also began to rely on the military to crush internal 
dissent. The sense that they were not only losing all autonomy but that 
they were being used to further Egypt’s continued subjugation led to a 
sense of discontent among many in the military. The right to direct the 
army was a constant demand made by Egyptian nationalists. Even though 
the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty gave Egyptians sovereignty over their 
army, the British remained and the army continued to be dependent on 
                                                 
37 An interesting point is made by Joel Gordon who argues that in the 1970s, 
Sadat instrumentalized the Wafd to alter the public discourse surrounding Nas-
serism by attacking Nasser (1992, 7).  
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British supplies and training. Moreover, by the 1940s King Farouk had 
taken control of the army from the government.  
 As Gordon has noted, the Free Officers were a culmination of a 
“dramatic political orientation in the Officer Corps from 1935 to 1952,” 
(Ibid, 39). In 1936 the Military Academy was opened up to men from the 
middle classes, following critiques from a growing nationalist movement 
that it was elitist, thus changing the class structure of the institution. This 
was made possible because property qualifications were lifted. Six of the 
fourteen members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that 
headed the coup had joined the Military Academy after 1936, when the 
restrictions were lifted.38 The Military Academy became accessible to mid-
dle-class Egyptian men at a time when Egypt was undergoing major polit-
ical and economic turbulence. “Previously the domain of bureaucratic-
minded officers currying favour with the palace, the officer corps was sud-
denly energized by men who were generally better educated, who had ei-
ther been influenced by or directly involved in the activities of diverse sys-
tem-challenging parties, and who saw the military as a potential tool for 
bettering the nation,” (Ibid, 40).  
 Gamal Abdel Nasser established what was called the ‘founding com-
mittee’ of the Free Officers’ movement in 1949. Initially, eight men met 
to discuss what type of political action was needed in Egypt: Nasser, Abdel 
Mon’im Abdel Ra’uf Kemal al-Din Hussein, Khalid Mohieddin, Abdel 
Hakim Amer, Salah Salem, Hassan Ibrahim, and Abdel Latif al-Boghdadi. 
They soon began to meet every fortnight. Gamal Salem and Anwar el Sa-
dat were added to the group later, and Abdel Ra’uf left soon after. Mem-
bers of the founding committee represented different sections of the mil-
itary in an attempt to ensure the movement had widespread support from 
all branches (Ibid, 51). In 1950, the first Free Officer pamphlets were 
printed, stating that the goals of the movement were to end British impe-
rialism, palace and government corruption, feudalism, and to tackle the 
Palestine question (Ibid, 53). Nationalism was a major theme: 
 
                                                 
38 Applicants needed to have letters of recommendation from influential actors 
in Egyptian society and must have obtained a certain level of education that was 
accessible to only those who could afford to pay tuition fees—thus not the ma-
jority of Egyptians. 
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“The Free Officers group constituted a national front in mi-
crocosm, based on several shared sentiments. The Free Of-
ficers were primarily motivated by an intense nationalism, but 
most also felt frustration over the ability of corrupt feudalists, 
monopoly capitalists, and foreign interests to block reforms 
essential to socioeconomic development; despair over civilian 
political response to such problems; and humiliation deriving 
from defeat in war and public scorn for the military as defend-
ers of a debauched king,” (Ibid, 59). 
 
While King Farouk knew that elements within the military opposed him, 
he was unaware of how deeply the Free Officers had penetrated the insti-
tution. The ties that existed within the military allowed for many within its 
ranks to unite on the basis of nationalist aspirations, particularly the end 
of British imperialism. In other words, an institution so intricately tied to 
nationalism represented fertile ground on which to unite individuals 
against what they saw as the declining state of Egypt. 
 On July 23, Anwar el Sadat announced to the country that a coup 
had taken place, and an outpouring of national support followed. Military 
bases and instalments, the national broadcasting station, and the Suez Ca-
nal were all seized. Muhammad Naguib, more experienced than most of 
the other Free Officers, was chosen to lead both the armed forces and the 
country. Ali Maher was chosen as Prime Minister, and had the support of 
many groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. King Farouk was sent 
into exile, leaving to Italy on his yacht, and the RCC was formed with 
Nasser as its leader. In his book, Nasser outlined the goals of the revolu-
tion, arguing the Officers now faced: 
 
“1. The lurking British occupation troops in the Suez Canal 
zone, the first principle was: Destruction of imperialism and 
its stooges among Egyptian traitors. 
 
2. The despotism of feudalism which dominated the land 
and those on it, the second principle was: Ending of feudal-
ism. 
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3. The exploitation of wealth resources to serve the inter-
ests of a group of capitalists, the third principle was: Ending 
monopoly and the domination of capital over the Govern-
ment. 
 
4. The exploitation and despotism which were an inevita-
ble consequence to all that, the fourth principle was: Estab-
lishment of social justice. 
 
5. Conspiracies to weaken the army and use the remaining 
part of its strength to threaten the internal front eager for rev-
olution, the fifth aim was: Building of a powerful national 
army. 
 
6. Political forgery which tried to veil the landmarks of true 
nationalism, the sixth aim was: Establishment of a sound 
democratic system,” (1954, 6-7). 
 
The response to this was electric. Certainly some segments of the popula-
tion were apprehensive—including the Wafd, the Egyptian bourgeoisie, 
and sections of the intelligentsia.39 Overall, however, there was great sup-
port for this new movement. 
 Anour Abdel-Malek’s seminal work40 on the Egyptian military is an 
important source that details the various stages this new regime went 
through. The first stage—1952-1956—centered on building an industrial-
ized society that was free from foreign domination. All political parties 
                                                 
39 For an overview see Gordon 1992. His book focuses on telling the story of the 
Nasser years through three main groups: the Wafd, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Communists. Arguably since these three groups were generally anti-Nasserist 
(although the Communists initially supported him), it is a skewed reading of the 
period. Gordon also makes problematic assertions such as the following: “The 
Free Officers aimed to inject new life into the political order, not topple it,” (37) 
demonstrating the book’s bias as he barely spends any time on the land, educa-
tion, employment and social welfare changes made under the Nasserist bloc.  
40 Abdel-Malek was one of Egypt’s most influential Marxist thinkers, and thus 
his analysis is sensitive to questions of capital and class. 
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were dissolved and officers and technocrats became the major figures 
comprising a new state bureaucracy. Land reforms were initiated that at-
tacked the landowning bourgeoisie and redistributed land to small and me-
dium-sized landowners. Capital was directed towards industrialization ra-
ther than agriculture, even though capitalists were reluctant to support all 
of the regime’s social programs (Ibid, xiv). The second stage—1956-
1961—was marked by Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in order 
to fund the Aswan Dam. Large foreign-owned firms were also national-
ized, sending a clear signal to the world about Egypt’s position vis-à-vis 
imperial powers. The military began to build alliances with the industrial 
and financial bourgeoisie, although they continued to hold political power. 
Despite these alliances, the bourgeoisie was still reluctant to invest heavily 
in industrialization, and also displayed concern at the pace of nationaliza-
tion and the state of the private sector. The third stage—1961-1967—was 
marked by the nationalization laws. Industry, insurance, and key economic 
firms were all nationalized or had to accept 51% state participation. The 
Arab Socialist Union was founded, and socialism became more pro-
nounced in official rhetoric due to the intensification of the nationalization 
program.   
 Soon after coming to power, the Officers began to position them-
selves in important political positions. The following table is from Richard 
H. Dekmejian’s breakdown of 131 political actors in Egypt between Sep-
tember 1952 and October 1968 (1971, 171), which demonstrates that 
33.6% had been military officers: 
 
 Of-
ficer  
Mili-
tary Of-
ficer-
techno-
crat 
Total Civil-
ian 
Total  
N 27 17 44 87 131 
% 20.3 13 33.6 66.4 100 
 Table 1.1: Aggregate breakdown: military vs. civilian 1952-1968 
 Source: Dekmeijan (1971, 171) 
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The table shows that the total number of military officers is 44, and the 
total number of civilian officers is 131. The proportion of military officers 
is quite high, but notably had declined by 1972.  By this time, there were 
marked attempts, first by Nasser and later Sadat, to demilitarize political 
posts in an attempt to control military power over the state apparatus, as 
was shown in the previous chapter. The military under this new Nasserist 
bloc concentrated on developing a new group of young officers—some-
times referred to as “officer technocrats”—that would go on to occupy 
key governmental posts (Faksh 1976, 143-4): 
 
“The advent of the armed technocrats was a manifestation of 
the growing role of the military and its increasing control of 
vital areas of Egyptian political life. They provided the military 
with the necessary trained, loyal, obedient, and expert man-
power that the ruling oligarchy hoped could cope with the 
new and diverse problems of a modernizing society. It is here 
where the regime seeks to develop among the cadet officers a 
strong sense of identification with and pride in the armed 
forces as a symbol of Egypt’s national independence. They are 
taught to consider themselves the vanguard in the struggle to 
liberate the Sinai from Israeli occupation and to modernize 
the country’s socioeconomic structure. This becomes appar-
ent from reading the hortatory political and nationalistic liter-
ature expressed in the different publications of Idarat al-
Tawjih lil-Quwat al-Musllaha (Center for the Socialization of 
the Armed Forces),” (Ibid). 
 
Several trends become clear from an analysis of the military regime under 
Nasser. While the state in Egypt has always played a major role vis-à-vis 
production, this became enhanced during this bloc, where the role of the 
state became crucial with regards to the economy, as exemplified by the 
nationalization of key industries and the focus on developing a bureau-
cracy as well as social welfare policies. Moreover, major land reforms and 
nationalizations ensured a modicum of independence to the Egyptian re-
gime. The power of the agrarian fraction was severely curtailed, military 
officers became part of the state apparatus and formed part of a new bloc, 
and a new technocratic class emerged. It has been argued that these devel-
opments served to prevent the participation of the masses in decision-
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making processes and to create the Nasser regime as authoritarian. While 
it is true that certain segments were alienated, this can better be explained 
through the economic policies implemented by this new bloc than by the 
lack of democracy. This is not to say that democracy was not a key issue 
at the time but that conflicts among various fractions were more likely to 
be because of what was at stake in changing Egypt’s accumulation struc-
ture. 
 The ideology of nationalism and independence, to be achieved 
through industrialization, was central. Pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism and 
Arab socialism were also used to position Egypt as a strategically im-
portant country within the new configuration of post-independence na-
tion states. There cannot be reduced to simple rhetorical plots, because 
many of the changes implemented by the new regime did indeed challenge 
economic imperialism and implement aspects of a social welfare state. The 
fact that it took a long time for fractions of labour to revolt against policies 
that ultimately harmed workers’ interests in Egypt reveals not only the 
strength of these ideologies but that very tangible material changes came 
about under this bloc, including land reform, an expanding public sector, 
and social welfare. These ideologies represent clear instances of the moral 
and intellectual reforms this bloc used in order to transcend their narrow 
interests.  
 One of the most notable characteristics of the new bloc was the way 
it re-positioned Egypt geographically. As a country occupied by the Brit-
ish, Egypt’s priorities had been Britain’s priorities. More importantly, 
Egypt’s production was structured to promote exports of raw materials 
rather than encourage forms of industry that would allow Egypt to de-
velop autonomously. After 1952, this changed. Although at first the new 
bloc attempted to establish friendly relations with the United States, at the 
time the emerging global power, this soon ended following tensions over 
the financing of the Aswan Dam. At this point, Egypt turned to the Soviet 
Union, signified by the signing of the Czech arms deal. Moreover, Egypt 
soon became a leading nation in the so-called “third way” movement be-
tween the US and Soviets. Events such as the Bandung Conference rep-
resented this new moment in global politics. Nasser’s focus on pan-Arab-
ism and pan-Africanism also helped cement Egypt’s prominent position 
in the new post-colonial world. These were not simply rhetorical moves 
and were often backed up by material support for countries fighting colo-
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nial powers. These shifts in Egypt’s geopolitical positioning were not hap-
pening separately from the internal shifts in production and accumulation. 
Indeed I argue that it was the new bloc’s intent on industrializing and pur-
suing state-led capitalist development that gave credence to their position 
as a challenge to the new configuration of global capital led by the US. 
From the start, the new bloc wanted to weaken the power of the old agrar-
ian fraction of capital. The aim was to redirect capital away from agricul-
ture—where it was accumulated by individual families and foreign inter-
ests—and towards industrialization. Reliance on Western foreign capital 
was seen as problematic and excessive, and the conditions attached to this 
capital was constricting. The financing of the Aswan Dam is a clear exam-
ple of Egypt rejecting Western capital because of reservations about con-
ditionalities. The financing of the Dam came instead from the nationali-
zation of the Suez Canal. The response from Western countries, and 
France in particular, was heated. Moves such as these served to demon-
strate the new position Egypt was taking vis-à-vis global capital, regardless 
of whether it was ultimately able to escape the need for foreign capital. 
 The aristocratic and agrarian fractions of capital that held power be-
fore 1952 were heavily Westernized and relied extensively not only on lux-
ury products from Europe but also European discourses and ideas. Many 
of the intelligentsia—traditional intellectuals as Gramsci called them—saw 
Europe as a model for Egyptian development. This can be seen in partic-
ular in the gender debates that erupted during the 1920s and 1930s, with 
women such as Huda Sha’arawi calling for Egyptian women to liberate 
themselves (1986). Sha’arawi was from an upper class family and indeed 
throughout her life had trouble touching on issues affecting the majority 
of Egypt’s women, who were poor. Indeed the foremost women’s journal 
of that period was published in French, indicating its class bias and ren-
dering it pointless to the majority of Egyptian women. Qasim Amin was 
another traditional intellectual, whose book The New Woman is one of the 
most well-known texts on women in Egypt, explicitly praised European 
women as more advanced and designated them as models that Egyptian 
women should follow (2000). There was a very clear leaning towards Eu-
rope and the modernity it signified, in an attempt for Egypt to achieve the 
same stature. Even the Egyptian nationalist movement included strands 
that saw Europe as a model for an independent Egypt. These discourses 
did not just impact the intelligentsia, but also played a role in the way the 
bourgeoisie lived. European education, languages, and periods of studying 
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abroad in Europe were the norm for a bourgeoisie that was very much 
detached from the rest of the country. What is notable about this period 
is this very detachment from the norms and values of the bourgeoisie, 
which did not penetrate the rest of the population. The bourgeoisie was 
often represented as being out of touch and overly-Westernized, at a time 
when nationalism and anti-imperialism were gaining ground. The workers’ 
movement, for example, did not see a distinction per se between their 
struggle for control over their livelihoods and the national struggle for in-
dependence from imperial control. For many Egyptians, the bourgeoisie 
was a clear representation of these imperial interests, especially in the 
countryside. Interestingly we saw that this state of affairs returned to 
Egypt under the Infitah historic bloc. The detachment between the norms 
and values of the ruling class and those of society was not to continue after 
1952. For this reason it seems apparent that the detachment was a function 
of Egypt’s colonial situation, whereby the apparatus that allowed elite 
norms to diffuse through society did not function, as the elite were not 
seen as part of Egyptian society and instead as tied to foreign capital. This 
changed with the Free Officers, indicating just how revolutionary the Nas-
serist historic bloc was: in effect it managed to divert Egypt’s trajectory 
away from European-led development, even if it was to return back to 
that path in the 1970s. 
 Because historiography has often looked at the 1952 revolution by 
focusing on the forces against the Free Officers, there has been less of a 
focus on the divisions within the new ruling fraction of capital. The first 
important conflict was over the decision by the new regime to close down 
political space, and the second was over control of the military. Both of 
these conflicts led to splits within the ruling class itself, which were to have 
long-term ramifications. Aside from these two major conflicts, there was 
a third that was to erupt right at the start of the reign of the Free Officers. 
Ali Maher had been appointed as Prime Minister, and despite showing 
initial resolve to make radical changes—such as destroying the patronage 
system within Egypt’s bureaucracy (Ibid, 66)—he soon made it clear that 
he not only supported martial law and suspending elections, but was op-
posed to land reform. This was a major blow to his position, as land re-
form represented a key area for the Free Officers. Maher himself was a 
big landowner, and argued for his position based on this, noting that land 
reform would reduce productivity and discourage foreign investment 
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(Ibid). Thus even before the conflicts with Naguib and Amer over democ-
ratization the military respectively, there were already tensions within the 
Free Officers. 
 Soon after coming to power, the Free Officers’ Revolutionary Com-
mand Council decided that parties needed to be reformed since they 
seemed unable to do so themselves (Ibid, 77). Later in 1952, the RCC 
ordered the arrest of 64 politicians, including Fuad Serag al-Din, Ibrahim 
Abdel Hadi and Nagui al-Hilali, all previous Prime Ministers. The reper-
cussions were so great that Ali Maher resigned after having not been in-
formed of the decision to arrest these politicians. Soon after, the RCC 
banned all political parties. This was largely a result of the sentiment 
among RCC members that civilians were incapable of ruling the country 
at that point in time: “The measures directly manifested the RCC’s belief 
that Egypt’s socioeconomic development could not be accomplished un-
der a liberal democratic system, given conditions of widespread poverty 
and illiteracy and the manipulative capabilities of civilian politicians,” 
(Ibid, 79). The RCC opted for a ban on political parties, primarily because 
the five members of the RCC who supported this dominated: Nasser, 
Amer, Boghdadi, Gamal Salem, and Zakaria Mohieddin (Ibid, 86). This 
was not a unanimous decision. The fact that not all members of the Free 
Officers supported the decision for a ban on political parties highlights 
the fact that splits were already present within the group as early as 1952.41 
This was underlined by the decision taken around this time by members 
of the RCC to isolate Muhammad Naguib. Naguib was against military 
men taking over civilian posts and generally pushed for a transition that 
would create a democratic space in Egypt. Slowly Naguib began to be ex-
cluded from RCC decisions as tension mounted between him and Nasser. 
                                                 
41 Parts of the military were also against Naguib’s resignation, including Khaled 
Mohieddin and the Cavalry Corps. Nasser sent Mohieddin to tell Naguib he 
would be reinstated, but on his return he was arrested. Despite this, Naguib was 
made President once again. Notably, the large street demonstrations in support 
of Naguib played a large role in forcing Nasser to reinstate him as President. 
These demonstrations were headed by a “national front” of civilian parties that 
had been discarded and attacked by the RCC: the Egyptian Socialist Party, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd, and the Communist Party. Though Naguib had 
been reinstated as President, Nasser was now Prime Minister and RCC Chairper-
son, making the role of president rather ceremonial. Naguib soon resigned, and 
was placed under house arrest, to be released in 1972 by Sadat.  
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The split between these two figures represents two possible historical tra-
jectories: on the one hand, the trajectory that materialized, which was a 
form of non-democratic state-controlled capitalism; on the other hand a 
trajectory that may have yielded a more democratic form of politics, as 
Naguib was known to have supported the idea of a democratic transition. 
Naguib was also, however, in favour of a liberal form of politics in which 
foreign capital played a significant role. This in effect would have meant 
the continuance of the type of structure already in place before 1952, ra-
ther than the dramatic changes envisioned by Nasser. Thus the question 
is not simply about democracy vs. authoritarianism; questions of Egypt’s 
economic structures were often key. The moment of Naguib’s removal 
from power could be termed a passive revolution because it represented 
two forces up against each other, with each representing a different possi-
ble trajectory for Egypt.  
 This raises interesting questions about decolonization, independ-
ence and democracy. The argument that newly independent countries 
could not afford to allow democratic space because it would allow imperial 
forces to exercise neo-colonial influence is one way of explaining the be-
haviour of the Nasserist bloc. There is little doubt that imperial forces 
wanted ways to replace the influence that had been lost through decoloni-
zation. Social forces such as the aristocracy and the landowning bourgeoi-
sie were closely tied to imperial global forces, and thus the decision to 
undercut their power was necessary in order to safeguard Egypt’s inde-
pendence. On the other hand, the regime went much further than this. By 
undercutting the power of forces that supported the nationalist project, 
such as labour, the regime completely demolished any democratic space 
in the country that could have eventually grown into a more consolidated 
democracy. Importantly, support from forces such as labour may have 
ensured the ultimate success of an anti-capitalist project that Nasser alleg-
edly wanted to implement through Arab socialism. Undercutting labour 
made sure that the support a socialist project needed was non-existent. In 
other words, the regime’s decisions extended far beyond simply undercut-
ting social forces that were backed by imperialism, and instead attacked all 
forces that posed a threat to the regime.  
 The second conflict within the Nasserist bloc was over control of 
the military, represented by the rift between Nasser and Abdel Hakim 
Amer. Although it had been relatively easy to isolate Naguib within the 
Free Officers’ group itself, as most of this support came from segments 
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of the public and other political groups, this was not the case with Amer, 
who headed the armed forces. Indeed the conflict between Nasser and 
Amer represents a clear intra-ruling class conflict, as both had immense 
power—concentrated in different fractions—to draw on. At the begin-
ning of 1952, Amer represented a notable figure due to his close relation-
ship with Nasser; their families had even intermarried. Most importantly, 
Nasser saw it as extremely important to keep the military on his side. The 
military qua institution was becoming increasingly powerful as military 
men began to occupy posts in companies as well as government positions 
across the country. This in turn led to upward social mobility for many 
officers who were now able to intermarry with the old aristocratic elite 
(Ibid, 125). From the start the Free Officers had realized the threat of the 
military and attempted to curb it, initially by forcing 450 officers to retire 
(Gordon 1992, 110). Amer’s close relationship with Nasser allowed him 
to ensure that the military was beyond reproach, and gave him a measure 
of independence over the military’s affairs. As tensions between the two 
mounted, however, Nasser found himself restricted by Amer’s popularity 
within the military. Nasser even received threats from within the military 
warning him not to remove Amer. By 1961, the two men effectively con-
trolled different aspects of the country: Amer the military and internal se-
curity agencies, and Nasser the rest. The ultimate outcome of the confron-
tation was Amer’s fall from power. 
  It was only after the defeat in 1967 that Nasser was able to remove 
Amer. Along with fifty military officers, Amer was arrested for plotting a 
coup against Nasser. After being kept under house arrest for several 
weeks, he was eventually taken to the hospital after swallowing pills in 
what appeared to be a suicide attempt, although it has been suggested that 
he was killed. This, as well as the conflict between Nasser and Naguib, is 
an important part of the consolidation of the Nasserist bloc.  
 
3.4 Arab Socialism or State-Led Capitalism? 
 
When the Free Officers came to power, the main fraction within the 
ruling class was the agrarian fraction of capital. Foreign capital was a major 
player in the Egyptian economy, represented mainly through British inter-
ests. Because of this, the private sector dominated, with the public sector 
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accounting for only 13% of GDP (Aoude 1994, 2). Indeed the dominance 
of the private sector represented one of the main problems identified by 
the new regime. Specifically, many of the regime’s initial moves repre-
sented attempts to weaken the power of this agrarian fraction and of pri-
vate capital, strongly connected to imperialism. The aim, however, was not 
to eliminate private property itself—which would indicate a strong social-
ist transformation—nor to institute new relations that would return to a 
concept of land as communal, but rather to dismantle feudalism and the 
agrarian fraction that benefitted from it. The major aim of the new regime 
was to dismantle the power of the agrarian fraction of capital and replace 
it with new fractions that would develop the new bloc’s drive towards 
state-led industrial development. The agrarian law of 1952 that limited per-
sonal ownership of land not only weakened the agrarian fraction that ac-
cumulated capital through the land, but also affected flows of capital by 
favouring a new industrial fraction (Ibid, 2). In other words, investment 
was now being concentrated in industry, thus making it a key locus of the 
extraction of surplus value as opposed to agriculture, although this bloc 
continued to see agricultural surplus as an important source of revenue for 
development. This may not represent a departure from the capitalist mode 
of production, but the revolutionary and anti-colonial stakes of the Nas-
serist historic bloc’s project are clear. This means that a departure from 
conventional depictions of the Nasser era is necessary: it neither used Arab 
socialism as a cover for capitalism and its ultimate goal of dominating the 
Egyptian ruling class; but nor did it put in place a transition to socialism. 
The aims of this bloc were certainly revolutionary, but ultimately contra-
dictions within the bloc as well as structural constraints that can only be 
understood historically resulted in the failure of the Nasserist project. 
  Nazih Ayubi remains one of the firmest critics of the notion that 
Nasser initiated a socialist economy: 
 
“It is not sound to call a system socialist simply because its 
leaders happen, at a particular political juncture, to raise so-
cialist banners and to use socialist terminology. We do not ac-
cept so readily the appellation ‘democratic’ that many of the 
command regimes attribute to themselves, so why are we so 
easily prepared to accept a ‘socialist’ designation of a regime 
simply because it is called so by its leaders?” (1992, 92) 
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As Ayubi42 goes on to point out, socialism refers to the popular control of 
and participation in the economic and political affairs of a country on the 
part of all classes. He argues that in Egypt, socialism developed as part and 
parcel of the nationalist project and its program for the economy of the 
country. It also served as a means of mobilizing Egyptians as well as con-
trolling the public sphere: 
 
“‘Socialism,’ therefore, did not come to power by way of a 
political movement intent on putting socialist ideals into prac-
tice. It did not come about through a political party formed 
before assuming power along a socialist platform, or through a 
mas or revolutionary movement with clear popular and egali-
tarian orientation. The norm was a military coup or a ‘palace 
coup,’ and although this sometimes proceeded to build up a 
single political organization that eventually adopted some ‘so-
cialist’ objectives, this was done from a position of authority 
                                                 
42 Alongside Ayubi, several other scholars have similarly argued that the aim of 
the new regime had never been to transition to socialism or to restructure the 
economy, but rather to take control of it. .42 Hussein has argued that “Egyptian 
‘socialism’ was a cover up for the domination of the major levers of the produc-
tion process by the Egyptian state bourgeoisie and for the systematic removal of 
the working masses from any real responsibility in that process,” (1973, 172). The 
control over the means of production shifted from one fraction of capital to 
another but did not become the property of a wider base of Egyptians. Part of 
this narrative rests on the ways in which the new bloc immediately began to dis-
cipline workers: “The state bourgeoisie became a specific social group necessary 
to the capitalist mode of production. Its individual elements were then able to 
constitute pressure groups endowed with real autonomous power and aware of 
a spontaneous sense of solidarity based on the defence of their common privi-
leges. From then on, they sought to increasingly dominate state power in order 
to fulfil their own narrow aspirations,” (Ibid, 191). Aoude also argues that Nas-
ser’s regime developed a state form of capitalism that had nationalist underpin-
nings (1994, 2). Hosseinzadeh pushes this further by stating that the reason Nas-
ser’s so-called socialism failed is because his aim had never been to create a 
socialist system to begin with. Instead, Nasser had aimed to get rid of corrupt 
capitalists and monopolies, and to replace them with small-scale capitalists who 
could be controlled by the state bureaucracy. 
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and was often aimed at installing ‘socialism without socialists,’ 
as a familiar Arab phrase describes it,” (Ibid, 94). 
 
The concept of socialism itself should be clarified before ascertaining 
whether the Nasserist project was indeed a socialist one. In Marxist 
thought, socialism refers to the period post-capitalism and pre-com-
munism; it is a transition period. Importantly, it refers to an economic 
system and a society that has moved beyond capitalism because of a crisis 
that managed to bring about the end of the capitalist mode of production. 
Nevertheless, socialism refers to a process, not to a mechanistic or rapid 
shift from one stage to another. The period of 1952 to the late 1960s can-
not be seen as long enough for such a transition to have taken place. At 
the same time, it is pointless to engage in speculation about what the in-
tentions of Nasser or the Free Officers had been: did they intend to even-
tually shift to socialism, or were they simply using that as rhetoric—Ayubi, 
for example, notes the constant use of socialist terminology, a hallmark of 
the Nasser regime—to gain support from the masses? (1992) These ques-
tions can only be answered by looking at the specific policies put in place 
by this bloc; policies which, I argue, point to the determination of this new 
bloc to create a different articulation of the capitalist mode of production 
that could eventually have enabled a transition to socialism. Here two de-
bates are crucial: the first is the debate among Third World countries that 
recently gained independence surrounding scientific socialism, neutrality, 
and anti-imperialism; the second is the position of Egypt as a peripheral 
postcolonial country, and the structural constraints that accompanied this. 
It is clear that structural and geopolitical barriers that prevented newly in-
dependent countries from straying too far away from capitalism were very 
much real, raising the question of the extent to which African leaders had 
the agency to implement radical changes. These two debates will be dis-
cussed further on, and are central to contextualizing the changes imple-
mented by the new bloc. 
 While arguments against designating the Nasser era (see footnote 
42) as socialist highlight important limits of the Nasserist project, they also 
ignore the structural limitations faced by the new bloc. The persistence of 
monopolies, for example, cannot simply be blamed on Nasser’s unwilling-
ness to control monopoly capitalists, since it was clear that several policies 
had attempted to do just this. Hosseinzadeh touches on an important 
point when he mentions that the aim of the new bloc had been to develop 
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a capitalism that would be less uneven (1988). When we look at the poli-
cies put in place by the new bloc through this lens, we can see that the 
excesses of previous eras and the institutional and structural continuities 
created continued to affect the uneven character of Egyptian develop-
ment. State-led capitalism was a way for the new bloc to achieve a form of 
balance between these excesses and their own project. Hussein’s argument 
that control of the means of production shifted from one fraction to an-
other, without affecting the majority of Egyptians, is also problematic 
(1973, 172). While it is true that there was a shift from one fraction to 
several other fractions, this shift had wider ramifications than he acknowl-
edges. Not only were the new fractions that were able to accumulate larger 
and made up of more than just the upper class, but they were also part of 
a larger nationalist project that ensured that their accumulation benefitted 
more than just the individual members of the fractions. Those who accu-
mulated through the new and expanding public sector, for example, were 
not only often middle-class and thus gained social mobility through this 
shift, but were also part of a public sector whose new modus operandi was 
the provision of welfare. Arguing that the power to accumulate simply 
shifted from one fraction to another ignores these important nuances. 
This is precisely why looking at historic blocs rather than simply analysing 
class fractions is key.  
 The transnational dimension is key to understand what some of the 
structural limitations to the new bloc’s project were. Because Egypt’s pri-
mary export was cotton, Egypt was tied to global trade in very specific 
ways.43 The regime wanted to create an autonomous base of capitalist de-
velopment in the world market. The regime saw no way to do this except 
through mechanization according to capitalist norms and with the finan-
cial and technical aid of economically advanced countries. Inevitably, 
therefore, the export of cotton, to which the whole Egyptian economy 
was geared, became the basis for such development as it was the major 
source of value exchangeable with foreign creditors. In other words, 
                                                 
43 To understand why this was the case, it is useful to look at how cotton became 
Egypt’s main export, and how this process tied Egypt into a global capitalist sys-
tem on an uneven basis. In an excellent book on the global history of cotton, 
Sven Beckert details the ways in which war capitalism, slavery, industrial capital-
ism and the British empire were key to the creation of cotton as one of the most 
valuable commodities in the world (2014).  
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Egypt’s integration into the capitalist world market—its organic depend-
ence on it—was reinforced rather than broken (Hussein 1973, 206). 
 Following the collapse of Muhammad Ali’s industrialization project, 
the British intervened and began opening Egypt’s markets: 
 
“British merchants worked hard to open Egyptian markets 
for their goods, as Egypt weakened vis-à-vis European pow-
ers. The value of British cotton goods exports to Egypt in-
creased by an estimated factor of ten between the second half 
of the 1820s and the second half of the 1930s. A system of 
“free trade” dominated by Britain made it practically impossi-
ble for Egypt to industrialize. Egypt’s cotton industry was 
devastated from two sides: its domestic embrace of war capi-
talism and its ultimate subjugation to British imperialism. The 
Egyptian state was powerful domestically, but weak when it 
came to defining Egypt’s position within the global economy, 
no match for British interests and designs,” (Ibid, 149). 
 
The development of cotton production in Egypt represents one of the 
structural constraints imposed on the Nasserist bloc by previous ruling 
classes as well as imperialism. The failure of industrialization, the creation 
of specific labour relations, and the control over Egypt’s main commodity 
by the British all served to weaken Egypt’s ability to develop inde-
pendently. The new bloc was therefore working within limits set by his-
tory—the limits of the possible, as Gramsci would say.  
 The decline of Muhammad Ali and the rise of Ismail has often been 
cited as the reason for the shift in Egypt’s economy from a state-controlled 
industrializing one to one dominated by foreign capital. However, without 
pointing to the influence of Britain it is difficult to tell the full story of this 
shift. As Samir Amin notes, the attempt for Egypt to “emerge” under Ali 
was violently put down by the British under Ismail (2012, 17). In 1882 this 
turned into a full-scale occupation. Amin makes the important argument 
that this line of reasoning does not exonerate Ali for the contradictions of 
his project, which were numerous; but without imperialist aggressions, 
these contradictions may have resolved themselves. Instead: “Beaten, 
emergent Egypt was forced to undergo 40 years as a servile periphery 
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whose institutions were refashioned in service to that period’s model of 
capitalist/imperialist accumulation,” (Ibid). 
 Key to the consolidation of British power in Egypt was precisely its 
ability to impose certain conditions on Egyptian development. As early as 
1838 there was an agreement between the British and the Ottoman Em-
pire44 that aimed to “abolish the monopoly system imposed by Muham-
mad Ali” and put in place a system of free trade (Amin 1981, 430). This 
removed any protections Egyptian industries have, and “within a few years 
Egypt became a European colony without a shot being fired,” (Ibid). 
Here, as under the Nasserist bloc, we see the rhetoric of state interference 
as creating monopolies that are a barrier to economic growth. Galal Amin 
makes the important observation that this shift also led to a shift in the 
habits and dispositions of Europeans in Egypt. He writes: “Under Mu-
hammad Ali, European merchants and officials regarded Egypt as their 
adopted country and identified their interests with those of the ruler. They 
went to Europe seldom. They did not wish and were unable to insulate 
themselves from the life of the country. With the introduction of the open 
door policy all of this changed and Western consumer habits and Western 
values came to Egypt with the new European adventurers, merchants and 
money lenders,” (Ibid). While this presents a somewhat romantic view of 
foreigners under Muhammad Ali, it does point to an area that needs more 
research, namely how economic transitions happen alongside and cause 
transitions in social relations. Indeed this was to happen again under the 
Infitah historic bloc. 
 When Hussein therefore argues that Nasser had never intended to 
destroy Egypt’s dependency on the global capitalist market, a better ques-
tion to ask is perhaps whether this was a possibility, given the limits just 
discussed. Hussein goes on the point out that the aim appears to instead 
                                                 
44 Under the Ottoman Empire the Capitulations were introduced, which were 
essentially contracts between the Ottoman Empire and European powers that 
specified the terms of trade. Central to this was the establishment of mixed courts 
in Egypt, which had a dramatic effect on Egypt’s legal system. Based on French 
and British law, the codes used by these new mixed courts had the effect of Eu-
ropeanizing the court system. Additionally proceedings were in French, and 
judges were appointed by the Khedive and were typically foreign. It was only in 
1949 that these courts were transformed into national courts.  
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have been to manipulate this position in order to later become an inde-
pendent economic power. This never materialized, according to Hussein, 
because the regime still envisioned development through capitalism: 
“Since the Nasserist schemes did not break the framework of organic de-
pendence on the capitalist world market, they fell under the laws of com-
petition, unequal development, and domination of the weaker by the 
stronger,” (Ibid, 208). Anour Abdel Malek makes a similar point, showing 
that the regime still encouraged foreign capital investment (1968, 90). 
While this is true, it is also clear that Egypt could not have completely 
turned away from foreign capital investment, and while it did seek it out, 
there were strong limits put on this type of investment. Indeed foreign 
companies objected strongly to limitations such as laws that required them 
to employ 90% Egyptians within the company, or to the government in-
terfering in the running of the company (1968, 90).  
 Following the deepening economic crisis of the 1960s, the new bloc 
began to formulate policies geared towards cultivating a stronger form of 
state-led development: 
 
“Without letting up on his socialist rhetoric, Nasser too tilted 
towards economic retrenchment and market solutions: more 
autonomy and incentives for managers, more discipline for 
workers, and more austerity for consumers. Slogan: ‘more 
production, less philosophy.’ The move to the right and the 
reversal of the socialist orientation long antedated Sadat’s rise 
to power. Under the surface, molecular movements toward 
market capitalism had been set in motion long before he rose 
to power; they simply came to the surface under his rule,” 
(Ibid, 301). 
 
This is an extremely important point that critiques commonplace histori-
ographical views of Egyptian history that see the Sadat era as the beginning 
of free-market policies in Egypt. In response to Egypt’s declining eco-
nomic performance, Nasser appointed Zakaria Mohieddin as Prime Min-
ister. This is significant as it signalled a change in economic policy orien-
tation. The new bourgeoisie that had been created by Nasser—which 
included Mohieddin—were market-oriented (Ibid, 311). Prices on general 
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goods were raised, as were taxes, and subsidies were lowered. Private in-
vestment was encouraged and there were efforts made to reduce imports 
(Ibid). It was the 1960s that Egypt also began to rely heavily on foreign 
aid, primarily from the West (Hussein 1973, 221). Although Nasser had to 
remove Mohieddin following resistance to his appointment, this move—
among others—set the stage for Sadat. In other words, these changes un-
der the Nasserist bloc should be seen as laying the groundwork for the 
coming Infitah that was formalized under Sadat.  
 This section showed that the question of defining Egypt’s economic 
system during the post-1952 era is a complex one that does not yield a 
simple answer. It is futile to engage in speculation about what Nasser and 
the new bloc’s intentions had been, since it is difficult to ascertain their 
intentions separately from what took place. The only recourse we have to 
answering the question of production during this historic bloc is by look-
ing at the actual policies that were implemented through the shifts within 
the ruling class. These suggest that concrete steps were being taken that 
could eventually allow for a shift towards what the bloc envisioned as Arab 
socialism. Without the policies put in place by the bloc, Egypt would likely 
have continued on the trajectory of capitalist accumulation driven by for-
eign capital, the private sector, and agrarian interests. Reducing the influ-
ence of large-scale capitalists, monopolies and private sector domination; 
initiating land reforms; opening up the education and health care systems 
as well as the employment market; and promoting political stances of neu-
trality and anti-imperialism all served to dismantle many of the relations 
of production and parts of the accumulation structure that was in place 
before 1952. The bloc may have continued on the path of capitalist pro-
duction, but the articulation shifted to a state-led form of development, 
where accumulation was diverted to nationalist projects and new and 
emerging fractions of capital that were linked to these projects. This is a 
far cry from the previous configuration, where accumulation was con-
trolled by foreign interests and an agrarian fraction of capital that accumu-
lated through exploitation and dispossession, achieved in coordination 
with the state. 
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3.5 Fractions of Capital and the New Historic Bloc 
 
Delineating class fractions is more than simply understanding who con-
stitutes the ruling class. While that is useful as a starting point, it is neces-
sary to dig deeper and analyse the material underpinnings of each fraction 
and how they relate to the production and accumulation. Each fraction is 
discernible not simply through the interests of its individual members, but 
through the dialectical process that creates each fraction and in turn 
Egypt’s production and accumulation strategies. In other words, fractions 
create these strategies as they are created by them. Moreover, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the ruling class includes structural divisions, 
and its unity is maintained by a specific mode of capitalist accumulation. 
Thus both these divisions and this unity need to be probed. This section 
will begin by briefly discussing the British occupation of Egypt and the 
development of class fractions during this period, and how this was af-
fected by the 1952 revolution. The rest of the section will draw the con-
nections between these class fractions and the fractions that emerged un-
der the Nasserist bloc. As noted by Aoude, “The new class fractions under 
Nasser eventually dominated the Egyptian social formation, including the 
state apparatus,” (1994, 1). In order to understand the rise (or cultivation) 
of new class fractions, it is necessary to return to the time period before 
1952. Here Braudel’s notion of time as continuous is key, rather than as 
made up of clearly distinct eras. History is connected through events. This 
notion of time is unique in the study of Egyptian history, where it is com-
mon to separate eras, see them as independent, and connect them to indi-
vidual leaders. I argue that this is impossible because certain patterns and 
social forces either continued to dominate under Nasser or set the limits 
to what his bloc could achieve; while other forces and patterns were weak-
ened.  
 
3.5.1 Foreign Capital, the State, and an Egyptian Capitalist Class 
 
It is important, when discussing fractions of capital, to outline the 
emergence of the Egyptian state and the ways in which this was connected 
to capital. Indeed as capitalism evolved, the nature of the state and its role 
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in capital accumulation became more pronounced. I argue that the Egyp-
tian state emerged alongside imperialism in the Middle East, and was nec-
essary for the organization of labour and accumulation of capital. Raw 
materials such as cotton are a major part of the story, as it was Egypt’s 
main export and thus the key interest of British capital and the British 
state. Beckert writes: “Territorial control in Egypt went hand in hand with 
the expansion of cotton agriculture,” (2014, 290). This was linked to the 
emergence of nation states at the global level, and how this was connected 
to the expansion of capitalism. Beckert continues: “The construction of 
markets, including global markets, was thus a political process. As more 
and more states competed for access to raw materials, labour, and markets, 
this political process was ever more framed by nation-states. National 
economies, empires, and national capitalists became increasingly the basic 
building blocks of the new global political economy,” (Ibid, 260). Thus we 
see that the state was key to imperialist expansion. It was for this reason 
that the Free Officers saw the need to capture the state in order to counter 
imperialism. Following this, the state should be seen as being put in the 
service of the various hegemonic projects under each successive historic 
bloc. It is not necessarily that the state was important under the Nasserist 
bloc and not so much under the neoliberal bloc; the state continued to be 
key to accumulating capital in the 2000s. Instead it is useful to see the state 
as being put in service of a different type of economic development in the 
2000s than in the 1950s. 
 When the British occupied Egypt—following Egypt’s inability to 
pay back its debt—there was already a class of foreign capitalists in place 
that accumulated wealth through cotton. Alongside this, there was also an 
agrarian fraction that was created following the introduction of private 
property and the disintegration of Muhammad Ali’s state apparatus. This 
fraction expanded within the context of imperialist domination, since it 
depended on foreign companies and banks, as well as foreign monopolies. 
Indeed by 1945, Egypt already had a well-developed private sector.  
  Cotton trade, banking, insurance, and construction represented the 
main areas of economic activity during this period. The ruling class was 
dominated by the Misr Group, which was linked to the major Egyptian 
capitalists, as well as the interests of specific groups, including Abboud 
Yehya and Farghali (Hussein and Chirman 1973, 24). The relations of pro-
duction were in a transition phase whereby the capitalist mode of produc-
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tion was becoming increasingly dominant vis-à-vis the tributary and feu-
dalist modes. “These relations of production were a direct reflection of 
Egyptian dependence on the capitalist world market and were rooted par-
ticularly in political and economic subordination to Great Britain,” (Ibid). 
Notably, as the British occupation progressed, the income of foreigners in 
Egypt began to rise while the income of the Egyptian bourgeoisie de-
clined, as did the general income of the Egyptian working class (Ibid, 53). 
 This transition to capitalism had been underway for decades, but it 
was during the British occupation in particular that a specific form of state 
as well as foreign capital came to play such an important role. The intro-
duction of private property had already changed the ways in which peas-
ants, who had previously survived off of land that did not belong to them, 
reproduced themselves. The class of landlords expanded, and whereas 
previously the state had played a crucial role in collecting rents from peas-
ants, the class of landlords began gaining power. Moreover, because 
Egypt’s economy was structured to export raw materials, foreign eco-
nomic patterns had a big impact on the lives of peasants. Soon debt be-
came a major reality for peasants who could no longer afford to reproduce 
their livelihoods; much of this debt was owed to foreign banks. The con-
solidation of private property, foreign capital, and debt all contributed to 
this shift from the feudal and tributary modes to capitalism as the domi-
nant mode. Capitalism did not, however, displace these other modes, as 
certain features remained; however under an imperial occupation the fac-
tors that were present lent themselves to cultivating capitalism. 
 Under the British occupation, an emerging focus on industry meant 
that a new class began to materialize that was distinct from the agrarian 
and foreign fractions: small industrial, commercial, and professional 
groups emerged that had more nationalistic ideologies (Vatikiotis 1975, 
22). 
 
“Few would deny the brilliance of those Egyptian entrepre-
neurs who had emerged in the 20th century and provided 
Egyptians with a credible threat to the foreigners in the cor-
porate world. Tal’at Harb had led the way for a generation of 
astute business executives: Abdelrahman Hamada, the new 
Mist textile giant; Hafiz Affifi, too easily dismissed as a politi-
cian, but an astute business personage; Ahmed Aboud, a busi-
ness dynamo involved in every aspect of Egypt’s economy; 
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and the alexandrine cotton merchants and exporters Ahmad 
Farghali and the Yahya family. By 1948 the Egyptian business 
presence had resulted in Egyptian nationals’ owning 39% of 
the share capital of companies operating in the country; in 
1900 they had held a miniscule 9%,” (Gerhart and Tignor 
1998, 36). 
 
The most prominent indication of the formation of a local industrial frac-
tion is the Bank Misr Group.45 Indeed by 1941, the threat Bank Misr posed 
was so great that the government requested that they no longer pursue 
activity aimed at creating new industrial enterprises (Davis 1983, 4). What 
was Bank Misr, and what type of social force did they represent? Davis, 
historicizing their emergence, argues that the founding of Bank Misr was 
the result of the crystallization of the social and political forces of the 19th 
century (Ibid, 12). The imperial condition, the dominance of foreign cap-
ital, and the concurrent rise of nationalism, were some of these forces. 
Bank Misr emerged due to the increasing aversion towards foreign capital 
and their institutions on the part of the agrarian fraction, revealing a major 
tension within the ruling class. The Bank was a means by which the agrar-
ian fraction and an emerging industrial fraction could find alternative 
sources of capital and reduce their reliance on foreign capital. Despite this, 
and the Bank’s general rhetoric of economic independence, there were 
very close connections between the agrarian fraction and Bank Misr, even 
though not all members of the agrarian fraction supported the founding 
of the Bank.46 Davis argues that by the 1930s it was clear that Bank Misr 
was acting largely in the interests of the ruling class—including foreign 
                                                 
45 The Federation of Industries represented another important group similar to 
Bank Misr, although it was comprised mainly of non-Egyptians. Its aim was to 
bring together establishments in order to pursue common interests and protect 
local industry. 
46 Davis explains that the reasons why the merchant class of capitalists were not 
as invested in Bank Misr was because it became difficult for Egyptian merchants 
to compete with European merchants following the influx of foreign capital. He 
also notes that because traditional merchants do not need as big of a capital in-
vestment as cotton investors, they did not need a national bank as much as the 
agrarian bourgeoisie (1983, 77). 
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interests—rather than furthering nationalist goals of economic independ-
ence which is what the Bank was set up to do: provide a source of capital 
for Egypt’s agrarian fraction and emerging industrial fraction in order to 
lessen their dependence on foreign capital (Ibid, 133). 
 It is useful to question the extent to which Bank Misr was able to 
achieve its goals and whether the limits that prevented this were insur-
mountable to begin with. Key here is the question of industrialization. Da-
vis writes: 
 
“The failure of the Misr Group to establish itself as a viable 
institution independent of foreign control and to create a self-
sustaining industrial sector in the Egyptian economy raises the 
critical question about the extent to which industrial develop-
ment can take place in underdeveloped countries given the 
constraints of the world market and the nature of precapitalist 
society in which such industrialization must occur,” (Ibid, 9). 
 
This is a question that is at the heart of an analysis of the native bourgeoisie 
in any postcolonial country, and brings us back to Gramsci’s point about 
the limits of the possible. It replicates the classic tension between structure 
and agency: the structures of imperial rule and global capital versus the 
agency of native elites. Davis argues that the origins of Egyptian industri-
alization were to be found in the contradictions that arose from the activ-
ities of foreign capital in Egypt (Ibid, 72). Moreover, the industrial fraction 
that emerged could not play a progressive role because it was not inde-
pendent of foreign capital (Ibid, 152). “Those members of the Egyptian 
bourgeoisie who collaborated with foreign capital during the 1930s should 
be seen in neo-colonialist terms as they provided a front which obscured 
the real control of the enterprises in question. On the surface, it appeared 
as if Egyptians had gained a greater measure of control over the economy 
than in reality they had,” (Ibid). Indeed this is where Marxism’s theoriza-
tion of a capitalist class becomes useful. Rather than formulate critiques 
of imperialism merely in terms of a European bourgeoisie dominating 
Egyptians, Marx instead spoke of a capitalist class, allowing the concept 
to be used in postcolonial contexts. In the case of Egypt, the ruling class 
may have been partly made up of native capitalists, but this does not de-
tract from their role as furthering capitalist accumulation in the country. 
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Thus the nationalist dimension is not enough in an analysis of the Egyp-
tian ruling class, as capital has been able to move beyond national con-
structions by creating indigenous capitalist classes across the globe. Frantz 
Fanon’s work is particularly useful here, as he has clearly demonstrated the 
ways in which a native elite—supported by Euro-American forces of cap-
italism—are able to keep most African countries in a state of neo-coloni-
alism (1963, 165). 
 Robert Vitalis has intervened in the debate on Egyptian local capital 
versus foreign capital, arguing that focusing too much on foreign capital 
and imperialism means losing sight of the power held by local capital 
(1995). Vitalis uses the example of Ahmad Abboud, who combined for-
eign-funded projects with local accumulation. He expands this by pointing 
out that in the early 20th century it was local capitalists that began to make 
use of Egyptian state resources—tax exemptions, coercive force and sub-
sidies for example (Ibid, 11). This argument is problematic because it un-
derestimates the power of the British occupation. How could the state’s 
coercive force, for example, be used in the interest of local capital—at a 
time when Egypt was a colonized country—unless the interests of local 
capital were somewhat aligned with the colonial power? Vitalis writes: 
 
“The dynamics of industrialization at a key juncture in Egypt’s 
recent history are more usefully understood as the outcome 
of the war of position among rival investor coalitions than as 
a representation of enduring structural features of agrarian so-
ciety and the dominant hierarchies of the international capi-
talist system. The politics of business and industry building in 
Egypt can no longer be reduced to the idea of an overarching 
struggle between imperialism and the nation,” (Ibid). 
 
Rival investor coalitions did exist, but as my previous discussion of Bank 
Misr indicates, these were not detached from Egypt’s colonial condition. 
The structural features Vitalis puts aside as irrelevant to Egypt in the early 
20th century were very much a part of the decisions local capitalists were 
able to make. Indeed it is quite a stretch to imagine that a colonized coun-
try was not under some form of structural limitations by its colonial rulers. 
The struggle between imperialism and nation is precisely the struggle all 
colonial societies were undergoing in the early 20th century. While it is true 
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that this is not the only part of the story when it comes to Egypt’s indus-
trialization, it is also not a simple side note. 
 Indeed here Nazih Ayubi’s work is extremely useful. Ayubi points 
to the ways in which colonial rule created a native class through which it 
could penetrate Egypt’s economy (1996, 92). The focus on land and ex-
port ensured little surplus went to industry. Trade, often through credit 
from European banks, became the priority. Importantly, Egypt’s “native 
elite was not the European type of bourgeoisie generated by a capitalist 
mode of production but a specific type of class that was characteristic of 
dependent/peripheral capitalism,” (Ibid). Samir Amin has referred to the 
state of this class as a “mere potentiality”—it was created by imperial cap-
italism while at the same time it found itself constrained by it (Ibid).  
 Vitalis also argues that the access local capitalists had to foreign fund-
ing was what allowed them to start industries and companies that would 
later form the basis of Egypt’s public sector (Ibid, 10). On the one hand it 
is true that some of these local capitalists set the grounds for Egypt’s in-
dustry; on the other hand, it was the Nasserist historic bloc—through re-
directing capital towards industry—that should be given the credit for cre-
ating Egypt’s public sector as we know it today.  
 Despite this important discussion, the question of the extent to 
which Bank Misr represented imperial capital’s interests or whether it rep-
resented a real challenge in its attempt to give Egyptian capitalists some 
independence remains. There is a debate in the literature that reflects on 
this question, by asking whether the local bourgeoisie at the time of the 
British occupation was a nationalistic one or completely tied to British 
interests. Marius Deeb has argued against this, starting that the Bank Misr 
group and the Federation of Industries were both against the British 
Chamber of Commerce (Ibid). Muhammad Tal’at Harb, for example, saw 
Bank Misr as a means of achieving economic independence for Egypt. 
Tal’at Harb believed that if Egypt wanted to have its own economic policy, 
it needed an Egyptian bank. Landowners and merchants were key to the 
founding of the Bank, as they comprised major shareholders. Six of the 
ten board members were landowners; two were merchants; and the last 
two were high-ranking officials (Ibid, 71). “From its foundation in 1920, 
Bank Misr represented the nucleus of a national bourgeoisie which wanted 
to develop the industrial sector of the economy so that Egypt would not 
remain a purely agricultural country,” (Ibid, 75). Specializing in agriculture 
meant that Egypt would always be dependent on fluctuations of food 
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prices and demands for certain crops through the uneven dynamics of 
global trade; thus industrialization was framed as necessary for economic 
independence. A 1929 Bank Misr report pushed for a ten-year industriali-
zation plan, arguing that new industries would create local markets and 
would cost less than imported products; joint-stock companies were also 
to be formed (Ibid). Bank Misr called on the state to be part of this indus-
trialization drive, with little response. This eventually led to Bank Misr co-
operating with foreign capital instead, a trend that continued into the 
1930s (Ibid). Although Bank Misr continued to establish purely Egyptian 
companies whenever possible, the capital brought in by foreign enterprises 
was much more significant and influential. In the 1930s, as local industry 
picked up, the ties between Bank Misr and local industrialists began to 
strengthen. Many of these industrialists were not Egyptian, however, as 
Bank Misr’s aim—to form a native, nationalist and independent bourgeoi-
sie—had clearly failed (Ibid, 79). While Bank Misr may have wanted to 
work towards Egypt’s economic independence within the global system, 
it did not succeed in doing so. 
 The question to ask is: why? While it important to know whether 
Bank Misr really did intend to create an independent and nationalist bour-
geoisie, or whether this has been a re-reading by certain academics of a 
historical era that has been characterized by nationalism, it is difficult to 
ascertain that now. What is more useful is to look at the various mecha-
nisms through which Bank Misr aimed to achieve this independence. The 
founding of a national bank that could award Egyptians loans for enter-
prise is one such mechanism. Another is the policy of industrialization 
through Egyptian entrepreneurs. Both of these mechanisms failed at ful-
filling a nationalist goal but did aid in providing foreign capital with ways of 
penetrating the Egyptian economy. Whether this was because the Egyp-
tian state and/or economic class did not work with Bank Misr—as they 
claimed—or because Bank Misr’s connections to foreign capital were 
stronger than presented, is tangential. Moreover, what is crucial is the class 
composition of Bank Misr’s founders: they were from the Egyptian capi-
talist class, a class that was not separate from foreign capital and indeed 
that existed through exploitation of the peasant masses. Landowners and 
merchants made up the bulk of Bank Misr’s operations. At a time when 
the capitalist mode of production was becoming dominant, one should 
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question whether any organization dominated by members of the capital-
ist class could have truly nationalist and independent aspirations for the 
Egyptian economy. 
 In sum it is perhaps more useful to emphasize the achievements of 
Bank Misr. The monopoly of foreigners was broken, a cotton textile indus-
try was created, and it laid the foundations for the possibility of diversifi-
cation in Egypt’s economy (Mabro and Radwan 1976, 28). Pressure from 
the emerging native capitalists also managed to introduce tariff reforms 
that protected Egyptian industries. It did not manage to change the colo-
nial character of the economy (Ibid), which, as noted before, is a structural 
limitation faced by native capitalists in colonial conditions. By 1940, Bank 
Misr was struggling. Tal’at Harb resigned, and the law of reorganization 
from 1941 meant that the government had to guarantee the deposits of 
the Bank. All unsuccessful Bank Misr companies had to be liquidated and 
the government gained the right to veto appointments to the board of 
directors.  
 The question of why Bank Misr failed to achieve economic inde-
pendence for Egypt recalls the Free Officers’ similar failure years later. 
Indeed I argue that this very question of structure versus agency, where 
structure represents imperial capital and agency represents local social 
forces, is an important one in the context of Egypt. The same tension 
recurred in 2011, where revolutionary forces were once again unable to 
overcome the structures set in place by imperial capital. The fact that this 
tension reoccurs throughout modern Egyptian history demonstrates the 
postcolonial predicament: capitalism seems intrinsically tied to imperial-
ism, and attempts to develop a “local” form of capitalism do not escape 
the imperial trap. The attempt by Bank Misr demonstrates the problems 
of capitalist expansion in the peripheries: despite it being indigenous, it 
was still by and for a small class of capitalists and thus of no benefit to the 
majority of Egyptians. This can be contrasted with the attempt at indus-
trialization under Muhammad Ali, when the capitalist mode still had not 
become dominant, and when the state was in complete control of the pro-
cess. There was no capitalist class to speak of at that time, whether indig-
enous or foreign, and therefore the mechanisms of the process were dif-
ferent. Ali and the Egyptian state did not exercise the kind of control over 
peasants, for example, that came to exist later on because peasants were 
still able to determine production according to their own needs. The logic 
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of the market as under the capitalist mode was not yet determining in the 
last instance. 
 Another group that emerged around this time represented the grow-
ing nationalist trend and was a response to the increasing dominance of 
foreign capital, similar to Bank Misr. It was this trend that the Nasserist 
historic bloc would build on ideologically. This group constituted rich 
peasants who owned or rented the land and exploited peasants to extract 
surplus value, and thus they played a larger role in rural areas (Ibid, 25). 
This group soon began to look for ways to challenge the organization of 
the system, as it viewed British imperialism, the landed bourgeoisie, and 
the general position of Egypt within the global capitalist system as detri-
mental to its own advancement (Ibid, 27). The upper section of the petty 
bourgeoisie—primarily state employees—also favoured an expansion of 
capitalism along nationalist terms (Ibid, 32). These two groups—primarily 
the latter—were to become significant after 1952, as we saw: 
 
“It was made up of army and police officers, university pro-
fessors, prominent journalists or economists, technicians or 
functionaries in middle-level posts. Of petty-bourgeois, Egyp-
tian origin, the members of this stratum were the first to 
‘make it’ in the wake of the limited growth of capitalism after 
World War 1; their parents—small peasants, tradesmen, or 
functionaries—had to make great sacrifices to pay for their 
studies. They were differentiated from the lower cadres not 
only by their specialized skills, but also by the class training 
they acquired while serving the agencies of exploitation and 
repression. They were ideologically and technically prepared 
to assume leading positions within the framework of an ex-
panding capitalism, and they became integrated into the capi-
talist state,” (Ibid, 33). 
 
This class, however, could not advance significantly because the structure 
of the economy continued to ensure the reproduction of a small landed 
elite. Class mobility was thus closely linked to ownership of land. 
 It was around this time that a native political elite began to emerge, 
alongside the increasing diversification of the economy. This elite was rep-
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resented primarily by the Wafd and Sa’ad Zaghloul. “The gathering revo-
lutionary forces had two major objectives: independence from foreign 
control and the establishment of their own authority by setting up repre-
sentative institutions in place of an autocratic dynasty that recognized no 
political rights,” (Ibid, 23). However, at its inception the Wafd was still an 
elite-based party and thus had few direct ties to the rest of the population. 
It was only in 1936 that it began to embrace different classes (Ibid, 24). A 
struggle between the monarchy and the Wafd ensued. Although the Wafd 
controlled parliament, parliament had no power to check executive au-
thority or the King. However, although the Wafd at one point in time 
represented different nationalist interests, it soon revealed its bias towards 
the elite, particularly through its attempts to control the workers’ move-
ment. The Wafd’s treaty of alliance with the British in 1936 and its rigid 
elite structure meant that it lost much of its popularity in the 1940s, as 
tensions with Egypt grew. 
 In conclusion, the debates surrounding Bank Misr also highlight the 
various fractions of capital present in Egypt’s ruling class during this pe-
riod. The agrarian fraction that pushed for alternative local sources of cap-
ital for investment; the fraction tied to foreign capital and British interests; 
and the nascent industrial fraction. There is little doubt that the fraction 
tied to foreign capital was the dominant one within the ruling class, as the 
state and economy were defined through Egypt’s colonial condition. It is 
precisely this that the other two fractions tried to resist through the for-
mation of Bank Misr. Although this ultimately failed, I argue that this 
should be explained through the structural limitations Egyptian capitalists 
were facing due to the British occupation, rather than because they did not 
want Egyptian independence. Thus we see the contradiction between the 
ideology of independence, and the material reality of continued subservi-
ence to global capital, a contradiction that emerged because of Egypt’s 
colonial condition. This contradiction was to resurface a decade later, 
when the power struggle between forces in favour of foreign capital and 
those who preferred local capital and industrialization was to set the stage 
for 1952. 
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3.5.2 The Emergence of an Industrial Fraction 
 
Unlike other eras, the literature delineating the various economic 
groups under Nasser is quite extensive. The main task undertaken by the 
new regime was to remove the power base of the agrarian fraction of cap-
ital and weaken its position within the ruling class. After the 1952 revolu-
tion, a different balance of forces was necessary to consolidate the new 
bloc. The land reforms put in place under the Nasserist bloc effectively 
dismantled the influence of many of the landowning families, thus ensur-
ing that the old regime’s social base was gone (although it was to return 
later). The military regime then cultivated a new fraction of capital that 
was to be a central locus of capital accumulation: the public sector, 
manned by a new technocratic/bureaucratic class. This fraction was not 
directly connected to an independent source of capital or wealth, such as 
land or industry, but they were connected to the state, which became a 
major driver or production and accumulation under this bloc. While this 
fraction did not have the material means to organize production according 
to their own interests, the state did. This is a unique development because 
they did not emerge from a specific circuit of capital, nor from a specific 
form of production. It attests to the strong position of the state in certain 
periods, and must be connected to the nationalist drive towards independ-
ence. Alongside this fraction there were also small capitalists that were 
exempted from the nationalization program; a rising industrial fraction (to 
be discussed next); and remnants of the old bourgeoisie. This latter group 
comprised both members of the old bourgeoisie whose wealth had been 
reduced, as well as middlemen from the old bloc that functioned as medi-
ators between the state and private sector. 
 One of the first directions in which the new bloc moved was to 
emphasize capital investment in industry instead of agriculture. The Nas-
serist bloc immediately began implementing laws that encouraged this: 
 
“To encourage national capital to direct its savings toward in-
dustrial development, the authorities increased duties paid on 
imported industrial commodities that competed with domes-
tic industrial products. The regime also cancelled or lowered 
duties on imported material inputs including equipment nec-
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essary for the development of Egyptian industry. New com-
panies were also exempted from paying taxes on profits for a 
five-year period. In addition, taxes paid on undistributed prof-
its were lowered by 50%. Finally, tariffs on luxury imports 
were raised,” (Aoude 1994, 6). 
 
It soon became clear that the aim was not to displace private investment 
in the economy, but to shift it from agriculture to industry. Here we see 
another sign of the new bloc’s program to re-articulate Egypt’s capitalist 
trajectory rather than demolish it. At the same time, the new bloc restricted 
foreign capital, pushed through import substitution industrialization, and 
invested heavily in infrastructure (Ibid, 7). Nasser described these moves 
as the creation of a “controlled capitalistic economy,” (Ibid).  
 Despite these changes, the bloc was largely unsuccessful at develop-
ing industry at the expense of agriculture. The capital needed for signifi-
cant investments belonged to a very small circle of elites who saw Nasser’s 
land reforms as anti-capitalist. Thus there was not enough trust to con-
vince these individuals to invest (Beattie 1994, 144). The regime’s disman-
tling of the old political parties also eliminated the avenues of influence of 
old elites—discussed in the previous section—further estranging them 
from the regime: “In the absence of political tools by which they could 
articulate and aggregate their interests, Egyptian capitalists remained sus-
picious of the Officers’ objectives and were reluctant to follow their direc-
tives,” (Ibid). Additionally, the old elite had very few links to the new re-
gime. Class tensions played a role here, as the old elite often looked down 
on the new class of officers who they saw as less sophisticated (Ibid). 
 
“Egyptian capital was concentrated in agriculture, and regime 
leaders destroyed large-scale investment support from that 
sector by denying major landowners any meaningful role in 
politics and earning their distrust through the land reform. 
Support from the rural middle class and peasants was greater, 
but it was insufficient for the industrialization and diversifica-
tion goals. Meanwhile, Egyptian capitalists in nonagricultural 
sectors were unable to respond assiduously to regime direc-
tives for several reasons: they were too weak, they lacked in-
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fluence over state economic planning, and they had little con-
fidence in the officer-rulers. Thus state actors, by default, be-
came the principal economic actors, while capitalists were left 
holding the short end of the stick,” (Ibid, 147-8). 
 
Meanwhile, the state began to redirect capital towards the public sector. 
“The regime wanted to save capitalism in Egypt by pursuing capitalist de-
velopment independent of the major capitalist countries. The only availa-
ble way of doing so was the building of a genuine public sector,” (Aoude 
1994, 8). Here I would qualify Aoude’s argument by noting that “saving 
capitalism” here meant ensuring an alternative articulation of capitalism in 
Egypt, one focused on development rather than rampant accumulation 
and consumption. This redirection of capital towards the public sector was 
the second major driving force of the new bloc, alongside encouraging 
investment in industry.  
 In 1960, the National Bank of Egypt and Bank Misr were national-
ized. This was followed by more nationalizations in 1961 which included 
all insurance companies and banks, 50 industrial and shipping companies, 
and most of the financial sector and the manufacturing sector (Beattie 
1994, 155-6). The 1962 National Charter allowed the state to nationalize 
any company owned jointly with the private sector. Large companies 
owned by private individuals were also nationalized. Nationalization Laws 
117 and 118 aimed at creating a public sector through making the state the 
central actor in production (Ibid). This is where we begin to see a particu-
lar relation between the state and capitalist development, one brought 
about by the particular conditions of the Nasserist bloc. 
 The National Charter clearly defined what role the private and pub-
lic sectors were to play. It limited private ownership to the sectors of con-
struction, land, buildings, and industry; and it made exploitation less likely 
by implementing land reform, rent controls, and new taxation rules. More-
over, the Charter guaranteed social welfare benefits such as education, 
health care, and a minimum wage (Ibid, 8). The Charter thus changed the 
role of state capitalism: it was now focused on either the public sector or 
joint projects between the state and the private sector. “By the end of the 
five-year plan, the public sector accounted for some 90% of total (mone-
tized) investment throughout the 1960s and until 1973. State capitalism 
had eliminated the main centers of bourgeois monopolistic control tied to 
imperialism,” (Ibid). The declining role of British capital and the focus on 
176  
 
industrialization thus both played a role in prompting the state to expand 
its role in production. The shift became apparent with realignments hap-
pening at the government level. Before the nationalization of the Suez Ca-
nal, the government divided the Ministry of Commerce and Industry into 
two separate ministries. Aziz Sidqi, who was an advocate of state planning 
and industrialization, was named the head of the Ministry of Commerce 
(Ibid, 94). 
 The politics surrounding the Aswan Dam represent an event 
through which some of these shifts can be understood. The Dam was 
conceptualized as a means through which Egypt could industrialize, as 
controlling floods would provide water for irrigation and generate elec-
tricity. Controlling the floods would also be productive for Egyptian farm-
land. The Dam was to be the main development project of the new regime, 
and the quest to find financing for it represented an important break be-
tween the Egyptian regime and Western interests. Due to the hefty con-
tracts, foreign capital was very interested in acquiring tenders. The regime 
preferred European private capital to American or World Bank financing, 
but English Electric (the main firm involved) threatened to back out of 
the deal if the World Bank was not included (Ibid, 105). Following this, 
the World Bank became a major player in the negotiations: “Although they 
say the project is a sound proposition, Egypt must apply herself to the 
discipline and austerity that will be necessary,” (Ibid). The arms deal signed 
with the Czechs in that year, as well as Egypt’s increasingly close ties to 
the Soviets, added more tension to the already-fraught negotiations, even-
tually leading to Britain pulling out of any possible financing deal. The US-
World Bank financing proposal had conditionalities that the new regime 
was averse to, however: 
 
“The agreement was contingent on the government of Egypt 
accepting a letter of intent that would impose economic re-
straints on the Egyptian government. The Egyptians would 
be required to give economic priority to the dam project, en-
suring that hard currency was always available for the prompt 
repayment of the loan and allowing the bank to determine 
what additional development expenditures the Egyptian gov-
ernment could undertake,” (Ibid, 107). 
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It is clear that these economic restraints as well as their interpretation by 
the Egyptian government as a new form of subordination to Western 
powers (Ibid) meant that the financing was intricately tied to the bloc’s 
new economic vision. The eventual decision by the British and American 
governments not to finance the Dam was thus a culmination of these ten-
sions. Egypt’s overtures to the Soviets were seen as especially problematic. 
Nevertheless, the decision still came as a shock to Nasser, as detailed by 
Heikal: 
 
“The President read Dulles’ statement and excused himself to 
Nehru (who was visiting Egypt) without telling him what was 
in the message, then brought it back to show Doctor Fawzi 
and myself. ‘This is not a withdrawal,’ he said, ‘it is an attack 
on the regime and an invitation to the people of Egypt to 
bring it down.’ He sat by himself for some fifteen minutes and 
then went and showed the message to Nehru. The Indian 
leader read it and said: ‘Those people, how arrogant they are.’ 
But Nehru did not feel the strength of the storm that was 
brewing,” (1972, 74).  
 
Nasser’s response was swift, and came as a shock to the rest of the world: 
he announced the full nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The 
announcement came in a speech Nasser gave to the Egyptian public, 
whose response was ecstatic: 
 
“There was a moment of silent incredulity, as the significance 
of what they had just heard sank into the quarter of a million 
people crowded into Menshiyeh Square (Alexandria). Then 
pandemonium erupted and scenes of wild excitement broke 
out in towns and villages through the length and breadth of 
the land where millions had been clustered round their radios 
to listen to the President’s speech. Nobody in Egypt slept 
much that night,” (1986, 127). 
 
Writing on the Suez crisis, Nasser later stated: 
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“The battle of Suez which was one of the major landmarks in 
the Egyptian revolutionary experiment was not merely a mo-
ment in which the Egyptian people discovered themselves or 
the Arab nation discovered its potentialities but was a mo-
ment of international significance and helped all oppressed 
people discover infinite latent powers in themselves and find 
out that they can revolt and that the revolution is the only 
course to take,” (1954, 12). 
 
The Suez Canal Company was an Egyptian firm, but its capital and man-
agers were completely foreign. Egyptians held 0.2% of shares in the com-
pany and the board of directors included only two Egyptians out of a total 
of 32 (Gerhart and Tignor 1998, 34). Egyptian banks also kept most of 
their funds overseas. “Many within the landed classes resented the rising 
business community, although there had been a steady mixing of capital 
streams. Perhaps more important, disagreements existed among capitalists 
seeking to promote Egypt’s export-oriented outlook and those striving for 
a more self-contained and industrialized country,” (Ibid, 35).  
 Nasser was unsure of whether Britain, France, and Israel would re-
spond militarily to the nationalization, but the regime realized economic 
warfare was a definite expectation, despite the fact that Britain and France 
had more to lose financially than Egypt (Ibid, 116). The Company itself, 
following Nasser’s announcement, pushed for full military intervention 
and economic warfare. Oil companies also responsed immediately, partic-
ularly as this announcement came only five years after the attempted na-
tionalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The oil companies 
pushed for an international organization that would take over the assets 
of the Suez Canal Company and manage the canal (Ibid, 122). The British 
carefully assessed the economic weapons available to them and it was at 
this moment that Britain realized what Egypt already knew: that Britain 
could not pursue financial sanctions because it would affect British finan-
cial interests more than it would affect Egyptian interests.  Egypt therefore 
had to find alternative sources of funding for the dam. Eventually, two 
bids from Egyptian entrepreneurs were considered. One was from Osman 
Ahmed Osman, now one of Egypt’s more prominent capitalists, and the 
second was from Ahmed Abboud. Osman was awarded the contract, and 
his company built the dam. His company was nationalized soon after (Ibid, 
187). 
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 The nationalization of the Suez Canal was very much part of the 
regime’s new project to both Egyptianize major companies in the country 
as well as to expand the state-controlled public sector. This was com-
pounded by the increasing tensions between Western powers and Egypt, 
particularly after the Israeli invasion of Sinai, which was supported by the 
British and the French. Although the Americans and the Soviets quickly 
halted the invasion, the act had important repercussions. It severed most 
links between Egypt on the one hand and France and Britain on the other, 
and many foreign nationals began leaving Egypt. The assets that had been 
amassed by foreign nationals over decades were sequestered. 
 
“The dissolution of the British and French economic pres-
ence in Egypt unfolded in conjunction with the invasion. At 
first the Egyptian actions were taken as wartime measures; 
only later were they made permanent through regular govern-
mental decrees. By viewing the evolution of the government’s 
relationship toward foreign capital during this period of acute 
strain, it is possible to see how the regime, so conflicted on 
the issue of foreign capital and the private sector, took its first 
decisive steps to undercut the power of foreign capital,” (Ibid, 
128). 
 
In 1957 it was ordered that all banks in Egypt must have only Egyptian 
shareholders and directors. In one move, the banking industry was nation-
alized. The same was done with insurance companies. Two additional laws 
were passed to create the Egyptian Economic Organization (to oversee 
public sector expansion) and to order commercial firms to turn themselves 
into Egyptian companies (this law was later made void following intense 
protest from foreign capital). These laws were constructed by both the 
regime and notable capitalists within the ruling class, including Aziz Sidqi, 
Abu Nusayr, Sayyid Marei, Kamal Ramzi, and Abdelmoneim Qaysuni 
(Ibid, 138). Even within the ruling class, there were disagreements over 
how much power the private sector should have. By the end of the wave 
of sequestering, British and French losses were massive. Moreover, their 
bargaining position was weak because they had more to lose in Egypt than 
Egypt had to lose in either France or Britain, as mentioned previously 
(Ibid, 144). Negotiations with the oil companies also led to significant 
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gains for the Egyptian state, including the power to set the price of Egyp-
tian oil products and to exercise control over foreign oil companies (Ibid, 
158). Throughout the entire process, however, Nasser always stated his 
intent to compensate shareholders for any losses. 
 It is clear from the preceding section that the events that led to the 
removal of large sectors of the foreign fraction of capital in Egypt signifi-
cantly altered several aspects of the Egyptian economy. The next section 
will focus on two fractions in particular that were prominent in the historic 
bloc during this period and whose evolving fortunes demonstrated the 
aims of the Nasserist project. The first was Bank Misr, which controlled 
much of the private sector and was a major monopoly controlled by Mu-
hammad Rushdy, Mohamed el-Atta and Ahmed Fuad. As noted by Abdel-
Malek, the 29 industrial companies started by Bank Misr between 1922 
and 1957 dominated almost the whole Egyptian economy (1968, 114). The 
second group was the Abboud group, controlled by Ahmed Abboud (who 
also had stock in Bank Misr). Abboud’s holdings were extensive, and he 
was on the board of directors of the Suez Canal Company. These two 
groups exercised immense power of the Egyptian economy during the 
1940s and 1950s. 
  
“This whole world of finance, industry and business pros-
pered as never before in the shadow of a strong authority con-
cerned with order and economic progress. But these com-
plexes had the habit of power. In another time they made and 
unmade ministries, negotiated with foreign powers, ran the 
press, the parties, Parliament: they were and they used the 
power of the state. Now their power was intact, their invest-
ments were clearly increasing and their profits were substan-
tial. The hegemony of the landed aristocracy, which had oc-
casionally got in their way, had been swept away,” (Ibid, 115). 
 
Thus we see that initially the declining power of the agrarian fraction 
opened up space for different fractions that relied on finance and industry 
rather than land. Importantly, these fractions needed a strong state that 
valued nationalism, industrialization and economic progress along specific 
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lines. Indeed this is what characterizes the new fractions that emerged un-
der Nasser: their capital came from and was concentrated on either the 
private sector or industry, and—later—the public sector. 
 Nevertheless, there were numerous tensions within this new config-
uration, including the fact that the new regime wanted to minimize the 
power of private capital and that the state wanted a lot of investment in 
industrialization, which was not always the main priority of the new frac-
tions. Nasser’s nationalization of many major enterprises also caused ten-
sion within the ruling class, as it placed these enterprises under state con-
trol. The sequestering of Abboud’s company is a clear example of this. In 
1952, the regime moved to sequester Abboud’s sugar company, which was 
then one of the largest privately-owned companies in Egypt. The company 
owed the government over five million pounds in payment. Targeting this 
one company meant threatening to disrupt Abboud’s entire economic em-
pire, built on many different companies and investment (Ibid, 112). Fol-
lowing sequestration, the government became the major shareholder in 
the sugar company and paid off the French investors, who comprised the 
majority. This move was read as a warning signal to the capitalist class in 
Egypt, who were worried that it would set a precedent. It appeared that 
while Nasser supported the continued existence of the capitalist class, this 
support only extended to capitalists willing to allow the state a significant 
amount of control. This, I argue, is the correct reading: Nasser needed the 
state to control production and accumulation because the entire project 
of the Nasserist bloc was the redirection of production and accumulation 
towards national development. 
 These events show that there were key tensions within the ruling 
class based on a divergence in opinion on what the role of the private 
sector was to be under this bloc. As noted by Tignor: 
 
“The business concerns used the traditional criteria of profit-
ability and safety to decide on their investments. They natu-
rally shied away from many of the large-scale projects that 
were close to the heart of the Egyptian rulers. In contrast, the 
military men were not merely enamoured of large projects for 
themselves and for the legitimacy they might bring to the rul-
ing faction. They felt a desperate urge, motivated by their de-
sire to stay in power, to jolt the Egyptian economy into for-
ward motion. They believed that this could be accomplished 
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only through profound structural change. They concluded 
that if the business community was unwilling to play a lead 
role in this effort then the state must,” (Ibid, 113). 
 
Aside from his reading of the new bloc’s orientation being driven solely 
by their desire to stay in power—which is problematic—Tignor makes a 
important point about profitability. For many within the ruling class, prof-
itability was the driving force determining where capital investments went. 
To some extent, this is common sense; however it is precisely this trend 
of personal accumulation of profits that the Nasserist bloc wanted to in-
terrupt. The aim of the bloc was not necessarily to not make profit, but 
rather this was to happen alongside the development of large-scale pro-
jects in the aim of national development. This was their criteria, and it was 
here that the tension arose with individual capitalists who did not share 
the same view. Moreover, the problem was that certain sectors have his-
torically been more profitable than others: investment in agriculture, land 
and real estate is less risky than in industry (Mabro and Radwan 1976, 24). 
The aim of the new bloc was to rearticulate Egypt’s position vis-à-vis the 
capitalist mode, and to do this required changing the direction of Egypt’s 
development, and the ways in which capital was accumulated. These large-
scale projects were therefore necessary, as well as the nationalization of 
key enterprises. In other words, nationalization should be understood 
within the framework of the new direction of the bloc, rather than simply 
as a means of amassing power. 
 The nationalization of the banks represented a watershed moment 
in this process. On February 11, 1961 Bank Misr and the National Bank 
of Egypt were nationalized. Two laws went into effect: one restricting the 
number of board positions to two and managing directorships to one; and 
another nationalizing the National Bank of Egypt and Bank Misr. The 
build up to these laws had been so intensive that the nationalization legis-
lation announced in July of 1961 did not come as a surprise (Ibid, 160). 
The socialist laws left the power of the state unchallenged in numerous 
sectors. The total value of assets seized amounted to over LE850,000,000. 
“The bulk of the gain for the state came at the expense of the landowning 
class, especially the royal family, which received no compensation for its 
seized properties,” (Ibid, 166).  
 1961 witnessed the intensification of the nationalization program 
and thus a deepening of the economic direction the new bloc was headed 
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in. First, laws were passed that had a specific impact on the export of cot-
ton that essentially ensured that the state had control over the cotton in-
dustry (Abdel-Malek 1968, 152). Second, laws were passed that targeted 
income inequality, including laws that required companied to be joint ven-
ture, as well as a law that increased the rate of progressive taxation (Ibid). 
Finally, laws were passed that focused on the ownership and management 
of productive enterprises that severely restricted private capital. The first 
law led to the nationalization of all banks and insurance companies, as well 
as 50 additional companies. The second law stipulated that 50% of capital 
must be held by a public agency, and this law affected over 80 companies. 
The third law ensured that the state was to become heavily involved in 
many companies through owning stock, and this law affected over 140 
companies.  
 The process of nationalization worked through the establishment of 
public agencies under which various companies were organized. While the 
specific relationship between the public and private sectors was not de-
fined clearly, it was clear that the public sector was to play the dominant 
role in economic development. The new laws ensured that the public sec-
tor owned companies in important sectors such as banking, insurance, and 
industry, and exercised varying degrees of ownership in other sectors. Top 
positions in these companies were filled by employees of public agencies, 
thus ensuring the emergence of a new technocratic class. These were 
drawn from the educated stratum of society, especially those who had 
been educated in the US or UK. For example, by 1961 the boards of 238 
newly nationalized companies consisted of one-third engineers and scien-
tists, while the rest were made up of lawyers, high officials, business grad-
uates, and judges and councillors (Ibid, 176). The middle ranks of man-
agement within these companies were also transformed as more students 
were admitted into universities and technical institutes. From 1964 to 
1965, for example, skilled workers increased by over one million (Ibid, 
177). As Abdel-Malek notes, the explicit aim was indeed to create a new 
social category—the managerial/technocratic class (Ibid). 
 A quote from Abdel Malek sums up the situation of the Egyptian 
economy by the end of the Nasserist bloc: 
 
“The Egyptian economy appears to be a mixed economy. It 
is still capitalistic in many ways: the land remains nearly un-
touched by nationalization; the public sector, though under 
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the direction of technocrats, is still regulated by the market 
demands and profit incentive; planning, and foreign aid in 
particular, tend to strengthen this pattern. It is a relatively fast-
growing economy with a central state-capitalistic sector of un-
usual proportions, but although every new wave of nationali-
zation weakens the power of private capital, it only provides 
more solidly entrenched positions and power to the techno-
crats,” (1968, 35). 
 
His designation of the economy is mixed is a useful point, as is his de-
scriptor of the ruling class as a state-capitalistic one. Above all, he puts 
together the contradictions of the bloc, and the ways in which certain lim-
its prevented the consolidation of the project envisioned by the Nasserist 
ruling class. 
 Egypt’s worsening economic situation in the 1960s meant that 
strikes and demonstrations began to increase. Although the regime con-
tinued to repress these, the repression was met with even more anger. No-
tably, this anger was often expressed towards the police. The move to 
make the police responsible for repression under Nasser (a move consol-
idated under the next bloc) was thus already having repercussions (Hus-
sein 1973, 231). 1967 saw an event that completely changed the balance of 
social forces in Egypt. The Israeli attack on Egypt was to have major re-
percussions on the Egyptian ruling class and the Nasserist bloc as a whole. 
Elements of the ruling class who were against a strong public sector at the 
expense of a private one began to gain traction. The chaos that resulted 
from the attack weakened the regime’s ability to discipline fractions against 
the Nasserist project, fractions that had increasingly grown in strength 
throughout the 1960s. Indeed individuals such as Zakaria Mohieddin, who 
wanted to open the Egyptian economy up to the West, began to exert 
more influence (Aoude 1994, 9). Following the 1967 defeat, Nasser reor-
ganized the military in order to ensure a less influential political and eco-
nomic role for the institution. 
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3.6 Fractions of Labour 
 
In order to properly situate the various fractions of labour within the 
Nasserist bloc, it is useful to go back to the Muhammad Ali period, during 
which many of these fractions were created through the spread of the cap-
italist mode of production. Key to Ali’s project and the expansion of cot-
ton production was the creation of a rural proletariat. Beckert argues that 
this not only functioned as a strategy with which to gain control over pro-
duction, but that the creation of a state was central to this: “Creating a 
rural proletariat proved just as impossible without clear-cut private prop-
erty in land, which could be fashioned only with massive expropriations 
and a powerful presence of the state,” (Ibid, 117). Beckert importantly 
raises the point that in the case of Egypt, war capitalism was the frame-
work used by Muhammad Ali to expand cotton production. War capital-
ism depended on the use of coercion, expropriation and slavery. 
 
“Ali understood the potential of this new export crop and or-
dered it grown throughout the country. Coercion was integral 
to this project from the beginning. Peasants were forced to 
cultivate cotton on state-owned lands for their yearly corvée 
duty, a forced-labour tax. On their own lands they were also 
forced to plant cotton in specific ways, to sell their crop to the 
state, and to work without pay. The government set process 
for the cotton and controlled all aspects of its transport and 
sale to foreign merchants in Alexandria, who were explicitly 
disallowed to directly purchase cotton from Egyptian grow-
ers,” (Ibid, 119).  
 
This strategy worked so well that Egypt soon appeared to follow the tra-
jectory of Europe. “Egypt had within itself many of the preconditions for 
successful cotton textile industrialization. It had access to raw cotton 
grown in even larger quantities on its own soil. It had a long history of 
textile production, and cotton was the most important craft industry of its 
major cities before the Industrial Revolution; in the eighteenth century 
Egypt was already exporting textiles to France. It had access to British 
technology. And Egyptians were able to mobilize sufficient amounts of 
capital. But by 1850 Egypt had not joined the small number of countries 
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experiencing the Industrial Revolution,” (Ibid, 146). Indeed Ali had even 
begun an import-substitution project aimed at gaining Egypt independ-
ence, and even placed an embargo on British goods to protect the Egyp-
tian market. By the 1830s, Egypt was fifth in the world regarding cotton 
spindles per capita (Ibid, 147). This rapid advancement as well as Ali’s 
intention of developing autonomously began to worry the British. Beckert 
explains Egypt’s divergence from other cotton-producing countries by 
looking at the labour regime. 
 
“Much more than European states, Ali followed the war cap-
italism model in Egypt itself. Workers were forced to work in 
the factories. When the first cotton textile workshops opened 
in the Khurunfish quarter of Cairo sometime between 1816 
and 1818, their skilled workers and machines came from Eu-
rope, but the one thousand to two thousand rank-and-file 
workers were Sudanese slaves and Egyptians coerced to work 
for minimal wages, tightly supervised by the army. These 
workers were frequently abused. Indeed, Ali demonstrated 
that war capitalism could, at least in Egypt, and for a short 
time, give birth to industrialization. By the 1850s, Egypt’s cot-
ton industry had essentially disappeared. Egypt was never able 
to build the institutional framework that would have enabled 
a full transition to industrial capitalism,” (Ibid, 148). 
 
This story is the perfect example of the importance of labour to the story 
of capital. The labour regime implemented under Ali, alongside British 
imperial interests, were what ultimately brought down Ali’s industrializa-
tion project. 
 The British occupation brought with it new forms of domination, 
and thus impacted labour in a variety of different ways. Here Timothy 
Mitchell’s work is particularly useful, and he begins by tracing the initial 
moment in 1830 during which Egyptians were confined to their villages in 
order to produce for the market (Mitchell 1991, 34). Following this, Egyp-
tians had to seek permission and official documents in order to leave their 
home villages. Drawing on military infrastructure, the village was from 
then on to be guarded and organized in a way conducive to the production 
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of commodities for European consumption. Central Bureaux of Inspec-
tion were established, with local inspectors in each village: 
 
“The ‘general system of dependence and subordination’ was 
more fully elaborated in a sixty-page booklet issued in Decem-
ber 1829, La'ihat zira'at al-fallah wa-tadbir ahkam al-siyasa bi-qasd 
al-najah (Programme for Successful Cultivation by the Peasant 
and the Application of Government Regulations), which pre-
scribed in detail how peasants were to work in the fields, the 
crops they were to cultivate, their confinement to the village, 
and the duties of those who were to guard and supervise 
them. The booklet was the outcome of a meeting of four hun-
dred provincial administrators and military and government 
officers, called in Cairo in 1829 to address the problem of de-
clining revenues and increasing desertion of the land,” (Ibid, 
40-41). 
 
We see here that the primary motivating factor was increasing revenues, 
alongside an argument about the correct and productive utilization of land. 
Peasants who did not obey were whipped. This new organization intro-
duced a novel system of surveillance that included intense regulation and 
administration. The first population census in 1882 was part and parcel of 
this new system, whereby recording births and deaths became central to 
surveillance. There was major resistance to the imposition of such an or-
ganization—countless villagers left their villages—despite heavy penal-
ties—and there were numerous uprisings (Ibid, 42). Alongside these 
changes we see the shift in modes of production, whereby peasants had to 
accept wage labour in order to survive under colonial capitalist expansion. 
Many British capitalists hired overseers whose job it was to ensure that 
farmers were “working properly,” (Ibid, 96). This was done through vio-
lence. Thus we see that the transition to wage labour was a violent process, 
whereby peasants had no choice but to adapt in order to survive. 
 The process of establishing private property was similarly a violent 
once. Once European modernists saw private property as central to being 
civilized, they established it as a core universal right. Mitchell notes the 
contradiction between establishing private property as a right and then 
using this to take over land in the colonies, including Egypt: “The land 
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could be taken because those who farmed it had not heard of this universal 
right,” (Ibid, 56). In violently seizing this land, the British had to construct 
the previous arrangement as backwards: the Egyptian state was portrayed 
as despotic and its right to the land seen as void because of this despotism. 
This is despite the fact that under the Ottoman Empire it was not the 
cause that the state “owned all land”—land was not seen as an object that 
could be owned: 
 
“The doctrine of state ownership of land did not correspond 
to the modern notion of property but registered the ruler’s 
political claim to a share of the revenue, while also acknowl-
edging both the revenue claims of local political forces and 
the subsistence claims of the cultivator and other members of 
the village,” (Ibid, 57). 
 
Thus we see that establishing land as an object and commodity was an 
extreme departure, and could only have come about through colonial rule 
and its mechanisms of imposing violence, both material and ideological. 
A similar process happened to induce Egyptian peasants to grow the com-
modities that the British needed: cotton, as well as opium, sugar and in-
digo. The British solved this problem through the institution of private 
property as well as a monopoly system that forced villagers to grow spe-
cific crops and then hand them over (Ibid, 60). Again there was resistance, 
with masses of peasants refusing to grow these crops and deserting their 
land—even a strict system of control of mobility was unable to stop this 
massive desertion. Alongside this, many peasants chose armed rebellion 
as a form of resistance. 
 The institution of debt was a final mechanism of colonial control 
over Egyptian peasants. Debt bondage due to the inability to survive on 
the low wages of the time was the fate of many peasants. Indeed debt was 
also the reason that Britain moved to occupy Egypt in the late 1800s: 
 
“Colonialism had helped institute the regime of private prop-
erty and the monoculture of cotton; European-owned prop-
erty companies and banks had driven the speculative growth 
of Cairo; large European financial houses owned the coun-
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try’s debt and had demanded the cadastral survey and the pro-
duction of many other forms of statistical in- formation; and 
European speculators were largely responsible for the growth 
of the stock market and the increasing circulation of paper 
money. Whether organized from Cairo or the European cap-
itals, this colonial activity was the activity of outsiders, those 
for whom Egypt itself existed as an object of speculation, in-
vestment, government—and curiosity,” (Ibid, 100). 
 
It is thus apparent that a new banking system and the debt it brought with 
it were to have dramatic effects on the future of Egypt. 
 How did labour respond? Although there is a line of argument stat-
ing that Egyptian workers were inactive before 1952, there was in actual 
fact an active movement against imperial capitalism in Egypt before the 
British occupation. As pointed out by Zachary Lockman, strikes and trade 
union activism started at the beginning of the 20th century (1988, 265). 
Importantly, many workers saw a connection between anti-imperialism 
and struggles around work, despite resistance to such views from actors 
such as the Wafd (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 39-40). Major incidents 
such as the Cairo tramway workers’ strike in 1908 defined the contours of 
British policy towards Egyptian labour activism. During the strike, the po-
lice intervened and broke it up, and “militant” workers were fired (Ibid, 
226). This heavy-handed approach came to define the British response to 
labour activism and was justified on the grounds that the British were con-
cerned about the political ramifications of successful strikes. In other 
words, it might further encourage nationalist sentiments, and this connec-
tion between labour activism and the nationalist movement was at the 
heart of what worried the British. “British officials deemed full-scale po-
lice intervention essential when a vital sector of the economy, such as pub-
lic transport, the railways, or public utilities was threatened, and when the 
nationalists had adopted the workers’ cause as their own to the extent that 
a successful strikes would be perceived as a blow to the existing semi-
colonial political order,” (Ibid, 270). 
 The 1924 regime was perhaps the most hostile towards labour ac-
tivism and workers in general. It was backed by King Fu’ad and the British, 
and shut down many labour unions through police harassment (Ibid, 277). 
However, the Egyptian working class was expanding, both numerically 
and in terms of influence. 
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“The aftermath of World War 1 witnessed an unprecedented 
trade union movement. By 1922, there were 102 trade unions: 
38 in Cairo, 40 in Alexandria, 18 in the Canal Zone and 6 in 
the provinces. Simultaneously, a wave of strikes hit most of 
the major industries: during the years 1919-1921, 82 strikes 
took place. Some of the causes contributing to this upsurge in 
Egypt during this period included, first, the boom and the ex-
orbitant rise in the cost of living, which immediately followed 
WW1; the lifting of protection meant that the full impact of 
foreign competition was felt by local industry; and foreign 
competition accelerated the replacement of workers by ma-
chines,” (Deeb 1979, 187). 
 
Additionally, there was increasing resentment towards the Wafd for not 
supporting strong labour laws as well as its tendency to make deals with 
the British. Although initially the Wafd had been close to many of the 
labour unions and activists during the 1919-1923 period, this began to 
change further on. Indeed in 1924 an agreement between the Wafd and 
the British led to the repression of the trade union movement by the 
Wafdist-led government (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 45). Alexander 
and Bassiouny go on to note that the trade unions were “growing in a 
context where waves of political and economic struggles were inextricably 
interlaced,” (Ibid).  
 By the 1930s, the Egyptian working class had become a social force 
that the British had no choice but to confront (Ibid). In 1930, Prime Min-
ister Ismail Sidqi set up an office—part of the security apparatus—to reg-
ulate labour affairs and intervene in labour disputes (Ibid). It soon became 
clear that repression alone would not quell the growing labour movement. 
In 1935, there were more strikes than there had been for years. The British 
were torn between recognizing the unions and trying to mediate between 
them and employers on the one hand, and increasing police repression 
against workers on the other (Ibid, 280). ‘Abbas Hilmi, a cousin of King 
Fu’ad who headed the labour federation, was seen as a major threat to the 
British. In 1936, however, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed, and the 
British were no longer responsible for labour policy formulation in Egypt. 
Subsequently there were attempts to try and mediate with labour unions 
rather than repress them. This process of co-optation, however, also failed 
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to resolve the situation. The nationalist momentum was too strong for 
labour activism to be quelled (Ibid, 283).  
 Interestingly, resistance to colonial rule brought together native 
fractions of labour and fractions of capital in an attempt to gain independ-
ence. Sven Beckert details the ways in which an alliance between capitalists 
and workers developed, brought together by the fact that both groups 
wanted to end colonialism and achieve independence. He argues that 
throughout the Global South, cotton workers, among others, played key 
roles in the struggles for national independence (2014, 345).  
 
“Independence first brought significant new protective la-
bour legislation and, especially, an important role for the 
state in the mediation of labour conflict. Eventually, inde-
pendence brought significant changes to the Egyptian 
economy, as raw cotton exports—the staple export of the 
Egyptian economy—stagnated as more and more cotton 
was used in domestic manufacturing. “Arab Socialism” 
brought improvements to workers, but also the repression 
of independent trade unions activities. During the 1960s, 
under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the cotton industry was na-
tionalized. The strength and political importance of the 
working class had in effect resulted in the expropriation of 
local cotton capitalists, coupled with the belief that indus-
trialization was necessary for the defence of the state itself. 
Capitalists’ dependence on workers (and peasants) in the 
struggle against the colonial state had now translated into 
diminished powers,” (Beckert 2014, 347). 
 
  As early as 1900, cotton workers organized to put forward programs 
of reform. Wady E. Medawar created such a program that included coop-
eratives, agricultural improvement associations, mechanisms for cheap 
credit to farmers, and an organization of rural cultivators that would com-
bine public and private initiatives (Ibid, 281). Alongside this, cotton work-
ers were engaging in outright rebellions. In 1865, for example, Ahmad el-
Shaqi led a revolt against working conditions put in place by the British 
(Ibid, 280). These new conditions were not to be underestimated. Alan 
Richards writes: 
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The booming cotton export industry destroyed the old quasi-
communal forms of land tenure, broke up the protective web 
of village social relations, replaced them with private property 
in land and individual tax responsibility, and helped create 
four classes: large landowners, rich peasants, small peasant 
landowners, and a landless class (Beckert 2014, 278).  
 
Thus we see that British colonial rule had an impact not only on Egypt’s 
economic structure, but on the types of subjectivities in place. Here we 
see, once again, the connections between the material and the ideational. 
Capital, defined expansively, refers not just to changes in economic rela-
tions, but also to the ways in which these impact social relations. Beckert 
adds: 
 
“As early as the 1840s, the government had begun compelling 
peasants to grow specific crops, including cotton, and to de-
liver them to government warehouses. Peasants had re-
sponded to this pressure by leaving the land in droves, which 
the government took as reason to deny any claims to the land 
by those who had “deserted” it. By 1862, anyone who left the 
land for more than two months lost his claim to the property. 
In 1863, when Isma’il, Egypt’s new ruler, took power, he fo-
cused his efforts on creating large estates, giving land to rela-
tives and officials in his government, and forcing peasants to 
work on infrastructure projects and on his own plantations. 
Resistance to such measures was violently repressed,” (Ibid). 
 
Outside of labour activism—although these tendencies were closely inter-
twined—there were numerous instances where Egyptians took to the 
streets to express anger and discontent at the imperial situation they were 
in. One example is the response to the British opening fire on the Buluks 
al-Nizam—police forces made up of working class men—in 1952. The 
Buluks were involved in an operation against a British garrison when the 
British attacked; over 50 were killed, and massive demonstrations followed 
(Hussein 1979, 82). The crowds were so big that no political party was able 
to take hold of the situation. “The masses were more conscious than other 
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popular classes of the need for acting outside the normal, legal frame-
work—and particularly the need for violence,” (Ibid, 83). On January 26, 
fires spread across Cairo. These targeted specific spaces such as expensive 
cinemas and cafes in order to make a point about the class privilege that 
had led to the dispossession and poverty of most Egyptians. Martial law 
was imposed and the King dismissed the government.  
 
 
 
View of the Rivoli Cinema, in Cairo, Egypt.47 
                                                 
47 Source: http://blogs.denverpost.com/captured/2013/07/09/egypt-1952-rev-
olution-free-officers-movement-military-rule/6183/ 
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Aerial view of the remains of the burnt out Cicurel, Cairo's biggest department store, in 
Cairo (Ibid). 
 
The British occupation was therefore clearly a time of intensive resistance 
on the part of workers. This resistance was fused with the nationalist con-
sciousness spreading across Egypt. Peasants in particular were dealing 
with changes in the land ownership system that dated back to Muhammad 
Ali’s successors as well as the domination of foreign capital and the struc-
tures this created in Egypt. The introduction of private property, the in-
creasing power of landlords, and the need for peasants to resort to wage 
labour—as they could no longer survive by producing their own livelihood 
through the land—all indicated the transition to a more capitalist mode of 
production. This transition was represented by the British colonial regime, 
which became the focal point against which workers resistance. Workers 
in more industrial sectors also took part in these rebellions, where strikes 
were the common form of resistance. Industry-based workers also tended 
to have unions—as mentioned, by 1922 there were over 100 trade unions. 
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The ruling class during this period—with the British at the center—saw 
the growth of a strong and nationalist labour movement that could not be 
ignored. 
 An interesting example of the hegemony of the Nasserist bloc vis-
à-vis subaltern groups can be seen with regards to Egyptian feminists. Alt-
hough the term subaltern has often been interpreted to refer to workers, 
the Nasser period was one during which multiple subaltern groups were 
brought into the historic bloc. I suggest that other subaltern groups, such 
as women, were as integral to the Nasserist projects as workers—accept-
ing, of course, that women were often workers. Even with groups such as 
women, we see the extreme strength of the Nasserist project in forming 
alliances with a wide spectrum of society. During the 1950s we see the 
emergence of state feminism, an extensive project that must be contextu-
alized within the broader changes happening under this new regime. As 
Mervat Hatem has argued: 
 
“In the late 1950s and the 1960s, an Egyptian welfare state 
was developed to provide the economic basis of a new social 
contract between the Nasser regime and its key class allies. 
For Egyptian women, who were scorned by the pre-1952 
states, the new welfare state offered explicit commitment to 
public equality for women. It contributed to the development 
of state feminism as a legal, economic, and ideological strategy 
to introduce changes to Egyptian society and its gender rela-
tions,” (1992, 231). 
 
The key paradox of feminism under this regime was that it simultaneously 
gave women access to spaces in society they had long fought for—includ-
ing work and education—while also closing down political space and ex-
tending control over independent organizations. In effect, state feminism 
represented a contradictory project that encapsulated the goals of the new 
regime and suffered from the authoritarianism that resulted from the 1952 
revolution. This was a period during which the power of the state was 
expanding into all realms of society, including the lives of groups tradi-
tionally excluded, including women and rural Egyptians. Moreover, these 
groups were used as examples of how the state was modernizing Egypt. 
And yet, at the same time, through these changes women were able to 
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access rights they had long been demanding, including the right to work 
and the right to an education.  
 Above all, this regime’s commitment to anti-colonial nationalism re-
mains an important reason as to why it was so strongly supported by many 
feminists, who were more often than not deeply involved in the anticolo-
nial struggle. Latifa al Zayyat, in her book The Open Door, details the ways 
in which she became involved in the anti-colonial struggle during the Nas-
ser years, and how this helped her navigate her own personal life (1960). 
This involvement in the nationalist struggle as what in turn was to inform 
her personal life is a theme that was quite dominant among feminists at 
the time. As Bier has written, “the novel’s resolution and its chronicle of 
Layla’s transformation from a passive victim to a strong and independent 
woman is a poignant and passionate statement of the intimate and insep-
arable relation between personal liberation and the political freedom and 
self-determination, as well as an allegory of the historical progress of the 
nation itself,” (Ibid, 24). It is precisely this inseparable relation between 
the personal and political that was a marker of this period. Moreover, it is 
the ideological and material support for anti-colonial nationalism that al-
lowed the Nasserist ruling class to form such broad alliances with subal-
tern groups.  
 
3.6.1 The Officers and the Workers 
 
In light of the widespread changes envisioned by the new ruling class 
as well as the ideology of Arab socialism that dominated this vision, the 
relationship between the Nasserist ruling class and fractions of labour is 
especially important to assess. Perhaps no statement sums the situation of 
workers under the Nasserist bloc as well as Charles Issawi’s: “The energies 
of labour were drained into the nationalist movement,” (1954, 173). Work-
ers from various sectors were an important and influential force before 
1952, and the ruling class needed to form alliances with them to create a 
strong historic bloc. Hussein has argued that it is possible to speak of the 
Egyptian working class pre-1952 as “proletarianized” rather than as a pro-
letarian class per se: 
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“Ideologically and politically, they are not yet radically up-
rooted from the environment controlled by the big landown-
ers or radically liberated from feudal values, i.e. from the sys-
tem of servitude characteristic of Egypt. They have by no 
means totally rejected every form of precapitalist exploitation, 
every form of oppression other than economic. It is the sys-
tem of servitude and obstructed transition that has uprooted 
them; it is not they who have challenged the system. This is 
the result of a historical process during which the ruling class 
initiated gradual change without provoking violent upheavals, 
and without allowing any intervention by the laboring 
masses,” (1973, 39). 
 
In other words, when this class revolts, it will never lead to structural 
changes since they are not organically linked to the processes of produc-
tion and distribution. Only through an alliance with the industrial prole-
tariat can a revolt begin to lead to changes. This industrial proletariat also 
does not own the means of production but has established a relationship 
to the means of production, unlike the proletarianized class. Prior to 1952, 
a strong militant workers’ movement was active in Egypt and played a 
major role in the anti-colonial movement—this movement was largely 
comprised of the industrial proletariat, who often occupied factories and 
formed the major part of nationalist movements. While this line of think-
ing is tempting, one cannot ignore the determining role played by Egyptian 
peasants, a role that has often been left out of the story because of the 
focus on urban workers, be they industrial, informal, service workers, or 
other. Hussein writes: “It is the system of servitude and obstructed tran-
sition that has uprooted them; it is not they who have challenged the sys-
tem,” (Ibid). And yet one wonders if these two processes are neatly sepa-
rable. There had clearly been a system that has uprooted many peasants, 
if not physically from their land then certainly from previous relations they 
had with the land, and this has led to resistance on their part. And yet is it 
not through changes that affect the livelihood of peasants that rebellion 
takes place? Hussein is right that feudalist values remain, but perhaps this 
is better explained by the continuing presence of feudalism in the mode 
of production itself. At that point in time, there was not a clear transition 
from feudalism to capitalism in Egypt; what was occurring was the emer-
gence of the capitalist mode as dominant. This meant that an articulation 
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of modes existed, and that feudalist social relations remained to some ex-
tent. 
 The debate about Egyptian workers’ consciousness and its ability to 
revolt is to be continued throughout the following decades, right until 
2011. The question of Egyptian workers and class-consciousness is at the 
heart of this debate. Some, like Hussein, argue that Egyptian workers have 
not yet developed a sufficient level of class-consciousness. To use Gram-
sci, they have not yet reached the level where they see themselves as a class 
for themselves. Gramsci outlined three levels. The first is the economic-cor-
porate level, where the individual sees himself or herself as an individual 
but realizes they need others to achieve their own goals—they need others 
because of their own self-interest. The second level is when solidarity is 
built based on shared interests, but where there is still no ideology con-
necting groups or workers from different sectors. The final level is when 
a class realizes that they need to go beyond their own class interests and 
form alliances with other classes—this is the level at which hegemony is 
formed. According to some scholars of Egypt, Egyptian workers are 
somewhere between the first and second levels. Until they realize the po-
litical nature of their class position and the need for structural change ra-
ther than reforms, they cannot be said to have gained consciousness. Some 
have even gone so far as to claim that foreign workers in Egypt developed 
consciousness while Egyptian workers did not (Beinin and Lockman 1998, 
56). 
 This may seem like a somewhat convincing argument, but it relies 
on a problematic de-linking of the political and economic, and the relega-
tion of workers’ demands to this so-called economic sphere. Those who 
reproduce the narrative that Egyptian workers lack a politicized conscious-
ness tend to ignore that the pre-1952 period, during which there was an 
active movement against imperial capitalism and the British occupation. 
As shown in the previous section, the pre-1952 workers’ movement was 
highly politicized and represented one of the bastions of Egypt’s anti-co-
lonial resistance. Following the 1952 military regime, however, new rela-
tions were forged between the state and labour that essentially co-opted 
their militancy and served to create the superficial distinction between the 
“political” and the “economic.” This continues until today, as can be seen 
from the way the literature represents Egyptian workers as only interested 
in economic questions (or ‘rights’) and as not sufficiently politicized to 
represent a real threat to the ruling class. Rather then explain this through 
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a supposed lack on the part of fractions of labour, I argue that it is con-
nected to the specific conditions of the Egyptian independent state and 
the ways in which the Nasserist historic bloc attempted to channel work-
ers’ nationalism into their hegemonic project.  
 1952 altered the balance between labour and the ruling class, and 
this was to have ramifications that have persisted until today. It is common 
knowledge that the Nasser regime made heavy use of the rhetoric of wel-
fare, and that it was during this period that a comprehensive welfare sys-
tem was set up. This was to ultimately lead to the de-radicalization of the 
workers’ movement through their co-optation (both ideologically and ma-
terially), through intimidation, and through the resulting separation be-
tween political and economic questions.  
 One of the most pivotal moments after 1952 was the brutal crack-
down at Kafr al-Dawwar, an industrial area 30 kilometres from Alexandria. 
The workers at the Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving Company (founded 
by Tal’at Harb) began a strike on August 12, 1952, calling for higher wages, 
better working conditions, union recognition, and the dismissal of two 
managers (Botman 1986, 355). The workers, numbering over 10,000, had 
nursed these grievances prior to the revolution, and believed that the new 
ruling class would look on their cause favourably: 
 
“It was very natural that the workers should start a movement 
in Kafr al-Dawwar because they heard the communiqués of 
the revolution which announced that the kingdom was abol-
ished, that the regime was against injustice, that the rights of 
the people would be restored. It was natural that workers who 
had been oppressed for a very long time, would put forward 
their demands. The management of the company represented 
elements of the old regime. They were capitalists, very reac-
tionary…and against both the workers and the revolution,” 
(Hilmi Yassin quoted in Botman 1986, 355). 
 
The response from the regime, however, was to surround the striking 
workers, blockade some inside the factory while attacking others, resulting 
in one death. 545 workers were arrested and 29 were charged with offenses 
ranging from premeditated murder, arson, and destruction of property 
(Beinin and Lockman 1998, 423). 
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 A court martial was appointed to try the leaders of the strike. The 
two main leaders—Muhammad Khamis and Ahmad al-Bakri—were con-
demned to be hanged while fourteen others were condemned to hard la-
bour (Hilmi Yassin quoted in Botman 1986, 358). The hangings were car-
ried out inside the factory grounds: “If nothing else was clear, the RCC 
wanted to make an example of anyone who threatened the stability of the 
new regime. A message was sent to the working class: no independent 
mass initiatives would be tolerated,” (Ibid). The hangings went forward 
despite the lack of clarity surrounding which individuals had actually 
planned the strike and whether Khamid and al-Bakri were actually leaders 
of the movement. Khamis’ last words were: “I am wronged. I want a re-
trial,” (Beinin and Lockman 1998, 423).  
 As Tignor points out, the military regime appeared to align itself 
with the management, and against labour (1988, 66). Although Amin 
Afifi—the chief accountant—and Muhammad Hussain al-Hamal—the 
manager—were questioned, both were released without charges. Moreo-
ver, the way in which the trials were held showed a determination on the 
part of the regime to make a point. 1000 workers were brought from other 
textile factories and lined up along a football field against a line of armed 
soldiers. A tank was in the corner. The indictments, including the death 
penalty, were announced over a loudspeaker. “The military emphasized 
that the present moment, while the British still remained in military occu-
pation of Egypt and might at any time unleash their troops on the Delta, 
was not propitious for labour agitation,” (Ibid). Joel Beinin argues the 
same, writing that the government that first embraced the nationalist 
movement and its working class components now discouraged workers’ 
collective action: “The government now regarded the same demands, 
demonstrations, and strikes that had been applauded by many nationalists 
before the military coup as provocations and threats to social peace, which 
might destabilize the new nationalist regime and disrupt Egypt’s economic 
development,” (Beinin 1989, 71). Beinin and Lockman write: 
 
“The regime indicated it would resolutely oppose any expres-
sion of autonomous working class organization and collective 
action. The widespread, though unproven, assumption that 
communists were responsible for inciting the workers of Kafr 
al-Dawwar to rebellion against the new regime strengthened 
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the hand of the already considerable anticommunist elements 
among the Free Officers,” (1988, 426). 
 
This initial moment of tension represented a preview of the upcoming 
battles, since the new regime did not intend to fulfil the main demands of 
the worker’s movement and in fact even wanted to exert control over it. 
This meant that conflicts between labour and capital were to continue, 
during which the state often sided with capital over labour. As Beinin and 
Lockman have thoroughly documented, the regime cracked down on nu-
merous strikes following the incidents at Kafr el-Dawwar (Ibid, 429). 
 However it was not simply through intimidation that the new regime 
attempted to de-radicalize workers. The ideological and material influence 
of the land reforms and welfare provisions put in place were equally, if not 
more, important. Soon after the incident at Kafr el-Dawwar, the Agrarian 
Reform Law was passed. Some of the major aspects of the law include: 
the ceiling on owning land was placed at 200 fedans per person; expropri-
ated land would be distributed to peasants by the state within five years; 
agricultural cooperatives were to be created; and farm workers were to be 
able to join unions. Nevertheless, the regime’s goals were often not met.48 
It was often the case that while small tenants benefitted from the new law, 
peasants often did not (Abdel-Malek 1968, 74). Abdel-Malek argues that 
the distribution of income among the different social classes in rural Egypt 
did not differ between 1952 and 1958: most peasants remained without 
land, direct exploitation of the peasants deepened; and the same produc-
tion techniques continued to dominate (Ibid, 82). Indeed, wealth disparity 
increased, even as the law reduced the power of the agrarian fraction. 
Thus, as noted in a previous section, the aim of this law had never been 
to empower the peasants economically nor to transform the system itself; 
the aim had been to undercut the power of the landed bourgeoisie in order 
to favour industrial development over agrarian development. But crucially, 
in the long term this would have had clear benefits for peasants.  
 While the land reform program held immense symbolic and material 
significance and presented the regime as being on the side of the people 
against capitalists who accumulated wealth for their own gain, the result 
                                                 
48 For a detailed discussion, see Abdel-Malek 1968, 72-76. 
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was not the type of wholesale structural change that would transform own-
ership of land—a crucial means of production—in a way that would ben-
efit peasants. The Nasserist bloc successfully dismantled the power of the 
old ruling class and the halted the structure of accumulation that class had 
put in place. Indeed Nasser made clear critiques of the class of business-
men who were not contributing to the country’s growth. At the same time, 
to achieve its project the regime still needed capitalists to invest in indus-
trialization, and therefore had to concede to some of its demands regard-
ing labour: 
 
“The RCC explicitly rejected the view that there was, or ought 
to be, a struggle between classes in Egyptian society. There-
fore, it sought to eliminate militant trade union leaders and 
replace them with elements loyal to the RCC and dependent 
on it. The repression of the Left in the trade union movement 
was an essential component of the RCC’s labour strategy and 
preceded any of the labour reform measures it eventually un-
dertook,” (Ibid, 73). 
 
At the same time, the regime realized it also had to grant certain conces-
sions to labour in order to prevent outright class conflict. For example, 
employment security was improved. Some, like Beinin and Lockman, have 
argued that Nasser’s policy towards workers was corporatist, just as the 
pre-1952 policies had been (1998, 432). I would, however, question this 
comparison. There is little doubt that in both cases there were attempts to 
instrumentalize workers and harness the power of their resistance in order 
to push forward specific goals that did not necessarily benefit the majority 
of workers. Yet the Nasser regime also represents one of the most pro-
gressive periods of modern Egyptian history precisely because of the ben-
efits many workers got through the welfare system. The access to free ed-
ucation, free healthcare and a guaranteed job are not to be underestimated. 
These changes elevated a large part of a generation of Egyptians that were 
now able to attend university and work in the public sector. One should 
question, however, the extent to which many Egyptians were still excluded 
from welfare, most notably peasants and workers in the industrial sector 
who may not have had the social mobility to migrate and take advantage 
of the new educational and employment opportunities. Moreover, even 
with regards to peasants and workers the situation was complicated: while 
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some laws negatively affected these groups, such as a law banning strikes, 
others benefitted them, notably the agrarian reform laws. For this reason, 
the picture under Nasser is more complicated than the pre-1952 situation.  
 The co-opting of trade unions was another blow to fractions of la-
bour under this bloc, as was the crackdown against Communists. Four 
laws have been particularly important in this regard: the trade union laws 
of 1942, 1952, 1959, and 1976. The law passed in 1952 was an attempt by 
the new regime to expand the power of the unions while simultaneously 
bringing them under state control (Bianchi 1986, 430). Laws 1959 and 
1964 completed the process of centralizing unionization. There were to 
be only a few federations that would be supervised by a confederation and 
a new Ministry of Labour. Bianchi argues that the labour movement was 
corporatized, with many in the union leadership being rewarded and thus 
co-opted. Moreover, indirect elections ensure that these leaders remain in 
office for extended periods of time. Leaders of the Confederation have 
been part of the ruling party, the People’s Assembly and the Consultative 
Assembly (Ibid, 433). Through their access to these spaces, Confederation 
leaders have also managed to impact the creation of economic policy (Ibid, 
434). These events consolidated the close relationship between Nasser and 
the labour unions, as the latter saw the state as an ally. This was despite 
the fact that the regime made striking illegal, on top of the many overtures 
it made to private capital at the expense of labour. As Beinin argues, while 
the state did improve some labour conditions, its ultimate priority was to 
favour capital (Ibid, 74). 
 The crackdown on Communism in Egypt targeted another ideolog-
ical trend connected to labour, although I would not classify it as a fraction 
of labour given its somewhat disconnected relationship to the working 
class. Communism did not have the same mass support as other move-
ments even though Marxist critique of Egyptian society played a big role 
in shaping the public discourse, particularly through journals and pam-
phlets (Gordon 1992, 20). As Selma Botman has noted, Communist 
thought and activism exerted ideological pressure on the Nasser regime, 
and they were key in formulating dissident thought against the pre-1952 
regime (1988).  
 The Communist movement in Egypt was largely made up of urban 
intellectuals (the effendiyya) and an industrial working class (Beinin 1987, 
569). Foreigners played an especially important role in the establishment 
of the movement as well as its re-emergence and radicalization in the 
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1920s. In 1950 and 1951, many of the Jewish leaders were removed and 
deported following tensions over the establishment of the state of Israel. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Egyptian intellectuals became the leaders of the 
Communist movement due to its anti-imperialist stance. Beinin writes, 
“The experience of the Egyptian Communist intelligentsia confirms 
Abdallah Laroui’s thesis that the attraction of Marxism for Third World 
intellectuals is principally as a guide to the conduct of the national libera-
tion struggle and as a way to reject traditionalism and overcome backward-
ness through understanding the historical, and consequently limited, char-
acter of the power of the West,” (Ibid, 572). Indeed Egypt has produced 
a wide array of prominent Marxist scholars, most of whose work has 
largely informed this dissertation. 
 The Communist movement was largely against the new Nasserist 
bloc, and suffered high levels of repression. In 1956, however, we see a 
shift, with almost all major currents of the movement supporting Nasser 
and the new bloc, swayed in particular by his anti-imperialism and the na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal. Because anti-imperialism was so central to 
the Communist movement, they seemed to have no choice but to support 
the new bloc, even as the repression of their movement continued. “There 
were difficulties maintaining an independent communist position under 
the hegemony of Nasserist nationalism,” (Ibid, 578). This is an important 
point: the Nasserist bloc had similar ideological stances, and enjoyed high 
levels of public support, especially among workers. This put the Com-
munist movement in a tough position. 
 Some have argued that when Nasser turned towards the Soviet bloc 
and away from America, there was an easing in the repression of Com-
munists (Ide 2015, 60). In 1958, all Communist currents merged to form 
the Communist Party of Egypt. In September of the same year, following 
failed attempts by the regime and the Communists to reach a political 
agreement, a full-scale attack was launched against the movement (Ibid, 
581). In December of the same year, 280 influential Communists were 
arrested, and within the next five months, an additional 700 were thrown 
in jail. Many suffered physical and psychological torture in prison (Ibid, 
582). Following negotiations with the regime, all Communist prisoners 
were released in 1964, after an agreement stating that all Communist par-
ties were to be dissolved. Beinin concludes: “The Egyptian Communists 
were caught up by their embrace of the national movement and ultimately 
destroyed by it. The Communist intelligentsia made the nationalist and 
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anti-imperialist struggle its priority and therefore conceded that political 
discourse should be conducted in these terms. But the Communists could 
not outbid Nasser for nationalist legitimacy,” (Ibid, 584). As I argued ear-
lier, it was precisely the strength of the Nasserist bloc that defeated the 
Communists, not necessarily the scale of repression. Because anti-imperi-
alism and nationalism were what defined the bloc, movements pushing for 
the same type of transformations but from a more radical position had to com-
pete with a ruling class intent on completing its own hegemonic project. 
 What is interesting is that despite the repression suffered by the 
Communist movement, many Communists remained supporters of the 
Nasserist bloc almost until the end. This tension has been addressed in 
Egyptian novels from the period. For example in Mohamed el Wardani’s 
novel Heads Ripe for Plucking there is the following scene between two pris-
oners, both Communist: 
 
“What I find hard to understand is how a nationalist gov-
ernment like President Nasser’s would actually take it upon 
itself to sanction the torture, humiliation, wounding, and mur-
der of Communist nationalists who stand by it.” 
“Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
and challenged the most arrogant and ruthless of imperial 
powers. We in turn stood by him, nor would it have been con-
ceivable for us not to support him. None of the measures he 
took would have been undertaken except by a nationalist gov-
ernment that we must back and support. The problem is that 
we need, simultaneously, to uphold our call for democracy,” 
(Mehrez 2011, 45-46). 
 
Similarly in Mohamed Morsi Qandil’s novel Broken Soul we read the fol-
lowing rumination on Nasser: 
 
“He was a strange man! Even though he had imprisoned my 
father, I was incapable of hating him, for he was able to enrol 
me, thanks to him, in the faculty of medicine, like the children 
of the elite. Even when they were being tortured they chanted 
his name. They believed that what was happening to them was 
a kind of bitter misunderstanding,” (Ibid, 37). 
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These emotive scenes show the tension many within the labour movement 
faced under Nasser’s regime: between on the one hand, realizing the 
changes that Egypt needed so desperately were being put in place; and on 
the other hand, the painful awareness of the closing of democratic space. 
 Despite the slow de-radicalization of the workers’ movement, it re-
mains important to note that fractions of labour were able to gain several 
concessions from the regime, and that it was not a simple case of co-op-
tation (Paczyńska 2010, 85). Right from the start there were debates within 
the Free Officers about whether they should support or repress the trade 
unions, with some arguing that providing workers with concessions would 
ensure their political support, and others arguing that this would negatively 
impact investment. Laws were passed that raised the minimum wage, 
strengthened labour codes, and gave workers representation on the man-
agement boards of state firms (Ibid, 86-87). 
 The founding of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), however, hinted 
at the new bloc’s intent on channelling labour’s revolutionary energy into 
its own project. Workers and peasants were supposed to form most of the 
ASU and have 50% of seats in parliament. An umbrella of trade unions 
was also formed—the Egyptian Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). 
 
“By the beginning the 1960s, corporatist labor institutions 
were finally in place and organized labor seemed firmly under 
regime control. Organized labor was willing to extend its sup-
port to the regime. Thanks to the shift in Egypt’s domestic 
and foreign policies and the support that organized labor 
threw behind the “socialist” regime faction, it succeeded in 
fulfilling many, if not most, of its major demands. These in-
cluded both substantive gains, primarily in the form of higher 
wages and benefits, and a number of procedural ones that 
gave the union leadership significant authority over the ad-
ministration of internal union affairs and finances as well as 
political access to the top decision-making circles through its 
membership in the ASU,” (Ibid, 88). 
 
However, by the mid-1960s there were increasing signs of worker unrest 
once again, with demonstrations across the country. These escalated after 
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the 1967 defeat to Israel. Ali Sabri, Chairman of the ASU, appealed to the 
workers in an attempt to move against Nasser. Seeing that once again there 
were tensions within the ruling class, fractions of labour—in this case the 
ETUC—pushed for more concessions. Nasser granted some, which in-
cluded placing the Ministry of Labour under purview of the ETUC. How-
ever, he could not grant their demand for trade union elections, as Sabri 
was strongly against this and Nasser could not afford to move against him 
that that particular point. Once again the concessions workers did or did 
not receive from the ruling class depended on the tensions within it. This 
demonstrates the ways in which a historic bloc is made and unmade: it is 
the negotiations and alliances formed both within the ruling class and be-
tween the ruling class and fractions of labour that determine the strength 
of a historic bloc.  
 
3.7 Egypt’s Strongest Historic Bloc 
 
Samir Amin has argued that because the Nasserist project was a 
planned one with very specific goals and a very specific ideology, the re-
gime had to take into account social forces that were expressed through 
fractions of labour, student unions, professional associations, and co-op-
eratives (2012, 173). Nasser named these forces “power centers” (marakez 
quwa) and this act of naming indicates the view of the Nasserist ruling class 
that any hegemonic project had to take them into account. This is perhaps 
at the crux of why this bloc continues to represent the strongest bloc to 
date in Egyptian history 
 The main argument of this chapter is that the Nasserist historic bloc 
was Egypt’s strongest bloc. It was the bloc that managed to bring the most 
fractions of capital and labour into the bloc, as well as implement changes 
that had far-reaching effects on most Egyptians. The ruling fraction of 
capital successfully transcended its narrow interests through moral and in-
tellectual reforms. But beyond this there is a stronger case to be made for 
the singularity of the Nasserist bloc, a case that has been lost in the schol-
arship condemning Nasser’s lack of democracy or socialism. This revolves 
around the simple fact that the Nasserist bloc was the first and last historic 
bloc in Egypt to be comprised of, and dominated by, a fraction that did 
not come from the wealthy class of elites with a history of accumulating 
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capital. While this fraction did continue the consolidation of the capitalist 
mode of production in Egypt, it did so by redirecting its trajectory. In 
other words, its articulation was changed, whereby capital was accumu-
lated for different ends: national development, led by the state. Indeed by 
1961, the state accounted for 90% of total investment, 75% of manufac-
turing value-added, and almost the whole of foreign trade. The state also 
employed 30% of the entire working population (Mabro and Radwan 
1976, 40). This is a major shift in direction, considering the structure of 
Egypt’s accumulation regime before 1952, where an agrarian fraction and 
foreign interests were accumulating vast amounts of wealth that were ul-
timately benefitting a small strata inside Egypt and in the center of the 
British empire. Similarly, the 1970s saw a return of this type of accumula-
tion structure, whereby a small strata benefitted from accumulating mas-
sive amounts of capital. Only by looking at the structure before and after 
the Nasserist bloc can we come to terms with just how different this par-
ticular bloc was. 
 The norms, values and dispositions propagated by the Nasserist 
bloc provide one avenue through which we can understand why the bloc 
was particularly strong. In a previous section I discussed the ways in which 
the pre-1952 ruling class was extremely Westernized: foreign education, 
foreign languages, and foreign travels were seen as the markers of the rul-
ing class. Consumption of luxury goods, displays of extravagant wealth, 
and a disparagement of local (read: popular) norms were rampant among 
this class. Even looking at the debates of traditional intellectuals during 
this period shows the extent to which European values and norms were 
seen as the model Egypt was to follow if it wanted to become modern. I 
also suggested that this type of ruling class was to return in the 1970s with 
the shift to the Infitah bloc: similar norms and values, expressed through 
similar characteristic. This can be explained by the return of a similar ac-
cumulation structure. 
 What were the dispositions favoured by the Nasserist bloc, and in 
which ways did they constitute this bloc as particularly strong? Here we 
need to look no further than the Free Officers themselves: most of these 
men hailed from the middle classes, and some from the lower middle clas-
ses. They had gained access to the Military Academy only because the in-
stitution had recently opened its doors to non-elites. They were, in other 
words, from the popular classes, and in a sense represented what Gramsci 
may call organic intellectuals. It is this concept of organic that I believe 
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describes this fraction within the bloc very well: they were not detached 
from Egypt’s masses through Westernized education and consumption. 
The debates they engaged in and that they used to define their programs 
were debates that many related to: Egyptian independence, nationalism, 
land reform, accessible education and employment. Seeing this fraction as 
organic is one way of understanding its strong ideological pull. The men 
making up this fraction did not come from a class that was used to accu-
mulating capital for personal gain. 
 This brings me to the second point that sets the Nasserist historic 
bloc apart from the other ones. The difference between this bloc and the 
previous ruling class, or this bloc and the following bloc, is not the exist-
ence of capitalism as a structure of accumulation. This was constant 
throughout, starting with the period following Muhammad Ali. What was 
distinctive was the ends to which this accumulation was directed. As Abdel 
Malek noted, “As the state provides about 90% of new capital formation, 
it can obviously impose its own priorities on economic developments,” 
(1968, 34). The Nasserist bloc redirected this capital towards nationalist 
development projects and the cultivation of new fractions that depended 
on the public sector. It curtailed the agrarian fraction that accumulated 
capital through exploitation and for private gain; and also curtailed the 
power of foreign capital. It is true that by the 1960s the bloc was no longer 
able to prevent the emergence of a class that, once again, resorted to cap-
ital accumulation for private gain. But this does not detract from the fact 
that the articulation of capitalist accumulation under the Nasserist bloc 
was significantly different. 
 While the Nasserist bloc ultimately failed in its attempt to rearticu-
late Egypt’s relationship to capitalist development, I argue that this cannot 
be explained by focusing solely on Nasser. It was not his hunger for power 
nor was it that he used socialist rhetoric to disguise his real capitalist goals. 
I believe the failure can be explained by returning to the structure-agency 
debate. The Nasserist bloc was ultimately unable to overcome the global 
capitalist logic of uneven development, a logic that not only set the con-
ditions within which the bloc had to navigate in 1952, but which also cre-
ated the single event that was to turn the balance of social forces away 
from nationalist and state-led development: the 1967 Israeli war. Hinne-
busch has written: “The state Nasser built is used increasingly for purposes 
different from those for which he shaped it and, also increasingly, forces 
inside and outside of it are altering it,” (1981, 443). This is where the story 
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of the Nasserist bloc ends. This was the one moment in modern Egyptian 
history where there was an attempt to alter the structures of production 
and accumulation in ways that benefitted more than just a handful of 
Egyptian and foreign capitalists. The two historic blocs that came after 
this one were to return Egyptians to a position of subservience, not only 
to global capital but to a small class of native capitalists for whom accu-
mulation was never to be thought of as a process that should benefit all 
Egyptians. 
  This chapter has countered some of the main theorizations on the 
Nasser era in an attempt to historicize it through the concept of a historic 
bloc. The Nasser era is represented as constituting a complete break from 
the previous era, with new structures and new social relations. I have ar-
gued that while the Nasserist bloc did not constitute a complete break, 
there were also significant changes in the ruling class and in Egypt’s polit-
ical and economic trajectory. This new bloc—while still within the param-
eters of the capitalist mode of production—produced a different articula-
tion than had existed under either Muhammad Ali, his successors, or 
British colonial rule. I ultimately argue that the conditions of global capi-
talism at the time prevented the continuation of state-led capitalist devel-
opment. This type of debate has been absent in much of the recent litera-
ture on Egypt, where structural or capitalist analysis is missing, and thus 
my debates throughout this thesis address this gap. The transnational di-
mension is thus integral to my approach, as well as the structure-agency 
dialectic, particularly clear in my discussion of Bank Misr. Moreover, the 
focus on the impact of colonial rule also sets my work apart, in particular 
my discussion on the establishment of land as a commodity, the introduc-
tion of wage labour, and the ways in which this continues to impact capi-
tal-labour relations in Egypt.  
  This chapter also addressed a key debate in the literature that fo-
cuses on defining Egypt’s economic system under this bloc. Rather than 
seeing Nasser’s policies as driven by a desire to stay in power—as some of 
the literature on this period assumes—I instead look at the ways in which 
his economic changes were caught in structural limitations, and how the 
agency of both fractions of capital and labour affected this. Indeed my 
attempt to situate labour historically and as made up of fractions is also 
unique in the literature on Egypt. Moreover, I critique approaches that see 
Egyptian workers as lacking in political consciousness by locating workers 
within the nationalist movement against colonial capital.  
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  Using the concept of historical non-linear time, denoted through 
changes in production, I was able to center the question of agency. Much 
historiography has focused on the challenges that faced the Free Officers 
from outside, and less on the structural divisions within the new ruling 
class. I was able to do this using the fractions of capital approach. The 
main factors behind the 2011 revolution can be located at various junc-
tures, and as they do not build off each other in a mechanical way, pro-
duction is a useful tool through which to locate them. This chapter aims 
to locate the junctures that were present during the Nasserist bloc, and 
ends by arguing, against much of the literature in the field, that the Infitah 
historic bloc had its roots in the late 1960s when social forces favouring 
liberalization began to dominate. 
  
212 
 
4 The Infitah Bloc 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
“I come to you along the path of Gamal Abdel Nasser; for I 
consider your decision to nominate me for the Presidency of 
the Republic as a direction for me to pursue the path of 
Gamal Abdel Nasser. And if the vote of our masses in the 
general plebiscite will be “yes,” I shall consider this as an order 
to me to pursue the path of Gamal Abdel Nasser which I de-
clare before you, in all honesty, that I will continue to follow, 
whatever the case may be and from whatever position.” 
– Anwar el Sadat’s address to the National Assembly on 
October 7, 1970. 
 
“Egyptians responded with disconcerting quiet to Sadat’s as-
sassination. When Sadat’s predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
had died a decade earlier, crowds had poured into the streets 
to grieve at the death of a leader routinely denounced in the 
United States as either a fascist or a communist. In the days 
following Sadat’s assassination Egyptians went about cele-
brating a religious holiday as though nothing had happened.”  
– Robert Baker (1990, 2)  
 
“At the time, a good many people in the West saw the assas-
sination of Sadat as just another of those apparently senseless 
acts of violence which have destroyed...so many prominent 
public figures. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
forces that conspired against Sadat were just as much a part 
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of the mainstream in Egyptian society as were the forces 
which overthrew the Shah from the mainstream in Iran. This 
was tragically and graphically illustrated at his funeral, when 
he was taken to his grave by a most imposing galaxy of foreign 
statesmen, including three former Presidents of the United 
States and the Prime Minister of Israel, but with only a hand-
ful of his own fellow-countrymen as mourners.” 
– Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (1983, x-5) 
 
Egyptian films and literature are full of references to the Sadat era and the 
rapid transformation of society that occurred at this time. This change was 
often represented by a specific group of businessmen that emerged during 
this time, a group I refer to as the Infitah fraction. Their families and social 
circles are shown as rich beyond imagination, decadent, Westernized, and 
extremely aware of their (newly achieved in a short amount of time) 
heightened position in society. Many are portrayed as drug dealers or cor-
rupt businessmen who managed to make millions quickly, and whose cul-
ture and values did not transform fast enough to “keep up” with their 
material gain and concurrent rise in society. The term nouveau riche func-
tions as a way of demonstrating that this new bourgeoisie did not come 
from “old money” or from the old royal or agrarian aristocracy; that their 
values and culture were not as refined; and that their money was often 
made in illicit ways. 
 These differences, portrayed in popular culture, are one of the ways 
through which we can trace the rise of a new historic bloc, one that is very 
distinct from the Nasserist bloc. On the one hand, it is clear that a new 
bloc became dominant around the time of Infitah and that a certain fraction 
that accumulated wealth in different ways began to dominate. Because of 
this, the mode of accumulation as well as the social relations arising from 
it—norms, dispositions, values—were different from the previous bloc. 
On the other hand, we see a pushback against this new fraction, these new 
forms of accumulation, as well as the resulting norms, from different parts 
of society—certainly classes who did not have access to this wealth, but 
also segments of the previous historic bloc. Indeed when we see the 
emerging distinction between “old” and “new” money we can clearly see 
the disjuncture between two historic blocs.  
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President Jimmy Carter stands center stage flanked by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, 
left, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin as the three leaders shake hands fol-
lowing the signing of the Middle East peace treaty at the White House in Washington, 
March 27, 1979.49 
 
Yet this new historic bloc that emerged was different from the Nasserist 
bloc in one other way: it did not manage to achieve the same level of he-
gemony the Nasserist bloc had achieved. I argue that while there was the 
clear emergence of a new historic bloc and that while this bloc was cer-
tainly hegemonic, it was less hegemonic than the Nasserist bloc. My argument 
about hegemony in this chapter is therefore one that focuses on degree. 
With the Infitah bloc we do not see the same level of acceptance of the 
ideologies propagated by the bloc, and this raises questions about the de-
cline in hegemony, something I will touch on later. Despite this difference, 
                                                 
49 Source: http://blogs.denverpost.com/captured/2013/07/09/egypt-1952-rev-
olution-free-officers-movement-military-rule/6183/ 
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there is little doubt that the new bloc ruled over one of the biggest transi-
tions in modern Egyptian history. In particular, the new fraction of capital 
that emerged is infamous for its rapid rise to riches through new forms of 
accumulation, as well as the new norms and values it embodied. As a 
group, it represented Egypt’s transition to free market capitalism, even as 
many processes associated with the free market occurred in the late 1990s. 
This group also represented the emergence of an intensified form of cor-
ruption at the level of business and politics, following the increasing pres-
ence of financial capital within the bloc. 
 The historic bloc that rose around the time Anwar Sadat was presi-
dent is often located either at the start of his presidency or with the passing 
of the first Infitah law in 1974. I argue, however, that the scene was set in 
the mid-1960s when there was the emergence of a new fraction within the 
ruling class that favoured a free market economy. The 1967 defeat to Israel 
gave this new fraction the momentum it needed to defeat the competing 
fraction that favoured state-led capitalist development. Thus the new bloc 
was one centered on opening Egypt’s economy and liberalizing it. In other 
words, the narrow interests that had to be presented as universal in order 
to form a historic bloc were those pertaining to a free market economy. 
 The center of the ruling class was what I call the Infitah fraction, a 
fraction of capital made up primarily of businessmen working within real 
estate, finance, and speculation. This fraction dominated, but other frac-
tions were also active during this period, notably the agrarian fraction that 
had been side-lined by the Nasserist bloc. An industrial fraction existed, 
although further weakened by Infitah, and the public sector fraction re-
mained about the same size as under the previous bloc, although Infitah’s 
focus on the private sector would eventually weaken those who accumu-
lated capital through the public sector. For a historic bloc to exist, there 
must be fractions of capital and fractions of labour within it in order to 
properly extend its hegemony. And yet it appears that this bloc’s hegem-
ony was weaker than the Nasserist bloc, and that the bloc that came after 
this one was altogether non-existent—the ruling class failed to create a 
bloc or hegemony. This is the major tension that I explore in this chapter: 
what accounts for the weaker hegemony of the Infitah bloc?  
 Another defining feature of this historic bloc is that we begin to see 
the crucial connections between national, regional and transnational capi-
tal vis-à-vis Egypt’s ruling class. Under the Nasserist bloc, foreign capital 
played a diminished role as compared to under British colonial rule. Under 
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this bloc, however, foreign capital was to return to its prominent position 
in Egypt, something that had an effect not only on material processes but 
also on norms and dispositions, particularly of the ruling class. Indeed this 
ruling class managed to transform Egypt’s economy and thus achieve their 
own narrow interests largely because of the growing power of transna-
tional capital. The connections forged between national and transnational 
capital will be a central focus of this chapter. 
 The final aspect I focus on in this chapter is to elaborate on the 
moral reforms this bloc attempted in order to transcend their narrow in-
terests, establish a bloc, and create hegemony. The 1970s and 1980s are 
particularly famous in Egypt for the emergence of a new class and the 
ways in which their norms and values differed dramatically from other 
classes, as well as from the ruling class of the Nasser era. I want to con-
cretely show the ways in which this new fraction reproduced very new and 
distinct changes in identity by focusing on the moral reforms they put for-
ward. Because the ideational is always grounded in the material, these 
changes need to be located vis-à-vis changes in production. This analysis 
will be done in part through an analysis of the new fraction and in part by 
looking at particular novels and films as representative of popular culture; 
the Infitah fraction is one that has been widely covered through literature 
and film, and particular attention will be paid to the divergences from the 
Nasserist bloc in order to highlight the dramatic shift in fractions of capi-
tal. 
 
4.2 1967 and a New Balance of Social Forces 
 
“Theoretically, anyone could become wealthy as long as they 
had the ability and determination. Opportunities were open 
to all classes of society,” (Aulas 1982, 12). 
 
The 1967 defeat to Israel as well as Egypt’s deteriorating economic situa-
tion both resulted in a turning point in Egypt’s trajectory, in large part 
because it rebalanced Egypt’s social forces and thus led to the emergence 
of a new historic bloc. Prior to this, Nasserist social forces that supported 
state-led capitalism and development—through a strong public sector—
had dominated. These forces had succeeded in strengthening the public 
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sector, undercutting the power of the landowning bourgeoisie, reducing 
the influence of foreign capital, and pushing for industrialization based on 
an ideology of national capital. However by the late 1960s the structural 
constraints facing Egypt demonstrated that development along the lines 
envisioned by the new regime was impossible. Egypt’s debt had risen tre-
mendously, economic growth had slowed down, and the Israeli defeat was 
a major shock to the country. The war and the defeat represented the first 
time that the Nasser regime and Nasser himself experienced such low lev-
els of public support. The war was a blow to the legitimacy and popularity 
of the regime and thus provided an opening to oppositional forces. Indeed 
it was during this time that various segments of society turned towards 
Islamism in an attempt to make sense of what had happened, and where 
to go next. Other segments turned to economic explanations and pushed 
for a new market approach as the solution. The war coincided with a gen-
eral economic downturn and thus was a useful pretext for the reorganiza-
tion of the Egyptian economy. As Cooper notes, bringing these two argu-
ments together, the war forced the reorganization of interests within the 
economy for political reasons (1979, 484). The shock brought about by 
this event in particular created the momentum needed for social forces 
that were continuing along Nasser’s path of state-led capitalism and that 
instead favoured turning towards the free market. 
 Ibrahim Aoudé has argued that the structural changes under Nasser 
marked the beginning of capitalist development in Egypt50 and that Sadat 
merely continued this under different conditions (1994, 1). Aoudé argues 
that the 1967 defeat marked a turning point after which the class fractions 
involved in national capitalist development through state capitalism de-
cided that structural changes were necessary. This, he continues, gave an 
impetus to seemingly dormant fractions of capital that pushed for Egypt 
to be integrated into the global economy. These fractions had already be-
gun pushing back against the Nasser regime’s economic policies, and fi-
nally had the chance to re-exert control over the economy. It was these 
forces that came to dominate under Sadat: “The Sadat period saw the re-
versal of national capitalist development under new conditions,” (Ibid). 
                                                 
50 This is questionable given the history of colonialism in Egypt and the ways in 
which Egypt had already been integrated into the global capitalist system before 
1952, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.  
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Moreover, it is notable that some of the fractions of capital that were re-
pressed under Nasser returned to prominence under Sadat, mixing with 
the class fractions that had been dominant since 1952. Similarly, Nazih 
Ayubi has argued that the changes in Egypt’s political economy did not 
simply result from the change in leadership from Nasser to Sadat; rather 
this movement was already happening when Nasser was in power, and in 
particular following 1967 (1982, 280). Ayubi points out that the war was 
what eventually tilted the balance in favour of the fractions of capital that 
wanted a strong private sector: “The managerial and technocratic elite, to-
gether with the middle and petit-bourgeoisie—who, in the final analysis, 
were the main beneficiaries of most of the changes that took place in the 
fifties and sixties—were now in revolt against the very socialist ideas and 
‘etatiste’ policies that had led to their eminence and to their flourishing 
position,” (Ibid). 
 The important point is that the multiple shifts that occurred during 
the transition from Nasser to Sadat—mainly that different fractions of 
capital began to dominate—were the result of processes that had taken 
place during the 1950s and 1960s. Because of the alleged “failure” of Nas-
ser’s program of state-led capitalist development, the rationale for shifting 
to free market capitalism became more convincing, thus emboldening so-
cial forces who supported this shift. Sadat emerged as the leader that 
would support these social forces. 
 
4.2.1 Shifting Ideologies and Shifting Materialities  
 
Anwar el Sadat came to power after Gamal Abdel Nasser passed away 
from a heart attack. One month after taking over the presidency, Sadat 
outlined the main elements of his political and economic program in a 
statement to the National Assembly. These included: completing the base 
of a heavy industry in Egypt in order to guarantee that the economy would 
be an industrial one; transforming scientific agriculture and achieving self-
sufficiency; freeing the Arab lands that had been conquered by Israel in 
1967; achieving socialism; acting as part of the non-aligned and liberation 
movements across the Middle East, Africa, and the rest of the world; and 
finally, consolidating Egypt’s special friendship with the Soviet Union. 
Anti-imperialism and attacks against both Israel and the United States 
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were also included, in strongly worded terms. These themes were present 
in many of his early speeches, and it is difficult to miss the similarity to 
Nasser and the Free Officer’s political and economic program—indeed, it 
seems a replica of it. This shows that at the start of the Sadat period, we 
still see a continuation in the rhetoric of industrialization, socialism, and 
non-alignment. Sadat often spent time emphasizing the continuity be-
tween himself and Nasser. This section focuses on the shift from Sadat’s 
replication of the ideological arguments made by the Nasserist bloc, to a 
new set of ideological justifications. This represents the shift from one 
bloc to another, with the new bloc having a new set of narrow interests 
that it needed to morally and economically justify. These narrow interests 
were framed using a new set of ideologies. In order to achieve these new 
interests, the Nasserist project had to be represented as a failure and a new 
project had to be constructed. This section is therefore not simply about 
pinpointing the ideological justifications, but also asking: what were these 
ideologies being used to justify? In other words, what were the material 
changes that gave birth to a new set of ideologies? 
 Sadat’s regime came to be known for a very different set of accom-
plishments from the Nasserist bloc: the liberalization of the economy, the 
peace treaty with Israel, and a turn towards the United States and foreign 
capital in general. One of Sadat’s first moves in office was what became 
known as the “corrective revolution.” Although this is credited to Sadat, 
the changes brought about can be traced to the previous historic bloc. It 
was in 1968 that a new reformist cabinet was appointed. The biggest 
change that this led to was the demilitarization of political institutions 
(Cooper 1979, 205). This was a sign of what was to come in the 1970s. 
The “corrective revolution” was to further demilitarize political posts in 
government, leading to a major shift in the amount of power wielded by 
the military. Moreover, the “corrective revolution” was to drastically re-
duce the force of leftists in Egypt, following multiple purges. Indeed many 
of these initially focused on purging the Nasserist elite—for example on 
May 14, 1971 when most of the ASU executive committee and a number 
of ministers were arrested—but soon moved to other social forces that 
had supported the Nasserist project (Aoudé 1994, 11). Simultaneously, it 
was clear by the 1960s that the agrarian fraction of capital that Nasser had 
attempted to dismantle—arguably succeeding to some extent—as return-
ing to power, as can be seen from its attempts to infiltrate the ASU (Arafat 
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2009, 11). Indeed the ASU represented an important threat to the emer-
gence of pro-free market forces, as key individuals that had formed the 
Nasserist bloc were part of the ASU, including Ali Sabri. In place of the 
ASU, the National Democratic Party (NDP) was created. 
 Alongside the social forces that were removed from centers of po-
litical power, we also see the consolidation of power within government 
posts on the part of the new social forces that had emerged over the past 
ten years. Lawyers and businessmen became more prominent in the new 
cabinets. An analysis of cabinets under Sadat shows that only 3.8% were 
military officers, 9% were technocrats, and 15% were economists—up 
from 9% (Ibid, 208). The posts occupied by military officers were dramat-
ically reduced, and were now to be given only in areas directly related to 
military expertise. Sadat broke the trend of deputy premiers coming from 
the military when he appointed Mahmoud Fawzy—a diplomat—in the 
November 1970 cabinet and Abdel Aziz Higazy—an economist trained in 
Britain—in the 1974 cabinet. Starting in 1972, two of the most important 
ministries—Local Government and People’s Assembly Affairs—were de-
militarized.51 Despite this, Cooper rightly notes that the appointment of a 
military man to the post of Vice President (Hosni Mubarak) signalled that 
the new regime wanted to keep the channels with the military open (1979, 
218). The demilitarization of the government will be discussed further on. 
 It would thus appear that a new type of individual was being ap-
pointed to government posts: economists and businessmen, often edu-
cated abroad. Yet Nazih Ayubi points out that many public sector manag-
ers appointed during the Nasserist bloc had been businessmen or 
economists who had trained in North America. This is a disposition com-
monly assumed to belong to the class that became powerful during the 
Infitah historic bloc. On the one hand, this proves that the shift towards a 
new historic bloc that favoured the free market was already happening 
under the Nasserist bloc, given that this type of individual was already 
being appointed to government posts. Indeed Ayubi argues that because 
many of these public sector managers had been trained in the West, they 
often had a bias towards free-market solutions to the problems of the 
public sector. Thus we see the seeds for the new historic bloc already 
                                                 
51 The 1973 cabinet was an exception—with a large number of military officers—
but this can be explained by the October War. Soon after the war ended, key 
posts were returned to civilian politicians.  
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emerging in the 1960s. On the other hand, the fact that these types of 
individuals were present in cabinets throughout both historic blocs sug-
gests that we need to look beyond such an analysis to pinpoint the exact 
differences between the blocs. Importantly, the class basis making up the 
new ruling class was clearly different from the beginning of the Nasserist 
bloc. In the latter instance, we see military men and bureaucrats from wide 
array of class positions—predominantly lower-middle and middle class—
taking up key positions. By the Infitah bloc this had shifted to Western-
educated economists and businessmen. 
 The demilitarization of public posts signalled a shift in the position 
of the military within Egypt’s ruling class. If the 1967 defeat to Israel was 
key to shifting the balance of social forces and leading to the rise of a new 
historic bloc, the 1973 war was what cemented this shift. “It was during 
that year that Egypt’s opening to foreign capital was consummated 
through a series of economic and political measures,” (Dessouki 1981, 
412). Hazem Kandil details the disastrous effects the war had on the coun-
try in his work on elites and the military in Egypt, arguing that an effort to 
reduce the military’s power and protect his regime Sadat began to rely on 
the Americans as a counter-balance to the military. He gave them a series 
of concessions, mostly related to the Israel-Egypt conflict, which eventu-
ally resulted in Egypt signing the Camp David Accords following a re-
sounding defeat in the 1973 war (2012). This defeat, according to Kandil, 
was because of the decisions Sadat made, without which Egypt would 
have won the war. “The president’s plan had been to wage limited war, 
which was only meant to act as a catalyst for political settlement,” (Ibid, 
235). Sadat also used the war as a pretext to remove Kamal Shazli, an in-
credibly popular military officer that had risen through the ranks (Ibid, 
256). Indeed Shazli wrote in his memoir that the defeat of 1973 had not 
been due to military incompetence: “Egypt’s soldiers and Egypt’s com-
manders were of a high standard and they fought well but they were let 
down by their political leaders,” (Ibid).  
 Here we see the beginnings of a shift towards a new set of ideologies 
that were to expand the new bloc’s narrow interests into universal ones. 
In the “October Paper” of 1974, Sadat explicitly blamed the military for 
Egypt’s economic problems: 
 
“Sadat blamed the military expenditure for the drop in 
Egypt’s economic development, hinting – even before Sinai 
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had been recovered – that the defense budget will be substan-
tially reduced. Sadat also made explicit overtures to Egyptian 
investors, signaling his intention to open up the economy. Sa-
dat was aware that this was the class that supported his war 
strategy most. Even before the October War, there was a plain 
consensus among Egyptian capitalists that a future war should 
not impair their scheme to join the Western camp and partner 
with American investors,” (Kandil 2012, 261). 
 
The military had already tried to move against Sadat when he came to 
power, when Field Marshall Muhammad Fawzy tried to organize a coup 
(Bou Nassif 2013, 510). Sadat, having gotten rid of influential military of-
ficers, proceeded to push the military towards economic investment and 
away from overt political life. Kandil argues that this was what depoliti-
cized the military, and that following this reorientation, Sadat had to find 
a different power base on which he could rely. For this he chose the 
United States: 
 
“Sadat’s decision to shift alliances, substituting U.S. protec-
tion for that which has been provided by the military, was a 
well-calculated power strategy. Reliance on the military for the 
past two decades proved to be (to say the least) problematic, 
leaving the political leadership vulnerable to the convulsions 
of the officer corps. By contrast to the military and its mood 
swings, the U.S. offered stable support with only a few strings 
attached: peace with Israel, abandoning the role of Arab 
power builder, contributing to the global war to contain com-
munism (and later Islamism), opening up the economy to for-
eign investors, and preferably signaling an opening of the po-
litical system. Sadat had no qualms with any of these demands, 
since none of them jeopardized his regime,” (Kandil 2012, 
274).  
 
This explanation by Kandil comes up against several issues, most im-
portantly the question of how Sadat managed to so greatly underestimate 
the dangers of relying on the United States. The idea that the US “offered 
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support with so few strings attached” was doubtful at best. A second prob-
lem with Kandil’s hypothesis is that it puts the burden of decision-making 
on the individual and thus hides the social forces involved in these shifts. 
A more plausible explanation is that the social forces now dominating 
Egypt’s political scene supported a shift towards the US because it served 
their economic interests. In other words, the new historic bloc was com-
mitted to transnational capital through liberalization. It was not just a de-
cision made by Sadat in order to protect himself, as Kandil suggests. Ra-
ther it was representative of the shift in social forces and the rise of a new 
bloc. Kandil writes: “Because Sadat wanted a loyal social base that owed 
nothing to Nasser, and because he knew that opening up the economy 
was a non-negotiable item on the American agenda, he resolved to entrust 
the ruling party into the hands of an emerging capitalist class,” (Ibid, 288). 
And yet this removes all agency from Egyptian social forces themselves 
and makes it seem that the move towards economic liberalization was the 
result of a US demand that Sadat gave into because he needed American 
support against the threat of the Egyptian military. This discounts the 
trend that had materialized since the late 1960s whereby social forces in-
side Egypt that wanted economic liberalization had begun to gain traction. 
 This brief sketch demonstrates two trends. First, the demilitariza-
tion of political posts, which was to foreshadow the shift within the mili-
tary from being heavily involved in government to becoming more heavily 
involved in the economy. Second, the high numbers of businessmen and 
Western-trained economists in the cabinets during this period are one way 
of showing the constitution of this new bloc. As noted previously, how-
ever, a change in political positions is not enough to understand shifts 
between historic blocs. This needs an analysis of changes in production 
and accumulation. The new fraction of capital that became dominant ac-
cumulated capital through three main avenues: speculation, import/ex-
port, and real estate, something I come back to later. The point I want to 
make here is that many of the figures that amassed wealth through accu-
mulating in these three ways were present in the cabinet. This was a new 
feature that eventually came to dominate this new bloc: the mixing be-
tween business and politics. This is not to say that money and politics were 
separate before but that during this bloc the appearance of what some 
have called crony capitalism was especially noteworthy. Rather than refer 
to this phenomenon as crony capitalism, however, I would see it is proof 
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that the new dominant fraction of capital favoured, or led to, the emer-
gence of businessmen in government posts. This is in distinction to the 
previous bloc, dominated by the military, in which military men dominated 
government posts alongside public sector bureaucrats who aimed to accu-
mulate capital through industrialization. We now see that businessmen, 
engineers and technocrats came to be highly represented, while military 
men were no longer dominant. This was not what brought about Infitah 
but was rather a result of a shift in social forces and the rise of a new 
historic bloc, which in turn led to the adoption of Infitah as its concrete 
new project. 
 The Nasserist project had to be represented as having failed in order 
for a new project to be proposed. This was one of the first steps the new 
bloc took to transcend their narrow interests through moral reforms. The 
framing of the public sector was key to this, as the public sector’s perfor-
mance was at the heart of this perceived failure. Some scholars, such as 
Ayubi, have argued that the dominant narrative is that by the 1960s the 
public sector was experiencing a crisis in financing resulting from the way 
the regime had structured it: 
 
“Through the manner of its organization, the public sector 
was an expansion of certain, mostly inefficient, private enter-
prises. Its organization was not seriously reformed, nor was 
technical or political control over its activities enforced. It was 
also set up in isolation from any ‘political movement’ that 
might have directed and mobilized it, and because it had been 
established in the absence of, and unrelated to, any process of 
comprehensive national planning, it developed separately 
from the planning machinery,” (Ayubi 1980, 280).  
 
In other words, the regime had not seriously reformed the structure of the 
public sector. The public sector was also under pressure because of the 
regime’s promise to provide full employment to all university graduates. 
These criticisms were used as part of a push for a strong private sector 
that would replace the “failing” public sector. Ayubi urges us, however, to 
interrogate this now-dominant narrative; this interrogation is necessary 
precisely because this narrative has been used time and again to justify the 
free market project that the newly dominant fraction of capital was keen 
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on implementing. The argument can be made that in fact most public sec-
tor firms were neither inefficient nor performing as badly as they were out 
to be (Ayubi 1980, 282). Despite the lack of structural reform on the part 
of the regime, the public sector was not “failing” in any sense: 
 
“One can therefore see that in spite of a variety of constrain-
ing factors, the public sector was functioning fairly well in the 
late sixties and early seventies, and in a way that did not at all 
justify the argument of that group of supporters of Infitah who 
wanted to see the almost complete dismantling of the public 
sector,” (Ibid, 282). 
 
The new hegemonic project had to be based on selling off the public sec-
tor and shifting emphasis to the private sector. Similar to Ayubi, Kandil 
has argued: 
 
“Another troubling aspect of this whole economic reform ep-
isode pertains to the very rationale behind the privatization 
program. The conventional account emphasizes how Egypt 
could not longer cover the losses generated by its failed public 
sector. Yet on the eve of the IMF program, 260 out of the 314 
state-owned companies were profitable, only 54 were suffer-
ing losses, and the rest were breaking even,” (Kandil 2012, 
352). 
 
The need to represent the public sector in a certain way was an ideological 
move necessary to pave the way for the material shift of power from the 
public to the private sector. Without first reframing the public sector as 
failing, and connecting this to the Nasserist bloc, it would not have been 
possible to fulfil the new bloc’s narrow interest of shifting economic pol-
icy. 
 Connected to this was the move to construct the private sector as 
the solution, and this was based on the notion, or idea, of efficiency. In 
1971, a specialized company was set up for hard currency foreign transac-
tions. Workers in the already-existing trade company complained to the 
Arab Socialist Union—a key organization under the Nasserist bloc—
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about this development, and a debate began in the National Assembly 
(Cooper 1979, 488). The records show that one minister defended the cre-
ation of a new company using the following rhetoric: 
 
“The creation of a specialized independent company for the 
practice of free market activity and the business of selling for-
eign currency to citizens and commercial activity carried out 
in the import market accords with the plan of financial and 
administrative reform which the government assumed in the 
period following the aggression, acknowledging the fact that 
the new company has all the necessary facilities to be a suc-
cessful company and the power to permit it to obtain a more 
appropriate price from the places of production as well as 
providing a greater opportunity for research and follow up 
and better evaluation,” (Ibid, 489). 
 
He went on to point out that the old company had gone into a deficit 
when it attempted to assume free currency operations. Workers in the old 
company argued that “tying income to ‘work’ and ‘productivity,’ imposing 
economic criteria, would damage their interests in the structure,” (Ibid). 
Both the rhetoric used by the minister and the response by the workers 
hint at the changing ideological landscape as Egypt shifted from one his-
toric bloc to another. The “practice of free market activity” was now a 
priority, and because the selling of foreign currency was crucial to this a 
new company had to be founded to handle this properly, implying that 
public sector companies would have been unable to do so. 
 The idea of efficiency was crucial to pushing for a private sector, 
and this case illustrates the ways in which they were used by the ruling 
class while also showing how they were resisted by fractions of labour that 
saw through the language of productivity. Indeed, as Cooper notes, liber-
alization policies targeted the public sector using the logic of efficiency. 
“This policy, when it impinged on the public sector, meant change in the 
distribution of resources—either between the public and private sectors, 
or among units within the public sector—and immediately raised political 
temperatures,” (1979, 488). It was politically controversial because any 
limitations put on the public sector were seen as an attack on the socialist 
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nature of the Egyptian economic structure, and thus an attack on Nas-
serism. As Sidqi states: 
 
“Such a sector (the public sector) cannot be ruled by the re-
strictions which rule government departments and the system 
of work in it cannot be developed in a manner which brings 
it within the scope of government control and thus loses its 
basic element of success. Consequently, this sector has to be 
managed on scientific and practical principles,” (Ibid, 492). 
 
The use of scientific management as a tool for evading government control 
is a marked departure from the common usage of scientific management 
as a means of achieving Arab socialism. We can recall here how Sadat 
initially propagated the ideologies used by Nasser in order to capitalize on 
their popular currency, even as over time the terms started to take on new 
meanings as the new bloc emerged. “There was a particular emphasis on 
the theme of continuity with the principles of the 1952 revolution: that 
the Infitah is not a retreat from socialism but rather a policy for achieving 
the same goals,” (Dessouki 1981, 410). This points to the fact that the new 
historic bloc was aware of how powerful the Nasserist bloc had been. Na-
tionalism, Arab socialism and anti-imperialism were strong ideologies that 
emerged from the hegemony of the Nasserist bloc, and these did not only 
win over allies in the ruling class, but throughout society. Notably, the first 
Infitah laws did not specify that any economic principles would be chang-
ing; rather, they emphasized that the means of achieving those same eco-
nomic goals were what would change. This began to change as the new 
bloc consolidated itself materially.  
 The transformative effects of Infitah were tremendous, and these 
changes mark a clear distinction between the two blocs. Changes in insti-
tutions were key here. Take the legal system, for example. Attracting for-
eign investment meant that Egypt needed a strong independent court that 
could guarantee foreign companies legal protections. Tamir Mostafa has 
argued that it was for this very reason that an independent constitutional 
court was established: the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) (2003, 
885). Because of the Nasserist bloc’s nationalizations, the new bloc had to 
ensure investors of guaranteed protection of property rights: 
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“Private property shall be protected and may not be put under 
sequestration except in the cases specified in the law and with 
a judicial decision. It may not be expropriated except for a 
public purpose and against a fair compensation in accordance 
with the law. The right of inheritance is guaranteed in it.” (Ar-
ticle 34)  
 
“Nationalization shall not be allowed except for considera-
tions of public interest, by means of law and with compensa-
tion.” (Article 35)  
 
“General confiscation of property shall be prohibited. Special 
and limited confiscation shall not be allowed except with a 
judicial decision.” (Article 36) (Ibid, 890) 
 
The SCC ended up being a key player in recording violations by the Sadat 
and Mubarak regimes. The SCC legalized the existence of many opposi-
tion parties, and ruled in favour of press freedom numerous times. Thus 
on the one hand, the SCC ensured property rights and the dismantling of 
the Nasserist bloc’s social welfare policies; while on the other hand it 
emerged as a key voice against the repression of this bloc and the next. 
 This section traced the rise of new social forces and their coming 
together as a new historic bloc. The narrow interests of this bloc had to 
be represented as universal and as applying to different fractions of capital 
and labour in order for the bloc to be strong enough to exert hegemony. 
The next section looks at the context within which the dominant fraction 
of capital drew legitimacy from: transnational capitalism and the emer-
gence of neoliberalism. The following section argues that this fraction’s 
ideological power was too weak to convince other fractions of their own 
narrow interests, thus failing to create a hegemony as strong as Nasser’s. 
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4.3 The Emergence of Neoliberalism and Transnational 
Capital: Infitah and the Egyptian Economy 
 
“The program of “structural adjustment” these organizations 
have attempted to impose on Egypt aims to dismantle the sys-
tem of state subsidies and controls. Prices Egyptians pay to 
consume, or receive for producing, food, fuel and other 
goods, are to reflect prices in the international market. Yet it 
hardly needs pointing out that world prices for many major 
commodities are determined not by the free interplay of “pri-
vate” market forces but by the monopolies or oligopolies or-
ganized by states and multinational corporations,” (Mitchell 
1991, 30). 
 
A central thread tying together the new project of the Infitah bloc as well 
as transnational capital and the emergence of neoliberalism at the global 
level is the process of liberalization, a process that has political, economic 
and social dimensions. This process was central in connecting the new 
historic bloc to transnational capital, and this connection was a defining 
feature that set this bloc apart from the previous one. The expansion of 
this process in Egypt under this new bloc must be contextualized within a 
global move towards liberalization, which had become a form of common 
sense. Springborg writes: 
 
“From Morocco to Iraq, Arab polities and economies appear 
to be liberalizing. The holding of comparatively free elections, 
easing of media censorship, and invigoration of associational 
activity have accompanied relaxation of political control by 
single parties. Economic liberalization has paralleled these po-
litical changes,” (Springborg 1990, 447). 
 
The literature on Egypt has often discussed liberalization from the per-
spective of political changes, with many arguing that the Sadat and Mu-
barak years witnessed increased freedoms in terms of civic rights. This is 
accompanied by the assumption that these expanding political freedoms 
are connected to the expansion of the free market, based on the theoretical 
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notion that transitioning to a free market automatically leads to democratic 
transition. While any analysis of the changes that occurred in Egypt during 
the 1970s and 1980s would be incomplete without a discussion about lib-
eralization, I do not subscribe to the idea that it is by default connected to 
a transition to a free market system. It is important to interrogate its un-
derlying assumptions and the ways in which dominant conceptualizations 
of political economy shape our notions of progressive and regressive eco-
nomic systems. Liberalization should be placed within a specific strand of 
theorizing that favours the free market and neoliberal policies as the most 
progressive way of ordering an economy. Liberalization comes with its 
own baggage, in other words.  
 The transnational question comes in very explicitly with regards to 
liberalization. Liberalization refers mainly to a reduction in the govern-
ment’s role as director of the national economy, whereby deregulation, 
reliance on market forces and disinvestiture are emphasized instead and 
the government’s ability to distribute welfare to society is reduced 
(Tschirgi 1996, 9). This economic definition also has political ramifica-
tions, and liberalization has come to be associated with participatory and 
liberal democratic systems of governance. “Liberalization cannot be a sim-
ple mechanical imposition. At best, it is an orientation whose concrete 
manifestations must be worked out in a process of accommodation be-
tween various power centers in any given society,” (Ibid, 10). Because the 
discussion on neoliberalism necessitates a much deeper probing than 
this—which I have presented in the previous chapter—suffice it to say 
here that there was a clear push from the new fraction of capital for the 
implementation of a free market system along with the expansion of the 
private sector. 
 The shift towards liberalization did not happen in Egypt alone but 
was part and parcel of a global shift towards neoliberalism that was solid-
ified through the Washington Consensus. The liberalization of the econ-
omy began to happen across the Arab world during the 1970s and 1980s, 
with visible effects materializing in the 1990s: 
 
“Privatization, currency devaluations and partial flotations, re-
juvenation of capital markets, reductions of subsidies on basic 
consumer goods, and other elements of economic liberaliza-
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tion packages have been adopted in varying degrees in the po-
litical economies of the Arab republics and, to a lesser extent, 
in the Arab monarchies,” (Springborg 1990, 447).  
 
These moves were supported by a growing international consensus that 
development and economic growth were to be achieved through integra-
tion into the global capitalist economy (Springborg 1989, 3). The idea that 
privatization and competitive markets were more effective for economic 
development than state-controlled economic systems became “common 
sense,” (Springborg 1999, 99).52 Protectionism, import substitutions strat-
egies and trade barriers were all seen as hindering growth. Alongside these 
changes, developing countries received loans and aid in return for “good 
behavior”—i.e. the willingness to reform along the lines stated above. 
 In the quote above, Springborg outlines what the literature views 
liberalization with regards to the Middle East. Politically, free elections, 
less media censorship, associational organizations and the lack of one-
party rules are what demonstrates that a country is liberalizing. Economi-
cally, privatization, currency devaluations, partial flotations, rejuvenation 
of capital markets, and the reduction of subsidies on basic consumer 
goods are indications of liberalization. In the same article, Springborg goes 
on to lament that Arab countries would not undergo a “thorough liberal 
transformation” engineered by an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie—as hap-
pened in Europe. Thus the teleology is made clear, as well as the assumption 
that Arab countries should follow the path Europe followed in the 18th 
century. Because the Egyptian bourgeoisie is split between those who fa-
vour the public sector and a more protectionist approach, and those who 
want to liberalize, the state continues to be a barrier to the establishment 
of a free market (1990, 447). This view is opposed by scholars such as 
Ellen Trimberger, who argue that the economic power of a capitalist class 
that is in a position of dependency vis-à-vis the global system will only 
create conflict and thus lead to the state becoming more authoritarian 
(1978, 166). 
 In an article he wrote on the 2011 revolution, Springborg once again 
returns to the question of liberalization, this time framing his debate 
                                                 
52 It is important to note that specific class fractions in Egypt used this to push 
for their interests, as I will demonstrate in the following section 
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through the concept of democratic deficits (2011). He lists these deficits 
as Egyptians being too young, too rural, too poor, too lacking in a middle 
class, too insecure, too poorly educated and trained, and too dependent 
on the government. Thus the liberal assumptions of his scholarship are 
made clear once again. Poor governance is yet another key aspect of his 
argument, and needless to say he does not mention either the global capi-
talist system nor unequal global relations as barriers to Egypt’s ability to 
democratize. He states: “The two most vital tasks of governance in this 
regard are assuring macroeconomic stability, and the security of the person 
and of property rights,” (Ibid, 91). The security of the person and of property 
rights is telling. Even his call for a focus on macroeconomic stability does 
not engage with the prominent critique that this understanding of the 
economy eludes social justice or redistribution as part and parcel of stabil-
ity. Moreover, his concern about the private sector and attacks on busi-
nessmen demonstrate once again his assumption that a strong private sec-
tor and weak state—key to liberalization—should have been the outcome 
of the revolution. At the end of his article, he notes that Egyptians are 
more occupied with “economic concerns” rather than democratization 
(Ibid, 92). In other words, there is apparently no connection between eco-
nomic justice and democracy. 
 Perhaps what is most surprising about his analysis is that the Egyp-
tian bourgeoisie is in no way connected to transnational capital. In fact, 
the problem appears to be precisely that the Egyptian state is preventing 
Egyptian businessmen from engaging in and developing a strong private 
sector. This is not an uncommon assumption in much of the literature on 
Egypt. Designating the Egyptian bourgeoisie as “crony capitalists” implies 
that the problem is corruption in Egypt rather than the process of capital-
ist accumulation itself and, as was to happen further on, the development 
of monopoly capitalism. Getting rid of corrupt practices is thus presented 
as the solution. The Egyptian bourgeoisie is presented as though detached 
from the global economy, and the role of transnational capital appears to 
be non-existent. What this section aims to show is that, in actual fact, it is 
impossible to tell the story of Egypt’s ruling class during this historic bloc, 
as well as afterwards, without speaking of the transnational level. 
 What was Infitah exactly? Because moves towards economic liberal-
ization had already stated under Nasser, the announcement of Infitah in 
1974 did not mark the beginning of the trajectory, although it is important 
as a concrete move towards a new economic project. As noted previously, 
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the new laws were presented as new means of achieving the same economic 
goals that had been outlined by the previous historic bloc. Initially, it was 
announced that private capital would not be allowed to dominate the pub-
lic sector and that foreign investment would not be allowed in strategic 
national industries—by the 1980s all of these restrictions were removed 
(Ibid). 
 Law 43 of 1974—“The October Paper”—was the legislative basis 
for Infitah. This law created free zone areas in Port Said and other Suez 
Canal cities, legislated for the relaxation of exchange laws and the facilita-
tion of the repatriation of profits, allowed the private sector access to the 
parallel market, and curtailed the state monopoly of foreign trade (Hamed 
1981, 3). The main aim of this law was to attract Arab and other foreign 
investment. Combined with Law 32 of 1977, the aim was to redefine what 
the private sector’s role was and to push for economic liberalization. Sadat 
announced that the private sector was to become the priority, even though 
the public sector would remain. As will be shown in the following chapter, 
Nasser did not remove the private sector; instead he regulated it and ex-
panded the public sector. Sadat’s Infitah, on the other hand, did the reverse: 
more power was given to the private sector, notably by centering foreign 
investment, and the public sector began to be regulated through principles 
of profitability. Moreover, Sadat encouraged those who raised questions 
about the efficiency of the public sector, such as Minister of Finance Ah-
med Abu Ismail, as part of the ideological attack on the public sector 
(Hinnebusch 1980, 455). This, importantly, does not mean that the public 
sector became irrelevant; rather it shows the ways in which it was realigned 
to the emergence of the new historic bloc and the new hegemonic project. 
 Over 100 laws were drafted in total, targeting almost all sectors of 
Egyptian political and economic life (Ayubi 1980, 281). By December 
1978, 591 enterprises and 312 free zones were approved as part of the 
Infitah project, and the total capital involved amounted to over LE 2085 
million. 65% of this capital went to distribution and services, and 35% to 
commodities (Ibid, 282). Prior to the 1974 announcement of the Infitah 
laws, there were already clear signs indicating the shift in policy. Foreign 
investors were guaranteed that their businesses would not be confiscated 
and did not have to pay income taxes for the first five years (Dessouki 
1981, 411). In 1972, a preferential trade agreement was signed between 
Egypt and the European Economic Community. Soviet military advisors 
were ordered to leave Egypt, and diplomatic relations with West Germany 
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were resumed. In 1973, the term “open door policy” was used for the first 
time in an official government statement (Ibid). Law 65 of 1971 allowed 
foreign capital to invest in an extensive number of areas that had previ-
ously been off-limits (Ibid). And finally, commercial banks were allowed 
to deal in convertible currencies at a higher rate without having to get per-
mission from the finance ministry (Ibid). 
 An increase in investment was key to Infitah. Indeed on March 27 
1977 the newly created Investment Authority approved 102 projects in 
five hours (Waterbury 2014, 145). There is nothing problematic in this per 
se, but in this instance, over 81 per cent of total investments were being 
directed to nonindustrial sectors such as services and tourism (Moustafa 
2008, 137). Samer Soliman confirms this by pointing out that structural 
changes in the Egyptian economy after 1974 led to the growth of traded 
goods and services at the expense of traded commodities (1998, 13). He 
argues that Egyptian capitalists did not invest much in industrialization 
during the early years of Infitah and that this was a rational choice given 
the economic conditions of the 1970s: the Egyptian economy during this 
period was characterized by a situation in which windfall earnings paved 
the way for a rise in the prices of non-tradable goods. Investments in in-
dustry yield long-term results and thus require confidence in the economic 
and political stability of the country, which Soliman argues was missing 
during the early years of Infitah. Moreover, this fell on the shoulders of the 
state, which did not actively encourage investment in industrialization 
(Ibid). On top of this, Egyptian capitalists who did not have foreign cur-
rency had to wait longer to gain the advantages given to foreign investors, 
thus indicating that the priority was not national but foreign capital. One 
should add here that foreign capital is more likely to invest in projects with 
a quick profit trajectory—industrial projects were therefore not on the top 
of the list. 
 Despite this, Soliman goes on to argue that Egypt did experience 
accelerated industrialization in the latter part of Infitah, a process that con-
tinued throughout the 1980s and 1990s: the share of industry in GDP in-
creased and the rate of growth of industry also increased and was above 
that of numerous other sectors (Ibid, 16-17). The reasons behind this ac-
celeration were the private sector and the investments made by industrial 
capitalists: “The tendency of the state is retreat from investing in industry 
was counter-balanced by the orientation of the private sector towards in-
vesting in industry,” (Ibid, 19). The share of the private sector in industry 
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rose from 36.9% to 55.6% in 1989/1990 (although this was also due to 
increased privatization of public sector companies) (Ibid, 21). Industriali-
zation began to slow down following the IMF’s structural adjustment pro-
gram in 1992, since the package involved policies that had negative effects 
on industrial investment (Ibid, 24). 
 However, it is important to point out that this industrialization pro-
cess relied on foreign goods and capital in several ways. For example, 
whenever foreign exchange reserves were low, it became difficult to im-
port needed materials. This was a problem because, as Soliman notes, 
Egyptian industry was highly dependent on imported machines and equip-
ment (Ibid, 23). Another example is the production of motor vehicles. 
During the 1960s there was one national company producing cars in 
Egypt. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were thirteen foreign companies 
producing cars in Egypt. While it is true that they used locally-produced 
components and created local jobs and that local businessmen provided 
50% of the capital, the fact that they were foreign is a notable shift from 
the Nasser period (Ibid, 28). 
 A fraction of capital centered on accumulating capital through the 
private sector was therefore an inevitability given these changes in direc-
tion. As Hinnebusch notes: 
 
“Infitah, the American connection and the peace treaty, all 
serve bourgeois interests first, bringing the revitalization of 
the private sector, free access to western cultural and con-
sumer goods, and the chance to get rich. Thus, in general, the 
private bourgeoisie has many reasons to support Sadat, and, 
by and large, has done so,” (Hinnebusch 1980, 457). 
 
The transnational connection is made clear here, whereby the turn towards 
American capital and the peace treaty with Israel are contextualized as 
events related to the emergence of a new Egyptian ruling class. Indeed the 
new bloc’s shift towards the United States became increasingly clear over 
time. Aside from the fact that Sadat considered David Rockefeller an eco-
nomic advisor (Kandil 2012, 293), Egypt also began to import massive 
amounts of American goods—$2.8 billion between 1974 and 1984, even 
while Egyptian exports to the US were worth only $33 million (Ibid). 
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American banks in particular profited greatly from Infitah (Ibid). Here pro-
tectionist policies made a difference between the ways in which the US 
and Egypt benefitted: 
 
“US protectionism was a major issue, especially since the US 
was Egypt’s main trading partner. Egypt was caught in the 
impossible situation whereby it accepted donor advice to pro-
mote its exports, phase out import restrictions, and discon-
tinue bilateral trade, and yet was prevented from making the 
expected transition to the status of a semi-industrialized 
mixed-economy exporter. Unless Egypt’s new aid and trade 
partners give special treatment to the exports from Egypt’s 
textile industry, the dominant source of comparative ad-
vantage, employment and linkages in the economy, there can 
be no prospect for Egypt to redress the balance between its 
exports and imports, or close its savings gap,” (Ibid, 120). 
 
The USAID program was also set up during this period, and although it 
was sold as beneficial to Egypt, most of its funds went to paying American 
personnel and consultants, and it insisted on the right to determine 
Egypt’s investment priorities. Some have argued that this partially explains 
why there was a clear lack of investment in industry during this period 
(Handoussa 1990, 110). The US government has repeatedly stated that 
Egypt’s mismanagement of the national economy is to blame for skyrock-
eting debt, while Egypt has argued that the USAID program is largely to 
blame (Ibid). Handoussa argues: “The concept of ‘no strings attached’ is 
false—indirect costs have been significant in the form of excessive US 
consultancy services imposed by the donor, procurement conditions stip-
ulating the use of often overprices US goods and services, and finally do-
nor selection of project priorities often at odds with Egypt’s priorities. 
This has resulted in the emergence of an inflated USAID bureaucracy of-
ten referred to as Egypt’s shadow cabinet,” (Ibid, 110). It is important to 
note that the US attached $1 billion in arms trade money to the $1 billon 
in economic aid. Soon after Camp David, Egypt had to pay $650 million 
in interest alone to service the debt. 
 The extent to which USAID money benefits American capital 
above all cannot be overstated. US corporations receive the bulk of this 
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money, with more than half of the aid package spent on US goods, pri-
marily grain (Mitchell 1991, 30). Egyptians may benefit from such aid in 
the short run, but it has created a dependency on importing US food prod-
ucts and equipment, as well as accumulating massive amounts of debt 
(Ibid, 31). Nobody has characterized this relationship better than Timothy 
Mitchell when he wrote: “USAID operates as a form of state support to 
the American private sector, while working in Egypt to dismantle state 
supports. None of this is explained in the discourse of USAID itself, 
which pretends to stand outside Egyptian politics, conducting merely a 
“dialogue” at the rational, detached level of “policy”,”(Ibid). This is indeed 
characteristic of almost all developmental interventions in Egypt. These 
power dynamics cannot be left out of the story, as they show a set of win-
ners and losers contrary to the usual development discourse that posits 
the non-West as victim.  
 Aside from the effects on the development industry, the growth of 
the USAID program in Egypt also indicates the expansive role transna-
tional capital was now to play. This bloc found itself in a very different 
geopolitical situation than the Nasserist bloc. Although the latter had to 
confront America’s anti-Communist hysteria, the world was not yet clearly 
aligned towards the US as the new unilateral global superpower, and ne-
oliberalism had not yet been solidified as economic orthodoxy. The Infitah 
bloc on the other hand saw the opportunities presented by US hegemony, 
and indeed the major activities of the Egyptian economy during this bloc 
show this: speculation, rents, and a turn towards finance capital are all 
connected to the increasing role of neoliberal capitalism at the global level.  
 The expectations surrounding Infitah were high among certain seg-
ments of the ruling class. Osman A. Osman, for example, claimed that the 
Canal free zone was attracting a lot of interest: “At least twenty of the 
world’s largest contractors have come in to see me in the past month. 
There is lots for everybody,” (Hamed 1981, 4). However, at the same time, 
the ruling class had to ensure that there was enough domestic stability to 
attract investment. “When a ruling elite decides to pursue a development 
strategy based on foreign aid and capital, it follows that all necessary steps 
will be taken to assume and entice its creditors. And the more dependent 
on others, the more vulnerable to their pressure a country becomes. This 
is especially true in developing countries whose leadership fails to produce 
coherent development strategies,” (Ibid, 413). External influences have 
238  
 
been constitutive of Infitah from the very beginning, since it relies exten-
sively on neoliberalization, and in particular privatization through foreign 
capital. This is opposed to the Nasserist bloc and even Egyptian capitalists 
of the 1920s and 1930s who tried to avoid foreign capital through forming 
Bank Misr. 
 By 1975, liberalization was moving ahead and there was a debate 
about how far free market policies should extend. Some argued that inter-
national capital should dictate all sectors of the economy, including subsi-
dies. This would force public sector companies to operate according to 
the laws of profitability and would ensure that the state would no longer 
offer subsidies on a large scale. Others argued that this was too drastic and 
that it would create deep class tensions. As pressure from transnational 
actors, including the IMF, pressed Egypt to remove subsidies and float the 
pound, the ruling class began to experience tensions over how to deal with 
the liberalization of thee economy. Those who resisted the pressure to 
liberalize completely, such as Minister of the Economy Zaki Shafei, were 
dismissed from their positions (Ibid, 456). By 1976, both the Minister of 
Economy (Hamid Sayeh) and the Minister of Finance (Muhammad Ha-
mid) were pro-liberalization. 
 International financial institutions were already approaching Egypt 
during this period. The IMF, for example, made its initial approaches in 
1975. In April, talks between Egypt and the IMF began, and the IMF re-
leased the following statement (presented here in part): 
 
“The Egyptian authorities have reaffirmed their commitment 
to the “open door” policy. The Fund believes that in order 
for this policy to be successfully implemented, fundamental 
changes in economic policies are required. Domestically, sub-
sidization needs to be sharply reduced to ease the budget def-
icit and release resources for investment.” 
 
“The structural imbalances in the Egyptian economy are par-
ticularly severe in the external sector. To correct these imbal-
ances, it is essential to make appropriate adjustments in ex-
change rate policies. It is also desirable to continue the present 
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trend toward greater decentralization of foreign trade deci-
sions and, in particular, to eliminate gradually the requirement 
of prior approval for imports,” (IMF 1976, 16-17).  
 
Other sections of the statement reiterate that the Egyptian economy re-
quires “major restructuring” and that three areas in particular needed ur-
gent attention: the elimination of subsidies; the upward adjustment of the 
interest rate structure; and greater flexibility in the foreign exchange mar-
ket (Dessouki 1981, 414). Sadat resisted for two years, despite mounting 
pressure from transnational actors. In 1976, the Gulf States, the US and 
the IMF refused to give Egypt a substantial amount of money unless Sadat 
agreed to the proposed IMF reforms (Ibid). Sadat gave in. The IMF agreed 
to provide Egypt with loans, with the understanding that subsidies would 
be cut in the 1977 budget (Ibid). At the beginning of 1977, the government 
announced an increase in the prices of numerous basic commodities, lead-
ing to the bread riots, which will be discussed in detail in the following 
section. 800 were injured, 1,270 arrested, and the military had to be called 
in to bring back public order. Both the regime and the IMF realized that 
subsidies had to be cut gradually. “Since then the Egyptian government 
has decreased the subsidies indirectly and gradually. It has resorted to a 
number of means such as lowering the quantity of a product sold for the 
same price, raising the price over a period of time, or changing the brand 
name,” (Ibid, 415). 
 The role of the IMF in the process of opening up Egypt’s economy 
highlights the role of transnational capital in the new configurations of 
power emerging under the Infitah bloc. John Waterbury makes the astute 
point that capitalist accumulation is always conditioned by the world econ-
omy (1985, 66). The new bloc was being conditioned by a different set of 
circumstances than in the 1950s-1960s. Waterbury makes the argument 
that Egypt’s transformation into a rentier state (through its dependence 
on oil exports, worker remittances, and Suez Canal and tourism revenues) 
under Sadat was inevitable and would have happened even if Nasser had 
still been in power: “It seems unlikely that Nasser would have had to face 
the same foreign exchange conundrum as Sadat and that he would have 
had to deal with it through some sort of trade and investment liberaliza-
tion,” (Ibid, 67). While it is true that the process of liberalization had al-
ready begun under the Nasserist bloc, this was due to the emergence of 
new social forces that were to eventually bring about the Infitah bloc. These 
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forces were not simply carrying out what was going to inevitably happen 
anyway; they also had a very different project from the social forces dom-
inating the Nasserist bloc. 
 Moreover, while geopolitical factors do condition Egypt’s economy, 
it is somewhat deterministic to suggest that local fractions of capital had 
no say in the extent to which Infitah was implemented, or that they did not 
have a specific project of their own. It is useful here to see the relation 
between local fractions of capital and geopolitical conditions—i.e. trans-
national fractions of capital—as more complicated than simply assuming 
that one dominated over the other. Waterbury’s tendency to see Infitah as 
more of a result of determinism rather than political agency on the part of 
a new historic bloc is clear in other statements as well. He argues, for ex-
ample, that “at its inception Infitah was more a state of mind than a coher-
ent set of policies. Different proponents of liberalization set for it different 
tasks and goals,” (Ibid, 70). While the latter part of the statement is accu-
rate, the former seems to suggest a lack of calculation on the part of the 
Egyptian ruling class. He continues: 
 
“With varying degrees of emphasis, the following goals were 
integral to the liberalization process: (1) to attract Arab invest-
ment capital to Egypt from the oil-rich states of the Arabian 
peninsula; (2) to attract Western technology and investment 
through joint ventures with Egyptian public or private enter-
prises; (3) flowing from the preceding goal, to promote Egyp-
tian exports and to stimulate the private sector; (4) to bring 
Egypt’s trade with convertible currency economies more 
nearly into balance; and (5) to promote the rejuvenation and 
competitiveness of public sector enterprises,” (Ibid). 
 
While this is an important summary of many of the faces of Infitah, it seems 
to somewhat go against his argument that Infitah was a mood, not a con-
crete set of policies. The goals mentioned above were specifically created 
and pushed through by particular fractions of capital—making up a new 
historic bloc—not simply a mixed set of aims promoted by different in-
dependent actors. It is precisely because of this shift at the national and 
international level during Nasser and Sadat that fractions of capital favour-
ing liberalization were able to implement Infitah. This still required that 
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these fractions existed and that their project coincided with the global ne-
oliberal one. Without liberalization occurring at the global level, thus cre-
ating new transnational fractions of capital that wanted to expand neolib-
eralization, it is unlikely that the new historic bloc that emerged would 
have amassed enough material and ideological capital to implement Infitah.  
 
4.4 Not One of Us: The New Ruling Class and Egyptian 
Society 
 
The rise of a new historic bloc was to have major ramifications on 
Egyptian society. The previous sections have focused on some of the ma-
terial changes that happened during the shift to a new bloc. This section 
aims to understand the ways in which these material changes created the 
conditions for new ideologies as well as new norms and values to emerge. 
These are always grounded in the material, and thus the aim is to connect 
the new norms, values and ideologies to these material changes.  
 Numerous scholars have noted the ways in which key elements of 
social relations changed following the rise of the Infitah bloc. Galal Amin, 
for example, has argued that this led to a new exploitative order: 
 
“If the extraction of surplus value from the worker requires a 
relentless ordering of production, including the imposition of 
long work hours, close surveillance of the times of work, lax-
ity, and absenteeism, then the extraction of surplus value from 
the consumer requires completely different methods. It re-
quires an intervention that moulds the consumer psychologi-
cally and conditions him so that the demands things for which 
he has no need, makes advance payments that enmesh him in 
debt, and leads him to throw away goods before they are fully 
used. The new mode of exploitation requires the diffusion of 
a completely different ideology, resting on a perpetual striving 
to change one’s social class by means (of changing one’s) con-
sumption,” (1981, 181). 
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Amin continues, noting the tendency to ignore the changes in class struc-
ture in the 1970s: 
 
“It is indeed regrettable that economists, in their search for 
factors underlying economic development, have almost to-
tally neglected the nonmaterial conditions of economic pro-
gress and concentrated instead on purely economic factors 
such as the rates of saving and investment, the availability of 
certain skills, and introduction of modern techniques; for 
such factors may only constitute the results rather than the 
cause of development,” (1980, 438). 
 
Liberalization did not only have economic effects, but also cultural ones. 
He draws a parallel between Egypt under Infitah and Egypt after the Suez 
War, noting that following the war Egypt achieved its highest rate of 
growth, reduced inequality, and experienced psychological and cultural 
changes. “A feeling of national pride came gradually to replace that feeling 
of inferiority towards the foreigner which has accumulated during a cen-
tury of foreign domination. Egypt’s middle class was forced to consume 
Egyptian products until it came gradually to admit that foreign products 
are not always superior,” (Ibid, 439). The fields of literature and the arts 
became lively once again (Ibid). These cultural changes are important to 
emphasize because they are directly conditioned by material realities. They 
are tied to the attempt by a new dominant fraction of capital to establish 
hegemony. 
 The focus on mental conceptions here is important. A new type of 
citizen was being imagined, one that defined him or herself through social 
mobility and consumerism. Under the Nasserist bloc the role of social 
mobility was also key, but this was never framed as necessary in order to 
consume; it was framed as necessary in order to serve and develop the 
nation. The shift to citizenship-as-consumption that occurred under the 
Infitah bloc was not accidental nor inevitable, but a result of a new hege-
monic project whose material underpinnings relied on import/export, 
rents, and real estate. The opening up of Egypt’s economy led to a wave 
of imports, most of them luxury goods. This in turn required the con-
sumption of these goods, as well as a class of individuals who had the 
material means to afford them. Luxury real estate in particular came to 
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represent the quickest way to accumulate wealth. This class “devoted their 
activities to short-term trade, reaping high cash profits that have…often 
been hoarded in the form of cash and jewellery, or spent on unnecessary 
luxuries, lavish consumption, or otherwise invested or saved abroad,” 
(Oweiss 1990, 43). As Kandil rightly notes: 
 
“What Infitah did in fact create were millionaires – thousand 
of millionaires in an overwhelmingly poor society. Moreover, 
these millionaires were no great industrialists who might even-
tually expand the job market, but were rather importers, mon-
eychangers, middlemen, as well as rehabilitated ancien regime 
landowners. They neither contributed to industry or employ-
ment. More dangerous still was Infitah’s re- distributional ef-
fects. […] This was Nasser’s greatest fear. As he one day told 
the director of the International Monetary Fund, Nasser was 
sure a state that basically provides raw materials and services 
to the industrialized world, and whose economic elite are 
largely merchants and speculators, rather than industrialists, 
will shortly become the victim of an unpatriotic, corrupted 
wealthy class,” (2012, 296). 
 
This is at the crux of the matter. Egypt had further reified its peripheral 
position under this new bloc, and now had a ruling class focused on ne-
oliberalization. Industrialization—perhaps the only path that could have 
given Egypt a semblance of autonomy from global market forces—was 
now off the table. 
 Egypt’s class structure underwent major changes during the shift to 
the Infitah bloc. The Nasserist bloc remains the only bloc to have materially 
advanced social mobility for a sizeable number of Egyptians. The empha-
sis of the bloc was on expanding and elevating the middle class through 
making education and healthcare free and providing public sector jobs for 
all university graduates. This had ramifications throughout society. It al-
lowed both rural and urban working and middle class Egyptians access to 
an educational system that had been closed off, and also provided key so-
cial support through free services and subsidies. Importantly, the Nasserist 
bloc had very close ties to these classes because most of the Free Officers 
came from them. The Infitah bloc was made up of elites that had a very 
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different class composition. Businessmen who had amassed wealth in an 
extremely short period of time—termed nouveau riche—as well as some 
members from the old agrarian fraction of capital dominated this bloc. 
These elites were not related to Egypt’s working or middle class in any 
way, and were clearly from the upper class, whether through “old” or 
“new” money. More importantly the changes in Egypt’s production and 
accumulation structure had negative effects on the majority of the working 
class, and only benefitted some within the middle class who rose to be-
come part of the upper class. Those who were able to take advantage of 
investment opportunities benefitted; but this was by no means the major-
ity. Because consumption was so central to this bloc, and because this 
consumption focused on luxury goods, it did not take long for the majority 
of Egypt’s popular classes to see that this bloc’s ideology of national de-
velopment did not mean development for all Egyptians. Simultaneously, 
the socialist policies of the Nasserist bloc were being curtailed. Put to-
gether, this led to a volatile situation in which it was difficult for the Infitah 
bloc to create and expand hegemony. It is not that the bloc did not have 
the material power to spread its ideologies of consumerism, individualism 
and free-market economics, but rather that there as not enough legitimacy 
surrounding these ideologies and they were unable to penetrate society in 
the ways Nasserist ideologies had. This was undoubtedly connected to the 
deteriorating material conditions many Egyptians found themselves in, but 
also to the class base of the new dominant fraction of capital and its de-
tachment from Egypt’s lower and middle classes. 
 I want to focus on this more and in particular on the ways in which 
the differences between the two blocs were represented inside the country. 
For this I turn to several novels and films that are famous for depicting 
the differences between the Nasserist and Infitah blocs and then use them 
to discuss why the latter failed to create a hegemony as strong as the for-
mer. 
 The first of these are two works by Naguib Mahfouz. Mahfouz no 
doubt remains Egypt’s most important writer, and his work provides us 
with an astute and critical analysis of several Egyptian regimes, leading 
Samia Mehrez to refer to him as an “underground historian,” (1994, 6). 
Two of his novels will be discussed here, one in its novel form—
Miramar—and another in its film version—Tharthara fow’q al-nil. Mah-
fouz’s novel Miramar is set in the 1950s and provides a useful counterpoint 
as it focuses on the changes happening in the 1950s. It is based on a series 
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of characters that come to stay at a pension in Alexandria owned by an 
older woman of Greek origin. The story revolves around a girl named 
Zohra, recently arrived from the countryside. Each character shows us a 
different aspect of the changes and upheavals of the 1950s. The owner of 
the pension, Mariana, demonstrates the ways in which Alexandrians of 
Greek or Italian origin were forced to confront their position within Egyp-
tian society. In one scene she is asked: 
 
 “But where are your people?” 
“They’ve gone, every one of them.” She purses her lips, show-
ing her wrinkles. “I couldn’t leave—where should I go? I was 
born here. I’ve never seen Athens,” (1978, 7). 
 
Another character, Hosny Allam, carries a chip on his shoulder because 
although he owns a lot of land, he does not have a degree. This demon-
strates a certain shift in societal expectations, whereby owning land—
which may have given you sufficient social capital before—is now not 
enough; one must also have a degree. This points to the role of education 
in Nasser’s Egypt. Similarly, Allam is made conscious—through other 
characters—of his lack of a government job, which is the only type of job 
seen as secure. Indeed owning land is risky because of the new land re-
forms, as can be seen through the character of a Pasha, whose land has 
been sequestered by the new regime. In one scene he is asked: 
 
“But you can’t deny there have been a few reforms.” 
“His [the Pasha] mouth twitches. ‘All meant for the diversion 
of this ignorant mob, who don’t have the head for it all,,” 
(Ibid, 67). 
 
Some have suggested that Zohra represents the new Egypt. Although she 
is uneducated because of her peasant origins, she is hardworking and al-
ways willing to learn more—for example when she begins taking classes 
to learn how to read and write. In the novel we see that each character 
pulls her towards him, symbolizing the pull of different forces affecting 
Egypt, ranging from rich landowning elites to nationalists. What is fasci-
nating about the novel is the way in which each character comes from a 
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different segment of society, and yet they are all dramatically affected by 
the emergence of the Nasserist bloc. Notably, it is Zohra—a peasant—
who is most positively affected, and it is precisely this message about the 
Nasserist bloc that is prominent throughout the book.  
 The film based on Mahfouz’s novel Tharthara fow’q al-nil  (Adrift on 
the Nile) focuses on the next shift in historic blocs. In this film we see a 
clear critique of the Infitah bloc as it emerged in the late 1960s. The film 
follows a group of young and successful Egyptian men and women that 
routinely meet on a Nile houseboat on which they gather to smoke hash-
ish, drink alcohol, and relax. In one telling scene, the group goes out on 
an excursion, clearly feeling the effects of hashish, and end up hitting and 
killing a peasant woman walking on the road. They decide to flee the scene 
without calling an ambulance. One member of the group—the odd one 
out—is Anis, who works for the Egyptian public sector as a bureaucrat in 
the Ministry of Health. It is ultimately Anis who confronts the group with 
the murder of the peasant woman, but they respond by belittling her, with 
someone even saying that she would probably have died of starvation an-
yway. A female journalist who had become part of the group in order to 
write an expose on them then intervenes, asking why they did not respect 
Egyptian laws. One of the wealthy actors responds that the laws were not 
made for them and that in the new and open Egypt, there would be better 
laws, laws that focused on freedom. In the back and forth that follows, we 
see a debate between the old bloc (Anis and the journalist) and the new 
emerging bloc (the rest of the group, who in this scene were drunk, 
drugged and who refused to let the severity of the murder get to them). 
We also see an emphasis on a new Egypt, one characterized by its open-
ness. 
 The film has been interpreted as a criticism of the Nasser era, alt-
hough I would argue that instead Mahfouz seems to be critiquing the un-
ravelling of the Nasserist project, witnessed in the ultimate emergence of 
a new class—and eventually bloc—that Nasser himself saw as a barrier to 
Egyptian development. A class of individualistic, well-off Egyptians who 
spent every night smoking hashish, getting drunk, and picking up new sex-
ual partners; a class made up of individuals who had no qualms about kill-
ing an Egyptian peasant and leaving the scene without even calling an am-
bulance; a class that was ultimately waiting for a new Egypt in which they 
could live as they pleased. Indeed in the scene where Anis confronts them 
with the murder of the peasant woman, one responds by saying that if they 
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had stayed to help, the peasant’s family would have killed them. They be-
came the victims of the violent and emotional fellah, rather than the peas-
ants being the victims of a rich and decadent class that was beyond the 
law. 
 Tharthara fow’q al-Nil not only shows the new and emerging class in 
negative and extravagant terms, but also makes a clear critique of the fail-
ure of the Nasserist project to control this class and prevent it from be-
coming dominant. It is within the contradictions of the Nasserist bloc and 
the ultimate defeat of 1967 that allow this new class to dominate a new 
historic bloc. The film, released in 1971, shows in stark terms the differ-
ences between this class and the historic bloc under Nasser, where such 
decadence, individualization, and Westernization were frowned upon. 
Above all, it predicts precisely the type of society that was envisioned by 
the new social forces that became dominant during the end of Nasser’s 
rule. Indeed Mahfouz recalls: 
 
“I was told after the publication of Tharthara fow’q al-nil that 
Abd al-Hakim Amer had said, “This time he has gone beyond 
the limits and he must be punished,” (Mehrez 1994, 26). 
 
These two works taken together show a dramatic shift from one bloc to 
another. This shift was very much made real by focusing on the material 
changes that took place. The emergence of new class forces was demon-
strated through the central role of characters that were defined by these 
new forces. From Zohra to the group of wealthy film actors, we see that 
the focus is always on characters that had now “made it” because of shifts 
in Egypt’s economic structures. 
 Another Egyptian writer, Sonallah Ibrahim, has also written exten-
sively on the various regimes in modern Egyptian history. Sonallah Ibra-
him is one of Egypt’s most important critical writers, and his leftist and 
nationalist views have ensured that his work includes clear and concise 
critical views on economic, social and political change in Egypt. Some of 
his novels, specifically The Committee (al-lagna), have represented explicit 
critiques of Egypt’s government. Indeed Ibrahim spent five years in jail in 
the 1960s—for being part of Egypt’s Communist Party—and was to come 
to heads with the authorities on more than one occasion. This critical 
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stance against the political repression suffered by writers in Egypt was re-
iterated in 2003, when he rejected a prestigious writing prize from the 
Ministry of Culture, worth LE100,000. Ibrahim attended the ceremony 
and used it as a chance to criticize Mubarak’s government, saying of the 
prize: “…it was awarded by a government that, in my opinion, lacks the 
credibility to bestow it.”53  
 Ibrahim has reflected on the difference between critical writing dur-
ing the Nasser era versus critical writing at other points time, noting: 
 
“The Arab community, with Egypt in the lead, was engaged 
in a fierce confrontation with American imperialism and its 
step-daughter Zionism, in addition to the emergence of Arab 
nationalism. Naturally I was plagued by the question of 
whether, in those circumstances, I was harming my country 
with this work,” (Ibid, 123).  
 
In another snippet on the Nasser era, Ibrahim asks: 
 
“Have not revolutions and historical rebellions always passed 
through these two stages? In the beginning the goal is simple 
and clear and everything is either black or white, for or against. 
There is enthusiasm and faith in the future and the ability to 
change the course of history. Not a time for reflection and 
analysis. Then the revolution is accomplished and another 
stage with a slower rhythm begins: tasks are more complex, 
objectives are less clear, and shadows of grey begin to smudge 
the whiteness and the blackness. This becomes the time for 
thinking. What about? The mistakes of the first stage and the 
possibilities of the future,” (Ibid, 125). 
 
Perhaps no other work in contemporary Egyptian literature provides us 
with a sweeping view of the different historical blocs that make up the 
                                                 
53 See: http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/sonallah-ibrahim-
egypts-oracular-novelist 
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subject of this dissertation than Ibrahim’s epic novel Zaat. Originally pub-
lished in 1992, the book was immediately popular. It charts the journey of 
a middle class woman—Zaat—from her university days and the beginning 
of her marriage during the Nasserist historic bloc, her marriage and career 
under the Infitah bloc, and finally her ultimate state of defeat during the 
shift to the last historic bloc before 2011. Zaat was published by Dar al-
Mustaqbal al-Arabi, a leftist and Nasserist published, and its publication 
was received with great celebration by Cairo’s intellectual scene. Samia 
Mehrez writes: “This is not a novel that critiques a regime of the past. 
Rather, it is one that hits hard at the present, in all its manifestations—
social, economic, cultural, ideological, religious, political,”( 1994, 129). 
The novel ends with the 1980s, but in 2013 a popular Ramadan series 
(mosalsal) based on the novel ended with the 2011 revolution. The novel is 
structured around a series of newspaper clippings that detail numerous 
problems and issues the country is facing, alongside claims by successive 
governments that everything is fine and progress is being made. As 
Mehrez has pointed out, using these newspaper clippings works as a form 
of testimony, as a way of ensuring that a collective memory of the state of 
the country was put in place and serialized through literature (Ibid). In the 
original Arabic version, the publisher notes that these clippings are there 
to create the atmosphere of Egypt, so that the characters can be properly 
contextualized. Indeed these newspaper clippings provide just the context 
needed for the multiple social, economic and political problems Zaat and 
everyone else in the novel faces. The clippings focus extensively on the 
spread of corruption, the rise of Islamic banking and Islamic conservatism, 
the rise of Gulf capital, and the deteriorating state of Egypt’s infrastruc-
ture. In one chapter, almost all of the clippings draw on news related to 
the foreign aid Egypt receives. Put together, the clippings provide views 
from the government and opposition papers in order to show the types of 
debates happening around certain issues. The chapter with clippings on 
foreign aid, for example, presents views critical of it as well as government 
views justifying why it is needed. 
 When asked why he wrote this novel, Ibrahim responded that he 
saw the novel as a sort of testimony: 
 
“Like everyone else, I was thinking about what was happening 
in the country and I wanted to give my own testimony. I was 
hoping I could write a modern myth, with a character that 
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would overcome all the existing deteriorating circumstances. 
But when I started writing, the situation changed. The char-
acter was transformed into a completely crushed one,” (Ibid, 
130). 
 
This vivid description brings to mind the situation of Egypt in the early 
1990s, a situation in which most Egyptians did indeed find themselves 
crushed. This would only worsen as time progressed, and by 2011 Zaat 
would have been even more broken down by life and the changes Egypt 
was witnessing. Mehrez points out that when used alone, the word Zaat 
means “self” or “being” in Arabic, a tactic Ibrahim used to displace the 
focus from an individual onto the collective. This is not a story about an 
individual Egyptian woman named Zaat, but a story—or a series of sto-
ries—about Egypt and Egyptians. 
 
“Through the transformations Dhat [sic] undergoes, a whole 
society is exposed—its institutions, mores, contradictions, 
failures, and mediocrity. Yet throughout the narrative and de-
spite the obstacles she encounters, Dhat does try to resist, but 
her resistance collapses in face of the general tide of her social 
reality,” (Ibid, 131). 
 
And in another place: 
 
“As we read Dhat’s individual history, which gradually loses 
any individual features because of its familiarity, we discover 
that it is conditioned and shaped by a collective history that 
unfolds through [the] newspaper clippings,” (Ibid, 131). 
 
We see here again how central the newspaper clippings are to the storyline. 
To those who lived in Egypt throughout the decades covered by the clip-
pings, there will be no doubt be a familiarity to the news stories and scan-
dals, as well as the constant reassurances from the government that “eve-
rything is fine.” Interestingly, the clippings cover two particular historic 
blocs: the Infitah bloc and the financial bloc; the Nasserist bloc is almost 
absent in the clippings, and even in the text of the novel itself appears only 
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in retrospect. These moments of retrospection, however, are enough to 
present us with the author’s view of the Nasserist era—on the one hand, 
Ibrahim approaches the idea of the Nasser years as representing a sort of 
utopia with sarcasm and ridicule; on the other hand, it is clear that it rep-
resented the most progressive bloc of the three blocs. Sonallah Ibrahim 
was a renowned leftist, and in many ways a supporter of the Nasserist 
project. But by the end of the 1960s, this project had crumbled and what 
was taking its place was worse. In his novel The Smell, Ibrahim writes of 
this realization; that the Nasserist project was dead: “The romanticism of 
struggle is over. What remains are utterly naked facts. The culture of per-
sonality and its collapse. Rethinking of everything.” 
 The novel begins with the Nasserist bloc, when we are told that Zaat 
is born on the exact day of the revolution: July 23, 1952. The novel as a 
whole traces the rise and fall of different historic blocs and shows the ways 
in which material changes produced changes in norms, values and culture. 
The Nasserist era is often spoken about almost romantically, for example 
in the following part: 
 
“In those days the tenant wasn’t obliged to paint the walls and 
tile the floors and fit all the taps and pipes, because landlords 
back then were still so naïve that they actually undertook the 
finishing touches themselves,” (2005, 7). 
 
We also see clear references to the ruling class under the Nasserist bloc 
itself. The Nasserist bloc is often referred back to as the period during 
which “the people” were central to any discourses put forward by the rul-
ing class. Within the first few pages we already read about Nasser’s rela-
tionship to the masses: 
 
“But Abdel Nasser, intoxicated with the exultation of the 
masses and their demands for more, ordered two consecutive 
reductions in rent,” (Ibid, 6). 
 
Similarly, we see comments about Nasser’s move to make certain goods 
available to all Egyptians, as opposed to what would come later when these 
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goods were available only to those who had access to what Ibrahim loosely 
calls “the market”: 
 
“The holy trinity which Abdel Nasser had placed within eve-
ryone’s reach: a water heater, a stove from the war department 
factories, and an Ideal fridge,” (Ibid, 5). 
 
It is useful to point out here that it was the Egyptian military that engaged 
in the production of basic household goods for civilians (Abdelrahman 
2014, 22). 
  Further on in the novel, as we get to the years of Infitah, we see the 
struggles of Zaat’s family and other families to save up enough money, or 
borrow enough money, to purchase modern fridges, cars, electronics, and 
so on. All of these luxury foreign-made models had now been imported 
into Egypt and were thus available—but only to those who could afford 
them. We thus see the changes wrought by the Infitah bloc very clearly in 
Zaat’s life and those of her friends and family. We see new luxury imported 
goods flood the Egyptian markets, creating pressure on middle class Egyp-
tians to consume them; we see the rise of corruption, particularly in the 
public sector; and we see the rise of migration to Gulf countries as a means 
through which consumption can be financed. Consumerism is the new 
way of being, and yet it is not accessible to everyone. Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s we see Zaat and her husband struggle to buy things that 
they need and want, always conscious of how well other Egyptians appear 
to be doing. Perhaps no quote better summarizes Ibrahim’s view of the 
Infitah bloc than the following: 
 
“The capitalist dream that had seemed almost attainable un-
der the socialism of Abdel Nasser had, amazingly enough, be-
come impossible during the capitalist era of Sadat,” (Ibid, 14). 
 
Zaat’s husband—Abdel Meguid—who had been against her working, 
changed his mind suddenly under this new bloc when he realized that they 
needed the extra salary. Zaat had a job and struggled to balance this with 
raising her children, whose responsibility was solely hers, with help from 
her mother. The 1970s saw many Egyptian women join the labour force 
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out of necessity. As happened all over the world, they soon found that 
they had to find a way to balance this with the household and childrearing 
jobs they still had to do.  
 During this bloc, we see two social processes that come to light 
through both the clippings and the narrative: the rise of Islamic conserv-
atism in Egyptian society, and the spread of corruption. The clippings con-
sistently mention Islamic banking services and corruption among the Is-
lamic elite, as well as quotes from prominent Islamic figures on a wide 
array of social issues. This rise in a specific type of Islamic conservatism 
impacted Zaat in numerous ways. Her style of dress is the most obvious, 
with her shift from the dresses and skirts of the 1960s to a more conserva-
tive style that eventually leads her to veil. This veiling happens after she is 
pressured by her co-workers, and also after her husband suggests it.  
 
“Then the higab revolution, which had spread through the 
women workers like fire through dry straw (even some Chris-
tian women had rallied under its banner) had been offset by 
an intentional crowding of too many desks into narrow 
spaces, which allowed for what was even more pleasurable 
than simply looking, by which we mean friction with protrud-
ing edges and corners,” (Ibid, 85). 
 
The “higab revolution” spread quickly through Egyptian society in the 
1970s and 1980s, leaving few Muslim women untouched. 
During this time we also see a series of events revolving around the 
issue of what Ibrahim calls “sectarian strife”: the relationship between 
Zaat’s family and their Coptic Christian neighbors changes; Zaat has a 
confrontation with her maid about the Coptic hymns the latter liked to 
play very loudly; and a new girl at work—Nadia—is boycotted by every-
one because she is a Copt, without Zaat realizing this. In an interesting 
scene about this last incident, Sonallah Ibrahim makes clear the difference 
between the Nasser and Sadat eras in terms of how Christians were viewed 
and treated by Muslims: 
 
“…she found in Nadia a submissive and patient receiver for 
replays of old transmission tapes, and she failed to notice the 
real boycott that her new friend had been subjected to. Zaat 
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only discovered this when Nadia did not come into work one 
day and she went to sign her name in the attendance register, 
as was the custom and spirit of solidarity among the workers. 
All of a sudden there was Rabbit Face [co-worker], exploding 
at her with penciled eyebrows raised: ‘Have we no one but 
this Christian to sign in for now?’ 
 
Kind generous Zaat was a loyal daughter of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
revolution, brought up on the principle that all people are equal 
regardless of religion or sex or wealth or rank or position. For 
this reason she had omitted to inquire after Nadia’s family 
name in order to ascertain her true identity, a fact that had not 
been ignored by the vigilant machines [co-workers]. In order 
to atone for her mistake she began to reassess her convictions, 
going over in her mind the different Christians she had 
known: their outer appearances, their clothes, their accents, 
their kinds of food and drink, their behavior, looking for the 
secret of this strange consensus against them. All she could 
find was the green crucifix that swung between the breasts of 
one of the editors, and a bronze statue of the Virgin that Ami-
nophis used to protect the papers of his encyclopedia, but she 
was a coward and she stopped visiting Aminophis in his office 
and she avoided Nadia. 
 
The machines, so it seemed, did not accept the Christian of-
fering, and Zaat, who failed to understand the real reason for 
the persecution to which she was being subjected, was over-
whelmed with despair,” (italics mine) (Ibid, 250). 
 
Here we see the juxtaposition between Zaat’s upbringing during the Nas-
ser era, with its focus on equality, and her current position in the Sadat 
era, where religious differences mattered. While one should question this 
romantic view—that the Nasserist era did not contain sectarian tension—
it is also undeniable that the rising Islamic conservatism of the 1970s ex-
acerbated it. Alongside such instances, we are also told that Abdel Meguid 
had started praying: 
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“Abdel Meguid saw the light, he stopped drinking (he even 
poured half a bottle he had been saving for special occasions 
down the toilet), began to pray regularly, and bought the 
works of Sheikh Sha’arawi though he did not read them,” 
(Ibid, 147). 
 
We also hear of him and other neighbors begin to be pressured by other 
men at work to pray regularly, and generally pay more attention to Islamic 
prescriptions. Alongside this, however, Ibrahim shows how corrupt the 
spread of this new piety was: 
 
“Hagg Abdel Salam donated to the mosque a number of elec-
tric fans, carpets and hard-wearing green mats to put down 
on the street when necessary, and thus he was now entitled to 
perform the call to prayer, lead the prayers, give the Friday 
sermon, and make pronouncements on the affairs of the faith-
ful,” (Ibid, 279). 
 
In other words, it was an increase in capital that facilitated men to exercise 
this type of religious pressure over others. All of these changes were con-
textualized by Ibrahim through both the newspaper clippings and the 
novel—he consistently refers to the rise of Saudi Arabia, not only as a 
investor in Egypt’s economy, but also as a state through which a certain 
form of Islam was being spread. At one point he includes a clipping of the 
following quote, juxtaposing the Nasserist and Infitah blocs: 
 
“His Highness Prince El Fasy: ‘We want to invest our money 
in Egypt, and there is money available, praise be to Allah. This 
is not what used to happen in the past when we were afraid 
to invest our capital in Egypt because of the danger of confis-
cation and nationalization. In those days we preferred to work 
only in the United States and Europe’,” (Ibid, 127). 
 
The second process happening under the Infitah bloc was the rapid in-
crease in corruption. Indeed almost all of the newspaper clippings in the 
book deal with the question of corruption, at all levels of society. This was 
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often linked to businessmen, and the name of Osman Ahmed Osman is 
mentioned more than anybody else’s to the extent that he is almost a main 
character in the book. In this way Ibrahim is clearly connecting the rise of 
corruption to the rise of very specific personalities in Egypt—prominent 
among them those that benefitted from Infitah, or the fraction of capital 
that was dominant in the Infitah bloc. 
 As we move into the 1990s, we see the full effects of Egypt’s dete-
riorating situation. Zaat’s son, Amgad, needed to be sent to a school and 
so Zaat goes off to enroll him in a public school. After seeing the ex-
tremely dilapidated conditions of the school, Zaat panics. This negotiation 
is familiar to many middle class Egyptians, who did not want to send their 
children to public schools and yet could not always afford the high fees of 
private schools. One way Zaat thinks of to solve this problem is by de-
manding that Abdel Meguid go and work abroad. Indeed this is a question 
Zaat often asks her husband, as migration to a Gulf country represented 
one of the few ways to save money during the 1980s and 1990s. In another 
part of the novel, we see Abdel Meguid—after failing to land a job in Saudi 
Arabia—become involved with men who work “in the market.” Ibrahim 
never explains what this refers to but from the descriptions we can infer 
that these men got rich off of financial speculation. Eventually Amgad is 
sent to an Islamic school, after the family scrapes together the money, and 
soon after Zaat is showing off to her co-workers: 
 
“The machines [co-workers] gathered around to hear the lat-
est news of the miracle child, who, as Zaat proudly an-
nounced, could now say apple and orange in English com-
pletely, though he was incapable of pronouncing them in 
Arabic,” (Ibid, 203). 
 
This touches on an important element of the Infitah bloc: the rising im-
portance of foreign languages. Indeed throughout the novel we not only 
see Abdel Meguid consistently pepper his sentences with English words, 
but we also see the increasing need for employees who spoke English, as 
well as the increasing social capital associated with being able to speak 
English or French—even at the expense of speaking Arabic well.  
 By the end of the novel, the newspaper clippings speak about cor-
ruption—as they have throughout—but also about the social effects this 
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was having, namely: a rise in sexual violence, and a rise in drug addiction. 
Indeed the last newspaper clipping of the book is an accurate summary of 
the tone of the clippings throughout: 
 
“The Prime Minister Dr. Atef Sidqi: We are a government, 
not a bunch of crooks,” (Ibid, 313). 
 
This ending, juxtaposed with an image of Zaat sitting in her bathroom on 
her toilet crying, completes the narration of Egypt’s modern history. We 
see the rhetoric of socialism and the public sector of the Nasserist bloc; 
the disintegration of this bloc and the rise of consumerism and corruption 
under the Infitah bloc; and finally the excesses of the Infitah bloc towards 
the end of the 1980s. This is where the novel ends, and thus it does not 
depict the financial bloc. 
 Sonallah Ibrahim, in an interview in March of 2003, had the follow-
ing to say about the events of January 25: 
 
“It certainly was not a revolution. A revolution has a program 
and a goal—a complete change of reality or the removal of 
one class by another. What happened was a popular uprising 
[whose] primary demand was ‘regime change,’ though it was 
not clear what that was supposed to mean, except in the sense 
of removing the most prominent symbols of the old regime. 
 
As for the youth, I did not have much confidence in them. I 
imagined their political awareness had been shaped by the val-
ues of our consumer society—and our society is wide open to 
the influence of foreign corporations, and Western values. I 
did not imagine that they had the consciousness they clearly 
do have, nor such an ability to rise up in defense of the prin-
ciples of freedom and democracy.”54 
 
Drawing on Marx, Ibrahim noted that: 
                                                 
54 See: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/1811/the-imagination-as-transi-
tive-act_an-interview-wit 
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“In Marxist philosophy, there is the principle of “the negation 
of the negation,” which says that any situation is composed of 
contradictory elements, and that the struggle between them 
sets in motion a transition to a new, different situation which 
is itself the result of one of the opposing sides beating out the 
other. And this victory of one side over the other is, naturally, 
then subject to its own conditions and so on. The transition 
to a new situation is not the end of the cycle, because the pro-
cess continues. The new situation creates new contradictions 
that set in motion a struggle between them. Certain forces tri-
umph—those forces which, at a certain moment and under 
the right global or regional conditions, possess the necessary 
capacity and potential. In other words, there’s a process of 
struggle and defeat—one thing negates another, only to be 
later negated itself. 
 
Capitalism is subject to change, and it is possible that a new 
system will come from these changes. It’s possible that they 
will be a mix of different systems. Life is open to any number 
of scripts—and it’s possible to predict them by studying the 
present reality we live in. By studying the forces that exist and 
the possibilities. By studying the shape of our economic sys-
tem and its resources, and the forms that climate change will 
take. By studying where all the weapons are and who pos-
sesses them. By studying the problems and opportunities of 
all these elements. 
 
Suppose that elections happen and we get a Parliament that 
represents the various political tendencies that exist in the 
country. Suppose a new president gets elected during this pro-
cess. I could not say that this would represent a victory for us. 
Given the nature of human life, and given how historical con-
tradictions develop, this victory will create other contradic-
tions of other kinds within five or ten years. These will give 
rise to other struggles, revolutions of another sort, and so on. 
The process goes on and on. The process of change and revolt 
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continues. In other words, a revolution is not the end of 
something. No, there will be another revolution. I believe an-
other revolution will happen again soon. Twenty or thirty 
years from now, there’ll be a new revolution. As Trotsky put 
it, ‘A permanent revolution’,” (Ibid). 
 
Perhaps there has not been a more accurate insight on 2011 than this.  
 
4.5 A New Historic Bloc 
 
“The joke was that at the crossroads the driver would ask Sa-
dat whether to go left or right. Sadat would ask the driver 
which way Nasser had gone. He would reply that he had 
turned left, so Sadat would tell him to signal left but turn 
right.”  
– Mohamed Berrada, Like a Summer Never to be Re-
peated (Mehrez 2011, 155).  
 
The previous four sections set the stage by providing the context within 
which the new historic bloc was to emerge. This section and the next look 
at the new bloc in detail by looking at fractions of capital and fractions of 
labour.  
 The approach whereby the ruling class is understood as made up of 
fractions rather than an individual ruling over society is relatively rare in 
the field of Middle Eastern Studies. Take the work of Raymond Hinne-
busch, for example, who has argued that the difference between Nasser 
and Sadat is that while Nasser was constrained by the Free Officers and 
could not wield power alone, Sadat was not constrained by any forces out-
side of himself: 
 
“There is no inner core of equals or revolutionary comrades 
to whom he is in any way accountable. No centers of power 
independent of the president have emerged. It is well known 
that Sadat makes many major decisions with little consultation 
with or concern for the opinions of the members of the elite, 
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whom he tends to regard as his staff rather than as colleagues. 
Especially in foreign policy Sadat has led rather than followed 
elite opinion. No member of the elite has been able to stand 
against him and keep his position,” (1980, 445).  
 
This analysis misses some important points about the new ruling class that 
emerged during this period. To conceptualize Sadat as acting alone is to 
ignore the presence of a specific ruling class during the Sadat era. This 
ruling class may have been different from the one in the previous historic 
bloc, but it was nevertheless a ruling class, not simply Sadat acting alone. 
It is more useful to understand the ways in which the ruling class not only 
changed but how they attempted to create a new bloc. Additionally, it is 
of importance that the historic bloc that emerged around Infitah was nota-
bly smaller than the one it replaced. Moreover, one could also question 
whether the new fraction of capital (or bourgeoisie as Hinnebusch labels 
them) did not exercise more power than he suggests. While the decisions 
made by Sadat regarding foreign policy were unpopular among numerous 
segments of the ruling class—notably the military—it is impossible to see 
them as isolated from a global system in which Sadat was under pressure 
from transnational capitalist forces. These forces also had support from 
specific class fractions inside Egypt, who were not against liberalization or 
the peace treaty.  
 It is therefore more accurate to speak of ruling class tensions and 
conflicts rather than argue that Sadat made decisions unilaterally, as 
Hinnebusch does. Indeed Hinnebusch’s argument reiterates Kandil’s view 
that Sadat made decisions based on protecting himself and his regime 
(Ibid). This elides the role of various social forces during the Sadat era by 
assuming that he alone made major decisions. This raises the following 
question: what exactly was the relationship between Nasser and Sadat and 
the fractions of capital that emerged? Did Sadat “cultivate” a bourgeoisie, 
or were elements within the bourgeoisie able to use Sadat and the state 
apparatus to exert influence over capital accumulation? I believe the an-
swer to the question of the relationship between the state, the regime and 
fractions of capital is always historically contingent. It is clear that under 
Nasser, it can be argued that the regime did indeed cultivate a fraction of 
capital. Through policies that dismantled the power of an agrarian fraction, 
the regime ensured the rise of alternate fractions of capital. Thus there is 
a clear causal connection between the ruling class and the regime under 
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Nasser. Under Sadat, however, it is more difficult to make that argument. 
As will be shown in the next chapter and as has been noted in this one, by 
the 1967 war it was clear that the fractions of capital that had been re-
strained by Nasser’s regime were gaining power. It was precisely these 
fractions that became dominant in the new historic bloc. Did Sadat culti-
vate these forces? Or did these forces manage to align the regime’s policies 
with their own interests? These fractions of capital attempted to create 
consent within the historic bloc through a specific hegemonic project. In 
other words, these fractions managed to convince other fractions that spe-
cific policies would serve Egypt’s interests—they universalized their own 
narrow interests. This section focuses on these new fractions. 
 It has been argued that at the start of the Sadat era, the class that 
controlled the means of production was Nasser’s public sector fraction of 
capital (Kandil 2012, 289). However, because they had been dramatically 
affected by the 1967 defeat, they were open to private capital as an alter-
native means of enriching themselves. Kandil uses this fact to make his 
point that Sadat used this class as a starting point from which to cultivate 
a bourgeoisie he could rely on (Ibid). This group had started to turn to-
wards the private sector as a way of making up for their losses following 
the 1967 war. The private sector post-Nasser comprised many different 
groups: families who had been influential in industry before the revolution 
and had lost some influence under Nasser but now shifted to the private 
sector; black market entrepreneurs who benefitted from wartime short-
ages; the open-door class of importers, builders and bankers; small manu-
facturers and workers returning from abroad; and aspiring local industri-
alists. 
 Alongside this, Sadat began to reach out to the landowning class 
that had been dispossessed under Nasser. There are multiple layers to the 
class dynamics present in the Egyptian countryside and these are crucial 
to any understanding of the changes in historic blocs. Before the 1952 
revolution, the agrarian fraction of capital represented the most influential 
fraction in Egypt. Under Nasser, the power of this fraction was severely 
curtailed and the ruling class became dominated by the state and the mili-
tary. Nevertheless, the landowning elite remained an important element 
within the ruling class and were to become prominent once again during 
both the Infitah and financial blocs, mainly due to the reversal of Nasser’s 
land reform program. Moreover, Sadat’s corrective revolution led to the 
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isolation of Ali Sabry and Abdel Mohsen Abou el Noor, both influential 
leftists under the Nasserist bloc. 
 Already by 1970 Sadat had formed a committee to address the “past 
injustices of land dispossession.” Indeed land speculation became an im-
portant path to accumulating wealth during this period. In 1970, there 
were no millionaires in Egypt. By 1980, there were 17,000 and many had 
made their millions through land speculation (Ibid, 292). Over 90% of 
building construction during the 1970s went towards luxury villas, apart-
ments and holiday homes, demonstrating that a specific class of Egyptians 
had access to these new investment opportunities. As Kandil notes: “Sadat 
was thus the founder of the Egyptian dependent state, the non-develop-
ing, de-industrialized, and randomly liberalized state; Mubarak only fol-
lowed in his footsteps,” (Ibid). The attempt to reverse many of the land 
reforms that happened under Nasser is one of the defining features of 
agrarian relations under the Infitah bloc, with the complete reversal hap-
pening in the early 1990s. The law introduced under Sadat aiming to reg-
ulate landlord-tenant relations gave numerous rights back to the landlord 
that had previously been taken away. The new law included amendments 
that would allow landlords to evict tenants (following a compensation pay-
ment of 10% of market value of the land); that placed limits on the inher-
itance of rental contracts; and that stipulated rent increases of over 100% 
(Springborg 1990, 449). The law was placed on the backburner following 
the Central Security Forces riots in 1986. 
 Springborg distinguishes between two levels within the bourgeoisie 
in the Egyptian countryside (1990, 449). The first is composed of capitalist 
landowners who have political influence and relate to their wage laborers 
through clientalist relations. The second is composed of an agrarian frac-
tion that was created through land reforms. The two groups are different 
in terms of their relations with agricultural laborers, the size of their land, 
and the amount and type of political power they wielded. This agrarian 
fraction emerged following Nasser’s land reforms but only became signif-
icant under Sadat. It was his policies of encouraging investment and relax-
ing price controls that provided an incentive to both the agrarian bour-
geoisie and foreign investors to increase investments in Egypt. 
 However, the most important fraction of capital in the new historic 
bloc can be said to be a new class of businessmen that emerged. New 
investment opportunities provided a new means of accumulating capital. 
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Because of the importance of businessmen in this new bloc, business-
men’s associations provide one avenue through which the new bloc can 
be analyzed. The Federation of Chambers of Industry and the Chambers 
of Commerce pre-dated the 1951 revolution but only came to play an im-
portant role first under Nasser and later Sadat and Mubarak. Under Nas-
ser, these two chambers were reconstituted as state-controlled organiza-
tions that would regulate the economy, whereas under Sadat and Mubarak 
they began to demand changes in policy that would deepen privatization, 
notably through the elimination of workers participation in management 
as well as through attempts to limit job security and eliminate barriers to 
foreign investment (Bianchi 1985, 148). Additionally, the Federation of 
Chambers of Industry pushed for state subsidies for private industry in 
order to shift Egypt’s economy from being a mixture between public and 
private industry to becoming reliant mainly on private industry (Ibid, 149). 
 In the new historic bloc there were three additional groups repre-
senting specialized interests that became dominant. The first was the En-
gineer’s Syndicate, led by Osman Ahmed Osman, who had been ap-
pointed by the state and who represented the state bureaucracy—
specifically elements of the rising bourgeoisie and the ruling party all at 
once: 
 
“Osman began to transform it into a business enterprise that 
would serve as the prototype of a new economic sector based 
on what might be called syndical [sic] capitalism. Many other 
corporatist occupational groups, including labor unions, have 
been induced/pressured to follow this example: renouncing 
demands for more autonomous expressions of special inter-
ests in exchange for opportunities to use pension funds and 
state grants to create new development banks, establish their 
own industrial enterprises, and enter into joint ventures with 
foreign capital,” (Ibid, 150). 
 
Osman tied the Engineer’s Syndicate into a new network of financial in-
stitutions he was building in order to adjust the syndicate to the new open 
door policy. Critics pointed out his attempts to depoliticize the syndicate 
so it would support Sadat’s policies. For example, the Engineer’s Syndicate 
was the only one to support Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel, and it was the 
264  
 
Engineer’s Insurance Company that insured the Israeli Embassy in Cairo 
even after all other insurance companies refused (Baker 1990, 43). 
 The second was the Commercial Employer’s Syndicate, headed by 
Abdel-Aziz Hegazy and Abdel-Razaq Abdel Maged, both of whom played 
a strong role in developing Infitah policies. After being pressured to leave 
office because they did not favour a strong role for the state in the econ-
omy, they managed to use the Commercial Employer’s Syndicate to exert 
political influence (Ibid). Finally there is the Egyptian Businessmen’s As-
sociation (EBA), a collation of more than 200 private businessmen in 
Egypt. It has become especially dominant during the Mubarak years: 
 
“It is establishing itself as the major coordinator of big-busi-
ness demands and as the private sector’s principle bargaining 
agent vis-à-vis the state and foreign capital. The association 
has welcomed Mubarak’s interventionist policies to transfer 
private investment from commerce to industry, to shift im-
porting from consumer goods to intermediate and capital 
goods, and to direct more foreign investment toward joint 
ventures with local firms. The coalition’s leaders have tried to 
persuade the government that there are elements of the pri-
vate sector that can be valuable allies in moving beyond the 
commercial profiteering, real estate speculation, and influence 
peddling that flourished under Sadat,” (Ibid, 151). 
 
In other words, the EBA has tried to demonstrate that private sector busi-
nessmen are invaluable to the state. 
 Which institution connected these businessmen to the state? Under 
the Nasserist bloc there was a large political party whose goal was to mo-
bilize support for the Free Officers. Under Sadat we see a new political 
party emerge: the National Democratic Party. As detailed in the previous 
chapter, the NDP was soon to become the emblematic symbol of corrup-
tion and neoliberalism in Egypt, and its headquarters was one of the first 
buildings to be burned during the events of January 2011. Robert Bianchi 
has argued that the NDP became increasingly important as a means of 
maintaining authoritarian control over Egyptian capitalists (Ibid, 155). 
However, one could question whether the relationship was that simple. 
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While it is true that the NDP played a central role in regulating many eco-
nomic policies and investment opportunities, it is also important to note 
that businessmen were part and parcel of the NDP. Bianchi’s explanation 
implies that the state used the NDP to control businessmen; I would in-
stead posit that there was not a clearly defined state on the one hand and 
businessmen on the other, with the NDP between them—the state and 
the new historic bloc, dominated by the capitalists/businessmen Bianchi 
is speaking of, are more porous than he implies, and the NDP was simply 
a mechanism through which this historic bloc accumulated capital and 
thus key to its project. Interestingly, the Arab Socialist Union—the NDP’s 
predecessor—did not play such a role for the Nasserist bloc. The ASU 
was more of a mechanism of transmitting ideology than for accumulating 
capital. This also indicates a clear shift between blocs. The key role of the 
NDP in this accumulation becomes especially clear in the late 2000s, when 
Gamal Mubarak and other members of his fraction were able to almost 
completely dominate the NDP. The new historic bloc saw the benefits of 
an NDP that functioned in their interests. See for example Sayyid Marei’s 
moves to lobby for the NDP to become more powerful. 
 An important shift within this historic bloc is the fact that many 
businessmen who accumulated vast amounts of capital were able to draw 
on power bases outside of the public bureaucracy controlled by the state—
a dramatic shift from the previous Nasserist bloc (Hinnebusch 1980, 447). 
Under the Nasserist bloc, due to a focus on industrialization the public 
sector was a key source of wealth; this is opposed to before 1952 when it 
was the land, and after the 1960s when it was a combination of land, fi-
nance capital, and luxury goods. Take Sayyid Marei, who drew on his 
landed family’s wealth. Marei was an important businessman that rose to 
prominence during the Sadat years. He was the People’s Assembly Speaker 
and came from an old landed family. He was heavily involved in agrarian 
issues and policy, and wielded a large amount of influence. Marei served 
as head of the Agronomist’s Union and in fact was one of the architects 
of Nasser’s land reform program. Under Nasser, Marei had instigated the 
practice of combining individual ownership with compulsory cooperative 
membership in agrarian reform areas (Springborg 1979, 54). Despite this, 
under Sadat he claimed that land reform was bad for production, since it 
“rewarded poor peasants with a high propensity to consume,” (Hinne-
busch 1980, 458). He went on to claim that if the state wanted growth in 
the agricultural sector, it would have to favour the agrarian fraction of 
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capital (Ibid). Along with Mahmoud Abou Wafia, he represented this 
agrarian fraction, which came to exert increasing influence within the rul-
ing class during the Infitah bloc, as will be detailed later in the section. Both 
Abu Wafia and Marei were supporters of Infitah and both pushed for po-
litical liberalization insofar as it would allow for relaxed market controls. 
Here we see two examples of businessmen who were able to use their 
wealth in land to push for Infitah and accumulate wealth. This type of cap-
ital accumulation is precisely what the Nasserist historic bloc had disman-
tled. 
 The power many businessmen wielded did not come from their po-
sition within the state bureaucracy or military, but rather from their per-
sonal business empires. During the previous bloc, there were class frac-
tions that relied on their position within the political system due to 
Nasser’s cultivation of a new bureaucratic and public sector elite. Under 
the new bloc, however, this was no longer enough to guarantee one’s po-
sition within a dominant class fraction. This shows why under the Infitah 
bloc class fractions can be directly linked to businessmen and economic 
interests, as opposed to under the Nasserist bloc where political and mili-
tary interests were key. Unfortunately this has served to disguise the work-
ings of capital accumulation in Egypt, rendering the Sadat era one of 
“crony capitalism.” Hinnebusch, for example, has argued that the bour-
geoisie under Sadat influential because of their proximity to Sadat himself: 
“Most of their political power accrues from closeness to Sadat, from their 
ability to influence his decisions, and because this is known, to thus influ-
ence a wide range of lesser decisions by other elite elements,” (Ibid). Other 
than the fact that this again assumes Sadat ruled as an individual despot, 
there is also the assumption that crony capitalism emerged under Sadat 
and was directly a result of him only granting those close to him access to 
new investment opportunities. The point of using the historic bloc as a 
tool for understanding change in Egypt is to move away from arguments 
that presuppose the lack of a ruling class. While proximity to Sadat may 
have played a role in one’s access to resources, this is not the full story. It 
is not because these men were close to Sadat that they wielded influence; 
rather it was because they formed a specific fraction of capital whose in-
terests—economic and political—were universalized to the entire historic 
bloc. This may seem like splitting hairs, as it seems obvious that proximity 
to Sadat played a role—but arguing this through the lens of individual 
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authoritarianism is different than through the lens of historic bloc for-
mations and shifts within the ruling class and capitalist accumulation. 
 Moreover, it is clear that proximity to Sadat cannot account for 
some of the individuals who accumulated large amounts of wealth. Indi-
viduals such as Marei and Abu Wafia accumulated capital through their 
connections to old, powerful, landowning families who owned extensive 
empires. Others, such as Osman, exerted influence and power because of 
the empires they built and their positions within the previous historic bloc. 
In other words, these men were already in an advantageous position in 
Egypt, and this is what allowed them to cultivate a specific relationship to 
Sadat, rather than vice versa.  
 Osman Ahmed Osman is an example of a businessman that was 
successful under both historic blocs. Because of this, he is a useful case 
study to tease out the differences between the Nasserist and Infitah blocs. 
Osman rose to prominence under the Nasserist bloc and eventually won 
the tender to build the Aswan Dam. This can only be explained through 
the specific position of the Nasserist bloc vis-à-vis local capital: Nasser 
rejected offers from foreign capital to build the Dam because of the con-
ditionalities attached that would render Egypt dependent on foreign coun-
tries; this is ultimately what led to the decision to look to national capital 
to build the Dam. In other words, without this bloc’s specific position vis-
à-vis foreign capital, and its decision to privilege national capital, Osman 
would probably not have gotten the tender. 
 However it was under the Infitah bloc that Osman expanded his 
business empire further and became involved in overt political life. When 
Sadat came to power, he was fully supported by Osman. The two had been 
close friends for some time, and Osman’s son—Mahmoud Osman—mar-
ried Sadat’s youngest daughter Jihan.55 Osman soon became the most 
prominent businessman in the country, representing the non-agricultural 
fraction of capital. Together, Osman’s sons founded 26 companies in total 
(Baker 1990, 27).  
 Osman was a strong supporter of free market principles and ex-
panding the private sector. Indeed it was his firm belief in these principles 
that guided his work as a minister in Sadat’s cabinet: “I became convinced 
                                                 
55 Another of Sadat’s daughters was married to the People’s Assembly Speaker 
Sayyid Marei’s son.  
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that I could serve a useful purpose as a government minister only after I 
saw Sadat’s goals coincided with mine to end the public sector’s strangle-
hold on our economy,” (Ibid, 25). In a telling paragraph about Osman, 
Baker writes about his views on freedom and the economy: 
 
“Osman argued that freedom in the seventies meant some-
thing different from the “bread” of the socialist era or even 
the political rights of the pre-1952 liberal period. According 
to Osman, the idea of freedom emphasized the opportunity—
whether large or small—open to all citizens to work hard and 
through individual effort improve their own position. As Os-
man saw it, individual successes also contributed to the gen-
eral prosperity of the country. Osman argued that by disman-
tling the oppressive structures of Nasser’s system, Sadat was 
making this opportunity available to all Egyptians,” (Ibid, 26). 
 
Moreover, Osman saw private property as essential to the “new Egypt” 
and argued that nationalization had had an extremely negative effect on 
the country. Nevertheless, he remained firmly against the idea that foreign 
capital should dominate Egypt, and was also wary of the increasing con-
sumerism among the new generation who were benefitting from the new 
economic policies. 
 Some have pointed out that Osman was the first prominent busi-
nessman in Egypt to set up pension funds and medical insurance for his 
employees. At the same time, his response to the 1977 bread riots was to 
see those who took part as a “jealous minority stirred up by the com-
munists to seize the benefits achieved by the people under the freedom 
and democracy of President Sadat,” (Ibid, 24). The Arab Contractors be-
came an institution of its own. By the 1970s, its profits rose to over LE 
22.4 million and it comprised 33 companies and 4 consortia—involved in 
construction, banking and insurance, hotel and medical care facilities, and 
engineering services (Ibid, 33).  
 Osman’s case can be used as proof of the thesis that the line be-
tween business and politics became exceedingly thin during the 1970s and 
1980s. Kandil, for example, writes: 
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“Osman argued that freedom in the seventies meant some-
thing different from the “bread” of the socialist era or even 
the political rights of the pre-1952 liberal period. According 
to Osman, the idea of freedom emphasized the opportunity—
whether large or small—open to all citizens to work hard and 
through individual effort improve their own position. As Os-
man saw it, individual successes also contributed to the gen-
eral prosperity of the country. Osman argued that by disman-
tling the oppressive structures of Nasser’s system, Sadat was 
making this opportunity available to all Egyptians,” (Ibid, 26). 
 
Moreover, Osman saw private property as essential to the “new Egypt” 
and argued that nationalization had had an extremely negative effect on 
the country. Nevertheless, he remained firmly against the idea that foreign 
capital should dominate Egypt, and was also wary of the increasing con-
sumerism among the new generation who were benefitting from the new 
economic policies (Ibid, 30). 
 
“Osman was therefore the quintessential representative of the 
new ruling class: a man who expanded his capital through 
state commissions, and then went on to assume a leading role 
in government and the ruling party. It is important here to 
compare his fortunes under Nasser and Sadat. While Osman 
made a living under Nasser as a public sector manager, he had 
no influence over economic, let alone political life. With Sadat 
in power, he not only made unfathomable financial gains, but 
he also became a major economic and political player. This 
pattern would continue with little change during Mubarak’s 
rule,” (Kandil 2012, 300). 
 
A group that was to become exceedingly influential over time and that 
emerged during this period were the Islamist businessmen. Sadat’s deci-
sion to release the Islamist forces that had been jailed under Nasser in 
order to use them as a counter-weight to leftists meant that there was more 
space available for Islamists to take advantage of the new economic op-
portunities. Sadat’s policies towards the Islamists have been one of the 
most controversial aspects of his regime. After the 1967 defeat, Nasser 
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had already released a number of Muslim Brotherhood figures from 
prison. Once he came to power, Sadat released the remaining in order to 
use them as a force against the leftists. This decision soon backfired, as by 
1970 it was clear that the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed increasing popu-
larity. This needs to be situated in the context of the 1967 defeat, which 
led many Egyptians to search for a new structure of meaning within which 
to understand political events. The Nasserist project was dead, and there 
was nothing to fill the vacuum. Religious ideology thus became an alter-
native. The Muslim Brotherhood were soon in a strong enough position 
to attack Sadat for his peace treaty with Israel, as well as to call for the 
implementation of Islamic law. Indeed it was the Islamic associations in 
particular that led the opposition to the peace treaty. The Muslim Broth-
erhood had by that time renounced violent activities, but other Islamic 
groups such as Takfir and Jihad did resort to violence against the state. 
Sadat’s assassination at the hands of Jihad in 1981 marked the ultimate 
failure of his plan to favour Islamists against leftists. 
 At the same time, a class of wealthy businessmen emerged from the 
Islamist ranks. Not only did many members become wealthy through the 
new investment opportunities, many also advocated for the new policies. 
After the Muslim Brotherhood were released from jail in the 1970s, they 
began a monthly magazine called al Da’wa, approved by the regime. It was 
funded by some of the businessmen who became successful, and came 
out in support of the new economic policies put forward by the new his-
toric bloc. Although the magazine did criticize the Western “cultural inva-
sion” in Egypt, it spent a lot of time criticizing Nasser’s leftist policies, 
including land reforms and nationalizations (Ibid). At the same time this 
magazine was released about eight of the eighteen families that controlled 
the private sector were connected to the Muslim Brotherhood (Ibid, 163). 
 What is interesting to note is that the emergence of a new class of 
Islamist businessmen coincided with the increasing conservatism of Egyp-
tian society. I argue that this new class managed to exert influence through 
civil society because of their increasing material power. New TV channels, 
publications and access to centers of power meant that this new class 
could spread their ideologies through society. While the 1967 defeat was 
part of why Egyptians turned to a more conservative form of religion, I 
would suggest that this new class and their access to material power was 
also responsible. 
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     The adherence to neoliberal capitalism on the part of the Muslim 
Brotherhood cannot be understated. In an article on the Arab Spring and 
Islamism, Kees van der Pijl wrote: “Over almost the entire post-war pe-
riod Turkish political Islam had a distinct anti-liberal, anti-Western con-
tender profile; only after the turn of the century has this been replaced by 
a neoliberal orientation compatible with the interests of transnational cap-
ital and the global pre-eminence of the liberal West, and embodied in the 
AKP. This strand today offers itself to the wider Middle East as an option 
for the future,” (2012, 7). I would argue, however, that the Muslim Broth-
erhood in Egypt had already adopted this path in the 1970s 
 This discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates that dur-
ing the Infitah bloc, they were a social force that was part of the historic 
bloc of that era. This was not the case under the Nasserist bloc, during 
which they were a weak social force that suffered from intense repression, 
nor was it to be the case under the new ruling class that emerged in the 
1990s, as they ultimately failed to create a historic bloc. Although the Mus-
lim Brotherhood became an increasingly prominent social force in the 
1990s and 2000s, largely due to the material power they amassed during 
the Infitah bloc, we cannot analyse them as part of a bloc because there 
was a failure to create a bloc after the fall of the Infitah bloc. Indeed the 
increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood in certain areas such as elec-
tions and syndicates demonstrates both their increasing prominence as well 
as the failure of the new ruling class to create a bloc. 
 I already discussed the dramatic demilitarization of government 
posts that took place under the new historic bloc. On the one hand, this 
affected their position within the new ruling class, although they remained 
an important fraction of capital. On the other hand, it was under this bloc 
that they expanded into new industries. They had accumulated wealth un-
der the Nasserist bloc but had done so from a central and dominant posi-
tion within the ruling class, and had done so vis-à-vis the state, which they 
controlled. On the other hand, this central position within the ruling class 
did not last into the new Infitah bloc, yet they remained an important frac-
tion of capital and continued to accumulate wealth. This is tied to the fact 
that the Egyptian military continues to indirectly own much of Egypt’s 
land. Nevertheless it is important not to underestimate the military during 
the Sadat and Mubarak years. The fact that both leaders continued to 
worry about popular military figures (notably Abu Ghazala) shows that 
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the military continued to exercise authority as part of the ruling class in 
Egypt. Indeed what changed was its position within the ruling class. 
 The demilitarization of the government was one of the first steps 
taken by Sadat when he came to power, and its pace increased after the 
1973 war. Men with military backgrounds were filling fewer political posts 
(Hinnebusch 1980, 448). Under the Nasserist bloc, political posts were 
filled with men from several distinct pools, as mentioned previously, in-
cluding the Free Officers, academics, bureaucrats, rural notables, and the 
new technocratic elite. Under the Infitah bloc, the number of political posts 
filled with men from a military background declined, suggesting Sadat’s 
intent to depoliticize the military. 
 
“While the presidency and vice-presidency are still preserves 
of ex-officers, the prime ministership, once a monopoly of the 
military, now goes to civilians; ministerial portfolios are open 
to a dwindling number of officers. (Under Nasser, officers 
made up about one-third of the elite; by the late Sadat years, 
little more than one new recruit in ten has been an officer.) 
The disappearance of the Free Officer-military career route 
means that the one recruitment channel by which younger 
persons of modest social status could reach top elite positions 
has eroded, and not been replaced. It also means an opening 
of top elite roles to civilians. Academia continues to serve as 
a main recruitment channel. The bureaucracy per se is still a 
major and expanding recruitment channel but the classical ca-
reer bureaucrat has increasingly been replaced in ministerial 
roles by a new breed of engineer-bureaucrats who work their 
way up through state organization and the public sector,” 
(Ibid, 450). 
 
Additionally, an alternative pool from which Sadat drew on to fill political 
posts was the expanding private sector. By the late 1970s, a quarter of new 
ministers were drawn from this private sector pool (Ibid). Moreover, ci-
vilians dominated all levels of the state apparatus, and there was an in-
crease in the number of ministers who specialized in economics, law, and 
engineering (Ibid, 451). This correlates with Sadat’s new economic strat-
egy, as well as his drive to depoliticize the army. Indeed as Cooper notes, 
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when a portfolio was removed from an officer to a civilian, it tended to be 
a civilian of very high political stature: “Whether or not this process was 
carried out as a conscious strategy or merely a series of ad hoc responses 
to specific events is difficult to say with precision. It can be said with ab-
solute certainty, however, that an intense ideological campaign to put the 
military permanently back into the barracks accompanied these changes in 
the cabinet,” (Ibid). While Nasser’s strategy vis-à-vis the military had been 
to isolate them and try to curb their political power, often through direct 
confrontations with influential military men such as Amer, Sadat instead 
aimed to depoliticize the military entirely and redirect them towards eco-
nomic investments. Because of Infitah, these opportunities were rife. It was 
during this period that the military built the economic empire they are now 
famous for. 
 There were strong responses from the military to this move to de-
politicize them. Decisions taken by Sadat during the October War were 
seen as the main reason for Egypt’s defeat (2012). There were therefore 
very clear critiques against Sadat from military men who felt that they had 
not been able to make the right decisions during the war. In terms of the 
new economic outlook of the Infitah bloc, responses were more mixed. On 
the one hand, many investment opportunities opened up to military men, 
and to the military as an institution. On the other hand, not everyone 
within the military was satisfied with the direction taken by this new bloc, 
with some expressing clear reservations. In 1976 there was reportedly 
some friction between Vice President Mubarak and War Minister Abd el-
Ghani al-Gamasy and Sayyid Marei, representative of the non-military part 
of the ruling class. In that same year there was also friction due to the large 
number of officers that resigned as a protest against Infitah (Dekmejian 
1982). Moreover, Dekmejian writes that the anti-Communist role now as-
signed to the military was not well received. In 1977, an uprising by naval 
officers was crushed. In 1978, former Chief of Staff General Sa’ad el-Din 
al-Shazly called for a military coup against Sadat and was removed from 
his post. Following this, 14 paratrooper officers who had supported al-
Shazly were jailed (Ibid). The final move came in 1978 with the War Min-
istry being replaced by the Ministry of Defense, meaning al-Gamasy lost 
his cabinet and military posts. “With Gamasy’s departure, the only indi-
vidual in the government who had possessed an independent power base 
left the political arena,” (Ibid). Dekmejian continues: 
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“Whatever the political wisdom of Sadat’s policies toward the 
military after October 1973, they have been consistent with 
his reiteration that the army has no political role. Military men 
are not permitted to vote in elections, not is the army consid-
ered as a corporate member of the Alliance of Popular Forces, 
as it was under Nasser. Moreover, the imposition of an ideo-
logical and strategic reorientation upon the army may further 
increase the apparent estrangement of the military from the 
regime. Also, a reduction of the army’s size prompted by the 
easing of the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation will produce a 
major unemployment problem with massive destabilizing 
consequences,” (Ibid). 
 
Thus it is clear that the military’s response to Infitah policies themselves 
were mixed, but their position vis-à-vis the new historic bloc was more 
antagonistic. Many powerful figures within the military rallied against the 
changes being undertaken by Sadat, particularly against Sadat’s strategy 
during the war with Israel. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the strategy of 
the dominant fraction in the new historic bloc worked: by the end of the 
1970s, the military was no longer the central force of the Egyptian ruling 
class.56  
 This section aimed to demonstrate the emergence of the new dom-
inant fraction of capital, its sources of wealth, and its relation to the state; 
as well as its attempts to include and exclude other fractions from central 
positions within the bloc. This is important to keep in mind before dis-
cussing the ways in which this ruling class transcended its narrow interests, 
formed through its unique connections to production. The next section 
looks at fractions of labour under this bloc. 
 
 
 
                                                 
56 The military will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 
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4.6 Egyptian Labour and the Beginnings of the Neoliberal 
Assault 
 
Egyptian fractions of labour during the Infitah bloc were in a period of 
transition. On the one hand, the Nasserist bloc had just broken down. 
This bloc was the strongest bloc in Egyptian history, and this was largely 
because the dominant fraction managed to incorporate almost all fractions 
of labour within it through moral and intellectual reforms. The welfare 
function of the state, the commitment to state-led capitalist development, 
and the focus on nationalism all provided workers with material benefits. 
These began to disappear with the rise of the Infitah bloc. On the other 
hand, the groundwork for the neoliberalization that was to occur was only 
just being put in place by the new bloc, and its concrete effects were only 
to be felt in the 1990s. During this bloc, the welfare provisions put in place 
during the 1950s were slowly dismantled, and reforms such as the land law 
were undone. Privatization was put into effect, and although the public 
sector continued to be a major source of employment, attempts to expand 
the private sector presented a constant threat to public sector workers. 
Moreover, the new ideological currents that emerged emphasized notions 
of individualism, risk-taking and self-sufficiency that benefitted the 
wealthy and demonized the poor. Class stratification increased dramati-
cally. For all of these reasons, the 1970s and 1980s saw a shift in the ways 
in which fractions of labour related to the state and the ruling class. This 
shift was to manifest itself clearly in the 1990s and 2000s, a period that 
saw a dramatic rise in workers’ actions. While it is this period that is known 
for workers’ mobilization, the Infitah bloc also saw important events that 
form part of this trajectory.  
 By 1971 and 1972, strikes were already happening in response to the 
deteriorating economic situation. In fact in 1974 over 400 work stoppages 
and strikes took place, and on New Years Day riots took place in Cairo. 
In 1975 over 33,000 workers took part in a strike at Mahalla al-Kubra, and 
in 1976 strikes continued throughout the country, sometimes turning vio-
lent (Ibid). “This growing worker restlessness came at an inauspicious mo-
ment for Sadat, who was attempting to consolidate his position through 
reforming the ASU and by redirecting Egypt’s economic policies in order 
to attract more foreign and domestic private investment. Both moves set 
him on a collision course with organized labour,” (Paczyńska 2010, 91). 
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This latter point is important: attracting foreign capital involved promot-
ing Egypt as a place attractive to multinational corporations that wanted 
cheap and flexible labour, a point I expand on later. 
 In 1974, the first attempt at restructuring a public sector company 
took place through the creation of a joint venture between Arab investors 
and the public sector (Ibid, 165). The Egyptian Trade Union Confedera-
tion (ETUC) rejected the proposal, arguing it would be harmful to Egyp-
tian workers. These objections were strong enough for proposals regard-
ing joint ventures to be shelved. When in 1980 there was another proposal 
to restructure the public sector—this time by selling 51% of state firm 
shares—it was again rejected, and shelved. This was to happen again in 
1981 and 1982 (Ibid). The deteriorating economic situation is what even-
tually changed this pattern: “Although by the late 1980s the ETUC con-
ceded that state firms would have to be restructured, it remained opposed 
to outright privatization arguing that the economy would be better served 
by foreign capital’s setting up new ventures rather than taking over public 
sector firms,” (Ibid, 166). 
 The government knew that unrest would emerge in response to the 
IMF-led privatization process, and therefore it suggested that workers be 
allowed to buy shares in companies that were being privatized. This was a 
problematic solution, as will be discussed in the following chapter, alt-
hough to some extent it allowed workers some control over the privatiza-
tion process. In 1991, the ETUC came out against Law 203—the privati-
zation law—and forced the government to make several concessions, 
including guarantees against mass layoffs (Ibid, 170). Nevertheless, soon 
the labour law was rewritten as the government needed to attract foreign 
investors and the private sector. The law took a full ten years to get pushed 
through parliament, due to two controversial clauses: the grounds on 
which workers could be fired, and the right to strike. Supporters of the 
law pointed out that it was pro-workers and showed the continuing legacy 
of Nasserism, and said that without a flexible labour market Egypt would 
not attract investment (Ibid, 177). The debate around this law shows the 
different positions: 
 
“The government conceded to labour demands and an-
nounced that the new law would include provisions guaran-
teeing protection of workers’ rights, maintain their rights to a 
share of company profits, and pledged to increase wage levels. 
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Business refused these. These negotiations also reveal splits 
within the business community. Although large business was 
interested in pushing through changes in the labour code, oth-
ers saw little reason to support any changes if the right to 
strike was included in the new provisions. Small and medium 
sized enterprises had little difficulty in circumventing the ex-
isting labour law and saw only marginal benefits in codifying 
flexibility in hiring and dismissal policies if such flexibility was 
at the expense of creating a more militant labour force,” 
(Ibid). 
 
What these negotiations also show is the power of fractions of labour to 
resist the oncoming changes. This was based on previous experiences, no-
tably those under the Nasserist bloc: “As in the past, when workers’ em-
ployment security and living standards were threatened, they were willing 
to confront the state. They knew from past experience that although the 
regime might initially respond with repression, it was also likely to grant 
the substantive concessions workers demanded,” (Ibid, 184). We see here 
that it was not fractions of capital that slowed down the passing of a new 
labour law or the implementation of the privatization program; it was frac-
tions of labour, primarily those tied to the public sector. This cannot be 
written out of the narrative. By focusing on the ruling class rather than the 
historic bloc, it is easy to miss forms of resistance on the part of labour 
that were not merely symbolic but that had real material effects on the 
ruling class’ hegemonic project.  
 This can be explained by fractions of labour and their particular po-
sition within production. As noted by Paczyńska: 
 
“Labour’s ability to respond to threats is theoretically greater 
than that of many other interest groups in society. Unions 
have established institutions and flexing political muscle is not 
easily ignored by governments. Strikes can have profound im-
pact beyond the factory gates and affect broader macroeco-
nomic conditions in a country. Even when trade unions seem 
weak they can make trouble for their employer and if that em-
ployer is the state then their behavior is politically threatening. 
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Privatization therefore affects what is one of the few orga-
nized groups in society,” (Ibid, 4). 
 
Workers are in effect so directly related to accumulation and production 
that it is these fractions that have the power to affect accumulation. This 
is precisely why revolutionary actions that do not include or do not speak 
to labour are not as powerful; they do not touch the mechanisms of pro-
duction and accumulation in the same way. In Egypt, fractions of labour 
were able to show down the implementation of the privatization program, 
and the restructuring of the public sector. Nevertheless, they were ulti-
mately unsuccessful. Here we need to return once again to the dialectic 
between the ruling class and fractions of labour within the historic bloc of 
Infitah and remember that ultimately, the ruling class had more cards to 
play. 
 The bread riots of 1977 represented the struggle the ruling class was 
to face until 2011: the precarious balance between its narrow interest of 
accumulating capital through free market reforms and transcending this 
interest through moral reforms in order to maintain political stability. One 
of the main arguments of this paper is that the 2011 revolution occurred 
precisely because this balance—already precarious—was completely un-
done. The new ruling class of the 1990s, with Gamal Mubarak at its helm, 
prioritized free market policies without attempting to maintain political 
stability. This ultimately resulted in a mass uprising. Indeed the concept of 
a historic bloc elaborated on in the first chapter pointed to the necessity 
of stability in order to avoid an organic crisis that could bring about the 
downfall of the bloc. The Nasserist bloc and even to an extent the Infitah 
bloc were well aware of this—see for example the response to the 1977 
bread riots. It is the last ruling class that lost all will to maintain this pre-
carious balance and it is precisely for this reason that they were unable to 
ultimately create a historic bloc. 
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4.7 The Rise of the Infitah Bloc 
 
 
 
The assassination of Sadat. October 6, 1981 
 
This chapter has told the story of the formation of the Infitah bloc by fo-
cusing on the new fractions of capital that emerged, outlining their narrow 
interests, and showing the ways in which they transcended these. Ulti-
mately these fractions were able to create a historic bloc and exercise he-
gemony, despite the fact that it was not as strong as the previous bloc. I 
have argued that this is because the moral and intellectual reforms this 
bloc used did not resonate with the majority of Egyptians, and did not 
form a powerful enough façade for the worsening economic situation 
faced by most of the country. Moreover, the moral and intellectual re-
forms of the Infitah bloc paled in comparison to those of the Nasserist 
bloc, whose focus on nationalism, anti-imperialism and state-led develop-
ment had closer ties to the ideologies of the subaltern classes. 
280  
 
 Nazih Ayubi has summed up the tensions the Infitah bloc faced in 
one paragraph: 
 
“The state leadership may therefore be inclined to think that 
a larger role for domestic and international capital might re-
lieve it from some of its growing developmental burdens, and 
the state bourgeoisie may eventually find itself tempted, or 
even corrupted, by a domestic commercial bourgeoisie and an 
international corporate bourgeoisie both of which are anxious 
for partnerships. In the meantime the concern of the state not 
to tamper with the welfarist pillar of its legitimacy, combined 
with the capitalist consumerist inclinations of the state bour-
geoisie, result in heavy financial burdens that force the state 
to live beyond its means and eventually to over-borrow,” 
(1996, 336). 
 
The link between a domestic commercial bourgeoisie and an international 
corporate bourgeoisie is one of the defining features of this bloc. At the 
same time, the expansion of this class had to occur without tipping the 
balance of political stability. In other words, capital accumulation could 
not rely on exploitation to the extent of creating enough instability to pre-
vent this very accumulation. This balance was to be completely destroyed 
following the rise of a new ruling class. This bloc, however, laid the 
groundwork for the penetration of transnational capital through the con-
sumerist inclinations of the new fractions created by the bloc. 
 To wrap up this chapter, I focus on the question of what Infitah’s 
concrete results were. Between 1974 and 1982, Egypt’s growth rates were 
the highest they had been in the 20th century. The GDP grew on average 
9% and the rate of national savings increased (Waterbury 1981, 73). This 
growth, however, did not result from growing productivity in sectors with 
the highest rates of employment, as Waterbury notes, but rather from oil 
exports, Suez Canal revenues, remittances, and tourism (Ibid). Other 
scholars agree with Waterbury, arguing that the results of Infitah were not 
very impressive. Hamed argues that even though the aim of the new pro-
ject had been to attract foreign capital and reduce public investment, over 
90% of investments made in the industrial sector in 1975 came from pub-
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lic funds (1981, 4). Agricultural output declined, from 20% in total invest-
ment in the 1960s to 8% in 1976 (Ibid). Finally, the deficit doubled from 
1973 to 1976, reaching $1.3 billion (Ibid, 5). 
 Many of the concerns surrounding Infitah and its focus on services 
rather than production were realized. Untaxed finished goods entering the 
country in great quantities were negative for local industries, particularly 
because Infitah projects were tax-except while local projects were not 
(Ayubi 1980, 282). Because many items could be imported duty-free, many 
imported goods ended up being cheaper than locally produced goods. In-
deed the Egyptian Federation of Industries lodged complaints about this, 
pointing out that locally produced goods were left to stagnate in the mar-
ket (Ibid, 283). 
 The question of the public sector remained at the forefront of the 
debates surrounding Infitah, as noted earlier. Despite attacks on the public 
sector, by the 1980s the state was still over-represented in production: in 
1979 the public sector accounted for 68% of industrial production, and in 
1981/82 the public sector was responsible for 77% of all investments 
(Ayubi 1992, 95). Even the privatization policies announced in 1987 did 
not drastically alter this. Throughout this dissertation I have touched on 
the debates surrounding the public and private sectors. Rather than at-
tempt to simply argue that the public sector became powerless as the pri-
vate sector gained power, it may be more useful to note that in actual fact 
the public sector did not lose its role in Egypt’s economic development 
from the 1980s onwards. Instead its services were redirected towards a 
new type of accumulation. Similar to the state, it is not a question of the 
public sector no longer being active, but rather that it was from then on 
used in the services of a very different type of project. 
 By the end of the 1980s, Egypt’s economic situation was deteriorat-
ing. Foreign debt increasing, there was a balance of payments deficit, and 
the macroeconomic situation was in bad shape. This set the scene for the 
IMF structural adjustment programs that Mubarak was to sign soon after 
becoming president. This was not the start of Egypt’s relationship with 
the World Bank or IMF, as noted previously (Soliman 2011). In 1976, fol-
lowing IMF advice to cut subsidies, bread riots broke out, signalling the 
unwillingness on the part of many Egyptians to accept austerity. This in-
stance of resistance not only forced the government to withdraw subsidies, 
but remains an important warning of what could happen if the delicate 
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political balance is not maintained. 2011 was to be another example of 
this.  
 However it would be a mistake to evaluate Infitah solely in terms of 
its concrete economic outcomes, since these cannot be separated from 
broader structural and ideational changes brought about by the new bloc. 
The Sadat era is infamous for creating the enormous gaps between social 
classes in Egypt, by allowing a small segment of Egypt’s population to 
become extremely wealthy. Moreover, due to the cultural changes detailed 
in the previous section, this segment was very much consumed with con-
sumption. This meant that their wealth was very visible. Lutfy Abdul 
Azim, editor of Al Ahram al Iqtisadi, wrote sarcastically about these 
changes: 
 
“With every step I take, my eyes are dazzled by the glitter of 
the open door policy. I need only walk into any grocery store 
to breathe a sigh of relief and to thank God that he has com-
pensated us so well for the long period of frustration and dep-
rivation,” (Baker 1981, 380). 
 
Azim is contrasting the promises of Infitah with their actual outcome: 
grand promises of advancement and opportunities for all Egyptians 
meant, in reality, luxury beyond belief for a small percentage. Latest model 
cards, luxury apartments in new suburbs, and new imported fashions were 
now to be found in Egypt—at any price. In his scathing critique, Aziz puts 
his finger on the core problem with Infitah: its success depended on the 
continued exploitation of millions of Egyptians. Salah Hafez wrote about 
the “dollar group”—a group of Egyptians who could afford to pay for 
new appliances, apartments and cars in US dollars; a group he contrasts 
with the majority of Egyptians who have only seen a dollar in the cinema 
or newspapers (Ibid). Major newspapers and journals also raised questions 
about the sale of the public sector and expansion of the private sector 
(Ibid). 
 Other scholars have argued that it was the excesses of Infitah that gave 
economic liberalization a bad name in Egypt: “Under a political leader 
more committed to more careful supervision of the economic reform 
package, Egypt may have played a pioneering role in the Middle East and 
even the Third World in adopting successfully and at an early stage the 
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main features of the new development orthodoxy,” (Springborg 1989, 5). 
An important question to ask here is whether it was indeed the “excesses” 
of Infitah that were the problem, or Infitah itself. Indeed Springborg seems 
to be reproducing the typical Orientalist fallacy that the lack of good lead-
ership (an offshoot of the Arab despot thesis) is what results in the failure 
of development in the Middle East. This automatically excludes any criti-
cal analysis of economic liberalization itself and broader questions of 
power and political economy. The assumptions underlying liberalization 
are naturalized, and the only reason it could have led to poverty or dissat-
isfaction is because it was not implemented the way it should have been—
a clearly problematic approach. 
 Galal Amin offers an alterative explanation. He argues that there 
was no reason why the liberalization of the economy could not have led 
to a high growth rate for a long period of time (1980, 434). The problem 
was that lower income groups did not feel the effects of the growth rate 
experienced at the GNP level. He links this to the relationship between 
developed and underdeveloped countries: “A typical third world country 
enjoys a very low degree of freedom in deciding what kinds of foreign 
goods and foreign investments to import. If it decides to import only what 
it considers to be necessary goods and investments, it is likely to be de-
prived of both the necessary and the luxury. On the other hand, if it fol-
lows a liberal economic policy whereby little discrimination is made with 
regards to what to import, it is likely to be showered by goods and invest-
ments for which it has very little need,” (Ibid, 436). Amin argues that the 
most an underdeveloped country can aim for is to influence the conditions 
of financial aid, pointing out that when Nasser attempted to find financing 
for the Aswan Dam, the West had no issues provided that Egypt liberal-
ized and prioritized foreign capital. Once Nasser rejected this, the aid of-
fers were withdrawn. Similarly, he points out that any underdeveloped 
country that opens its economy to foreign investment, foreign goods and 
foreign capital cannot expect to determine the policies surrounding the 
distribution of income. “This is why one finds it difficult to reconcile the 
call for greater liberalization of the economy with the call, often made by 
the same persons, for greater equality of income,” (Ibid). Amin’s point 
that lower income groups did not feel the growth rate experienced at GDP 
level alludes to the very structure of neoliberal capitalism. Growth is meas-
ured through macroeconomic indicators that do not take the distribution 
of wealth into account.  
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 In effect, what happened under this bloc was that capital was once 
again redirected from one place to another. Under the Nasserist bloc, as 
we will see, capital was redirected away from an agrarian fraction of capital 
and towards industrialization and the public sector. Under this bloc, capi-
tal was redirected away from the public sector and social services, as well 
as away from industrialization, and towards the private sector. Despite the 
rhetoric, there were not massive amounts of foreign capital coming into 
Egypt; what changed significantly was the dramatic expansion of imports. 
Many have noted the continuing dominance of the state and public sector 
under this bloc, aiming to disprove the narrative that Sadat favoured the 
private sector. And yet a longer historical view is needed to see that it was 
under this bloc that the decline of the public sector began, even if it was 
not completed under the same bloc. Capital was being redirected away 
from social services but the state and its organs were still responsible for 
distributing it elsewhere. Moreover, it is of no surprise that many within 
the public sector saw the opportunities created by Infitah and grasped 
them. 
 Infitah ensured that a new framework for discussing Egypt’s econ-
omy became dominant, one in which the main actors were the state and 
the market. The state was seen as an impediment to growth and the general 
well-being of the country, while the market was seen as the solution to this 
impediment. This framing was to become even more dominant as time 
went on, and was a drastic departure from the Nasserist bloc, under which 
the state was the main actor and was seen as a force for progressive 
change. 
 This chapter has exposed the ways in which the rise of a new historic 
bloc led to both material and cultural changes in Egyptian society. The 
economy moved towards a free-market system that privileged the private 
sector, foreign direct investment, sectors of the economy such as tourism 
and real estate, and a new political reliance on the West. Simultaneously, 
new norms of self-reliance, individualism and entrepreneurship became a 
staple of the new bloc’s hegemonic ideology. In order to wean people off 
state support and social services, a new way of interacting with the market 
needed to be presented and normalized—whereby each citizen is respon-
sible for taking advantage of the new economic opportunities. Only then 
could they partake in consumption of new luxury goods and real estate. 
What is left out of this story is that these new economic opportunities 
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were not available to everybody, and given that, the removal of state sup-
port meant the creation of a class in Egyptian society that found itself lost. 
This is precisely what set the groundwork for the 2011 revolution. 
 Perhaps most important is the fact that the historic bloc that 
emerged around Infitah was smaller and less hegemonic than the one it 
replaced. Not only was it unable to form alliances with key fractions of 
capital left over from the previous bloc; it was also unable to reach out to 
all major fractions of labour and incorporate them into their project. Be-
cause it was a period of transition for labour, some fractions resisted while 
others were incorporated; but overall we do not see the wholesale incor-
poration of the Nasserist bloc nor the wholesale rejection of the financial 
ruling class. This is not an argument about whether hegemony existed or 
did not exist; it is clear that both the Nasserist and Infitah blocs were his-
toric blocs and that both were hegemonic. Rather it is an argument about 
the degree and intensity of hegemony. Whereas the Nasserist historic bloc 
was able to exercise a high level of hegemony within itself and thus over 
society, as will be shown in the next chapter, we see that this was not the 
case with the Infitah bloc, which did exercise hegemony but in a limited 
form. This is important in light of the fact that the bloc that came after 
the Infitah bloc, was even less hegemonic. The previous chapter demon-
strated that the fraction of capital dominant within the historic bloc under 
Mubarak was unable to form alliances with most fractions of capital, and 
with no fractions of labour. Thus we see that over time the historic bloc 
has decreased in size and power, and this is central, I argue, to the 2011 
revolution’s timing.  
 This chapter has argued that the social forces that were to dominate 
the Infitah bloc began to exert their dominance in the late 1960s and not 
the early 1970s as is commonly assumed. Because of the “failure” of the 
Nasserist bloc’s program of state-led capitalist development, the impetus 
to shift towards free-market capitalism became more convincing, thus em-
powering these new social forces. Under this new ruling class, we see a 
shift in the status of the military as well as the cultivation of crucial con-
nections between national, regional and transnational capital vis-à-vis the 
new ruling class. The so-called failure of the public sector was key to the 
transition to a new bloc, although it is often ignored in the literature. By 
focusing on this, I center the role of productive versus financial capital in 
Egypt’s modern history. Indeed the neoliberalization taking place in Egypt 
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under this bloc further reified Egypt’s peripheral position, removing in-
dustrialization from its central position under the Nasserist bloc.  
 Because this new ruling class relied on a very different set of norms 
and values to construct its hegemony,  part of this chapter focused on 
several films and novels in order to demonstrate the dramatic shift from 
the Nasserist to the Infitah bloc. Positioning the ideational vis-à-vis the 
material in the way I have done here is rare in the literature on Egypt’s 
cultural scene., despite it providing us with a unique lens through which 
to understand shifts in ruling classes.  
  The focus on fractions rather than individual elites—rare in the field 
of Middle East Studies in particular—once again allowed me to avoid  the 
assumption that Sadat acted solely in the interest of maintaining power. 
Instead this chapter provided a more complex view of the period. The 
focus on the Muslim Brotherhood as a fraction of capital and thus part of 
the ruling class avoids the excessive focus on Islamism that is present in 
much of the literature on modern Egypt. Finally, this chapter shows how 
by transcending their narrow interests, the Infitah fraction of capital was 
able to create a bloc and hegemony, even though it was ultimately not as 
strong as the one preceding it.  The 1977 bread riots are an indication of 
this weakness, and a warning of the importance of transcending these nar-
row interests in order to create consent. 
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5 
A Failed Attempt at Hegemony: 
Gamal Mubarak and a New Financial 
Fraction of  Capital 
 
“In every country the process is different, although the con-
tent is the same. And the content is the crisis of the ruling 
class’s hegemony, which occurs either because the ruling class 
has failed in some major political undertaking for which it has 
requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad 
masses (war, for example), or because huge masses (especially 
of peasants and petty-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed 
suddenly from a state of political passivity to a certain activity, 
and put forward demands which taken together, albeit not or-
ganically formulated, add up to a revolution. A “crisis of au-
thority” is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, 
or general crisis of the State.”  
    – Antonio Gramsci (2007, 210). 
 
This chapter looks at the last ruling class before 2011, and their attempt 
to create a historic bloc. As argued in the previous chapter, the ascension 
of Hosni Mubarak did not result in the rise of a new historic bloc; rather, 
it represented a period of trasformismo. Thus when Mubarak came to power, 
there was a historic bloc and hegemony in place, although it was weaken-
ing. This attempt at damage control ultimately failed and by the late 1990s 
we see the final decline of the Infitah bloc and the rise of a new ruling class 
centered around Gamal Mubarak and others. This ruling class failed to 
create a historic bloc because of its failure to transcend its narrow interests. 
Neither fractions of capital nor fractions of labour were drawn into their 
project and thus a bloc was never formed. It is this, ultimately, that led to 
an increasing reliance on coercion rather than consent, and that created 
the material and ideological conditions for the 2011 uprising.  
 
288  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As can be seen from the title of this chapter, the focus is on the emer-
gence of a new fraction of capital. This fraction represents a shift in 
Egypt’s accumulation strategy only insofar as it became a central mode of 
accumulation—it is not new in the sense of not having existed before this 
fraction emerged. Because of my argument that the new ruling class was 
dominated by a financial fraction of capital, I call this bloc the financial 
ruling class. This chapter is split into five sections, outlined below.  
 The first part of this chapter provides a justification for why I con-
ceive of a break in the mid-1990s at which the Infitah bloc—a bloc that did 
exercise hegemony—declined and there was an attempt by a new fraction 
to establish a historic bloc. I argue that in the mid-1990s we see the emer-
gence of a new fraction of capital that was to become dominant, one with 
a separate accumulation strategy. This fraction has been called the “ne-
oliberal elite” in much of the literature on Egypt, betraying its allegiance 
to neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy. However, it seems that a 
more accurate description would be to treat them as a financial fraction, a 
point I explore in the chapter. This is characterized by an acceleration of 
neoliberalization. This fraction has also been described as “crony capital-
ist” or as a fraction known for blurring the lines between politics and eco-
nomics because of the ways in which the businessmen that make up the 
fraction use political parties and state institutions to accumulate capital. I 
argue, however, that this does not represent a blurring of the line between 
politics and economics—as this line never existed—but rather that the 
state as a central institution of capitalist accumulation was now under the 
control of a new fraction of capital. Above all, referring to this bloc as a 
financial fraction of capital relates to one of the central arguments of this 
dissertation: that the rising dominance of financial capital over productive 
capital was completed under this bloc, and it is this that largely explains 
the organic crisis that brought about the 2011 revolution. 
 The second part of this chapter explores the position of the Egyp-
tian military within this new ruling class. Many scholars have argued that 
the military was pushed out of power because of the emergence of the 
financial fraction. However, at the same time, it seems necessary to locate 
the military as an important economic actor in Egypt, particularly through 
its control of land. This tension will be addressed through an analysis of 
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the military’s accumulation strategy and its resulting position within the 
ruling class in the period before the revolution. Importantly, it will address 
the question of how to understand the military: are they a class, an eco-
nomic actor, a fraction, or the ruling class itself? Addressing the military is 
also important vis-à-vis my argument about financial and productive cap-
ital; the military have historically represented the latter and so their mar-
ginalization within the ruling class can be seen as representative of the 
marginalization of productive capital itself. 
 Third, this chapter deals extensively with fractions of labour under 
this last ruling class. This period is known for its massive number of work-
ers’ actions and strikes, with over two million workers participating over 
the span of ten years. This heralds a new wave of labour action that needs 
to be contextualized vis-à-vis neoliberalization. Moreover, this bloc did 
not include any major fractions of labour, thus rendering it weak in terms 
of its class alliances. This is important to discuss in light of its ultimate 
downfall at the hands of workers themselves. 
 The final part of this chapter brings together the various arguments 
in order to demonstrate that this new fraction of capital ultimately failed 
to establish a historic bloc and by extension hegemony. Increasing levels 
of coercion demonstrate this, and the final price this fraction had to pay 
for failing to create a bloc was its downfall following the 2011 revolution. 
I have arranged the sections in this order because I want to clearly demon-
strate the emergence of this new fraction of capital, its accumulation struc-
ture—accelerated neoliberalization—and the ways in which it failed to ex-
pand its own narrow interests through moral reforms as well as to create 
a bloc. Each section thus provides a piece of the puzzle that shows why 
this final ruling class set the final conditions for the 2011 revolution.  
 
5.2 A New Fraction of Capital 
 
When Hosni Mubarak became President of Egypt, we saw an old pat-
tern being repeated: just as Sadat had made sure to stay close to Nasser’s 
rhetoric and position when he first became president, Mubarak maintained 
the same tone and objectives as Sadat when he first took office. Key to 
this was Egypt’s new position as a US ally. Indeed in an interview he stated: 
“Without the United States it would have been difficult, if not impossible 
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to achieve what President Sadat achieved. I am very comfortable about 
dealing with the United States, and I will continue to do so and to enhance 
our relationship,” (Kandil 2012, 312). This section begins by looking at 
the transition from Sadat to Mubarak, and arguing that this transition was 
marked by a period of trasformismo, rather than the emergence of a new 
bloc. The section then focuses on some of the mechanisms of accelerated 
neoliberalization that allowed for a new fraction to emerge, such as the 
structural adjustment program, reform of the banks, and a new cabinet of 
businessmen. The final part of the section looks at who made up this new 
fraction of capital, and what distinguishes it from the previous Infitah bloc. 
 Following Sadat’s assassination and Mubarak’s ascendancy to 
power, Mubarak initially moved to make significant changes to various 
institutions, primary among these an attempt to strengthen the public sec-
tor and to weaken the power of import-export businessmen. While these 
changes have been read as a move to weaken Sadat’s power base, I argue 
instead that this period represents a period of trasformismo, during which 
Mubarak was attempting to do damage control. Trasformismo refers to an 
attempt to co-opt rising challenges in order to maintain both the state of 
consensus as well as the power and dominance of the ruling fraction. Chal-
lenges to the social order from the rise of new social forces as well as new 
ideas need to be co-opted in order for the hegemony of the historic bloc 
to stay in place.57 
 When Mubarak became president in the early 1980s, we see that 
certain challenges existed and that they posed a threat to the Infitah historic 
bloc. This chapter looks at these challenges, the ways in which Mubarak 
attempted to co-opt them through a process of trasformismo, and the even-
tual rise of a new fraction that destroyed the Infitah bloc. Looking at the 
shift from one bloc to another is important, and these periods usually rep-
resent periods of transformation whereby a historic bloc attempts to sub-
vert challenges it may face. It is key to remember that the Infitah bloc had 
a weaker hegemony than the Nasserist bloc and thus faced numerous chal-
lenges by the time Mubarak became president. The Infitah bloc did not end 
when Mubarak came to power, but it did enter a period of transformation. 
This period lasted until the mid-1990s, when we see the fall of this bloc, 
                                                 
57 Gramsci has written that trasformismo is one of the historical forms of the ‘pas-
sive revolution’ or ‘revolution/restoration’ dialectic (1971, 157). 
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and the rise of a new fraction that ultimately failed to create a new historic 
bloc. 
 Mubarak, like Sadat, inherited a country full of economic problems. 
“Economists agree that the country could no longer tolerate the specula-
tive activities and short-term ventures of private investors and their for-
eign partners, nor could it afford the consumption tendencies that sur-
faced in the 1970s, especially those directed toward imported luxuries. In 
conclusion, a return to state-planned economic development was essen-
tial, even if the private sector was allowed to play a leading role in this 
process,” (Soliman 2005, 40). This was what was needed. By the end of 
the 2000s, the complete opposite had taken place. Consumption (primarily 
of luxury goods) and speculation meant that Egypt’s productive industries 
were weak. Corruption had become endemic following Infitah, primarily in 
the now-defunct public sector. Members of this class constituted a large 
segment of the ruling class, but they represented a form of capital that was 
unproductive. The public sector did not create enough jobs or wealth to 
become productive the way it had been previously.58 Similarly, the specu-
lation and consumption of Infitah was not productive in the ways industrial 
development may have been—instead, it produced a new class of wealthy 
elites, and a large gap between them and the rest of society. To add to this, 
foreign debt increased exponentially during the Infitah period, to add to 
the already high levels inherited from Nasser. Indeed by 189, Egypt de-
clared bankruptcy.59 
 The first response to this was Egypt agreeing to participate as a US 
ally in the 1991 invasion of Iraq, a move which earned Egypt the cancel-
lation of half its debt. This was still not enough, and in 1991 Egypt signed 
an IMF structural adjustment deal—the ERSAP. Nevertheless, this was 
not a simple case of capitulation. Egypt’s negotiation team— Kamal el-
Ganzoury, Atef Ebeid, Mohamed Ahmed el-Razaz, Salah Hamed, and 
Youssef Boutros Ghali—were strong, and negotiations took quite some 
time. For example, the IMF called for shock therapy as the only solution 
to stabilizing Egypt’s economy, but this was rejected by the negotiating 
                                                 
58 Indeed empirical data collected shows that by the early 2000s, the private sector 
vastly surpassed the public sector (ECB reports 2002/2003, 2004/2005, 
2006/2007).  
59 This spiralling debt was only somewhat declining in the 2000s, as can be seen 
from ECB reports (ibid).  
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team, who probably realized the dramatic political ramifications of this. At 
the same time, strengthening the private sector remained a key priority of 
both the IMF as well as the Infitah bloc. But even this was not per se an 
outright capitulation, as the government moved to privatize public sector 
companies at a very slow pace. Ikram rightly notes: “Privatization on the 
scale proposed was not simply a financial exercise, but rather the aban-
donment of a model of development that had shaped Egyptian society for 
a generation,” (Ibid, 78). This would have no other outcome than a drastic 
realignment of economic power. “Thus the seemingly straightforward 
technical issue of privatizing some 300-odd enterprises might be the thin 
edge of a wedge that could initiate far-reaching changes in Egyptian soci-
ety. The Egyptian authorities in 1991 accepted this possibility,” (Ibid). I 
would argue that the Egyptian authorities not only accepted this possibility 
but that it was in line with the hegemonic project the Infitah bloc had put 
in place. At the same time, it also set in place the groundwork for the new 
ruling fraction that was to emerge in a matter of years. 
 By 1995, 75% of Egypt’s subsidies had been cut, most public sector 
companies were being prepared for privatization, and it looked like ne-
oliberalization was firmly underway: Egypt’s budget deficit was cut, and 
the economy started experiencing growth (Ibid, 350). Nevertheless, the 
IMF program should be assessed critically. Timothy Mitchell has noted: 
“The reform program did not remove the state from the market or elimi-
nate profligate public subsidies. Its main impact was to concentrate public 
funds into different hands, and many fewer. The state turned resources 
away from agriculture and industry. It now subsidized financiers instead 
of factories, cement kilns instead of bakeries, speculators instead of 
schools,” (Mitchell 2002, 276). The connection between the IMF program 
and the emergence of a new fraction of capital is important. Through pri-
vatization in particular, a central tenet of IMF demands, a new fraction of 
capital was able to accumulate capital through neoliberalization. 
 By the late 1990s, it was clear that something had begun to shift in 
Egypt. Finance became integral to many Middle Eastern countries as ne-
oliberalization deepened.60 The control the government exercised over 
credit was liberalized in the 1990s, making credit widely available to the 
                                                 
60 This was confirmed by empirical data collected in the form of ECB reports 
detailing the shifts in types of investment and GDP expenditure (ECB reports 
2002/2003, 2004/2005, 2006/2007, 2008/2009).  
  293 
private sector. In Egypt this credit was taken advantage of by a small group 
of businessmen who were part of the ruling class. 
 
“In early 2000, 42% of the 206 billion Egyptian pounds ex-
tended to the private sector went to only 343 clients, with 28 
of them taking 13% of the total. By 2002, nearly 18% of non-
performing loans were held by only 12 clients. Well-con-
nected business groups were generally able to borrow with in-
sufficient collateral and no formal procedures. These 
borrowers were often connected to the Mubarak regime and 
the state were indicted in the 1990s for running a loan distri-
bution network connecting public banks, businesses and the 
political system,” (Hanieh 2014, 82). 
 
This new fraction of capital began to give off the impression that decision-
making had increasingly become the purview of a smaller group: “The 
process of neoliberal reform is driven by the ability of a highly centralized 
political core to frame the context of the implementation of its policies. 
This dialectic of centralization and decentralization has been the distin-
guishing feature of the institutional restructuring of the neoliberal state in 
the Middle East region—rhetorically founded upon “good governance” 
and “accountability,” while simultaneously strengthening the tendencies 
towards authoritarianism,” (Ibid, 92). 
 The shift towards accelerated neoliberalization with its focus on fi-
nancialization is key to the development of a new fraction halfway through 
the Mubarak era. As has been argued, financialization often affects power 
relations in a country because they increase the political independence and 
power of private businessmen (Roll 2010, 350). A key aspect of financial-
ization has been the loss of government control over the allocation of 
capital, including credit. Take this table issues by the Central Bank of 
Egypt for the fiscal year 2002/2003 (Central Bank of Egypt 2002/2003, 
64): 
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Table 2.1: Private vs. Public GDP Expenditure 
 
This report, part of my empirical data, details the massive percentage of 
GDP expenditure the private sector monopolized, versus the public sec-
tor. Even sectors traditionally dominated by public capital such as con-
struction and transportation were now primarily listed under private. 
These reports are also important as they show the sectors that experienced 
massive growth during the 2000s, when this new fraction began to con-
solidate itself. Indeed this same report noted the government’s focus on 
strengthening the private sector, reporting that for fiscal year 2002/2003 
the private sector contributed about 71.9% of GDP (ibid, B). Tourism and 
tourist resorts in general began to experience massive growth, as detailed 
by both the reports cited above as well as reports by the General Authority 
for Investment and Free Zones (General Authority for investment and 
free zones 2010/2011, 2009/2010, 2008/2009, 2007/2008, 2006/2007, 
2005/2006, 2004/2005, 2003/2004). Another part of my empirical re-
search – the American Chamber of Commerce reports – consolidated this 
view in a report published in 2008 (American Chamber of Commerce 
2008).  
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  Indeed chairman of Banque du Caire noted that between 2000 and 
2005, 75% of the bank’s loan portfolio belonged to 46 businessmen (Roll 
2010, 356). Banking sector reforms and the development of Egypt’s capi-
tal market were both central to this financialization process that benefitted 
the new fraction that emerged. Without access to capital offered by public 
banks in particular, the new fraction would not have had the liquidity 
needed to make such large investments. “These mechanisms enabled a few 
entrepreneurs to take excessive advantage of financial sector reforms, 
[which] led to capital concentration within the private sector and therefore 
a ‘restructuring’ of the Egyptian business elite,” (Ibid, 363). Roll points to 
the fact that large family holdings were not what dominated the economy 
in the 1980s, but by the 1990s they had become characteristic of the Egyp-
tian economy (Ibid). While it is true that they only became notable in the 
1990s, it is important to point out that the conditions for their emergence 
began with the shift to the Infitah bloc. Many within this new fraction 
achieved a level of independence and power unseen since the colonial pe-
riod. Take the example of Samih Sawiris, member of Egypt’s richest busi-
ness family, and his move to register Orascom—one of Egypt’s biggest 
companies—as a Swiss company in order to avoid interference from the 
Egyptian government (Ibid, 366). This move, not unknown to major cor-
porations across the globe, indicated a new level of independence for 
Egyptian capitalists. It ensured that company assets were beyond the reach 
of the state and made it easier to transfer capital abroad. This is despite 
the fact that Mubarak’s tax system was not that threatening to big business. 
By 2001, taxes on industrial and commercial profits amounted to a mere 
4.4% (Abdelrahman 2014, 15). This worsened under the “cabinet of busi-
nessmen,” during which the corporate tax was cut from 42 to 20%. By 
2009, salaried workers paid a total of LE13 billion in taxes while corpora-
tions paid only LE29 billion (Ibid). 
 The relationship between banks and businessmen was another as-
pect of the emergence of a new fraction of capital. Businessmen were in-
creasingly able to take out massive loans to finance investments. Ahmed 
Bahgat, for example, founder of Bahgat Group and one of Egypt’s most 
successful businessmen, took a loan of over LE2 billion to finance the 
construction of Dreamland (El Tarouty 2015, 87). Aside from Dreamland, 
he also started the private TV channel Dream TV and owned multiple 
factories. In May 2004, he was prevented from leaving the country because 
he owed billions of pounds to the National Bank of Egypt (Ibid, 89). 
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 Hassan Hussein, former head of Misr Bank Al Motahad, said in an 
interview: 
 
“In the 1980s, there were respected businessmen who worked 
in trade and industry. They would open a letter of credit and 
when the goods arrived, they would pay the banks. But in the 
1990s, businessmen were trading with the banks’ money. For 
example, those who had political connections bought pieces 
of land for a nominal price. Then they would get loans from 
the banks based on the value of this piece of land after the 
bank had highly inflated its price. These people were involved 
in unproductive activities and made money using state-owned 
lands,” (Ibid, 71). 
 
His point about productive capital is fascinating, and touches on one of 
the key distinctions between the Nasserist historic bloc and the new frac-
tion of capital that emerged in the 1990s, with the Infitah bloc acting as a 
bridge between the two, namely: the shift to accelerated neoliberalization 
and financialization entailed a shift towards forms of capital investments 
that were on the whole unproductive. Under the Nasserist bloc, the aim 
had been to make the public sector the center of the economy, based on 
industry. Under the Infitah bloc we see that financial speculation, primarily 
based on land, became one of the main forms of generating capital, as well 
as import and export. This solidified under the financial bloc, where finan-
cialization became the dominant form of capital generation. Thus when 
Hussein designates the new type of businessman as unproductive, he 
means that land and money were being used to generate more money, 
rather than being invested in industry, trade, or other long-term projects. 
This shift is crucial to understanding the differences between the different 
blocs. Speculation, especially when done using national banks’ funds, was 
not only risky but was on the whole not able to contribute to the develop-
ment of the nation as a whole; instead it developed a small class. Alongside 
this, when we see this shift to the Infitah bloc and the fraction of the 1990s, 
we also see a change in the public sector itself. Once the harbinger of 
development and productive capital, it slowly degenerates until it is held 
up by nothing but corruption. Indeed the critiques made of Egypt’s public 
sector during Nasser—that it was unproductive, corrupt and inefficient—
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were ironically untrue at the time, but because true following the shift to 
a free market system.61 
 Changes in public banking and the availability of capital lend cre-
dence to Timothy Mitchell’s argument that the reforms of the financial 
sector did not get rid of state support, but redirected it where the support 
was to go (2002, 277). This points to my argument that the state should 
always be contextualized within historic blocs, and not be seen as essen-
tially consisting of its own policies or preferences. This is something we 
saw in Chapter Three where I argued that what the Nasserist historic bloc 
did was essentially change the recipients of capital, rather than the mode 
of production itself. Similarly, under the new ruling class of the 1990s, we 
see that the new fraction was able to redirect state support—or capital—
towards its own investment projects. Indeed they were able to initiate an 
almost complete reversal of what the Nasserist bloc had achieved. This 
was done through several mechanisms, including the restructuring of 
banks for example. In 2004, a close associate of Gamal Mubarak—Faoruk 
el Okda—was made head of Egypt’s Central Bank: 
 
“The most important thing was to amend the Central Bank 
law and reconcile with the businessmen. El Okda wanted to 
change the environment. There was a general pressure on the 
banks to reconcile with the businessmen and not to arrest 
them…they don’t pay back the whole amount but negotiate 
on paying part of it, and they will get out,” (El Tarouty 2015, 
72). 
 
Gamal Mubarak was a key figure driving these financial reforms.62 Na-
tional banks were a major part of these reforms, despite the fact that the 
                                                 
61 For the decline in investment in the public sector, see the ECB reports (ECB 
reports 2002/2003, 2003/2004, 2004/2005, 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/2008, 
2008/2009, 2009/2010).  
62 As Roll notes: “…financial sector reforms allowed Gamal Mubarak to 
strengthen his personal ties to the strategically important financial sector. Many 
of the changes taking place in the boardrooms of public and private financial 
institutions as part of the financial reforms put in power friends or, at the very 
least, confidants of the President’s son, whom he had known since his own fi-
nancial sector career. Exemplary of this are Hassan Abdallah, Vice Chairman and 
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point of such banks was to finance national infrastructure and public pro-
jects through the use of tax payers’ savings and pensions (Abdelrahman 
2014, 15). Indeed the National Investment Bank was a major player. In-
stead, national banks were tied up financing private businesses. By 2011, 
Egypt was servicing a debt of LE962.2 billion—double the amount it had 
been in 2004—just seven years ago! (Ibid) 
 
 
Table 2.2 
                                                 
Managing Director of the Arab African International Bank (AAIB) and Board 
Member of the Central Bank of Egypt as well as Yasser El-Mallawany, Chief 
Executive Officer of EFG-Hermes. Both of them are members of the NDP’s 
Policy Secretariat and are seen as close friends of Gamal Mubarak,” (2010, 366). 
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Table 2.3 
 
The two tables above show the most important companies in Egypt, as 
well as the biggest families in terms of wealth and investment. It is these 
individuals and companies that make up the private sector from the table 
presented by the 2002/2003 report from the Central Bank of Egypt cited 
above. The first table tells us that Orascom Holdings is the most valuable 
company in Egypt, headed by the Sawiris family. The Sawiris family, who 
are characteristic of capital in Egypt during the 1990s and 2000s, owns 
seven out of the top seventeen companies that are trading on the Egyptian 
stock market. The family controls the Orascom conglomerate, which in-
cludes companies in the sectors of tourism, industry, technology, and tel-
ecommunications. Forbes has estimated the family’s worth at $36 billion.63 
Onsi Sawiris and his three sons—Naguib, Samih and Nassef—run the 
                                                 
63 http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/10/billionaires08_Naguib-
Sawiris_4MRK.html 
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various companies. Orascom was started in 1950, and since then the fam-
ily has also invested heavily in the media, notably newspaper al Masry al 
Youm and the TV channel ONTV.  
 The second table shows the major families in Egypt and indeed it is 
notable that the circle of elites is not much bigger than shown here. As the 
following table shows, the main business groups on the Egyptian stock 
exchange are controlled by seven families. 
 
Table 2.4 
Source: Roccu 2012, 147. 
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Who formed this new fraction?64 Alaa al-Din Arafat has written about elite 
changes during the Mubarak era. Four fractions dominated the NDP dur-
ing the mid-1980s, when we see Mubarak become president: one led by 
al-Sharif, supported by Mubarak; one led by Wali; one by al Shazli; and 
one by Gamal Mubarak. Wali has been quoted as saying: “We have very 
deep-rooted conflict and disagreement, especially in the NDP economic 
committee. There is no structural hegemony in the party. We have a vari-
ety of fractions,” (Ibid, 55). Arafat argues that the fraction led by al Shazli 
was the most powerful, and it was this fraction that was soon to be deci-
mated by Gamal’s fraction. 
 By the time we see the rise of Gamal Mubarak, there was a power 
struggle between two groups only: the “Big Four” and the “Big Eight,” 
(Ibid). The Big Four were Youssef Wali, Kamal al Shazli, Safwat al Sharif, 
and Fathi Sorour. The Big Eight were Gamal Mubarak, Ahmed Ezz, Hos-
sam al Badrawi, Ali al Din Hilal, Mohamed Kamal, Mahmoud Mohie el 
Din, Mahmoud abou el Enein, and Youssef Boutrous Ghali. The Big Four 
rose during 1987, and were central to Mubarak’s attempt to consolidate 
his rule. Already by 1990 the tensions between these groups were evident: 
when the NDP performed badly in the elections, Gamal Mubarak was able 
to defeat al Shazli and Wali and push for the NDP to become more au-
thoritarian (2009, 27). Younger cadres were given a bigger role to play, and 
the Big Eight managed to put in place people loyal to them over the Big 
Four (Ibid, 31). Gamal Mubarak authored a report on NDP structural re-
form, arguing that political and economic liberalization were necessary to 
move forward, and emphasized the pivotal role of the private sector (Ibid, 
33). The Policies Committee was also established at this point, which was 
chaired by Gamal Mubarak. This was to become an important mechanism 
through which the new historic bloc accumulated capital. 
 Members of the Big Four such as Wali—who represented the agrar-
ian fraction of capital—were replaced by al Sharif from the NDP General 
Secretariat in 2006. This was after the NDP created a new General Secre-
tariat in 2006 in which Gamal Mubarak became one of the three assistant 
                                                 
64 For an important set of oral history interviews with key players in the Egyptian 
economic scene, see the archive of the Economic and Business History Research 
Center: http://schools.aucegypt.edu/research/ebhrc/archives/Pages/EBHRC-
NarrativeProjects2015.aspx 
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secretaries, replacing al Shazli. Arafat argues that moves such as these con-
firmed the NDP’s new bias towards businessmen at the expense of other 
fractions. Indeed the fraction now dominating was the second generation 
of those who had dominated under the Infitah bloc (Ibid, 37). 
 
“The NDP elite under Mubarak first consisted of wealthy 
peasants and provincial businessmen who established them-
selves in the 1980s and 1990s. This is different from Sadat’s 
munfatihun (those who made money through Infitah). During 
the 1990s, Mubarak’s regime leaned away from wealthy peas-
ants and towards business magnates, especially those active in 
the mid-1990s such as Ezz, el Enein, and al Badrawi. The new 
electoral system encouraged businessmen to stand for elec-
tion since they didn’t require any political affiliation, follow-
ers, or grassroots organizations, but simply needed a lot of 
money. The NDP’s new elite of businessmen filled two-thirds 
of the high-ranking party positions and half of cabinet minis-
tries,” (Ibid, 39). 
 
While the battle between these two groups within the NDP could be in-
terpreted as being a generational one, it is also important to note, as Rob-
erto Roccu argues, that what divides them can also be understood in terms 
of class (Roccu 2012, 181). On the one hand we see Gamal Mubarak and 
co, a financial fraction; and on the other the old guard, who can be seen 
as—according to Roccu—bureaucrats. The first group wanted aggressive 
liberalization, while the second wanted a stronger public sector. I would 
question Roccu’s designation of this latter group as bureaucratic, and ra-
ther pose that they should be seen as the earlier generation of Infitah elites 
who also favoured economic liberalization, but at a different pace. Never-
theless, the point remains that these two groups represented different frac-
tions and different approaches to capital accumulation. One favoured a 
slow neoliberalization in which the public sector still played a major role; 
the other a form of accelerated neoliberalization that all but destroyed the 
ability of the public sector to be productive. 
 Ahmed Ezz played a key role in consolidating the new historic bloc 
under Gamal’s fraction of capital. Businessmen have flourished under this 
new configuration. This was by no means an easy task, and indeed 
  303 
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s the two fractions—the old In-
fitah guard and Gamal’s new circle—battled with one another for control. 
The 2005 parliamentary elections are one example of this struggle. Indeed 
the NDP performed badly in those elections, partly due to these inter-
faction struggles. “The old conservative had more reason to doubt Gamal 
Mubarak’s role, especially after five years of reforms. Gamal and his cote-
rie had failed to improve the party’s image or win elections under the NDP 
banner. While the NDP’s hold on parliament remains secure, the party’s 
ideological grip has been seriously weakened,” (Ibid, 133). It was the Mus-
lim Brotherhood that capitalized on these weaknesses, winning an unprec-
edented 88 seats. Indeed under the new historic bloc the Muslim Brother-
hood managed to dominate the syndicates and associations, seeing them 
as a means of increasing their influence. Universities also became a key 
site of expanding influence. By 1993, when the Syndicate Law was 
passed—requiring that 50% of a syndicate’s membership must vote for a 
syndicate election to be valid—this influence had already spread far and 
wide. By 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood were demanding reforms and 
holding demonstrations. Escalation against them increased after their ma-
jor wins in the 2005 elections, and by 2006 mass arrests were happening 
in response to Brotherhood attacks on the government’s slow pace of re-
form. In one extreme instance in 2007, two MB members of parliament 
were arrested on accusations of being involved in terrorism, money laun-
dering and belonging to a banned organization (Ibid, 176). They were re-
leased a few hours later. Notably, businessmen tied to the MB were also 
arrested—their combined investments totally $4 billion, indicating the 
strength of the MB’s material base, as well as the regime’s ability to attack 
it. 
 This new fraction headed by Gamal Mubarak managed to close all 
avenues of change to Egyptian society (Ibid, 139). Changing electoral laws, 
refusing to reform the NDP from the bottom-up, and calling for extensive 
economic liberalization caused tension to build up in a society that had no 
outlets—the “only solutions were a revolution or a coup d’état,” (Ibid). By 
the 2010 parliamentary elections, the new fractions—through the NDP—
were clamping down on all political space. They won 97% of the available 
seats. Importantly, the last elections before 2011 saw 49 police officers 
elected to parliament for the first time in history (Kandil 2012, 340). 
Speaker of Parliament and member of the old guard, Fathi Sorour, said 
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the following about these results: “I said this was political stupidity. I tel-
ephoned Hassan Abd al Rahman, head of State Security, and asked him 
what in the world was going on. I also complained to Safwat al Sharif 
(former intelligence officer and NDP Secretary-General). I have worked 
with the President for 25 years, but lately I felt that the Interior Ministry 
was running the country,” (Ibid). This touches on the emerging differ-
ences between the two fractions. What Sorour was labelling as political 
stupidity was the blatant rigging of an election. Clearly, for the old guard, 
there was still a need to maintain some kind of pretension that Egypt was 
not completely authoritarian. The new guard, on the other hand, did not 
seem to see the need for such pretensions. This is precisely why it is diffi-
cult to argue that this new fraction of capital created a historic bloc, or 
hegemony. Winning 97% of the vote created a major scandal, and I would 
argue that this scandal was one of the main triggers of the 2011 revolution. 
 By the late 1990s, Egypt’s economy was controlled by a dwindling 
number of individuals. Sfakianakis puts the number at 32 businessmen and 
notes that they were primarily involved in rent-seeking operations (2004, 
79). These businessmen were import-oriented and privatization gave them 
new opportunities to expand their wealth. He notes: “The networks that 
elite businessmen put in place in the mid-1990s were not circumstantial. 
They were established as a result of the dwindling power of the public 
sector elite and the regime’s intention to see businessmen replace the 
bosses of the state-owned enterprises,” (Ibid, 89). Kandil argues that the 
economy was controlled by not more than 25 family-owned monopolies: 
“The founders of these dynasties had a lot in common: most were into 
construction; their businesses were kicked off through state contracts; they 
drew funds freely from public banks; they partnered with foreign (espe-
cially American) investors; they employed a relatively small working force 
(3000 on average); and their products catered to the needs of the affluent. 
This fraction certainly did not represent the Egyptian bourgeoisie in its 
entirety but it was the fraction off of which the rest of the class members 
made their living, and the one none of them had any hope to compete 
with or dislodge,” (Kandil 2012, 353). Kandil’s point is crucial: the new 
fraction restructured the economy in such a way that other fractions had 
no choice but to accumulate capital in the same way. In other words, frac-
tions that had previously accumulated wealth through other means—for 
example the public sector—now found their access to this form of accu-
mulation blocked. 
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 In 2004, Egypt’s first “government of businessmen” was formed, 
with Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif at its helm: 
 
“The cabinet included six monopoly capitalists who were put 
in charge of ministries directly related to their business port-
folios, in addition to a number of prominent neoliberal intel-
lectuals. A few examples suffice. Ahmed al-Maghraby, owner 
of the tourism conglomerate Accor Hotels, was appointed 
Minister of Tourism, and a year later Minister of Housing and 
Construction; Rashid Ahmed Rashid, head of the Middle East 
and North Africa affiliate of the multi-national Unilever, be-
came Minister of Industry and Trade; Mohamed Mansour, 
chairman of Al-Mansour Motor Group, was charged with the 
Ministry of Transportation (he had also served as Secretary-
General of Gamal’s Future Generation Foundation, and Pres-
ident of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt be-
tween 1999 and 2003); Youssef Boutros Ghali, longtime IMF 
executive, was entrusted with Treasury; and Mahmoud Muhi 
al-Din, a Cairo University professor who was later elected Ex-
ecutive Director of the World Bank, handled economics and 
investment. These were all of course members of the Policies 
Committee,” (Kandil 2012, 356). 
 
However here we begin to see friction within the Infitah bloc, friction that 
would eventually lead to the emergence of a new ruling class. Gamal Mu-
barak’s fraction of capital had taken over the NDP through the formation 
of a Policies Committee, a central mechanism through which this fraction 
went on to exercise control. Over time, the “old guard” of the NDP—the 
Big Eight—began to object to the new direction being taken by the party. 
Kandil quotes Fathi Sorour, for example, who criticized the inclusion of 
so many businessmen in the new cabinet (Ibid, 357).  
 When we look at some of the individuals making up this fraction, 
we see exactly what was at stake: literally billions and billions of pounds. 
Take Hussein Salem, for example, a close friend of Hosni Mubarak. He 
was engaged in arms dealing, tourism, construction and real estate, and his 
wealth was estimated at $15 billion. He fled to Dubai and then Spain dur-
ing the events of 2011, with a bag containing $500 million in cash (Kandil 
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2012, 343). Another example is Ahmed Ezz, already discussed above, 
whose wealth added up to an estimated $10 billion. He owned steel facto-
ries and monopolized the steel industry, controlling 55.3% of the domestic 
market and 72.3% of exports (Ibid, 362). Interestingly, when Fathi Sorour 
tried to intervene to reduce this monopolization of the steel industry, he 
found that ultimately it was Ezz who called the shots: “At this point I 
realized that Ahmed Ezz was stronger [than the President], that he repre-
sented a dangerous power,” (Ibid). It’s important to remember that Sorour 
was one of the key personalities of the Infitah bloc. 
 In a study on Egyptian firms and political connectedness, Chekir 
and Diwan found that connected firms in Egypt tended to be concen-
trated in the following sectors: construction, services, textiles, and metals. 
These firms represented over half of stock market value (Chekir and Di-
wan 2013, 8). In the first quarter of 2011, connected firms lost twice as 
much value on the stock market as non-connected firms. Importantly, the 
study found that most of the heads of politically connected firms were 
being held on corruption charges post-2011. The study reveals interesting 
information about the precise ways in which connected firms were tied to 
state power. Notably, this was not through tax exemptions, as they found 
that connected firms paid as many taxes as non-connected firms—show-
ing that not all institutions in Egypt were biased towards the direction of 
the Infitah bloc and the ruling class that came after it. At the same time, we 
see that the tax rate was low by international standards, which is another 
example of a Nasserist policy reversed by the Infitah bloc. In terms of bor-
rowing, the study found that connected firms borrow more, suggesting an 
advantage. The authors argue that banks may have found it more profita-
ble to lend to connected firms: “It suggests that banks were focusing their 
loans not just on large firms, but on the firms that had the higher market 
shares, i.e. the more dominant firms, which suggests that they believed 
that these firms would be more profitable,” (Ibid, 14). At the same time, 
connectedness also played a role, as banks assumed it more likely that con-
nected firms would be bailed out if a crisis occurred. Connected firms also 
tended to have a larger market share and they became more dominant as 
we move towards 2011 (Ibid). 
 Thus we see that this new fraction increasingly become dominant in 
comparison to the old guard and that this was key to the decline of the 
Infitah bloc. How did they accumulate wealth? Here privatization was cru-
cial. Members of government who were against privatization were side-
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lined during the 1990s, most notably Abdel Wahab, Minister of Industry. 
Ironically, he became chairman of a company that eventually benefitted 
greatly from privatization: the Arab Swiss Engineering Company (Ibid, 
94). The company eventually joined with French capital to acquire one of 
Egypt’s most profitable state-owned cement factories, Ameriyah Cement 
Company. By 1991, Law 203 was passed, which created the legal frame-
work for privatization by dividing the public sector into holding compa-
nies that were allowed to put their components up for sale or liquidation. 
This law did not reduce the role of the public sector, but rather “made it 
the agent of its own privatization,” (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 47). 
Law 8, passed in 1997, prohibited the nationalization or sequestration of 
companies and prevented the interference of administrative authorities in 
pricing or regulating profits. 
 Until these laws, privatizations often occurred in an extra-legal fash-
ion, as opposed to nationalization, for example, which had taken place 
under the Nasserist bloc through clearly defined laws. The structural ad-
justment deal that had been signed with Mubarak in the late 1980s had 
already called for privatization, but the pace was extremely slow at the 
start. It was only in the early 2000s with the emergence of a new cabinet 
under Ahmed Nazif—the government of businessmen—that privatiza-
tion sped up tremendously. Indeed Nazif was highly commended by or-
ganizations such as the IMF. Privatization signaled a shift whereby foreign 
capital became more dominant in the Egyptian context, especially as Gulf 
companies became major investors in many of the companies that were 
privatized. By 2007, GCC capital in Egypt represented over 25% of in-
vestment (Ibid, 81). By 2008, four of the largest Egyptian banks were for-
eign-owned, and one-fifth of Egypt’s stock exchange capitalization was 
controlled by seven families (Ibid, 82). 
 In Egypt the concept of Employee Shareholders Associations 
(ESAs) ensured that workers participated in the privatization of the Egyp-
tian economy. While this could be seen as a powerful means through 
which workers can exercise control over economic decisions, the draw-
backs were numerous. These associations allowed workers to buy shares 
in a company after it was privatized, and this was used to frame the process 
as democratic. “By offering workers a share in the company, it could turn 
worker opposition to privatization into strong support,” (Hanieh 2013, 
67). Moreover: 
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“ESAs were linked to debt-for-equity swaps—the US govern-
ment would swap the debt that a country owed to it for equity 
in a newly privatized company, and then sell this equity to 
workers. In this manner, the country’s debt burden was di-
rectly offloaded onto workers while they were simultaneously 
enlisted to help in the privatization of their own company. 
Egypt was the first country in the global South to trial the 
ESA approach,” (Ibid). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, ESAs were part of almost every single privatization 
(Ibid). Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) were another central mecha-
nism through which rampant privatization could continue unabated with-
out raising too many concerns. In such a situation, a private company en-
ters into a contract with a public company to provide a service: 
 
“PPPs differ from typical privatization deals in that they often 
involve the partitioning of economic sectors into a large num-
ber of integrated functions, each of which is contracted out 
separately. This separation institutionalizes a market-driven 
logic into the everyday reproduction of the economy that is 
difficult to combat because the precise responsibility for var-
ious functions can be hard to identify. Moreover, the state 
may retain a role in one or more of these functions, socializing 
the risk and cost of less profitable activities while profit-mak-
ing functions are shifted to the control of private capital,” 
(Ibid, 73). 
 
Agriculture in particular has been an important site of privatization. As 
Hanieh points out, it is an especially symbolic site because of the emphasis 
Nasser placed on redistributing land following Egypt’s independence 
(Ibid, 103). Law 96, passed under Mubarak, gave landlords the right to 
evict tenants. The World Bank, IMF and USAID all supported the law, 
which led directly to one million Egyptians losing their rights to the land 
(Ibid). This rural dispossession has driven many Egyptians to either move 
to urban areas or to migrate. Moreover, there has been heavy investment 
in Egyptian agriculture by foreign investors, primarily from the Gulf. It 
was under this ruling class that Egypt became a country that imported 
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food—by the late 1980s, Egypt was importing over 60% of its food needs 
(Kandil 2012, 345). Moreover, even agriculture saw a shift towards pro-
duce aimed at the middle and upper classes. Expensive fruits and vegeta-
bles came to replace rice, sugarcane and other staples (Ibid). Poultry pro-
duction was controlled by three companies, all based in the Gulf, who 
controlled more than half of production.65 Dairy and juice were also con-
trolled by three companies, all connected to Gulf capital.66 Fruit produc-
tion was controlled by one company, based in Kuwait.67 The effects on 
farmers was disastrous. By the time these liberalization reforms were put 
in place, rents in the countryside increased by 300-400%. One third of 
Egyptian families lost their right to farm. 
 These changes date back to the Infitah bloc, during which Egypt be-
came the third biggest importer of grain (Mitchell 1991, 21). Egypt fi-
nanced increased imports of grain through borrowing. This change can be 
attributed to both a growing class of rich Egyptians who created a market 
for luxury produce at the expense of traditional staples, as well as govern-
ment policy that subsidized the import of staples and heavily taxed staples 
produced by Egyptian farmers (Ibid). Mitchell writes: “The image of a 
vast, overbreeding population packed within a limited agricultural area if 
therefore quite misleading. Egypt’s food problem is the result not of too 
many people occupying too little land, but of the power of a certain part 
of that population, supported by the prevailing domestic and international 
regime, to shift the country’s resources from staple foods to more expen-
sive items of consumption,” (Ibid, 22). 
 The textile sector was also severely affected. Here there are very 
clear gendered effects. For example, poor women began to be drafted into 
textile factories to work at extremely low wages so that Egypt could com-
pete with other countries that also provided cheap labour. Thus working 
conditions worsened, the informal economy expanded rapidly, and pro-
tection for workers became almost non-existent. Workers in textile factors 
                                                 
65 Cairo Poultry Company (Kuwait), Wataniyah Poultry (Saudi) and Misr Arab 
Poultry (Saudi).  
66 Dina Farms, Beyti and Juhayna. Dina Farms is owned by private equity com-
pany Citadel Capital, which joins leading Egyptian capitalists with Saudi private 
business groups. 
67 Americana Group. 
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actually had their wages drop 4% from 1999 to 2007, even as the numbers 
of workers were also decreasing (Hanieh 2013, 78). 
 Real estate was one of the prime investment sectors under this new 
ruling class. A flurry of construction emerged, with luxury real estate dom-
inating. In May 2007, for example, Egypt held one of the largest land auc-
tions in history. 90% of the 18.5 million square meters of Cairo land up 
for sale went to Saudi Arabian, Qatari, and Emirati companies (Hanieh 
2015, 164). Holiday resorts, gated compounds and shopping malls popped 
up all over the country. Over 67,200 square kilometres were allocated by 
the state to investors, worth LE80 billion (Kandil 2012, 362). Who got this 
land? 
 
“[Ahmed] Ezz acquired 21 million squared meters at the price 
of L.E. 4 per meter in the industrial area on the Gulf of Suez, 
only to resell it to foreign companies for L.E. 1000 per meter 
a couple of years later; Minister of Tourism Zohair Garanah 
allocated plots in some of the best tourist sites at prices con-
siderably below that of the market, thus costing the state over 
L.E. 2 billion in 2006 alone; Minister of Housing and Con-
struction Ahmed al-Maghraby allocated between January 
2006 and December 2008 over 27.2 million squared meters to 
13 companies in which his family-owned Palm Hills Company 
controls between 49 and 100 percent of each – in Palm Hills 
itself, the President’s younger son’s stock increased by L.E. 16 
million in 2009 alone as a result of the appreciation of the 
value of land acquired by the company; Minister of Agricul-
ture Amin Abaza gave away 11,556 feddans in Sinai for free 
to a businessman, who then sold 8,000 of those feddans for 
L.E. 350 million to foreign investors; companies owned by 
the Presidents sons and in-laws acquired vast amounts of ag-
ricultural land on the Cairo-Alexandria Desert Road for the 
ridiculously cheap price of L.E. 200 per feddan to build luxu-
rious compounds with hundreds of multi-million-dollar villas; 
former Minister of Housing and Construction Ibrahim Sulei-
man sold 40,000 squared meters of land on the Mediterranean 
Sea for L.E. 300 instead of its true market value of L.E. 8,000; 
finally, the Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif cost the country a 
total loss of L.E. 51.2 billion by passing Ministerial Decree 
  311 
2843 of 2009, which legalized the disputed acquisitions of 1.5 
million feddans for 2.5 percent of their market price,” (Ibid). 
 
The case of Ahmed al Maghrabi in particular is notable, as it formed part 
of a post-2011 court case. His position as Minister of Housing allowed 
him to sell massive tracts of land across the country at low prices to busi-
ness associates. Indeed his company, Palm Hills, was the second largest 
real estate developer in Egypt. Alaa Mubarak, Gamal’s brother, owned 
shares in Palm Hills. This case, among others, shows how real estate, cor-
ruption, and connections to Gamal Mubarak were key to capital accumu-
lating during this ruling class.  
 Another example here is Ahmed Ezz, who has been described as “a 
living embodiment of the intimate connection between the state and cap-
ital under neoliberalism (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 55). At some 
point during the 2000s, Ahmed Ezz controlled around 65% of the steel 
market in Egypt (Chekir and Diwan 2013, 2). This is no small matter, con-
sidering the central place of steel in construction, one of the major drivers 
of Egyptian investment under both the Infitah bloc and the new ruling 
class. The scandal surrounding Ezz began when he was accused of buying 
Egypt’s largest public steel company at an extremely low price. The fact 
that this was a public sector company shows that this sale was part of the 
larger privatization program. The accusation centered around the point 
that the price was artificially low, suggesting corruption. In addition to this, 
Ezz was accused of manipulating steel prices to make profit; ensuring that 
the anti-monopoly bill that was passed through parliament was weak; and 
ensuring that foreign tariffs were put in place that protected the steel in-
dustry in Egypt. Ezz’s position in the NDP and particularly in the Policies 
Committee was precisely what aroused suspicions. Moreover, some have 
pointed out that Ezz was in debt to major public banks and this was why 
he was able to invest such massive amounts of capital into his steel com-
pany (Roll 2010, 357). Attaining such significantly sized loans from public 
banks would have been impossible without both his political connected-
ness as well as the weak state of public banking in general. As noted, Ezz 
was central to the new orientation of the ruling class emerging around 
Gamal Mubarak. 
 Gamal Abdel Nasser saw industry as the key to Egypt’s future, and 
steel was a central aspect of this. Indeed companies such as the Egyptian 
Iron and Steel Company were seen as key symbols of Egyptian nationalism 
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and independence, underlining how steel production was central to Egyp-
tian development. Indeed, Nasser called this particular company “Egypt’s 
dream come true,” (Makram Ebeid 2012, 14). The company aimed to pro-
duce enough steel so that Egypt would not have to import any. By the 
2000s, Egypt’s steel was controlled largely by a single individual: Ahmed 
Ezz. Under the Infitah bloc, Japan built a steel factory in Egypt—Ezz el 
Dekheila—which was later sold to Ahmed Ezz. This company began to 
take away EISCO’s market share. Indeed EISCO was already suffering 
from increased prices due to structural adjustment, as well as the liberali-
zation of the economy and the competition from imports (Ibid, 23). Egypt 
went from producing steel in large public sector companies with the aim 
of developing the country, to producing steel in private companies mo-
nopolized by a corrupt businessman-cum-politician for his and his family’s 
private gain. 
 How was this new fraction connected to transnational capital? It 
was clear that the aim of this fraction was to further align Egypt with the 
global neoliberal order, a process happening across Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East. The weakening power of workers and peasants, as well as the 
decline of the public sector and the rise of the private sector are all mani-
festations of this (Roccu 2012, 182). Roccu has argued that this alignment 
with global capital played out in two forms in Egypt: 
 
“On the one hand, the outward-oriented component within 
the regime developed its own project of neoliberal reform, 
which leads the IMF, the World Bank and the EU to take on 
a lower profile. On the other hand, “reformers” were able to 
pursue the final goal of a “free market economy” by mixing 
up the implementation of recipes suggested in the previous 
decade with more heterodox policies, such as continuing state 
intervention in agriculture, the launch of state-funded indus-
trial modernization, and the move towards PPPs with respect 
to the management of state assets,” (Ibid, 183). 
 
This points to the fact that neoliberalization as a process is always com-
bining with previous structures, thus producing a mixed set of processes. 
In the case of Egypt, the continuing importance of the state can only be 
understood historically. At the same time, understanding local conditions 
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does not take away from the fact that “under conditions of neoliberal glob-
alizations the room to manoeuvre on the national scale narrows down sig-
nificantly,” (Ibid, 184). While the benefits accruing to the new dominant 
fraction may seem to have been attributable to their own power, it is key 
that these benefits ultimately also served global capital.  
 The emergence of the new fraction of capital also coincided with 
the taking off of the Egyptian stock market (Ibid, 6). This was connected 
to attempts to expand the private sector and make Egypt competitive in-
ternationally. The stock market grew steadily from 2002 to 2007, linked 
partly to the entrance of foreign investors into the economy. It crashed in 
2008 as a response to the global crisis, and again in 2011 because of the 
revolution. An interesting historical anecdote is that the Egyptian stock 
market was founded by the British in the 1890s to manage the new com-
panies being formed, and soon became one of the six most active stock 
exchanges in the world: the capital of joint stock companies was 
£92,617,219 by 1907 (Mitchell 2002, 95). What is fascinating is that most 
of this capital was held by land development companies—a pattern re-
peated in the 2000s. In the early 1990s this was due to the expansion of 
private property; in the early 2000s the increase in speculation and finan-
cialization. 
 Foreign investment more than tripled during the first three years of 
the Nazif government (Ibid, 358). Here we see a very important shift, one 
that continues to define investment in Egypt, and that is the shift towards 
Gulf capital. Indeed by the 2000s, Gulf capital represented the most im-
portant source of investment to Egyptian capitalists. Adam Hanieh has 
argued that the route through which Gulf capital has penetrated Egypt has 
been through private equity. He looks at EFG-Hermes as a classic exam-
ple of this, and writes that it is difficult to overstate the influence of this 
company on Egypt’s economy (2013, 167). This firm developed many of 
the privatization plans for the Egyptian state and indeed was at the fore-
front of many of these in the 1990s. In 2006 an Emirati company, Abraaj 
Dubai, took the largest stake in EFG-Hermes by investing $300 million 
(Ibid). This was later sold to two UAE-based investment funds: the Dubai 
Group and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Hanieh writes: 
 
“There is a pattern whereby Gulf investors merge with large 
Egyptian capital groups in financial firms that are nominally 
owned by Egyptian capital and are considered ‘Egyptian’ but 
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have high proportions of their capital controlled by the Gulf. 
Citadel Capital and Beltone Financial are examples. Both Cit-
adel and Beltone are renowned for recent purchases of farm-
land throughout the rest of Africa and thus Egyptian private 
equity has acted as a means for Gulf-based capital to expand 
deeper into the African continent,” (Ibid, 167). 
 
While much has been made of Mubarak’s attempts at political liberaliza-
tion—including his moves to allow multi-candidate presidential elections, 
allowing political parties, and amending the constitution several times to 
achieve these two changes—it again seems useful to see these as attempts 
at trasformismo—damage control to try and save a declining Infitah bloc. 
This ultimately failed as we see a new fraction of capital emerge. Perhaps 
nothing was more symbolic of this decline of a bloc and rise of a new 
fraction as the 2007 annulling of the constitutional reform that guaranteed 
socialism.  
 Arafat has argued that this new fraction never exercised hegemony, 
arguing that their influence was always individual, not collective, and that 
as a class businessmen were still under control of the regime (Arafat 2009, 
69). This separates capitalists from the state, a move that is problematic. 
Moreover, Arafat also argues that these businessmen did not exert as 
much influence on the state as is assumed, and that the “political elite” 
had much more power. He argues that they are divided, and that different 
fractions lobby for different things, e.g. industrialists for tariff protections 
for domestic industries and importers for the opposite (Ibid, 81). This 
suggests that the structural divisions within the ruling class were acute dur-
ing this period, and that the new financial fraction was unable to form 
alliances with other fractions that would allow them to form a historic 
bloc. However I disagree with Arafat’s contention that there was a group 
of businessmen on the one hand and a state/regime on the other, and that 
the reason this group of businessmen were not hegemonic is because they 
were controlled by the regime. Instead I posit that the reason that this 
group—who had already infiltrated the state and who were the regime—
were unable to form a bloc or hegemony is because they did not attempt 
to transcend their narrow interests through moral reforms. This is a central 
aspect of the formation of a historic bloc. However the accelerated ne-
  315 
oliberalization of this new fraction proceeded without the necessary ac-
companying moral and intellectual reforms that would form alliances with 
other fractions of capital and with fractions of labour.  
 Although this fraction did attempt to justify its neoliberalization, 
these attempts were never strong enough to penetrate society. Take the 
example of think tanks, and in particular the Economic Research Forum 
(ERF) and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES). These 
think tanks comprised intellectuals who can be labelled as organic. Both 
were founded in the 1990s, both are foreign funded, and both use rhetoric 
closely aligned to that of the Washington Consensus. ECES was founded 
by Egyptian businessmen and became the policy platform of the new fi-
nancial fraction of capital (Ibid, 192). The major aim of these think tanks 
was for neoclassical economic views to dominate the debate on the Egyp-
tian economy. Roccu’s work shows concretely how the work done by 
these think tanks began to impact Egyptian policies (Ibid, 193-196). 
 Nevertheless, while the ideas propagated by think tanks and other 
institutions may have been enough to formulate policies and create con-
sensus within the financial fraction itself, they were not enough to form 
alliances with other major fractions of capital, let alone labour. Thus this 
fraction ultimately failed in convincing others of its project. If we consider 
the other fractions of capital to consist of the agrarian fraction (that had 
come back full force under the Infitah bloc), the industrial fraction, and the 
public sector/productive capital fraction—including the military—we can 
see that none of these fractions can be considered to be influential within 
this ruling class. This is because the hegemonic project of this fraction 
revolved not only around financial capital, but also served to displace other 
forms of capital such as productive and industrial capital. In other words, 
it challenged other fractions. This can be seen from the wave of privatiza-
tions above all, as well as the pace of neoliberalization. The move to make 
financial capital the basis of Egypt’s accumulation strategy benefitted one 
fraction above all—the financial fraction—while threatening the accumu-
lation strategies of other fractions such as productive capital. Unlike other 
historic blocs, these fractions sat uneasily side by side until the contradic-
tions became visible.  
 On another level of analysis, the push to make financial capital the 
center of Egypt’s accumulation strategy also served to create severe soci-
etal unrest. Distribution of income and benefits to various segments of 
society was severely affected, particularly after the attack on productive 
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capital through the public sector. Not only did the working class suffer; 
the petty bourgeoisie felt the lack of economic opportunities as well. This 
situation created the type of unrest that other fractions of capital must 
have seen as a problem. For accumulation a certain level of stability 
through legitimacy is required; the project of the financial fraction steadily 
eroded this stability and this affected the ability of all fractions to accumu-
late capital. Thus it is not just that the moves to financialize Egypt’s econ-
omy affected fractions of capital directly by challenging their accumulation 
strategies; it is also that these moves affected the balance of society itself 
and therefore the ability of any fraction to accumulate.  
 
5.3 Defining the Egyptian Military 
 
The Egyptian military has been subject to a high level of scrutiny in the 
academic literature since 2011. Despite the fact that very little is known 
about them, as this information is difficult to access, there seems to be a 
tendency to grant them center stage in events preceding and following the 
Egyptian revolution. It is therefore necessary to pause and ask what pre-
cisely the role of the military is in the Egyptian context: does it constitute 
the ruling class itself, or is it a fraction within it? If it is a fraction, what 
kind of capital does it represent? Moreover, understanding the military is 
important in light of its move to remove the financial fraction of capital 
in 2011, in an attempt to co-opt the revolution and save themselves. 
 As we have seen, under the Nasserist bloc the Egyptian military 
came to be central to national development and state-led capitalism. Mili-
tary men occupied most high-ranking positions and were key to decisions 
regarding production. Ministerial and bureaucratic positions usually drew 
on military men, particularly those Nasser could trust. Under the Infitah 
bloc the military was to lose its control over such positions, as Sadat’s 
corrective revolution replaced military men with economists and other ci-
vilians. The 1967 and 1973 wars played a central role in weakening the 
military’s power. Much of the military’s attention was now to turn towards 
investing in the new economic opportunities available because of Infitah.  
 It seems clear that after the 1973 war there was a rift between mili-
tary commanders and the new regime, headed by Sadat. This was initially 
over the Sadat’s disastrous military decisions that led to Egypt’s ultimate 
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defeat at the hands of Israel, to be described in the following chapter. This 
soon extended to other matters. Kandil writes: 
 
“With the rise of the President’s son and his U.S.-connected 
business associates during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule, 
the Defense Minister and Chief of staff, criticized the direc-
tion the regime was taking in general, and to the increasing 
role of Mubarak’s son and his capitalist circle in particular,” 
(2012, 327). 
 
By the time Mubarak came to power, the military was no longer a central 
part of the Egyptian ruling class. Under Mubarak military men continued 
to receive financial rewards from the state as well as opportunities to be 
appointed as governors and heads of public institutions. 
 The only major confrontation Mubarak was to have with the army 
was when he faced competition from Major General Abd al-Halim Abu 
Ghazala, who, unlike Mubarak, had been a member of the Free Officers. 
Abu Ghazala was extremely popular within the military, not least because 
he raised wages, upgraded facilities, and was a down to earth figure (Kandil 
2012, 413). Importantly, Abu Ghazala oversaw a period under which the 
military became involved in manufacturing and food production on an 
unprecedented scale. By 1986 18% of food production was under the con-
trol of the National Services Projects Organization, run by the military 
(Alexander and Bassiouny 2014, 55). His anti-communism meant that the 
US saw him as a potentially more useful ally than Mubarak, a point Mu-
barak was well aware of. Following a scandal over allegedly smuggled wea-
ponry, Abu Ghazala was eventually demoted, but these events demon-
strate the continuing threat posed by the military: as depoliticized as they 
may have been by the end of the 1980s, they still had a strong enough 
material and ideological basis from which to challenge other fractions of 
the ruling class. 
 One of the most common sentiments about the military is that it 
controls around 30-40% of the Egyptian economy. These claims are diffi-
cult to prove for two reasons. First, it is likely that this is an exaggeration. 
Following the events of 2011, a Financial Times analyst wrote that the 
military’s “reputed economic ‘empire’…is considerably more modest in 
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volume than is commonly believed, and has probably shrunk in propor-
tion to a national economy that has grown by more than 3% annually since 
2003 […] Although a few generals are rumoured to have become rich, the 
main purpose is to ameliorate the impact of a rapidly privatizing economy 
on the living standards of officers,” (Sayigh 2011, 11). Kandil supports this 
line of reasoning, arguing that the army’s concern had always been to sup-
ply army personnel with enough of a wage to live decently, at a time when 
the upper-middle and upper classes were consuming ever more luxurious 
goods. He writes: 
 
“While military spending in the mid-1970s represented as 
much as 33 percent of the country’s GDP, it fell significantly 
afterwards to 19.5 percent in 1980 and further down to 2.2 
percent in 2010 – reaching its lowest level in Egypt’s recorded 
history. In money terms, defense expenditures oscillated be-
tween approximately $2.4 and $4.2 billion during Mubarak’s 
three-decade term, without ever being adjusted for the erosive 
effects of inflation, the ever-mounting cost of technology, or 
the tenfold increase in Egypt’s GDP from around $17.8 to 
$188 billon between 1980 and 2010.27 Moreover, the cele-
brated $1.3 billion provided annually by the U.S. had depreci-
ated in real terms by at least 50 percent since the Peace Treaty 
was signed in 1979,” (2012, 322).  
 
Some have argued that American military aid gave the military an enor-
mous economic resource, an argument Kandil also disproves. The political 
conditions that were part of the aid package had long disturbed the army, 
specifically the de-militarization of Sinai (Ibid, 327). Similarly, Bou Nassif 
points out that while top ranking officers may have had access to high 
positions because of state patronage, mid-ranking and low-ranking mili-
tary men had to survive on less than $300 a day (2013, 516). Housing and 
medical facilities were available to anyone in the military, and there was 
always the goal of reaching the high ranks, where financial and political 
rewards were promising. Indeed out of 156 governors appointed under 
Mubarak, 65 were from the military. 
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Table 3.1 
Source: Bou Nassif 2013, 517. 
 
We see that alongside military officers, police officers were also a signifi-
cant pool from which governors were drawn. Once officers were drawn 
into this system of patronage they often became part of corruption scan-
dals.68 
 Another constraint facing the army because of Infitah was that they 
could no longer recruit from the middle and upper-middle classes. Sadat 
wanted to free up these classes to work in the new and expanding private 
sector, and therefore changed the conscription criteria. Now college grad-
uates only had to serve nine months (Ibid, 331). The question of class and 
class mobility is indeed an important and often-neglected one. Kandil 
quotes Major General Ahmed Fakhr, who once noted, during the Sadat 
years, that until the economy was stabilized the military would not “for-
sake its members to the caprice of market forces; it is duty-bound to pro-
vide them at least with a decent living,” (2012, 320). On the one hand, the 
army continues to offer one of the few remaining avenues of social mo-
bility in Egypt, particularly to rural working class Egyptians. On the other 
hand, as the military’s importance declined beginning in the 1970s, they 
were unable to maintain the standards needed to attract middle-class 
Egyptians. Thus we see the effects of both processes: the continuing im-
portance of the military as an institution in the eyes of poor Egyptians; 
                                                 
68 See: Bou Nassif 2013, 518. 
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and the decline of the military because of the lack of a pool of well-edu-
cated Egyptians to draw on for leadership purposes.  
 The second problem with asserting that the military owns 30-40% 
of the Egyptian economy is a methodological one. As Maha Abdelrahman 
notes, “No accurate estimate of the size of the military economy is feasible 
in a country like Egypt. The term ‘military economy’ is fraught with meth-
odological ambiguities making it difficult to determine what to include and 
exclude. Official figures show a very low 2% of GDP,” (Abdelrahman 
2014, 21). What is more useful is to instead trace the specific benefits ac-
crued by the military as an institution. Above all, the military has autonomy 
over its budget; it is central to Egypt’s public bureaucracy—particularly 
through the organization it runs called the Authority for Organization and 
Administration; it has somewhat developed its own class that makes it au-
tonomous from other institutions (Ibid, 76); and it has access to state re-
sources—both material and social—through the appointment of military 
men to top political posts. 
 The question of the military and the economy is key because it is 
often presented as the reason behind the military’s continuing power in 
Egypt today. It is argued that under Sadat there was a depoliticization of 
the military whereby they were removed from political power but were 
instead given an economic empire—or at least, access to a wider range of 
investment opportunities. This depoliticization is at the heart of the ques-
tions posed in this section. Some scholars—indeed, the majority—posit 
that the Sadat regime successfully “bought off” the military by redirecting 
them towards lucrative economic investments under Infitah.69 Sadat had 
created the National Service Projects Organization as a mechanism 
through which the army would be directed towards national development 
projects.  
 One of the main mechanisms through which the Egyptian military 
accumulates wealth is through the Arab Industrial Organization (AIO), 
started in 1975 with the aim of building Egypt’s military industrial power. 
The organization began with the production of rocket, military and missile 
vehicles but soon became involved in manufacturing non-military goods 
as well (Ibid, 526). This case is an example of how the military became 
part and parcel of Infitah by taking up the new investment opportunities 
                                                 
69 Springborg 1989; Sadowski 1993; Cook 2007; Droz-Vincent 2007. 
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and simultaneously turning away from the Nasserist bloc’s program of na-
tional development. The point here is not to romanticize the military un-
der the Nasserist bloc but rather to show the ways in which Infitah itself 
created new relations between fractions of capital within the ruling class. 
 There are therefore two major questions with regard to the Egyptian 
military and the 2011 revolution. The first is the position of the military 
before the revolution, and the second is about the military’s accumulation 
strategy. The first question is one that has been extensively debated, while 
the second has received less attention. The literature seems split between 
two positions: on the one hand, the idea that the military had been pushed 
out of power in the decades preceding the revolution, a position exempli-
fied by the work of Hazem Kandil (2012). On the other hand, there is the 
position that the military never lost the power they amassed during the 
Nasser period, and they continue to wield the same kind of influence today 
(Sayigh 2012).70 Maha Abdelrahman similarly argues that the military’s 
economic interests have benefitted from neoliberal restructuring under 
Mubarak, which she demonstrates by citing the promotion of military of-
ficers to positions within the private sector. At the same time she points 
out that the military was not the primary benefactor in Mubarak’s Egypt.  
 The question of the military and its relationship to the new domi-
nant fraction of capital is important in light of my argument that the two 
fractions had different accumulation strategies. Here, again, privatization 
is key. A concrete case to highlight this growing friction is that of the “pri-
vatization” of the Alexandria Shipyard in the 1990s. The Shipyard was 
supposed to be privatized, but after several failed privatizations it was in-
stead transferred to the Ministry of Defence. Alexander and Bassiouny 
argue that this indicates an attempt by the military to “frustrate neoliberal 
reforms” and protect its own interests (Ibid, 36). What is the difference 
between these two accumulation strategies? On the surface it would seem 
that one fraction—the military—sees the state as central to accumulation, 
while the other fraction—the so-called neoliberal elite—see the free mar-
ket as central. However once we accept that the state never really retreated 
from the market, this explanation becomes less tenable.  
                                                 
70 An important caveat is that Sayigh does argue that the military were no longer 
the central decision makers in Egypt under Sadat and Mubarak. 
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 The demilitarization of the army under the Infitah bloc should be 
seen as central to the changing position of the military in Egypt. The po-
sition of the state has always been key to accumulation and production, 
and therefore the removal of the military from state power—power they 
had previously monopolized—would clearly have an impact on the ability 
of the military to control the levers of production. This is not to say that 
the military did not have access to the economy or new investment op-
portunities—it is clear that under the Infitah bloc they did; but having ac-
cess is not the same as controlling the area, priorities and extent of invest-
ment itself. I want to propose a way of bringing these two extreme 
positions on the military pre-2011 together. Understanding the military as 
part of the historic bloc through each era allows us to trace the ways in 
which the military shifted in terms of other fractions of capital within the 
ruling class. Under the Nasserist bloc it is clear that the military were the 
center of the ruling class and historic bloc; there is little doubt that this 
shifted under the Infitah bloc and financial ruling class. We can see that 
post-2013, the military has once again come to the center. The historic 
bloc is therefore never static, but always shifting. Indeed the changing po-
sition of the military has been one of the major measures with which the 
rise and fall of historic blocs can be traced in Egypt. 
 Under this new ruling class, dominated by a new financial fraction 
of capital, it appears that because of the military’s alternate accumulation 
strategy historically, it was side-lined by the dominant fraction of capital un-
der this ruling class. The military, starting from the Nasserist bloc, repre-
sented the productive and national forms of capital. Industrialization and 
investment in infrastructure were two examples of how the military accu-
mulated capital, and indeed under Nasser the aim had been to create a 
ruling class that relied on national capital through industrialization. The 
Infitah bloc changed the position of the military within the ruling class, and 
by extension its accumulation strategy—or as a result its accumulation 
strategy—was side-lined under the increasing dominance of speculation, 
real estate, and finance capital in general. Indeed this bloc acted as a bridge 
to the new ruling class, under which accelerated neoliberalization ensured 
that finance capital dominated. To push this further, however, it is crucial 
to note that productive or national capital did not disappear; it remained, 
but was no longer the basis of accumulation as it had been under the Nas-
serist bloc. Financial capital was now that basis, along with the specific 
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contradictions it brought with it. Through understanding this displace-
ment, we can see why the military was not the center of the ruling class 
from the 1970s up until the 2000s. 
 This process can also shed light on the intervention of the military 
in 2011. The battle was not simply about who would control institutions 
or the state; it was a much larger battle about who would dominate the 
ruling class, and by extension, determine the accumulation strategy Egypt 
would follow post-revolution. Although beyond the scope of this disser-
tation, an interesting analysis would focus on the historic bloc formed in 
2013—with the military as the dominant fraction—and what types of ac-
cumulation strategies have been made central. It is highly possible that the 
military did not return to the accumulation strategy they were known for 
that emerged under the Nasserist bloc. It is possible instead that their in-
clusion within the Infitah bloc constituted them as a fraction that saw their 
future in financial rather than productive or industrial capital, a response 
to the dramatic and accelerated neoliberalization of the Egyptian economy 
over the past few decades. 
 
5.4 Labour’s Response  
 
Part of the failure to form a new historic bloc in the 1990s and 2000s 
was due to the inability to draw fractions of labour into the hegemonic 
project spearheaded by the new fraction of capital. We see that the Infitah 
bloc had been able to form a hegemony, albeit one that was weaker than 
the one under the Nasserist bloc. This fraction, on the other hand, was 
unable to form alliances with subaltern groups, and this is one of the cen-
tral reasons for the weak nature of this ruling class and its inability to create 
hegemony. This comes back to the failure on the part of this fraction to 
transcend their narrow interests in order to form a bloc. Moreover, labour 
agitation and resistance during this period was at an all-time high. This 
section aims to trace the ways in which this resistance has been under-
stood, as well as the contribution it made to the revolution itself. I begin 
by discussing the so-called split between political and economic grievances 
and how this has served to depoliticize fractions of labour in the Egyptian 
context. 
324  
 
 The delinking of the political from the economic has been one of 
the central ways in which the workers’ struggle in Egypt has been depolit-
icized. It has been noted that the struggles of workers and peasants have 
been characterized as being “narrowly focused on economic demands,” 
(Ibid, 117) as opposed to—one assumes—movements such as Kefaya and 
movements by peasants and workers but also because it assumed that eco-
nomic demands are “narrow.” This middle class bias extends to groups 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood as well, who have never established a 
strong support base among workers because of both their paternalistic and 
utilitarian approach, as well as their own class base. Rauf Abbas, a promi-
nent historian of the workers’ movement, writes: 
 
“In the history of our country, there are areas which have 
been far from the attention of researchers, who have re-
stricted their interest to the political side of Egypt’s develop-
ment. Some attention was given to the economic aspects; but 
they neglected the social sphere and only rarely attempted to 
delve into it and present studies that would shed light on ob-
scure events and explain social phenomena and their causes, 
so that the study of the past might provide a useful lesson for 
the development of our country in the present and future. The 
history of the Egyptian workers movement is one of the sub-
jects that deserves the serious attention of researchers. The 
workers today constitute the pillar of socialist construction in 
the period of the Revolution. It is our duty to trace their 
movement and its development, for it includes many of the 
social, political and economic phenomena significant to the 
history,” (Abbas 1967, 10). 
 
It is precisely this delinking of the economic from the political that allows 
for class, capitalism and imperialism to be decentred in much of the work 
on the Middle East. Indeed it is the capitalist process itself that serves to 
create a so-called binary between the political and economic. Maha Ab-
delrahman has explained the ways in which different groups in Egypt have 
chosen to focus either on the political or the economic, thus reproducing 
this false binary (2012, 620). She writes: 
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“Examining the nature of the demands of workers and unor-
ganized groups of citizens, one can easily see their overtly po-
litical character. By demanding potable water and effective 
garbage collection, disempowered and marginalized groups 
have been bringing the state and its agents to account and 
putting pressure on its institutions to be responsive and ac-
countable in the only way that was left open to them. Simi-
larly, labour protest to demand better pay and secure jobs is 
necessarily a political act. While the failure to see labour 
strikes and market-relations-based protests for economic ben-
efit as truly political is a huge analytical oversight, the unwill-
ingness to see the growing ‘political’ demands of Egyptian la-
bour during the last decade is tantamount to blindness,” 
(Ibid). 
 
This intervention from Abdelrahman is crucial to the debates surrounding 
fractions of labour in Egypt. Categorizing workers as non-threatening be-
cause their demands are economic—and not political—not only repro-
duces the problematic binary between the two but also serves to hide the 
fact that economic demands are by nature political. In other words, any de-
mand to change the structure of production affects accumulation, which 
in turn touches the very heart of politics: the ruling class. Abdelrahman 
goes on to give the great example of workers’ demands for economic se-
curity being highly political because they reference the Nasserist historic 
bloc, thus making a clear statement about the decay of the political order. 
Indeed this debate reminds me of the following scene from a novel by 
Gamal Atia Ibrahim called Down to the Sea: 
 
“Shatara laughed. ‘So it’s a question of politics!’ 
‘Politics is in everything,’ Girguis replied. ‘If you ate beans 
for breakfast, it’s politics, and if you had meat, it’s politics’,” 
(Mehrez 2011, 381). 
 
When workers in Egypt, under this new ruling class, rose up time after 
time, it was always a political challenge. Demands for pensions, job secu-
rity, wage increases and so on were a challenge to the very heart of the 
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political system, because they were a challenge to the accumulation strat-
egy put in place by the ruling class. Moreover, this challenge was being 
made to the financial fraction through references to the Nasserist historic 
bloc—one was being used to criticize the other. This highlights that what 
were seen as narrow economic demands always contained an implicit cri-
tique of the new ruling class—and explains why this fraction could not 
establish a historic bloc. The rest of this section traces the changes that 
happened under this new class that affected fractions of labour, as well as 
labour’s response. 
 The liberalization of Egypt’s economy brought with it new relations 
between labour and capital. Through the reduction of trade barriers, an 
increase in foreign direct investment, and the deregulation of markets, 
Egypt was to become more competitive globally. What this essentially 
meant was an assault on the working classes. Alongside rapid privatization, 
moves were made to deregulate labour. The labour force was to become 
more flexible and casual, according to guidelines suggested by the IMF 
and World Bank. In order to drive workers towards the private sector, the 
public sector could not have better working conditions. Temporary con-
tracts became more commonplace and it became easier for workers to be 
fired (Hanieh 2014, 70). Brecht de Smet has argued that this represented 
the state withdrawing from the moral economy pact it had established with 
workers during the 1950s (2012, 146). 
 Any discussion of labour under the new ruling class has to take the 
acceleration of privatization as a major event. As Ikram notes: 
 
“A main reason for the government’s hesitation in launching 
the privatization program was the effect that this would have 
on the labor employed in the privatized enterprises. It was no 
secret that public enterprises suffered from a surfeit of labor. 
It was inevitable that if these enterprises were to be made at-
tractive to the private sector, the excess labor would have to 
be shed. Several measures were adopted to help cushion the 
impact: creation of the Social Fund for Development; offer 
of early retirement packages,” (2007, 82). 
 
By the 1990s, this hesitation was abandoned and privatization moved for-
ward. Labour responded fervently to this change in pace. Indeed by 2000, 
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a proposed labour law that would have taken away significant rights from 
workers was in its 17th version. The National Committee in Defence of 
Workers Rights was formed, whose aim was to increase labour’s say in the 
new law. Earlier, in 1993, the National Committee to Combat Privatiza-
tion had been formed. Alongside this, a massive wave of strikes was en-
gulfing Egypt. As Kamel Abbas has noted, “The only way to understand 
the wave of strikes that have taken place…is that they only have one thing 
in common: they are targeting—at least in part—the measures taken 
within the framework of privatization,” (Paczyńska 2010, 188). An addi-
tional important point about this new labour law was its aim to creating 
and deepening a division between temporary and permanent workers, thus 
attempting to fragment the working class (Makram Ebeid 2012, 29). The 
labour law also marks a transition from the Nasserist bloc’s promise of 
stable lifetime employment to workers in the public sector to the neolib-
eral bloc’s withdrawal of that promise and its imposition of flexible and 
precarious work conditions. These kinds of shifts which are major but 
which take place over decades are key to the story of the rise and fall of 
historic blocs, but can only be traced historically.  
 These changes did not affect all workers in the same way. In her 
research on steel workers in Egypt, Dina Makram Ebeid argues that the 
onset of neoliberal reforms in 1991, which along with other changes in the 
state allowed some workers to access state resources while dispossessing 
others, creating a situation of unevenness (2012). Her fieldwork focuses 
on the Egyptian Iron and Steel Company (EISCO), founded under Nasser 
as part of his industrialization program. It was a company that held major 
symbolic capital as the symbol of Egypt’s independent future. In a telling 
passage, Makram Ebeid narrates the ways in which the lives of company 
workers were changed by becoming part of this company: 
 
“In time, permanent workers at EISCO acquired a status in 
their communities and had higher expectations about the sort 
of lives they should lead. ʿamm ʿUmar, a production worker 
said that when buying clothes in Helwan, he never tells the 
salesperson he works at EISCO; otherwise they would triple 
the price. Responding to my surveys in the plant, many replied 
to the question, “What is the most important benefit you 
gained from working at EISCO?” with “kul ha ̄ga” (‘every-
thing’) and workers often described the plant with generous 
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terms such as al-sharika dih ʾummi ʿata ̄ʾha ̄ gheir mutana ̄hi ̄ 
(‘this company is my mother, it gives endlessly’), or “I did not 
own land, but this job is my piece of land” or “I am retiring 
from the plant as a bey”. Their reflections explain how the 
stability of their work allowed them to plan for the future and 
to make their aspirations for upward social mobility concrete, 
whether through offering their children the opportunity of 
higher education or through stable jobs in the plant, building 
family houses for their nuclear families, marrying their chil-
dren into well-off families, or buying land. Hajj Medhat, a re-
tired worker, summarised the life conditions of many workers 
in a somewhat intense way when he said: “we were nothing 
when we came to the plant, now we have become something, 
a big thing”. Those who joined the plant later as temporary 
workers starting from 2007 lived a different reality condi-
tioned by the devaluation of EISCO’s market status since the 
1980’s,” (Ibid, 22).  
 
This emphasis on stability is what demonstrates the change following the 
neoliberal reforms. Indeed the number of workers was cut in half follow-
ing these reforms, demonstrating in immediate attack on the sense of se-
curity or stability of these workers. By 1991 there was a halt in hiring new 
employees, and early retirement packages were introduced.  
 Most importantly, specific reforms introduced under the new ruling 
class made it impossible for different types of workers to see production 
as a common interest (Ibid, 86). Pointing out that management and work-
ers do not necessarily correlate to capital and labour, she shows how en-
gineers in EISCO began to see themselves in solidarity with workers fol-
lowing the neoliberal reforms. Engineers lost their prestige and hence their 
power, and thus ended up aligning with workers in order to subvert the 
very structures that created their deteriorating position (Ibid, 106). Here 
we see how Gramsci’s discussion of the different levels/moments in 
workers’ consciousness is useful: we see how engineers have transcended 
the individual level and are now forming solidarity with workers outside 
of their sectors through recognizing their common positions as workers. 
 By the 1990s, when accelerated neoliberalization was looming over 
Egypt, there was also an acceleration of labour activism. On the one hand, 
the ETUC directly challenged the regime over its privatization plans and 
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how this was to affect the public sector. On the other hand, other organ-
izations and workers engaged in direct actions. While some have argued 
that the ETUC challenged the privatization program, others have posited 
that the ETUC’s role vis-à-vis the neoliberalization of Egypt demonstrates 
the ways in which by the 1990s the organization had become a mechanism 
through which the state could control various fractions of labour. Alexan-
der and Bassiouny argue that the ETUC did not challenge privatization 
because of pressure from workers, but that they did so because they were 
part and parcel of the hegemonic project of the historic bloc. This would 
suggest that the financial bloc had indeed managed to form alliances with 
fractions of labour, a line of arguing I suggest is unfounded. They cite the 
fact that the ETUC declared its support for privatization policies in 1991 
and list a host of examples whereby the union did not back workers (2014, 
137). They also state that the lower levels of the ETUC should be seen as 
separate from the upper levels, which had been corrupted and therefore 
no longer served labour’s interests, and should therefore be seen as an 
extension of the state bureaucracy (Ibid, 143).  
 On the one hand, Alexander and Bassiouny make the important 
point that the ETUC structure was changing as historic blocs shifted 
(Ibid)—by the 1990s and 2000s it was indeed the case that the organiza-
tion could not be said to be serving the interests of labour. On the other 
hand, their argument suggests that this places the ETUC within the his-
toric bloc of the period, an assertion I find problematic. What seems clear 
is that the ETUC adopted a whole range of positions over time, showing 
that there were most likely tensions within the organization vis-à-vis the 
hegemonic project of the new historic bloc. Thus it cannot be said that 
they were part of the bloc. Moreover, their waning power and the fact that 
they did not adopt consistent positions means that by the late 1990s, many 
fractions of labour no longer looked to them as a representative organiza-
tion. Strikes and actions began to bypass the ETUC, and they no longer 
formed a major part of negotiating teams. This decline meant a resurgence 
in workers’ self-organization as a means of challenging capital (Ibid, 154). 
Moreover, in any discussion about the ETUC it is crucial to note the ways 
in which workers were materially tied to it—pensions, healthcare and 
other subsidies were dependent on membership in state trade unions. This 
has to be made clear in discussions about workers resisting state trade un-
ions as well as in discussions about the proliferation of independent trade 
unions post-2011—indeed by 2013 there were more than 1000.  
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 By 2011, some of the major organizing by workers focused on dis-
mantling the ETUC and replacing it with independent unions. The first 
independent union began to be developed in 2007 after the successful tax 
collectors’ strike. The union was formed to oversee the implementation of 
the agreement reached following the strike. The strike had been an explic-
itly political one that challenged the power of the state itself, as well as the 
power of the ETUC who were side-lined throughout. The strike took the 
form of a sit-in, and soon losses for the Property Tax Agency were at 
LE300 million (Ibid, 164). Three days later, on December 12, negotiations 
that ended at 4 am led to the government agreeing to implement the de-
mands of the strikers. The resulting pay rise of 300% was significant. The 
success of the strike led the organizing committee to institutionalize itself 
into an organization: a new and independent labour union called the Real 
Estate Tax Authority Union (RETAU). 
 
“By December 2008 the Permanent Committee had recruited 
a membership of nearly 30,000 across all 26 provinces, around 
a third of them women. The picture of the union’s internal 
structures […] reveals the depth of the roots that had grown 
out of the strike. The union claimed membership in every 
province,” (Ibid, 167). 
 
Thus the self-organization of workers as a response to the weakness of 
the ETUC suggests that we should not assume that the ruling class had 
successfully aligned major fractions of labour as part of their project. The 
opposite seems true, even as new policies introduced by the bloc served 
to divide fractions of labour from one another. This is precisely why I 
argue that there was no historic bloc in place, nor hegemony: the intellec-
tual reforms and alliances needed to form both of these were not culti-
vated by the new fraction of capital. 
 Migration of workers is another key aspect of labour under this his-
toric bloc. Samir Amin has referred to migration of lower and middle class 
Egyptians as a “safety valve” that allowed the regime to stay in power 
(2012, 21). Indeed migration can be seen as one of the most concrete re-
sponses by labour towards policies of both the Infitah bloc and the finan-
cial fraction of capital: having given up on living a decent life in Egypt, 
they moved abroad. We only have to look at literature and film, as well as 
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anthropological work, to see that even while being treated badly in places 
like the Gulf or Europe, Egyptians preferred migration over the increas-
ingly pointless struggle of trying to subsist in Egypt. Amin’s point is 
equally important: migration certainly helped the individuals who mi-
grated, but it also helped the ruling class by acting as a valve that released 
pressure.  
 Resistance to neoliberal reforms came from another significant frac-
tion of labour: peasants. Indeed land reform was the first target of reform 
under the Nasserist bloc, and was also the first target of reform under the 
neoliberal bloc, demonstrating both its material and symbolic significance. 
In the middle of the 1990s, the law eliminating rent ceilings was removed, 
and farmer protests began. In some instances farmers blocked railway lines 
to prevent trains coming from and going to Cairo (Mitchell 2002, 265). 
The law was implemented in 1997, after which there was an escalation in 
protests. According to the Land Center for Human Rights, 1997 and 1998 
49 people were killed in disputes relating to the new law, 956 were injured, 
and 2,785 were arrested (Ibid). Timothy Mitchell notes that the impact of 
this law had different effects across villages, because each village had its 
own history of tenancy and land ownership. Despite this, the statistics are 
staggering: half of tenant farmers affected by the new law became landless, 
while the other half continued farming on other plots they owned or be-
cause they managed to negotiate with their tenants (Ibid). 
 An important point about fractions of labour and the ways in which 
they resist comes from the excellent work being done by economic an-
thropologists such as Dina Makram Ebeid (2012). Much work on labour 
resistance has focused on over actions such as work stoppages, strikes, sit 
ins, and demonstrations, as well as on whether workers have participated 
in political movements and demonstrations. While this is important and 
tends to be focused on because it is easier to notice and thus study, daily 
acts of resistance are also part and parcel of the ways in which workers 
resist capitalism. Jokes, everyday stories, family arrangements and relations 
within the workplace are all part of the everyday, and are central to a 
worker’s state of being. Makram Ebeid shows, for example, how aging 
machinery at EISCO led to the increased breakdown of machines, which 
in turn led to frequent work stoppages. These lapses in production were 
blamed on workers, who were penalized for them. She shows how when 
these breakdowns happened, workers always gathered collectively in order 
to try and resolve the issue, and always tried to make sure that no one 
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single person got blamed. When these codes of solidarity were broken by 
someone, this person was often ostracized:  
 
“Shaʿban was ostracised for not expanding the relations of 
trust, the values of collectivity and the investment in the well-
being of others. These practices were largely valued on the 
shop-floor and were practiced everyday through the collective 
negotiation of work. Relations among workers were thus not 
just a product of the division of labour or of the production 
process, but their power and ability to influence everyday pol-
itics comes from their entanglement with the values that peo-
ple hold and their ability to reproduce the moral and cosmic 
logic that guides the community. These relations produced 
workers’ solidarity and control of the shop-floor,” (Ibid, 83). 
 
This type of solidarity is crucial to understanding labour and their re-
sistance to increasingly bad conditions. This would provide an important 
intervention to studies of Egyptian labour, which focus almost exclusively 
on actions taken by workers against their working conditions. Economic 
ethnographies instead show the micro level of workers’ resistance. Even 
during times when strikes, demonstrations or sit-ins are not happening, 
for a whole range of possible reasons, these micro practices of resistance 
show a form of consciousness amongst workers that should not be ig-
nored. Indeed this type of consciousness disproves theses on Egyptian 
labour that argue that they lack the type of consciousness needed for 
meaningful or successful resistance.  
 
5.4.1 The Mahalla Fine Weaving and Spinning Factory Strike 
 
The Mahalla Fine Weaving and Spinning Factory is the largest factory 
in the Middle East and Africa, and employs one quarter of Egypt’s entire 
public sector textile labour force (Abdelrahman 2014, 56). In 2006 Prime 
Minister Ahmed Nazif tried to address rising worker unrest by promising 
all public sector workers a raise in their annual bonus. When workers from 
the Mahalla Fine Weaving and Spinning Plant arrived to collect their bo-
nuses, they received only the old bonus amount. This led to a spontaneous 
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demonstration made up of 10,000 workers. The number doubled the next 
day when security forces tried to control the crowd (De Smet 2012, 147).  
 
“The Mahalla strikes are the story of a particular economic 
struggle for livelihoods that developed into a fight for general 
labor rights. Neo-formations such as strike committees, mass 
meetings, sit-ins, and “tent cities” stimulated collective debate 
and decision making and transformed the worker activity sys-
tem,” (Ibid). 
 
The official trade union position was that workers did not have a valid 
cause to strike. Despite this, the Minister of Labour, Ai’sha Abdel-Hadi, 
announced that the demands of the workers would be met and that strike 
days would be seen as a paid holiday. 
 The 2006 Mahalla strike has often been labelled one of the key mo-
ments for labour in Egypt. It was a strike, and not a sit-in or work stop-
page, and it ended with the government giving in to all demands rather 
than security forces violently breaking it up (Alexander and Bassiouny 
2014, 103). In 2007 there was another strike to demand the profit-sharing 
bonus as laid down by law, as well as pay rises (Ibid, 118). This strike was 
extremely well organized, and also ended through negotiation rather than 
state-inflicted violence. Most of the workers’ demands were granted. The 
2008 strike, however, ended very differently. Security forces violently pre-
vented workers from demonstrating, and also responded violently when 
demonstrations broke out in the town of Mahalla itself. One person was 
shot, and hundreds injured arrested. What some have called a local upris-
ing was brutally crushed (Ibid, 120). 
 Most scholars have tended to situate these strikes within the grow-
ing “protest culture” that was spreading across Egypt. According to this 
narrative, Kefaya and other political movements and groups were part of 
the reason why workers began to strike. It is important to note here that 
the ways in which growing political movements and groups such as Kefaya 
were accused of what De Smet had called colonizing the workers’ struggle, 
through ignoring workers’ demands and subsuming their struggle inside 
that of the political group: “The colonizing attitude of civil-democratic 
actors led on 6 April 2008 to an important setback for the entire Egyptian 
workers’ movement. When Mahalla worker leaders and activists planned 
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a new strike, some political groups, bloggers, and student activists seized 
the event to call for a “general strike” or “day of anger” against the regime, 
without, however, organizing anything on the ground,” (Ibid, 150). This 
is very different from what Gramsci called for if there is to be an alterna-
tive hegemony, whereby different classes realize their common interests 
and unite against the ruling class. 
 This touches on the ways in which different fractions of labour re-
sponded to the new ruling class. Industrial and textile workers, such as 
those at Mahalla, seemed to be more radicalized than workers in middle-
class professions, who tended to be part of movements like Kefaya. Doc-
tors, engineers and so on were active through their syndicates, and have 
often taken a stance against the new historic bloc’s increasingly neoliberal 
and coercive policies, but the class division between them and the working 
class or peasants played a notable role in uniting the various fractions of 
labour. 
  The eventual defeat at Mahalla was a message to workers not to step 
out of line when challenging the new ruling class. Whereas before, partic-
ularly under the Infitah bloc, we see that the ruling class often gave in to 
worker demands and that a process of negotiation took place, the violent 
repression at Mahalla suggests a shift in tactic that can be explained by the 
emergence of a new fraction. As Maha Abdelrahman has noted, the new 
dependency on negotiation and settling labour disputes rather than using 
raw violence demonstrated what she calls “the new variant of capitalism 
in Egypt” represented by a new type of business owner that used cost-
benefit analysis rather than automatic violence (Abdelrahman 2014, 59). 
This points to a shift in the relations between fractions of capital and la-
bour. As we see a new mode of accumulating capital, we also see a new 
form of disciplining labour. The violence used against labour during the 
Nasserist and Infitah blocs was substituted for negotiation with labour—
but while this may seem positive on the surface, it is useful to remember 
that this shift also came with increasing insecurity in the workplace in 
terms of job contracts, salaries, pensions, and social services. In effect 
workers found themselves negotiating for things that they had under the 
Nasserist bloc and that were slowly being taken away. At the same time, 
the violent crushing of the 2008 Mahalla strike indicates a change in this 
policy of negotiation. Why? I suggest that by the late 2000s the contradic-
tions of this bloc—namely its inability to form alliances with enough frac-
tions of capital and with any fractions of labour, and its resulting inability 
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to extend its hegemonic project—had become so severe that coercion be-
came the means of survival for the ruling class. this turn to brutal coercion 
was not just on show in labour strikes, but extended to the entire society, 
as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.5 Coercion, Hegemony, and the Failure to Establish a 
Historic Bloc 
 
What is beyond dispute is that increasing levels of coercion were nec-
essary to maintain stability under this new ruling class. The 2000s—the 
decade during which this new fraction consolidated itself—saw a rapid 
expansion of internal security forces, and a spike in the brutality and vio-
lence used by these forces against those seen as a threat to the status quo. 
By 2010, this latter group had come to include almost all Egyptians. I want 
to use the expansion of coercion to end this chapter in order to demon-
strate that this fraction was ultimately unable to create a historic bloc. In-
deed even if the events of 2011 had not happened, the increasing reliance 
on coercion, materially and ideologically, demonstrates that the ruling class 
was weak.  
 In 1997, Habib al-Adly was appointed Minister of the Interior, and 
was to remain in that post for over fourteen years. Adly was a graduate of 
the Police Academy and was known for having expanded the practice of 
using thugs during elections to intimidate voters. Notably, he was close to 
the Policies Committee, which represented the dominant fraction within 
the ruling class. Between 1988 and 2002, expenditure on the Interior Min-
istry went from 3.5% of GDP to 6% (Kandil 2012, 336). Not only did 
police wages increase, bribery also became more commonplace as police 
began to target more and more people. An important shift was when po-
lice began to target Egyptians not involved in overtly political activities. 
Indeed in 2010, this realization was made visible through the torture and 
killing of Khaled Said in Alexandria. On June 6, 2010, two police officers 
entered an Internet café and began asking for people’s ID cards. 28-year-
old Khaled Said objected to being searched without a warrant. He was 
then attacked physically by the police officers, before being dragged out 
of the café and into a nearby street, where the officers smashed his head 
into a concrete wall. They then threw him into their car, only to return 
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minutes later to dump his corpse onto the street (Abdelaty, 2000). While 
the Ministry of Interior claimed Said had died because he swallowed drugs 
he was carrying, photo- graphic evidence of Said’s smashed up face spread 
rapidly through social media, throwing doubt onto the official story. 
Demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria followed, but paramilitary and 
riot police forces crushed them violently. A Facebook page entitled We 
are all Khaled Said (Kolena Khaled Said) was started and became one of the 
prominent sources of information before and during the uprising. For 
many Egyptians, Khaled Said represented a normal, middle-class youth 
who was not politically active, thus allowing them to identify with him. 
His death seemed to highlight that no one was immune to police brutality 
(Salem 2015, 33). 
 Some have argued that the increased coercion was a result of Mu-
barak himself. Springborg, for example, writes that Mubarak’s “passion 
for security was obsessive,” (1987, 27). Similarly, Kandil writes: “Mubarak 
adopted an unorthodox security strategy, which rather than targeting ma-
jor opposition groups, kept the entire society paralyzed with fear through 
a dizzying pattern of detention, release, and then re- detention, striking 
almost randomly at various activists, common citizens, and even some of 
the ruling elites without explanation,” (2012, 341). On the other hand I 
believe it is more useful to look to the position of the new ruling class to 
understand why coercion became so necessary. The argument that Mu-
barak was obsessed with his safety somewhat hints at the fact that his re-
gime, compared to previous ones, was not as stable. I want to push this 
further and look at the inability of this new fraction to establish a historic 
bloc.  
 It is important here to address political science’s main “innovation” 
when it comes to Egyptian politics during the 1990s and 2000s: the con-
cept of cronyism. Indeed this has become an overused mantra that is sup-
posed to explain all of Egypt’s problems using a single concept. Conven-
iently, this concept places the blame for Egypt’s social, economic and 
political problems squarely on the shoulders of Egyptians themselves, 
sometimes even relying on old cultural tropes of Arabs as being especially 
prone to corruption and nepotism. “For these authors, an imperfect eco-
nomic liberalization allowed weakening regimes, coming out of the crisis 
of state-led growth during the 1950s-70s, to redefine the rules of the game 
by building alliances with the business elite in ways to dominate the busi-
ness sector and use it as a source of patronage,” (Chekir and Diwan 2013, 
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3). Here we see that an imperfect economic liberalization was what led to 
the reliance on cronyism to solve the emerging contradictions. I have tried 
to show instead that it was economic liberalization itself that led to the 
emergence of a ruling class unable to make alliances with any fractions of 
capital and labour outside of its own fraction and thus failing to create a 
strong historic bloc or a hegemonic project that would allow for capital 
accumulation and maintain stability. The inability of this bloc to form al-
liances with other fractions is a key reason for its eventual downfall. Bu-
reaucrats from the Nasserist bloc, landowners and the agrarian fraction of 
capital, and industrialists were all left out of this bloc.  
 Proponents of the thesis of “imperfect liberalization” suggest that 
the lack of political liberalization or a pluralizing of the political system 
was what made the entire liberalization project fail. This seems to suggest 
that had the political system been open, liberalization could have gone 
ahead as though it had the support of most of the population. In fact it is 
the opposite: the majority of Egyptians, and specifically the majority of 
fractions of labour, were against economic liberalization. Political space 
had to be constricted and closed for the liberalization project to be put in place. 
Alongside this argument, it is useful to look at the literature arguing that 
economic liberalization increased authoritarianism in Egypt (Kienle 2001, 
El Tarouty 2015).  
 Perhaps one of the central questions of this chapter, and of the dis-
sertation as a whole, is the role of the state, the regime and the new dom-
inant fraction of capital. On the one hand neoliberal common sense would 
have it that as neoliberalization occurs, the role of the state shrinks and 
the power of those associated with the free market expands. This, how-
ever, ignores the fact that the free market needs the state to act in certain 
ways to ensure that markets can work—in other words, the state must 
intervene, but only in ways beneficial to accumulation through neoliberal-
ism. On the other hand, it seems clear that in Egypt the role of the state 
and the regime did not diminish as neoliberalization deepened. One ex-
planation is that the state was “in on it” and therefore supported the eco-
nomic liberalization because of that. Another more convincing explana-
tion is that the ruling class that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s did what 
every other ruling class had done: use the state for its own project. This 
amounted to nothing less than using the state to redirect accumulation and 
production according to the project of accelerated neoliberalization. So it 
was never a question of whether the state was controlling capitalists or 
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whether capitalists were controlling the state—it had always been and con-
tinues to be a question of which fractions of capital are using the state to 
direct production and accumulation. In some sense this matches the sec-
ond theory—that capitalists always control the state—but it is more com-
plex than individual capitalists using the state for their own ends; Ahmed 
Ezz, for example, using the NDP to expand his steel monopoly. The state 
is not an instrument to be used merely by individual capitalists, but is part 
and parcel of the historic bloc; it is always in line with the hegemonic pro-
ject of the bloc in power. It is a key part of the ruling class. Questions of 
autonomy of capitalists from the state and vice versa therefore miss the 
point. 
 By 2010 the failure to form a bloc had left the ruling class no choice 
but to resort to high levels of coercion to maintain stability. The increased 
focus on finance at the expense of productive capital had transformed the 
economy into one that relied heavily on importing basic goods, that was 
dominated by Gulf capital, and that was saturated with investment oppor-
tunities for luxury goods, primarily luxury real estate. It is no surprise then 
that the gaps between classes had grown to an all-time high, and that eco-
nomically the poor were finding it more and more difficult to survive. At 
the same time, neoliberal norms and values such as individualism, self-
support and entrepreneurship had failed to become hegemonic and justify 
the hegemonic project of the bloc itself. Indeed the 2011 revolution was 
saturated with calls for a return to social welfare, showing just how weak 
the financial bloc’s ideational push had been. This can be traced back to 
the failure of the new fraction to incorporate enough fractions of capital 
and labour by transcending its narrow interests and forming a bloc. Trac-
ing the previous two blocs, we see that the historic bloc’s size had been 
steadily decreasing, and that the financial fraction of capital failed to even 
create a bloc, and therefore failed to avoid the organic crisis that led to the 
events of January 25th 2011. 
 The focus of this chapter has been on the emergence of a new frac-
tion of capital. Much of the literature on Egypt in the 1990s and 2000s 
acknowledges the emergence of a new elite, but rarely has this elite been 
conceptualized as a fraction of capital, or, in other words, vis-à-vis its po-
sition to production. I have argued that what characterizes this new frac-
tion is accelerated neoliberalization. This fraction has been called the “ne-
oliberal elite” in much of the literature on Egypt, betraying its allegiance 
to neoliberalism as an accumulation strategy. I have argued it may be more 
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accurate to characterize them as a financial fraction instead. I also argue 
against the tendency to label them “crony capitalist” and rather locate the 
increasing levels of corruption in the acceleration of neoliberalization. In-
deed it is under this fraction that the dominance of financial capital over 
productive capital is completed, leading to the organic crisis of 2011. 
 I have argued that the start of this period—the late 1980s—is char-
acterized by a period of tranformismo, in which Hosni Mubarak attempts to 
save the declining Infitah bloc. This ultimately fails as we see the emergence 
of a new fraction of capital. This was to have dramatic effects on a key 
player within the ruling class: the military. The battle of 2011 was not 
simply about who would control the institutions of the state but about 
who would dominate the ruling class.  
 This new fraction of capital was ultimately unable to create a historic 
bloc or hegemony. The increasing levels of coercion are one sign of this, 
as well as its inability to transcend its narrow interests to other fractions 
of capital such as the military. Yet again we see the focus on an individual 
ruler looking for power in much of the literature, whereby Mubarak is seen 
as having turned towards violence as a means of keeping himself in power. 
Instead I have argued that the dominance of coercion is due to the non-
existence of a historic bloc. 
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6 
Concluding Remarks: 
Why 2011? 
 
 
“If the ruling class has lost consensus, that is, if it no longer 
“leads” but only “rules”—it possesses sheer coercive 
power—this actually means that the great masses have be-
come detached from traditional ideologies, they no longer be-
lieve what they previously used to believe, etc. The crisis con-
sists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new 
cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of 
the most varied kind come to pass.” 
- Antonio Gramsci (1992, 32). 
 
The story of the 2011 revolution has two beginnings. The first can be 
located in the two decades leading up to the revolution itself; decades dur-
ing which there was an important shift within the ruling class that was to 
accelerate Egypt’s neoliberalization. This in turn resulted in unprece-
dented numbers of workers’ strikes and actions, with a total of over two 
million Egyptian workers taking part in actions through the 2000s. The 
second beginning goes back much further. It would be a mistake to as-
sume that 2011 can be explained by looking at the decades that preceded 
it. Instead, I have argued that we need to go back at least one century to 
understand why in 2011 Egypt saw a revolution demanding bread, free-
dom and social justice. The reason for this temporal choice—after all, one 
can always go back further and further—is because it was almost one cen-
tury ago that the capitalist mode of production became a major part of 
Egypt’s trajectory. My main argument is that the increasing expansion of 
the capitalist mode of production can explain many of the changes in 
Egypt’s ruling class over time. In particular, by looking at changes in the 
mode of production, we can trace the rise and fall of various historic blocs. 
It is only by adopting a longue durée perspective that looks at patterns and 
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disjunctures over a significant period of time that we can answer the cen-
tral question of this dissertation: why did the revolution happen in 2011? 
I have attempted to answer this question by tracing the various historic 
blocs and ruling classes in modern Egyptian history. In order to answer 
the overarching question of the research project, I will answer the question 
of why the final historic bloc fell in 2011.  
 
6.1 Why 2011? 
 
Finally we arrive at the main question this dissertation seeks to answer: 
why did the revolution happen in 2011? The broad answer to this is that 
by 2011 there was no historic bloc in place, nor a hegemonic project that 
could either prevent the conditions that ultimately created an organic cri-
sis, nor withstand an uprising once it took place. Egypt’s first historic bloc 
was created in 1952 following formal independence from Britain. The Free 
Officers were able to go beyond their own narrow interests in order to 
create a historic bloc around numerous fractions of capital and labour. 
This was done through particular moral and intellectual reforms, through 
which they were able to establish and maintain hegemony. 1967 repre-
sented the organic crisis that was to bring about the decline of the Nas-
serist bloc and the rise of a new Infitah bloc based on social forces that 
were already beginning to become dominant by the mid-1960s. The Infitah 
bloc was dominated by a fraction of capital—emerging businessmen—
that was also able to move beyond its own narrow interests in order to 
draw other fractions of capital and labour into the bloc. This bloc was not 
as hegemonic as the Nasserist bloc, but nonetheless did establish a hege-
monic project. By the time Sadat was assassinated and Mubarak came to 
power, the Infitah bloc was declining and there was a period of transfor-
mation, during which there were attempts to stabilize the bloc. By the mid-
1990s, however, we see a rival fraction of capital emerge that sealed the 
fate of the Infitah bloc. This new fraction attempted to create a historic 
bloc but ultimately this attempt failed. This is why by 2011, there was no 
historic bloc nor hegemony to speak of, a far cry from the 1950s Nasserist 
era.  
 The ruling class that was in power from the mid-1990s until 2011 
not only failed to create a bloc, it also put in place several other processes. 
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First, the precarious balance between political stability and capital accu-
mulation was destroyed; in other words, accumulation happened at such 
an intense rate that social tensions exploded. This was due to their project 
of accelerated neoliberalization. This meant that there was an increasing 
need to rely on coercion in order to maintain power. The second reason 
is that the fraction of capital dominating this bloc began to accumulate 
capital in ways that directly threatened the accumulation of other fractions. 
Additionally, because there was no bloc, there was no attempt to bring 
fractions of labour into an alliance with the dominant fraction. The final 
reason is that this fraction failed to resolve some of the key structural 
problems of the Egyptian economy that were present before 1952 and that 
returned in the 1970s. Increasing reliance on foreign capital—whether 
Western or Gulf—as well as the marginalization of productive capital—
meant that Egypt’s economy became a highly financialized one. Taken to-
gether, these three elements can explain why by 2011 an organic crisis 
erupted that toppled the ruling class. Precisely because it was a failed at-
tempt at creating a bloc and hegemony, any organic crisis would have been 
a serious threat. All three elements are connected to this fact, and I briefly 
explore each in the form of a dialectic below. Indeed since 1952 the size 
of Egypt’s various blocs had been decreasing, both in size as well as heg-
emonic power. By 2011, there was not even a bloc in place.  
 
6.1.1 Coercion and Consent  
 
The first dialectic is Gramsci’s famous formula of coercion and con-
sent, key to understanding the failure of this final ruling class. Gramsci 
argues that if a bloc is hegemonic, it will not need as much coercion to 
maintain order. The less hegemonic it is, the more coercion is needed to 
maintain order. The new ruling class that emerged after the fall of the In-
fitah bloc needed increasing levels of coercion to maintain social order. 
This was expressed most clearly in the internal security forces becoming 
more powerful and more visible through all segments of society. Whereas 
previously it was usually Egyptians who were politically active or from 
marginalized groups that felt the brunt of police violence, by 2010 we see 
that almost all segments of society were now exposed to—at the very 
least—the threat of police violence. Policing became an increasingly visi-
ble mechanism of control. This indicates precisely how weak consent was 
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during this final decade preceding 2011. The moral and intellectual re-
forms this fraction needed to establish hegemony were lacking and thus 
their narrow interests were transparent. This transparency is precisely what 
sparked resistance from so many parts of society, from labour to political 
activists and professional syndicates. Indeed the 2010 parliamentary elec-
tion where the ruling party won with 99% of the vote was one of the piv-
otal moments where we see that this fraction was not even attempting to put 
on a show. It was precisely this transparency and lack of effort on the part 
of this fraction that angered many Egyptians who became politicized as a 
result. Because of this increasing anger and resistance, more coercion was 
needed. The Ministry of Interior became a powerhouse because of how 
reliant the new fraction was on it. Indeed it was no coincidence that the 
revolution began on January 25—the day Egyptians were supposed to 
have been celebrating the police. 
 Related to coercion and consent is the question of stability and le-
gitimacy. Perhaps there was no clearer lesson the new fraction of capital 
could have learned from the Infitah bloc than the one learned by Sadat 
following the 1977 bread riots. While the ultimate goal of any historic bloc 
is capital accumulation, there is always a political question that needs to be 
addressed—the question of legitimacy. In other words, there must be 
some level of stability in the relation between capital and labour, and this 
is achieved through legitimacy. Once this legitimacy is destroyed because 
labour’s conditions are deteriorating too rapidly, stability comes under 
threat. The accelerated neoliberalization put in place by the new fraction 
of capital ultimately required a dramatic deregulation of labour. Disciplin-
ing workers through increased flexibility, harsher working conditions and 
lower salaries/fewer bonuses were some of the ways this happened. In 
response there was a rapid rise in strikes to counteract these measures. 
Many of these strikes explicitly targeted privatization and saw it as the rea-
son so many laws negatively affecting workers were being passed. It is 
precisely this new fraction that adopted accelerated privatization as its 
main measure of accelerating neoliberalization. Workers often made ref-
erences to the Nasser era and thus to a bloc that was seen as pro-labour, 
as opposed to the current ruling class that simply wanted to make profit. 
Indeed from the Infitah bloc onwards we see that the ruling class was in-
creasingly seen as being driven solely by profit, and not development. This 
demonstrates the increasing failure of dominant fractions of capital to 
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transcend their narrow interests—which were indeed centered around 
profit—in order to form strong blocs. 
 
6.1.2 Private and Public 
 
The second dialectic is that between the private and the public sphere. 
The new fraction of capital did not only come up against resistance from 
workers and society at large, but also from one other fraction within the 
ruling class that was to eventually remove them from power: the military. 
It is key that the new accumulation strategy—accelerated neoliberaliza-
tion—clashed with the military’s history legacy of accumulating through 
the public sector. Privatization was one of the central mechanisms through 
which this new fraction accumulated capital. Even under the Infitah bloc 
we do not see the levels of privatization that we see from 2004 onwards, 
when Ahmed Nazif becomes Prime Minister. This surely had an effect on 
the relationship between this new fraction and the military, whose assets 
and investments tended to be concentrated in the public sector. As more 
of the public sector got privatized, the more this new fraction became a 
threat to the military’s own accumulation. This partly explains why in 2011 
the military so willingly sacrificed Hosni Mubarak, and with him this entire 
fraction of capital. This was necessary in order to both save the ruling class 
itself—a class the military was a part of, after all—as well as to prevent the 
further consolidation of this new fraction’s strategy of accumulation—ac-
celerated neoliberalization. By the end of the revolution we see that the 
ruling class remained the same, but with this new fraction no longer dom-
inant and with the military at the center. 
 
6.1.3 Productive and Unproductive Capital 
 
The final nail in the coffin for this fraction of capital was that it presided 
over the end-point of a transition that began under the Infitah bloc. It was 
under this bloc that we see a transition whereby the base of Egypt’s econ-
omy changes from being productive to being financial. In other words, by 
2011 we see that finance capital is the determining force in Egypt’s econ-
omy. This shift began under the Infitah bloc but was consolidated by the 
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fraction that emerged after this bloc declined. Foreign capital became a 
cornerstone of Egypt’s economy, and in particular Gulf capital—by 2011, 
few major companies in Egypt were not at least partly owned by Gulf 
businessmen. This brought with it a ruling class that was very much West-
ernized. As mentioned throughout, a strong presence of foreign capital 
was always accompanied by norms and dispositions among the elite that 
mirrored a cosmopolitan and global ruling elite. This was a far cry from 
the Nasserist bloc, when elites focused on Arab and Islamic identity and 
national cultural norms. But arguably the biggest shift we see from the 
Nasserist bloc to the final ruling class is from a focus on productive capital 
to unproductive capital. The ultimate aim of the Nasserist bloc had been 
industrialization and nationalization, in an attempt to give Egypt auton-
omy over its economy. Nasser ultimately did not succeed, and this was 
largely due to the global structural impediments as well as to the emer-
gence of the very social forces that would create the new Infitah bloc. The 
new bloc took Egypt in a very different direction: it was to be finance 
capital that would create a new class of millionaire businessmen, whose 
aim was profit alone. While this bloc was able to transcend this interest in 
order to create a bloc and hegemony, the ruling class that came after it was 
not. 
 
6.2 Time and Production 
 
To return to the title of this dissertation—the old is dying and the new 
is not yet born—I suggest that the ‘old’ was the Infitah bloc and the new—
that was not born—was a new historic bloc to replace it. The ultimate 
reason 2011 happened when it did was that the contradictions of Egypt’s 
accumulation structure had become overbearing, and there was no historic 
bloc in place to resolve them or to at least maintain a synthetic level of 
stability. Two events in 2010—the heavily rigged parliamentary elections 
and the murder of Khaled Said by the police—both made it clear that the 
new ruling class was not interested in transcending its narrow interests in 
order to maintain a façade of national development. This meant that ulti-
mately it did not form a bloc nor hegemony—the only two things that 
could have prevented what was initially an uprising demanding reforms 
turning into a full-blown revolution that restructured the ruling class.  
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 Throughout this dissertation I have used the concepts of time and 
production to analyse the rise and fall of different ruling classes and his-
toric blocs. A key claim I have made is that not every era is characterized 
by a historic bloc—many are simply represented by a ruling class. Another 
claim I have made is that not all historic blocs are equal: some are more 
hegemonic than others. Along this line, I have tried to find out what made 
the Nasserist bloc as hegemonic as it was, and found that it was the most 
successful at disseminating moral and intellectual reforms and thus had 
the largest historic bloc, with multiple fractions of capital and labour. As 
time goes by, we see that the historic bloc decreases in size until 2011, 
when we have no bloc in place.  
 The concept of production, understand through neo-Gramscian 
theory, has allowed me to trace ruling classes and historic blocs through 
changes in Egypt’s accumulation structure. This has led me to argue that 
Egyptian history should not be understood through the conventional the-
matic eras of Nasser—Sadat—Mubarak, whereby their years in power in-
dicate separate and distinct eras. Instead, if we take production as our 
starting point, we come to a very different understanding of time. We see 
that the Nasserist historic bloc ended in the mid-1960s and the Infitah bloc 
began soon after this, following a very brief period of trasformismo. Simi-
larly, the Infitah bloc only ended in the mid-1990s, after which we have a 
similar period of trasformismo and then the rise of a new fraction of capital 
and a new configuration within the ruling class.  
 The concept of time has been key in tracing and understanding the 
shifts between the different ruling classes and blocs, as well as in uncov-
ering patterns and repetitions, as well as disjunctures and breaks between 
the different eras. Because time was always connected to production, I was 
able to reconceptualize Egypt’s history and reorganize it according to 
changes in production. The dissertation has tried to show that starting 
with the Nasserist historic bloc, we see a diminishing level of hegemony. 
The Nasserist bloc represents Egypt’s strongest bloc as well as strongest 
instance of hegemony. The Infitah bloc was hegemonic, but less so, and 
thus we see the beginning of a decline in hegemony. By the time we get to 
2011, there is no hegemony or historic bloc to speak of. The changing 
nature of hegemony shows why time is so crucial to this project. It is only 
through analysing the cumulative aspect of hegemony and historic blocs that 
we can ultimately understand the 2011 revolution. It is not simply about 
the failure of the financial fraction of capital to form a bloc in the 2000s 
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that matters, but about how this was the pinnacle of a series of events, and 
the end point of the cumulative and incremental changes happening within 
hegemony and historic blocs from the late 1800s. Historical trajectories 
are key, but not in a linear sense. Although each bloc is related to the ones 
around it in time, there is not a linear progression that we can speak of. 
Ultimately, the question this dissertation tried to answer is one related to 
time: why 2011? It was only by connecting time and production that I was 
able to answer this. 
 
6.3 The Rise and Fall of Historic Blocs 
 
 The main contention of this dissertation was to trace the rise and fall 
of historic blocs in modern Egyptian history in order to answer the ques-
tion of why the 2011 revolution happened when it did. A historic bloc is 
the structure and superstructure forming a unity, and includes the state 
and civil society. It is not simply an alliance, but rather a condition to be 
achieved, and is comprised of both fractions of capital and fractions of 
labour that are tied together in a hegemonic project developed by the dom-
inant elements of the ruling class. These elements must transcend their 
narrow interests through moral and intellectual reforms in order to estab-
lish a historic bloc. This is the key: the transcending of narrow interests to 
form a hegemonic project that convinces major fractions of capital and 
labour to be part of the bloc. 
 In Chapter Three I argued that we cannot speak of a historic bloc be-
fore 1952 because the formula of consent-coercion cannot exist in a colo-
nial situation, either under the Ottomans nor under the British. Colonial-
ism is a condition of coercion, even when masked through consent, and 
thus while there were several ruling classes in place before 1952, these did 
not form a historic bloc at any point. The narrow interests of the colonial 
rulers were not transcended in the Egyptian case, and there was no hege-
monic project to speak of. 
 1952 saw the formation of Egypt’s strongest historic bloc. We see this 
in the ability of Nasser and the Free Officers to transcend their narrow 
interests—capital accumulation through the state and military domination 
of the economic and political spheres—through moral and intellectual re-
forms—anti-colonialism, nationalism, pan-Arabism, social welfare—and 
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create a hegemonic project that provided material changes to the majority 
of Egyptians, and that convinced all major fractions of capital and labour 
to join the bloc. Chapter Three has detailed both the narrow interests of 
the dominant fraction of capital, as well as the reforms they put in place 
to expand their historic bloc. The chapter ends by discussing the organic 
crisis—1967—that led to the fall of this bloc. We know that this bloc de-
clined because new social forces with a contrary set of narrow interests 
began to call for a different hegemonic project. 
 These new social forces are the subject of Chapter Four. I argue that 
the new dominant fraction of capital, in favour of economic liberalization 
through free-market capitalism, was able to construct a historic bloc by 
transcending these narrow interests. However this bloc was weaker than 
the previous one because it was smaller: while the bloc did include most 
major fractions of capital and many fractions of labour, it did not include 
all of them, as the Nasserist bloc had. Labour in particular was undergoing 
a transition at this point, and thus we see the beginnings of the resistance 
towards neoliberalism. Thus we know that this new dominant fraction 
convinced many fractions of capital and some fractions of labour that the 
market liberalization project was Egypt’s only way forward—thus success-
fully creating a historic bloc—but we also know that this hegemony was 
not as strong as the Nasserist bloc’s hegemony had been. 
 This became clear when it did not even take an organic crisis to bring 
about the decline of this bloc. Hosni Mubarak attempted to save the bloc 
when he took power, but ultimately failed. By the 1990s we see a new 
dominant fraction of capital emerge, characterized by the narrow interests 
of accelerated neoliberalization. This dominant fraction, however, did not 
transcend these narrow interests and create a historic bloc; indeed by the 
2000s it is clear that most fractions of capital and all fractions of labour 
were against this dominant fraction. This failure means that there was no 
historic bloc in place for much of the 1990s and all of the 2000s. It is this 
absence that ultimately explains why the 2011 revolution happened: there 
was no bloc in place to either avoid the deteriorating economic and polit-
ical conditions that led to the revolution, nor to control the demonstra-
tions once they began. Neither trasformismo nor a passive revolution was 
possible by the financial fraction of capital, which is why post-2011 we see 
the emergence of a new dominant fraction—the military—who did suc-
ceed in establishing a historic bloc in 2013. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
The overarching objective of this dissertation was to propose an an-
swer to the question of why the 2011 Egyptian revolution happened when 
it did. I have done this by using both Gramscian and neo-Gramscian the-
oretical concepts and by using time and production as key explanatory 
variables. I believe this dissertation has answered the research questions 
highlighted in chapters one and two adequately, and these answers have 
been highlighted above. It was my aim to trace the ruling class, subaltern 
classes, and the historic bloc—or lack thereof—throughout different eras, 
and I believe that this is the dissertation’s major contribution. By tracing 
historic blocs, I have been able to demonstrate the ways in which hegem-
ony was created and undone, as well as the ways in which it was resisted. 
I have also suggested alternative historical eras in understanding Egyptian 
history, eras that are delineated through changes in social forces and blocs. 
 Both Gramsci and the neo-Gramscians I have used proved to be 
enlightening and useful in exploring this topic. Although the Amsterdam 
and Nottingham schools were key to my analysis, I went beyond them by 
looking at the particular connections between Egypt and the international 
system through my analysis of the cumulative nature of historic blocs.  
 Historical materialism’s focus on both time and production as well 
as the rich concepts of the historic bloc and hegemony were instrumental 
in providing a fresh take on the 2011 Egyptian revolution. While much 
work has looked at the revolution, the answer of why it happened when it 
did has not been explored thoroughly. This work has suggested a way of 
looking at elites and subaltern classes as part of one whole, and has high-
lighted the dialectical relationship between these forces. This work has also 
emphasized the centrality of the mode of production to Egyptian history, 
and it is my hope that this also becomes central to Egyptian historiog-
raphy. The story of the revolution has been told in many ways. Above all, 
what I have put forward here is the suggestion that capitalism, class, 
power, and history should always be included in any story about the Egyp-
tian revolution.
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